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¿Qué es la vida? Un frenesí. ¿Qué es la vida? Una ilusión, 
Una sombra, una ficción, y el mayor bien es pequeño. 
¡Que toda la vida es sueño, y los sueños, sueños son! 




Reach for the answer 
Take your chances and taste the pain 
Open up your mind, don't trust your senses  
You have been blind 
Awaken the sleeper 
Dig down deeper and break the chain 
Let the truth flood in, tear down your fences 
The search begins… 
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I offer a novel reading in this dissertation of René Descartes’s (1596–1650) skepticism 
in his work Meditations on First Philosophy (1641–1642). I specifically aim to answer the 
following problem: How is Descartes’s skepticism to be read in accordance with the 
rest of his philosophy? This problem can be divided into two more general questions in 
Descartes scholarship: How is skepticism utilized in the Meditations, and what are its 
intentions and relation to the preceding philosophical tradition? 
I approach the topic from both a historical and a text-based analysis, combining 
textual and contextual research. I examine Descartes’s skepticism against two main 
traditions in the historical analysis: philosophical skepticism and Aristotelian 
Scholasticism. I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is intended to oppose and 
upheave both Scholasticism and skepticism. The intended results of the work are not 
merely epistemological but also metaphysical and even ethical. Furthermore, these 
ambitions cannot be neatly distinguished but merge into each other. 
The third historical context against which the skeptical meditations are examined is 
the literary genre of meditative exercises, particularly from the 1500–1600’s, which, 
while religiously and spiritually oriented, likewise provided the practitioner with an 
enlightened understanding of self-knowledge and their cognitive place in the world on 
the way to closer spiritual proximity to God. I argue by this reading that the skepticism 
of the Meditations is an attentive, meditational cognitive exercise that is not merely 
instrumental and methodological but is to have a genuine and serious (psychologically 
real) effect on our thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a theoretical thought 
experiment but is to be seriously practiced as a transformative process of reorienting 
one’s cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, tranquil, 
and virtuous life. 
I offer a close reading in the textual analysis of the first three meditations of the 
Meditations. I argue that the meditative skepticism employed in the work does not reject 
the previous beliefs but suspends judgment on them, withdrawing assent until further 
evidence can be found. I introduce a new term into Descartes scholarship in this 
analysis, based on the terminology of ancient skepticism: Cartesian epochē (gr. epochē, 
suspension, withdrawal). Instead of rejecting previous beliefs or assenting to the 
probably false, the skeptical procedure of the Meditations is argued to emulate in 
important ways the suspension of judgment on equally balanced reasons in ancient 
Pyrrhonian skepticism. Novel interpretations are presented along the way of the will’s 
freedom, of the First Meditation’s skeptical scenarios, of the cogito, and of the vindication 
of metaphysical certainty, as well as a clarification of the Cartesian Circle problem. 
x 
Reinterpreting the relation of Descartes’s skepticism to the preceding historical and 
literary traditions leads to a new look at the skeptical method itself. Presenting a new 
interpretation of skepticism in the Meditations leads at the same time to a new look at its 
relation to the historical context. The two research questions are, then, intrinsically tied 
together. 
My focus in the study is on the Meditations, but I also reference and discuss 
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1. Introduction: Before the Meditations 
René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy is a truly influential and revolutionary 
work, transforming the way philosophers both then and now approach epistemological 
and metaphysical issues. Its most famous aspects are the skeptical inquiry by the method 
of doubt, seeking an unprejudiced fresh start while undermining skepticism, and the 
rational foundationalist metaphysics, discarding Aristotelian Scholasticism while making 
way for the period’s New Science. Many books and studies have been written about 
these topics, yet there is a remarkable absence of systematic reading against both the 
skeptical and Scholastic traditions. Studies tend to make a choice, focusing either on 
Descartes’s metaphysical project and cognitive theory (e.g., M. Wilson 1978; Carriero 
2009), reading them against Scholastic doctrine, or on skeptically driven epistemology 
and the method of doubt (e.g., E. Curley 1978; Broughton 2002), reading them against 
skeptical history. 
However, these areas are not separate. Descartes’s use of skepticism is closely 
connected with his metaphysical and cognitive projects, aiming to overturn both 
Scholasticism and skepticism. In this book, I will fill this gap in the research literature 
by reading both anti-skeptical and anti-Scholastic positions side by side while combining 
them with an understanding of Descartes’s method of doubt as a meditative skeptical 
exercise. In the latter aspect, specifically, I draw from the historical genre of spiritual 
exercises, or meditations, prominent especially in the 16th and 17th century, that formed a 
part of the religious-cultural background of the period when Descartes wrote.  
The dissertation presents a novel interpretation of Descartes’s skeptical method in 
the Meditations, basing it on a close textual and contextual reading of the work and the 
surrounding tradition. I argue the skeptical enquiry to be a serious effort to overcome 
both the Aristotelian-Scholastic cognitive framework and skeptical tradition, with 
intended metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical results.  
Before getting to the core reading, I chart certain initiative topics in this introductory 
chapter. I begin by mapping previous key interpretations of Descartes’s skeptical 
procedure and relation to skeptical and Aristotelian tradition. Next, I present my own 
take, first by advancing a reading of the skeptical inquiry as a cognitive exercise against 
the historical background of the meditative literature of 1500–1600’s, and then by 
discussing how such a reading leads us to take the skeptical inquiry sincerely: not just as 
a tool, a form of play-acting, but a genuine exercise requiring practice and effort. I finish 




1.1. Earlier Readings  
It is impossible when writing about the history of interpretations of Descartes and 
skepticism, to overlook the influence of Richard Popkin, whose work on the history of 
skepticism (1960; 2003) has perhaps contributed more to the handling of the issue than 
any other work. Before Popkin, Descartes’s relation to, and use of, skepticism was rarely 
discussed; the common consensus saw him seek distance and liberation from Medieval 
Scholastic oppression to make way for the New Science (e.g., Gilson 1951; cf. Sebba 
1964; Lennon 2008, 56; but see Dambska 1950; Gouhier 1954; 1958). What Popkin did 
was to take more seriously Descartes’s own comments and concerns about skepticism, 
especially Renaissance skepticism, paying attention to statements of having overcome 
“the suppositions of the sceptics” with his philosophy (e.g., Discourse: AT VII, 32; CSM 
II, 127). Instead of as an opponent of traditional dogmatism, Descartes became pictured 
as its fiercest proponent against the novelty of Renaissance thinking. Popkin even went 
as far as to suggest Descartes’s philosophy to be a reaction to a personal skeptical crisis 
suffered sometime around 1628–1629. However, according to Popkin, despite his best 
efforts, Descartes failed to slay the dragon of skepticism due to his philosophy being so 
skeptically inclined from the very beginning: He ended up a skeptic malgré lui. 
Most of Popkin’s claims have been questioned by later research (see chapters 2.4 and 
2.5), but his influence was strong. Following Popkin, readings continued to take 
seriously Descartes’s own claims of conquering skepticism, considering his aim with the 
Meditations to be to irredeemably refute skeptical thought that formed a threat or even a 
crisis at the period of the work’s writing. If he failed at the task, it was typically due to 
the arguments for God’s existence and the veracity of clear and distinct perception being 
viciously circular. (E.g., Gouhier 1999; 1972; E. Curley 1978; Gilson 1987.) 
Nevertheless, while the claims for targeting skepticism were taken seriously, the use 
of skepticism itself was not. Cartesian skepticism was typically taken as a sort of sham: 
something ungenuine, not to be taken too serious, and abandoned as soon as possible. 
This sort of reading was often sought in order to distinguish Descartes’s modern 
‘methodological’ skepticism from ancient skepticism as ‘a way of life’ (Burnyeat 1982; 
1997; Annas & Barnes 1985; M. Williams 1986; Grene 1999). Instead of helping to live 
a practical life, skepticism is to be insulated from it – to be used only as means to an end, 
an epistemological instrument, for certain knowledge. One would know from the 
beginning the skeptical inquiry to be mere pretention, not a serious and genuine 
discarding of belief. Descartes’s position at the end of the First Meditation is one of 
rejecting the previous beliefs and affirming the probably false, with the doubt being a kind 
of play-acting, a mind-game of sorts (Gueroult 1953; Kenny 1968; Larmore 1998; 2006; 
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2014; Newman 2019). Cartesian skepticism has been called “innocuously thin and 
undisruptive”, leaving us “provisionally, with a shadow of a doubt or unease”, and even 
considered “inappropriate” to be described as skepticism, and unnecessary to be 
conjoined with the skeptical tradition (Frankfurt 2008, 20–23; M. Wilson 1978, 26, 33; 
Brandhorst 2010, 21). Even scholars who consider the doubt to be in part serious and 
well-founded still refer to it as a “tool” and concentrate on its methodical aspect (B. 
Williams 2015; 1983; Broughton 2002). 
However, if the ‘skepticism’ of the Meditations is a sort of sham, is it even deliberately 
set to answer skeptical thinking? Several scholars have challenged the previously 
common interpretation of Descartes as an epistemologist concerned with skeptical 
issues, reading him instead as a metaphysician interested in the role and function of the 
human mind in the world or propagating his own scientific views and interests (e.g., 
Gaukroger 1995; Alanen 2003; Carriero 1997; 2009; Christofidou 2013). 
This change in the literature has come simultaneously with what could be considered 
two of the most major advances in contemporary Descartes studies: the directness of 
cognitive access and the questioning of immediate transparency of thought or 
‘consciousness’. Instead of considering Descartes as trying to reach the world behind a 
‘veil of ideas’, various major accounts read him as sharing with his Scholastic 
predecessors “the basic tenet that cognition involves a common reality, form, or 
structure existing both in the mind (“objectively”) and in the world (“formally”), even 
at the level of sensory cognition” (Carriero 2009, 21). Descartes’s cognitive theory 
would not be indirect – imprisoned to grasp mere representations of things – but direct, 
able to grasp the things themselves through their reality existing objectively in the 
cognitive act. (Alanen 2003; Broughton 2008; Carriero 2009; Sinokki 2015.1) As such, 
the next to unanimous essentiality of transparent conscious experience has likewise been 
challenged by concentrating on the relational aspect of Cartesian cognition: Awareness 
is seen as “a mark of thought or the mental” but not constitutive of it (Alanen 2003, 
82). Instead of being the “High-Priest of Transparency” (Paul 2018), Descartes sees our 
cognition to be obscure and confused for most of the time, and though some of our 
cognition can be transparent, we must do a lot of cognitive and meditative work to 
cleanse that lucidity out. (See Barth & Lähteenmäki 2020, 2–3; cf. Rozemond 2006; 
Lähteenmäki 2007; Barth 2011; 2017; Hatfield 2011; Simmons 2012; Forsman 2019.) 
These advancements have also affected the view of Descartes’s handling of 
skepticism. A strong consensus lately is to read Descartes as not really bothered by the 
skeptics and using skeptical doubt merely as means to an end for his scientific and 
 
1 Using Sinokki’s analogy, by coming into contact with, say, the Eiffel tower, it infects us with its reality like 
a virus, copying its being into our thinking (2015, 3). 
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metaphysical work, specifically in bringing down the Aristotelian edifice. Descartes 
would not be truly interested in the skepticism he uses, having no genuine or serious 
treatment of it but seeing it rather as a methodical tool. David MacArthur expresses 
Descartes to be seen “more concerned to establish the metaphysical and epistemological 
foundations of the new mathematical physics than he is to answer the skeptic” (2003, 
160). Or, as John Carriero puts, “excessive focus on skepticism – in particular a 
misunderstanding of what Descartes is using the skepticism for – has distorted our 
understanding of his thought” (2009, 3). Descartes was not only a skeptic, but his 
interest in and concern about skepticism, as well as willingness to answer or refute it is 
also, pardon the pun, called into doubt. (E.g., Garber 1986; 1992; Graukroger 1995; 
Carriero 1997; 2009; Grene 1999; Kambouchner 2005; Clarke 2005; Lennon 2008.) 
Two arguments have particularly been raised against Descartes’s refutation of the 
skeptical tradition. (1) There appears to be no evidence of direct concern or even 
interest in skepticism in Descartes’s works and letters before the condemnation of 
Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) in 1633. Until then, he had been preparing the  World, his 
treatise on physics, for publication in the United Provinces of the Netherlands, but after 
hearing that Galileo had been convicted for establishing that Earth circumnavigates the 
sun, was so astonished he “almost decided to burn all [his] papers” (Letter to Mersenne, 
End of November 1633: AT I, 270–271; CSMK, 40–41). The Galileo incident would 
have made Descartes worried about the acceptance of his scientific theories, prompting 
him to change tactics with the publications of the Discourse and Meditations and to use 
skepticism as a presuppositionless way to insinuate the metaphysical underpinnings of 
his mechanistic and corpuscularian worldview that would overcome and replace 
Aristotelianism. (Loeb 1986, 263–264; Gaukroger 1995, 11–12, 184–186; 2008, 12–14.) 
(2) If Descartes is primarily concerned with refuting skepticism, why does not he ever 
say so? Descartes would consider the skeptics a lost cause instead of as a serious threat, 
claiming to refute them when pressured about being a skeptic himself and, even then, 
not due to epistemological or scientific but to moral reasons, forbearing to demonstrate 
a bad example. (Lennon 2008, 62–77.) His primary concern would be (scientific) 
certainty, with skepticism being merely a “tool” for gaining it. 
No doubt, one of Descartes’s motivations for skeptical utilization was methodical 
and tied to his interests in mechanistic, anti-Aristotelian science, and he indeed had 
reasons to be concerned about the reception of those views by the religious authorities 
at large. Being well-versed in the anti-Aristotelian scientific movement and influenced 
by the Dutch natural philosopher Isaac Beeckman (1588–1637), he drops the names of 
Bernardino Telesio (1509–1588), Giordano Bruno (1548–1600), Tommaso Campanella 
(1568–1639), Sébastien Basson (c. 1573–1625), and Lucilio Vanini (1585–1619) in a 
Introduction 
5 
Letter to Beeckman in 1630 (AT I, 158; CSMK, 27). He must have known that Telesio’s 
books were prohibited, Campanella was arrested by the Inquisition, Basson got into 
trouble with the theologians in Geneva, and Bruno and Vanini were executed. Later on, 
he warned Mersenne not to tell anyone of his plans to write a commentary on 
Eustachius a Sancto Paulo’s (1573–1640) Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita (1609) before 
the publication of the Meditations, as he feared it might hinder the approbation of the 
Faculty of Theology in Sorbonne for it. A few months later he warned the Minim not 
to let people know that it would contain “all the foundations of [his] physics” because 
it could make the Aristotelians less accepting (AT III, 233, 297–298; CSMK, 157, 173). 
Skepticism, then, probably did appeal to Descartes as a presuppositionless beginning 
for his scientific, Aristotelian critical foundations. (Cf. Broughton 2002, 10–13.)  
However, unlike what Gaukroger claims, one can also find evidence for skeptical 
worries in Descartes’s thought before the Galileo incident. Descartes returned to Paris 
in 1625, joining a circle of like-minded thinkers, many of whom were skeptically 
inclined. The city at the time was open to new ideas but, at the same time, dangerously 
protective of orthodoxy. Vanini had been burned at the stake six years earlier for 
libertinism (i.e., free-thinking), atheism, and suspected homosexual acts. Noted anti-
libertines connected the libertine movement with atheism and other morally suspect 
behavior, with a strong link also with skepticism (see chapter 2.5).2 Descartes was very 
familiar with the libertine and skeptical movements; his friends included both libertines 
and anti-libertines, although he later shed and vehemently denied whatever association 
he himself had with libertinism.3 
Descartes began several scientific treatises in Paris, among them early drafts of what 
would become Optics, Meteorology, and Geometrics, but left them unfinished due to being 
“forced to start a new project, rather larger than the first” and moved to the United 
Provinces in 1628. We do not know exactly what his “new, larger project” was but can 
draw conclusions from his allusions to metaphysical topics. Descartes was, at the time, 
likewise working on a draft of the Regulae, which included the thesis of only attending 
to those objects which the mind has certain and indubitable cognition by intuiting clearly 
and distinctly, a precursor of the doctrine of clear and distinct perceptions in the Discourse 
 
2 The definition of atheism was wider than today’s, covering almost all heterodoxy, like homosexuality and 
questioning of soul’s immortality. See Ariew 1998, 137; Gaukroger 1995, 135–138; Grayling 2006, 116–
122; Clarke 2006, 72–81. 
3 Gisbert Voetius and Martin Schoock accused Descartes of skepticism, atheism, and libertinism in 
Admiranda Methodus (1643), with thinly veiled sexual allusions by comparing him to Vanini. To say 
Descartes was unhappy would be an understatement (Letter to Voetius, May 1643: AT VIIIB, 169–175; 
CSMK, 223). Cf. Seventh Objections (AT VII, 528–531), Letter to Chanut, 1 November 1646 (AT IV, 
536; CSMK, 299), and Comments (AT VIIIB, 365–368; CSM I, 308–310). See Rodis-Lewis 1998, 207–209; 
Watson 2007, 226; Clarke 2006, 239–241. For Descartes and libertinism, see also Cook 2018. 
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and Meditations (AT X 362–370; CSM I, 10–15; cf. chapter 3.4). However, the draft was 
abandoned in 1628, published posthumously as a Dutch translation in 1684. I postulate 
that while working in the skeptically charged atmosphere, Descartes recognized a 
skeptical concern buried in making infallible intuitive cognition the main means to, and 
source of, certain knowledge, resulting in the need for more secure metaphysical basis 
for correct science (the larger project). Descartes talks in his 1630 correspondence with 
Mersenne not only of his work in physics but also of a “little treatise in Metaphysics” 
on which he worked the first nine months in Holland, set to prove “the existence of 
God and of our souls when they are separate from the body” in a manner “more evident 
than the proofs of geometry” (AT I, 144, 182; CSMK, 21–22, 29). 
This early metaphysical work is lost, so whether it already included skeptical inquiry 
is impossible to say, although the Letter to Mersenne, 27 February 1637, implies that 
the arguments of Part IV of the Discourse are condensed from the Latin treatise from 
eight years earlier (AT I, 350; CSMK, 53). However, I argue in a later chapter (2.5) that 
there is not much doubt about the use of these proofs in opposing atheistic skepticism. 
This opposition was ethically inclined, yet such moral issues cannot be set aside from 
the epistemological or metaphysical in the way Lennon does. Thus (contra Lennon 
2008), the issue is specifically about skepticism of an immoral and atheistic kind with a 
clear-cut distinction between epistemological and moral skepticism being forced and 
something Descartes cannot afford to make. Consequently (contra Loeb 1986; 
Gaukroger 1995; 2008), Descartes’s interest in skepticism would not be simply a means 
to an end to make his natural philosophy more acceptable; it rose over a long period 
and was partly motivated by his work in natural philosophy. If Galileo’s conviction 
changed anything, it was the order of the plan, not its execution. (Cf. E. Curley 1978, 37–
38; Rodis-Lewis 1998, 78; Alanen 2000, 259–261; Broughton 2002, 13.4 ) 
Filtering out other targets and intents of Descartes’s skeptical handling has been 
highly beneficial, yet part of the benefit has come at the cost of devaluing the impact of 
the skeptical movement and Descartes’s own concern over it. This concern might 
originate more from ethical issues and his own scientific and metaphysical work, but it 
is still identifiably there, motivating Descartes’s worry over the skeptical issue. 
Descartes’s relation to the skeptical tradition and his use of skepticism has been more 
positively featured in recent commentaries, not treating Cartesian skepticism as simply 
rejecting and considering everything previous as false but as actually suspending belief 
(e.g., Bermúdez 1997; Alanen 2000; Fine 2000; Broughton 2002; MacArthur 2003; 
 
4 In chapter 3.4, I connect the problem of skepticism with Descartes’s doctrine of God’s created eternal 
truths, discovered before 1630 and included in the early stages in his “treatise on physics” because he 
“would not have been able to discover the foundations of physics” had he not “looked for them along 
that [metaphysical] road” (AT I,145; CSMK, 22–23). 
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Paganini 2008a; 2008b; Christofidou 2013; Maia Neto 2015). However, there is still a 
call for a coherent reading that brings the anti-skeptical, anti-Aristotelian, and pro-
scientific aspects into a single frame. 
1.2. Reading the Meditations as a Cognitive Exercise 
Descartes offers three reasons in the Third Replies for the use of the skeptical doubt: 
(1) to prepare the readers’ minds “for the study of the things which are related to the 
intellect” and help them distinguish these from corporeal things; (2) to “reply to them 
in the subsequent Meditations”; and (3) to “show the firmness of the truths” that he 
propounds later on, in “the light of the fact that they cannot be shaken by these 
metaphysical doubts” (AT VII, 171–172; CSM II, 121). Reason (1) is targeted at the 
Aristotelian view of cognition, (2) is seemingly targeted at the skeptical tradition, while 
(3) is a continuation of the first two, demonstrating how Descartes’s natural philosophy 
is to be preferred over all the competing theories because of its firmness and certainty. 
Secondary literature, as mentioned, usually takes into account all of these reasons 
but rarely simultaneously. Most readings of Descartes tend to emphasise one of the 
reasons over the others. This is surprising, given Descartes’s comments on both 
Aristotelianism and skeptical philosophy. His Preface to the French edition of Principia 
(henceforth the French Preface) identifies philosophy prior to him as a dispute between 
disciples of Plato (the skeptics) and Aristotle (the Scholastics), seeing the main debate 
among them as “whether everything should be called into doubt or whether there were 
some things which were certain” and considering both sides to have led to “extravagant 
errors”. “Some of those who were in favour of doubt extended it even to the actions of 
life, so that they neglected to employ common prudence in their behaviour; while those 
who took the side of certainty supposed that it had to depend on the senses and trusted 
them entirely…”. (AT IXB, 5–7; CSM I, 181–182.) Descartes’s own assessment is that 
the truth lies “midway between [these] two positions” which, surprisingly enough, is 
also the position that the Sixth Meditation posits:  
[B]eginning to achieve a better recognition (nosse) of myself and the author of my being, 
although I do not think I should heedlessly accept everything I seem to have acquired 
from the senses, neither do I think that everything should be called into doubt (AT VII, 
77–78; CSM II, 54). 
It is easy to see how these three motives come together. Descartes wants to build a 
solid ground for science, but such ground cannot be found from science itself. One 
must go over scientific observation to the function and limits of understanding and 
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judgment to find this sort of absolute (or, as Descartes also puts it, metaphysical) 
certainty. Descartes aims to overturn both the Scholastic-Aristotelian doctrine and the 
skeptical philosophical tradition with his own Cartesian skepticism – the skeptical phase 
one must go through in the Meditations to discover the metaphysical foundations of 
Cartesian science. The use of the skeptical method is, then, therapeutic – correcting our 
cognitive errors as though treating an illness (AT VII, 172, 573–574; CSM II, 121, 387). 
Cartesian skepticism does, then,, have a methodic aspect; however, due to Descartes’s 
skeptical motivations independent of Aristotelian or skeptical onslaught, the skeptical 
arguments cannot be considered simply as instrumental but as having sincere and genuine 
application. (Cf. B. Williams 1983; Alanen 2000, 259.) 
A major reason why the serious and genuine aspect of Cartesian skepticism has not 
been sufficiently recognised is an incomplete understanding of the Meditations as the text 
of a meditative cognitive exercise. Now, reading the work as a therapeutic mental exercise 
does have a long tradition (e.g., Alquié 1950; Gilson 1951; Gouhier 1999; Frankfurt 
2008; Kosman 1986; Hatfield 1985; 1986; Garber 1986; Cunning 2010; Secada 2013; 
Schüssler 2013; Wagner 2014; Vitz 2015). More structural argumentative readings are 
still not uncommon (e.g., Almog 2002; Larmore 2006; 2014; Rubin 2008; Dicker 2013) 
but an approach to the text as an exercise to be practiced instead of a cohesive argument 
to be followed, is beginning to be more or less accepted across the board. Nevertheless, 
I argue that all the implications have not yet been fully explored. Likewise, recent 
discoveries in the 16th and 17th century meditative tradition force us to re-evaluate 
Descartes’s drawing from, and the Meditations as a text inside, the literary genre in 
question. I begin this evaluation with a short historical introduction to the topic before 
moving on to discuss the consequences such a reading has for the skeptical enquiry. 
1.2.1. Meditative Tradition 
Meditation (from meditārī, to reflect, to contemplate, to practice) forms an important 
and evolving tradition of attentive, spiritual exercises in the western Catholic history. 
Religious meditation typically involves learning to turn one’s attention onto God by a 
series of mental steps and practices done in solitary contemplation, often with the 
guidance of a written word or manual. The guide text could be a passage of scripture, 
like in Lectio Divina, a manner of reading in which a biblical passage is read and meditated 
on, becoming a sort of prayer, or, as was typical during Baroque Scholasticism (1500–
1600’s), a written meditative record of a solitary thinker in the form of a first-person 
narration, whose place the reader would occupy. (See Mercer 2014, 27; Vitz 2015, 16.) 
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St. Augustine’s (354–430) Confessions (c. 397–400) is the single most influential text 
in the meditative tradition. Following a mostly (neo-)Platonic example, the work is part 
autobiography, part private intellectual meditation on God and human corruption, in 
which Augustine invokes his decades-long search for truth and enlightenment. It 
influenced a series of similar meditative works that encouraged self-improvement and 
intellectual attainment of God, such as St. Anselm of Canterbury’s (c. 1033–1109) 
Monologion or Exemplum Meditandi de Ratione Fidei (1075–1076). 
Following a period of meditative practices loosely based on Augustinian ideas, the 
12th century saw the rise of more systematic meditative exercises, explicating 
contemplative steps on the faculties of memory, imagination, intellect, and will. 
However, with the influence of Aristotelian cognitive theory on Medieval Scholasticism, 
an intellectual grasp of God became less emphasised because direct cognitive access to 
divinity was considered impossible. Instead, the faculty of imagination became 
particularly important for spiritual meditation, the goal being to imagine the emotional 
reality of Christ’s suffering as vividly as possible to genuinely feel it as psychologically real. 
Certain exercises also instructed the practitioner to meditate intensely for brief periods, 
punctuated with periods of rest. (See Hatfield 1985; 1986, 48; Mercer 2014, 27–29.) 
Catholic theologians began to evolve significant changes in spiritual practices in the 
1500’s, on the heels of the Protestant Reformation, when proper development and 
following innovative teachers were promoted. One such spiritual leader was Ignatius de 
Loyola (c. 1449–1556), founder of the Jesuits and the writer of Spiritual Exercises 
(Exercitia spiritualia, 1548). The work is a set of meditative exercises, divided into four 
thematic weeks, intended to cultivate the “three powers” – memory (including 
imagination), understanding, and the will – of the participants at religious retreats to 
join their wills in union with God’s will. The Ignatian meditation differs from the 
Augustinian due to the Aristotelian cognitive basis but it likewise features turning away 
from the senses as a major component. Imagination is used to draw attention to various 
canonical matters, and understanding to draw implications from experience, raising 
affections in the will and strengthening its resolve. Part of the Exercises are written in 
the second-person, in the form of a director who leads he meditation, and part are in the 
first-person, in the form of an exercitant who practices them. The reader is intended to 
read the author’s instructions (second-person parts), and then undertake the role of the 
exercitant (first-person parts) and meditate accordingly (e.g., ES: I, i, pr. 1). (See Hatfield 
1985; 1986, 48–49; Mercer 2014, 29; 2017; Vitz 2015, 17–18.) 
Much of the previous attention on the meditative form of the Meditations has been 
directed towards comparisons of Descartes’s cognitive with Loyola’s spiritual exercises 
(e.g., Hatfield 1985; 1986; Vitz 2015). Descartes was an alumnus of the Jesuit School La 
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Flèche, so there is no doubt he was familiar with Loyola’s work and likely had meditated 
along with it several times himself. There are similarities between the two texts, most of 
them probably intentional, but also striking differences, which has made certain scholars 
question the direct influence of the Ignatian model on the Meditations. Descartes’s 
exercise follows more in the intellectual Augustinian path and while imagining is used 
to direct the attention towards certain psychologically real states (see chapter 4.5), it is 
emphasised far less. It is possible to distinguish the voice of an ‘author’ from the voice 
of a ‘meditator’, yet there are no second-person instructions found, so this difference is 
much more subtle. Augustine’s Confessions is another clear influence (Hatfield 1985; 
1986; Menn 1998), yet the Meditations traces more faithfully in the meditative exercise 
model of the time. Thus, there are reasons to expect Descartes to have had some other 
meditative work as an example for the Meditations than simply Loyola’s and Augustine’s. 
One of the historically interesting features of the reformed spiritual exercises leading 
up to the 16th century was that they were increasingly being written by women. In the 
Catholic efforts to promote spiritual teachers in the face of Protestant revolution, one 
of these teachers was a Spanish Carmelite nun, Teresa of Ávila (1515–1582), whose 
writings, particularly the Interior Castle (El Castillo Interior, 1588) became widely known 
and translated into several European languages, including Latin and French. Divided 
into seven parts, called Mansions, the work compares the human soul to a perfect castle 
through which the “seeker” is required to wander by the means of a meditative exercise 
to experience a mystical union with God. Like many other meditative works of the 
period, the Castillo has the meditation’s author share advice on how to acquire more 
accurate knowledge of the self and become increasingly familiar with divinity. What sets 
Teresa’s work apart though, is its psychological subtlety and intimacy, mixing personal 
struggles with analytical clarity in spiritual improvement. There are, likewise, several key 
similarities between the Castillo and the Meditations that hint towards a rather large 
influence by Teresa on Descartes. 
No direct evidence exists that Descartes had read the Castillo but Teresa’s large 
recognition and particular reverence among the Jesuits make it highly probable. Written 
solely in the first person, the Castillo offers a closer comparison with Descartes’s own 
meditative exercise than either Loyola or Augustine. Both Teresa and Descartes urge 
turning away from external sensory matters, emphasise the arduousness of the 
meditative journey, and, maybe most importantly, have their meditators struggle with 
customary concerns forcing their way in and face off against deceiving demonic powers. 
Teresa, like Decartes also sees proper self-knowledge as an entryway to better 
knowledge of God. (Castillo I, ii, 9; II, i, 1–8; see Mercer 2014, 34–35; 2017.) 
Introduction 
11 
Looking at previous meditative exercises can help us understand the Meditations as a 
text in a literary tradition. However, we must be careful not to force the comparison too 
far. Descartes is not after a religious experience similar to the Medieval and Baroque 
meditations and we ought not to take his examples of demons as literally as Teresa’s 
(see chapter 4.5). Most likely Descartes took full advantage of the available resources of 
imagined physical realities containing deceiving demons, and his use of them in similar 
passages of the Meditations gives his audience clues what to do (see Mercer 2014, 35; 
2017).5 We also should not underestimate the closeness of metaphysical knowledge to 
a spiritual experience in the tradition Descartes is working in.  Still, many comparisons 
between Descartes and earlier texts miss the mark by trying to force similarities in the 
contents and the forms of the exercise.6 We should take the meditative genre as a guide 
to understanding the Meditations instead of interpreting them as bending to the form of 
the genre. Such an understanding imposes certain requirements on our reading. The 
purpose of a meditational text, like a book on physical exercise, is partly lost unless the 
reader does the exercise. We do not read a book on practicing yoga as an essay or a 
treatise; we are expected to actually practice yoga. (Cf. Brandhorst 2010, 4–8.) 
1.2.2. First-Person Narrative in the Meditations 
The first-person narrative is one of the most famous aspects of the Meditations, 
introducing a tempting structure through which to follow each Meditation with intimacy 
and warmth and inviting the reader to experience the thought processes of a solitary 
meditating person as their own. The overarching “story” of the work is for this 
meditator-reader to discover the three founding ‘principles’ of errorless (so true and 
certain) cognition – ‘I’ (the self as a cognising being), God (the author of the meditator’s 
nature and existence), and body (the sensory-material reality) – without being able to 
grasp any of these principles through sensation (cf. Carriero 2009, 3; see also chapter 
7.3.3). The meditative cognitive exercise form suits these purposes ingeniously.7 
However, one must be careful not to identify the ‘I’ of the text as Descartes himself 
(contra, e.g., Lennon 2008, 207; Rubin 2008; Ariew 2011, 33–34). The meditating 
 
5 Mercer (2017) forcefully argues for Teresa to be the originator of Descartes’s Deceiving Demon doubt, 
and the reason for previous inattention to this is the exclusion of women in early modern history. See, 
however, chapters 2.3.3 and 4.5. See Mercer (2014, 30–35) for other early modern meditations, some of 
which likewise include warnings about demons and deceivers,  
6 Unfortunately for the otherwise excellent analysis, this is likewise the case with Mercer (2017). 
7 Descartes experimented with other forms, e.g., textbook (Principia), dialogue (Search), and philosophical 
autobiography (Discourse). See Menn (2003) and Paganini (2009a, 255) for history of philosophical 
autobiography and the Discourse. 
Introduction 
12 
person of the exercise traditionally is not fully the author themself and the cognitive 
journey is not meant to be simply autobiographical. Instead, as with Loyola’s Excercises 
and, more subtly, with Teresa’s Castillo, we can distinguish two ‘voices’ or ‘characters’ 
in the text: the ‘author’ or the ‘narrator’, working as a sort of a guide, and the ‘meditator’, 
working through the exercise. This distinction in personae is most apparent in first-
person, quasi-imperative resolutions: “[r]eason now leads me to think […] I must make 
an effort to remember […] I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious […] I 
will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses” (AT VII, 18, 22, 24, 
34; CSM II, 12, 15, 16, 24). Such resolutions guide the meditator’s attention to the issues 
that must be concentrated on next in the meditative order, providing instructions to be 
followed for the exercise. In the beginning, the meditator-reader is to simply trust the 
‘narrator’ (the resolutions) and follow the instructions in a non-confrontational way, 
supposing that the exercise is successful in dissecting our errors. (See Kosman 1986; 
Broughton 2002, 23–25; C. Wilson 2003, 5–7; Carriero 2009, 28–29.) 
Not everyone agrees, though, with the division into two personae, seeing it as 
undermining the authority of the “natural light” of reason that every person shares (e.g., 
Christofidou 2013, 9–10). Indeed, Descartes does not consider himself privileged here, 
but does make the caveat that “hardly anyone makes good use of that light, so that many 
people […] may share the same mistaken opinion” (Letter to Mersenne, 1639: AT II, 
598; CSMK, 1398). The narrator’s instructions are due not to most potential meditators’ 
inability to follow the exercise but due to their reasoning being clouded and confused. 
Descartes’s role as the author dictates certain guidance due to the ‘pedagogical 
problem’ of most readers not being in the best position to perceive things as evident in 
the beginning of the enquiry. This becomes apparent in the Second Replies, in which 
Descartes sheds light on the work’s “order” and “method” of reasoning, calling the 
latter “analysis” as opposed to “synthesis” (which proceeds from axioms to theorems 
in a geometrical fashion), and the former: “items which are put forward first must be 
cognised (cognosci) entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the later items must 
be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone 
before” (AT VII, 155; CSM II, 110; translation modified). This order is also called the 
order of discovery, dictating that one can draw conclusions only based on material that has 
come previously in the meditation. 
Order of reasoning is sometimes taken to be synonymous with the analytic method, 
so that analysis itself presupposes no steps that have not already been made (e.g., 
Gueroult 1953, 23–29; Frankfurt 2008, 6–8). However, note that Descartes 
distinguishes the order from the method, indicating that as there are at least two possible 
 
8 Note that these passages are a critique of Herbert of Cherbury’s notitae communes. See chapter 2.5.1.  
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methods of reasoning, the proper order of reasoning can be followed with either. The 
synthetic method “demonstrates the conclusion clearly” by employing “a long series of 
definitions, postulates, axioms, theorems and problems”, so that if anyone denies a 
conclusion “it can be shown at once that it is contained in what has gone before” no 
matter how argumentative or stubborn the reader is. What sets analysis apart as the 
more fitting method for the purposes in the Meditations is that synthesis does not 
“engage the minds of those who are eager to learn” like the analytic method does, 
because “it does not show how the thing in question was discovered”.  The order of 
relying only on what has come before likewise applies to the synthetic method, but it is 
only with the analytic method that it becomes the order of discovery. Synthesis, being the 
chosen method of “ancient geometers”, starts from premises that were discovered later 
(being perhaps metaphysically prior but epistemically posterior) to demonstrate what 
was discovered first. Analysis, when done with the proper order of reasoning, starts 
from what is easier and more effortless to discover and reveals what takes more 
meditative work later.9 (AT VII, 156–157; CSM II, 110–111.) 
This means, for Descartes, that the analysis is the “best and truest” method of 
instruction (docendum). Most readers enter the enquiry with a confused understanding of 
self, God, and the sensory-material reality (taking things that are deeply problematic to 
be plausible and even certain), thus having a misaligned conception of cognition. 
Bringing the reader into the best position to see things as they really are, requires 
instruction and leadership from the author-narrator, with the meditator-reader entering 
into a sort of voluntary pedagogical relationship with the latter. 
However, as opposed to synthesis, the nature of the analytic method requires 
considerable amount of collaboration from the reader. Geometrical truths accord with 
sensory perception (following the Aristotelian-Scholastic model) and are readily 
accepted by even “the less attentive”, whereas the “metaphysical subjects” dealt with in 
the Meditations conflict with our common-sense understanding and preconceived 
opinions derived from the senses by habit. As such, while being more evident than the 
geometers’ “primary notions (primae notiones)”, perceiving them to be such takes more 
effort, and as such “only those who really concentrate and meditate (valde attentis & 
meditantibus) and withdraw their minds from corporeal things, so far as is possible, will 
achieve perfect cognition (perfecte cognoscuntur) of them”. (AT VII, 156–157; CSM II, 111; 
 
9 For example, God is metaphysically prior to the ‘self’ but discovering the ‘self’ takes less attentive 
meditative effort. See chapters 6.2.3 and 7.1. While “synthesis” is a priori in the traditional Thomistic sense, 
proceeding from cause to effect (see chapter 3.1.1) it is “as it were” a posteriori in Descartes’s sense 
(proceeding from what is posterior by the order of discovery). Note that this “as it were” understanding 
of a priori – a posteriori likewise differs from the post-Leibnizian one (what is and is not known 
independently of experience).  
Introduction 
14 
translation altered.) The work is not titled ‘Disputations’ or ‘Theorems and Problems’ 
and the meditative form requires careful attentiveness to achieve the required effect. 
Descartes specifically calls for a serious meditator in the Preface, urging only those who 
are “able and willing to meditate seriously with me, and to withdraw their minds from 
the senses and from all preconceived opinions” to read the book. Confrontational 
readers, who do not make the effort to grasp the proper order of reasoning, should not 
even bother. (AT VII, 9–10; CSM II, 8.) This call is repeated in the Second Replies: 
Analysis shows the true way by means of which the thing in question was discovered 
methodically […] so that if the reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention 
to all points, he will make the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he 
had discovered it for himself. But this method contains nothing to compel belief in an 
argumentative or inattentive reader; for if he fails to attend even to the smallest point, he 
will not see the necessity of the conclusions. […] I would not have nothing to do with 
anyone who was not willing to join me in meditating and giving the subject attentive 
consideration. […] I am therefore right to require particularly careful attention from my 
readers; and the style of writing that I selected was one which I thought would be most 
capable of generating such attention. […] [I]t is fair for me to reject out of hand and 
despise as worthless, the verdict given on my work by those who refuse to meditate with 
me and who stick to their preconceived opinions. (AT VII, 155–159; CSM II, 110–112.)  
Reading the work and doing the practice entails faithful but critical exercise by the 
reader, perceiving the evident reasoning and coming to the conclusions on their own. 
Descartes also comments on the importance of occupying the first-person point of 
view in the Letter to Clerselier, 12 January 1646: 
I never wanted to force anyone to follow my authority […] [and] pointed out in several 
places one should allow oneself to be convinced only by quite evident reasoning. […] 
[T]he perception or cognition (perception ou connoissance) [of each person] should be for him 
the ‘standard which determines the truth of the thing’ […]. (AT IXA, 208; CSM II, 272.) 
Descartes’s own thinking is not the “standard of truth” and should not be followed 
authoratively. Any reader willing to meditate along with the work should, instead, 
attempt to adopt the cognitive and volitional states of the meditator for themself (cf. 
AT IXB, 20; CSM II, 189). 
Although ignorant people would do well to follow the judgment of the more competent 
on matters which are difficult to know, it is still necessary that it be their own perception 
which tells them they are ignorant; they must also perceive that those whose judgment 
they want to follow are not as ignorant as they are, or else they would be wrong to follow 
them and would be behaving more like automatons or beast than men. (AT IXA, 208; 
CSM II, 273.) 
The practiced meditation is a cognitive exercise in grasping things as they are. It is 
therefore not enough to just read it; the first-person meditative form requires an 
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attentive and capable reader who is willing to intensively and seriously meditate along 
with the guiding narrator, the supposed result being a genuine effect, a psychologically real 
experience, on our conceptions. Taking the role of the narrator as a ‘teacher’ too literally, 
then, is to misunderstand the meditative exercise form of the work. (Cf. Cunning 2010; 
14, 27–28, 40; Secada 2013, 201–202; Mercer 2014; 35–37; contra Vitz 2015, 18–19.) 
I follow the practice of separating the narrator (to whom I refer to as Descartes10), 
who instructs and motivates the exercitant, and the guided meditator, who takes the role 
of the I in the meditations. I refer to the meditator with the pronoun “she” to further 
distinguish her from Descartes-as-the-guide (of whom I use the pronoun “he”).11 
1.2.3. Meditator’s Persona 
Descartes is a ‘teacher’ or a mentor in that he recognises the unfavourable position from 
which most meditators enter the meditation. We have difficulty paying attention and 
following what cannot be sensed or imagined due to overt reliance on embodied sensory 
perception. However, the meditative procedure likewise implies a second difficulty: Not 
everyone begins to meditate from an equal mental impediment. Not only are we not in 
the best position to perceive things as evident in the beginning, but also most meditators 
enter the inquiry from a variety of positions (AT VII, 120; CSM II, 85; cf. Cunning 
2010, 28–29.) I will analyse in this chapter some of these positions relevant for our 
understanding of the text, concentrating on three: Aristotelian, naïve, and skeptical.12 
Not everyone agrees with the meditator occupying a specific role in the narrative, 
though. Rico Vitz (2015, 9–20) has particularly argued against such approach, reasoning 
that because the work is a set of meditations, the meditator is not a character in a 
fictional narrative but any actual person attempting to adopt the cognitive and volitional 
states of the I as their own (contra, e.g., M. Wilson 1978, 5; Christofidou 2013, 10). I do 
agree that the meditator is meant to be any thoughtful and attentive reader, and, thus, 
 
10 I do not mean to insinuate that the historical Descartes would have discovered all the doctrines of the 
Meditations in the order they are presented in. However, Descartes-as-the-guide can be considered a sort 
of a ‘mentor’ who has already found the truth and is now eager to show what has been discovered (cf. 
Cunning 2010, chapter 1; Vitz 2015, 19). 
11 Note that as contemporary readers, we cannot naturally engage in the exercise and fully put on the 
meditator’s garb. Due to this historical distance, I sometimes refer to “readers” separately, with the 
pronoun “them”. Cf. Secada 2013, 202. 
12 Compare with the Search, which includes three characters: Epistemon (gr. ἐπιστημων, “knowledgeable”), 
a person well versed in Scholastic philosophy; Polyandros (gr. πολυς ἀνήρ, “everyman”), an uneducated 
but capable layperson; and Eudoxos (gr. ἐυδοξος, “one of good judgment”), who has already discovered 
the truth and guides Polyandros to do the same. For earlier dialogues clearly inspirational for the Search, 
see Le Vayer’s Dialogues (1630–1631) and Galileo’s Dialogo (1632) and Discorsi (1638). 
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is to be as general and easily relatable as possible, but there is, likewise, intrinsic worth 
in reading her as meditating from a certain starting position. It not only helps make 
sense of certain passages (which sometimes hint at an initial cognitive basis) but it also 
enables to somewhat track the meditative progress of the intended readership. 
Descartes’s instructions are intended to address various minds, be they Aristotelian 
inclined, philosophically naïve, skeptically or atheistically concerned, or mechanistically 
leaning. The question of the meditator’s persona, while largely an extratextual matter, is 
therefore not as irrelevant as Vitz presents it. (See Broughton 2002, 23; Cunning 2010.) 
The first position I want to bring up is a supporter of the Aristotelian worldview, 
reflecting a common well-educated reader of Descartes’s period, who (unknowingly) 
would have to witness and accept the undermining of her traditional view piece by piece. 
This unsuspected, gradual demolition is especially emphasized in the Letter to Mersenne 
from 28 January 1641: “I hope the readers will gradually get used to my principles, and 
recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle” 
(AT III, 297–298; CSMK, 173). However, it is questionable whether the meditator is to 
represent an Aristotelian-Scholastic philosopher, with an understanding of the metaphysical 
cognitive structure deriving from Thomistic doctrine (contra, e.g., Carriero 1997; 2009, 
30–34) who most likely would not be wondering about the fundamentals (as for her, 
something lasting has already been pertained) and might be too confrontational and 
argumentative (see Broughton 2002, 27). Even Descartes himself seems skeptical that a 
person with a strong Scholastic conviction would be able to meditate along easily (see 
the Search: AT X, 502; CSM II, 403).13 Instead, we could see the Aristotelian meditator 
occupying a more broadly Scholastic position, well educated in the School system of the 
time but not necessarily a professional philosopher, generally agreeing with the 
Aristotelian view of sensation and cognition (as most readers at the time would).14 
The second possible position, often likewise posited for the meditator, is as a 
philosophical novice, a sort of naïve but intelligent and capable layman. This 
philosophically unsophisticated viewpoint is brought up in the Conversation: “[T]he 
author is considering at this point the man who is only just beginning to philosophize 
and who is paying attention only to what he knows he is aware of” (AT V, 146; CSMK, 
332). This “pre-philosophical level” naïve meditator shares certain commitments with 
the Aristotelian position but in a less metaphysically and epistemologically robust and 
sophisticated way. She would not enter the Meditations with a ready theory of cognition, 
 
13 Cf. the Letter to Pollot, 6 October 1642, Regulae, and the French Preface (AT III, 577, IXB, 12–14, X, 
366; CSM I, 13, 185–186, CSMK, 215). 
14 Broughton (2002, 27), drawing from the Search, postulates that we could picture an eaves-dropping 
Scholastic philosopher following someone else’s meditation. However, this would go against the 
meditative form of the work. 
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but it is reasonable to think she has some sort of a broad idea of the nature of reality 
running essentially through her senses. She could not access reality if she had no senses, 
or her senses would not work as she thought, thus, possessing a sort of rudimentary 
picture of cognition directly related to the world, but one that lacks theoretical 
systemisation. She would then be a folk naïve realist. Descartes seems to think that the 
Aristotelian-Scholastic cognitive account takes this sort of naïve, everyday picture and 
works it out in a more systematic and nuanced version within the Aristotelian frame. 
The meditator’s beginning position, in this sense, encapsulates both the philosophically 
naïve folk thinking and its more robust, Aristotelian elaboration in a strategically clever 
way. (Cf., e.g., Frankfurt 2008, 19–21; Larmore 1998, 2006; 2014; Broughton 2002, 27; 
Kambouchner 2005, 256; Carriero 2009, 32–35.) 
The third position, which has not previously been much emphasised, is a meditator 
convinced of the skeptical literature and thinking of the time, reflecting an ex-dogmatic 
skeptic. This sort of former empirical aspect might be possible to dissect from the first 
sentence of the First Meditation: “Some years ago (ante aliquot annos) I was struck by the 
large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood” (AT VII, 17; 
CSM II, 12). The implication could be seen that the meditator used to be an empiricist 
(either of the Aristotelian or naïve variety) until she awoke from her dogmatic slumber. 
This position, though initially triumphant, is likewise undermined on the way. I will 
argue in chapter 2 that the commonly perceived skepticism in Descartes’s time was 
atheistically oriented, and as such, the skeptical meditator can also fill the role of an 
atheistic practitioner, whose position will similarly be undermined by discovering full 
knowledge (scientia) of God’s existence (see the Dedicatory Letter to Sorbonne: AT VII, 
1–3; CSM II, 3–4). (Cf. chapters 4.1.2 and 5.1.2.) 
The (atheistic) skeptical position is particularly fruitful in analysing the meditator’s 
initial motivation for undertaking the inquiry. One of the primary questions in the 
literature about the meditator’s character has been her reason for suspecting her 
childhood-acquired beliefs to be false. The problematic is easy to solve in the case of a 
skeptically inclined meditator, yet such motivation is difficult to understand in the case 
of the meditator occupying Aristotelian or naïve positions: Why would someone with 
an Aristotelian education or folk common-sense reliance come to question their 
previous beliefs and seek to do so by the means of a radical skeptical meditation. Some 
commentators have opted to read Descartes as putting words into the mouth of the 
meditator at the start due to lack of a clear answer to this question (e.g., Broughton 
2002, 28–32; cf. C. Wilson 2003, 10–31). 
However, it seems to me that the search for a particular motivation is misguided and 
forcing the fictional narrative too far. Anyone picking up the work as a meditational text 
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and occupying the meditator role should be ready to follow the instruction and accept 
that their previous beliefs include possible falsehoods (even if they had not before), just 
as anyone picking up Teresa’s Castillo should be ready to accept the soul resembling a 
castle. However, this does not mean, either, that we should expect the meditator to 
enter the text with a fully developed understanding of Cartesian philosophy. She is 
initially confused, after all, and only with time and attentive meditation will she discover 
the metaphysical and epistemological grounds of her errorless cognition, turning into a 
Cartesian scientist (in the sense of possessing scientia). The question is more that not all 
the motivations must be fully available from the start; it is enough that her curiosity and 
interest are piqued (cf. Carriero 2009, 28; Vitz 2015, 19). Instead of asking what is the 
meditator character’s motivation to begin the inquiry, we should ask what motivation 
any common person (be they an Aristotelian, a philosophical naïf, or an atheistic 
skeptic) would have to undertake the meditation and begin the skeptical enterprise (I 
discuss these motivations in the following chapter; cf. chapter 2.5.2). 
I consider that these three meditator positions – Aristotelian framework, naïve 
sensory reliance, and skeptical allegiance – benefit the text’s analysis, with some passages 
making more sense from one than the other position; therefore, I will carry them along 
in the reading, with the atheistic position partly overtaking the skeptical at the beginning 
of the Second Meditation. Note, however, that these are not the only possible options 
for the meditator’s identity. The meditator is meant to be as universal and relatable as 
possible; thus, any reader from any position should be able to perform the meditational 
exercise. An exercise that would undermine only Aristotelianism, folk naïve realism, and 
skepticism would leave other competing views unscathed. As such, I will occasionally 
also refer to the meditator’s position as a materialist and a mechanist, to represent some 
of Descartes’s competitors (such as Hobbes and Gassendi). (Cf. Ayers 1998, 1011–
1013; Cunning 2010, 30–33.) 
1.3. Taking Skepticism Seriously: Cartesian Epochē  
The meditative reading, as mentioned, sets certain stipulations for our approach to the 
skeptical method. Many other aspects of the meditative approach have been discussed 
in the literature (see, e.g., Kosman 1986; Hatfield 1986; Secada 2013), but the 
implications for Cartesian skepticism have gone largely unnoticed (but see Rosenthal 
1986; MacArthur 2003). The cognitive exercise emphasises how the suspension is 
arduous, challenging, and difficult, which suggests that the meditator should be 
completely serious about the general suspension, genuinely trying to withhold her assent 
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from previous opinions, difficult as that may be. The use of skepticism would not, then, 
be a purely instrumental, hypothetical thought experiment. Cognitive suspension of 
judgment is meant to be a real and genuine experience, as is the imaginative state of the 
baroque meditative exercises. 
The previously mentioned traditional distinction between ancient and modern 
(Cartesian) skepticism is sought through two different modes of skepticism – one that 
is “serious” and another that is “unserious” or purely “philosophical”. The latter would 
leave our behaviour or mode of life unaffected and would undermine only the 
epistemic-philosophical notion of knowledge, being the chosen method of Descartes’s 
and other modern forms of skepticism. The ancients, however, utilised a “serious” 
skepticism, that does affect one’s mode of life, having practical and ethical ramifications 
for everyday situations through the practice of thorough suspension on all matters and 
beliefs known as epochē (ἐποχή). Thus, there would be a large distinction between 
‘therapeutic’ or ‘ethical’ ancient skepticism and ‘methodological’ Cartesian skepticism. 
(Annas & Barnes 1985, 7–9.15)  
A closer look, however, shows that this attempt to draw the distinction is unjustified. 
The skepticism of the ancients can just as well be described as ‘methodical’ (a method 
to suspend belief) and the skepticism of the Meditations is just as much ‘therapeutic’ and 
‘ethical’ in its application. I suggest in chapter 2 ways to draw the distinction more 
accurately (as a change from a discursive public practice to a private mental experience 
and from what I term moderate to extreme external world skepticism through the 
Medieval Christian tradition). It suffices for now, though, to note that the description 
of Cartesian skepticism as simply ‘methodological’ misjudges something important 
about Cartesian skepticism and skeptical history. (Cf. Paganini 2008a, 186–191.) 
Moreover, Descartes emphasises the seriousness of the inquiry in several places.  
I would not urge anyone to read this book except those who are able and willing to 
meditate seriously with me. […] I will devote myself seriously and freely to the general 
overthrow of my opinions. […] [That doubt can be raised on all former beliefs] is not a 
flippant or ill-considered conclusion but is based on powerful and well though-out 
reasons. […] So grave are the doubts into which I have been thrown… […] You pretend 
that I am playing a game when I am serious […]. (AT VII, 9, 18, 21–23, 350; CSM II, 8, 
12, 15–16, 243. Translation modified.) 
He even states it to be a grievous misreading of the Meditations to regard them as merely 
an “unserious” philosophical game – “a sham”. It is necessary to read the skeptical 
arguments as serious. 
 
15 This is not the only way this distinction has been drawn, but I use it as an example of a larger approach. 
Cf. Fine 2000.  
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When I said that the entire testimony of the senses should be regarded as uncertain and 
even false, I was quite serious; indeed the point is so necessary for an understanding of 
my Meditations that if anyone is unwilling or unable to accept it, he will be incapable of 
producing any objection that deserves a reply. (Fifth Replies: AT VII, 350; CSM II, 243.16) 
Reading the Meditations as a cognitive exercise is intended to have a genuine effect 
even on our common-sense view, including moral and ethical implications. The exercise 
is a rediscovery and reorientation of the self and one’s thinking through intensive and 
rigorous meditation. The reorientation takes time and effort, just as with the Baroque 
spiritual exercises, being a slow and arduous journey, and Descartes advises his readers 
to “not just take the short time needed to go through [the First Meditation skeptical 
suspension], but to devote several months, or at least weeks, to considering the topics 
dealt, before going on to the rest of the book”. Doing this, they will “undoubtedly be 
able to derive much greater benefit from what follows”. (AT VII, 130; CSM II, 94) The 
skeptical inquiry takes attentive effort, which in the beginning can be extremely difficult 
and strenuous but becomes easier through practice and repetition as the meditator 
progresses with the exercise. Thus, the skeptical suspension appears more arduous in 
the first two Meditations than in the later ones (see AT VII, 62; CSM II, 43). Why would 
skepticism be initially more laborious than by further use if it was simply an insincere 
thought-experiment? (Secada 2013, 201; Mercer 2014, 35–37; cf. M. Wilson 1978, 5; 
Forsman 2017, 54.) I see the intended psychological result no less serious or genuine 
than the epochē of the ancient skeptics due to this meditative, practiced aspect of skeptical 
scrutiny. Thus, I will refer to the Meditations’ general suspension as Cartesian epochē.17 
There is, however, one aspect that the traditional depiction explains correctly: Unlike 
the skepticism of the ancients, meditative skepticism is not intended as ‘a way of life’. 
The meditative person in the spiritual exercise tradition is not expected to substitute the 
exercise for their day-to-day attitude or mode of living but to use it instead as an 
alternative (often more accurate) approach to spiritual matters. Descartes similarly 
emphasises the distinction between everyday life and meditative inquiry.  
[W]e must note the distinction which I have insisted on in several passages, between the 
actions of life and the investigation of the truth. For when it is a question of organizing 
our life, it would, of course, be foolish not to trust the senses, and the skeptics who 
neglected human affairs to the point where friends had to stop them from falling off 
precipices deserved to be laughed at. […] But when our inquiry concerns what can be 
known with complete certainty by the human intellect, it is quite unreasonable to refuse 
 
16 Descartes does refer to the doubt as “excessive” and “metaphysical” in some instances. I explain these 
in suitable places. 
17 To be exact, what I refer to as Cartesian epochē, is the self-induced suspension of judgment from the 
Second Meditation onward, which leaves one’s own existence (at least momentarily) outside of the scope 
of the epochē. See chapter 5.1.2; cf. chapters 2.5.2 and 4.4. 
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to reject these things in all seriousness (seriò) as doubtful and even as false. (AT VII, 350–
351; CSM II, 243. Emphasis added.) 
The skeptical exercise is to be practiced while secluded from the worries, obligations, 
and activities of everyday life, requiring a “stretch of free time” in peace and solitude 
(AT VII, 17–18; CSM II, 12). The skeptical endeavour is indeed, in this sense, to be 
insulated, but the reason for this is, ironically, not the unseriousness but the seriousness of 
doubt, as an intense and attentive exercise. 
The precondition of a committed attentive and unprejudiced undertaking for the 
skeptical meditation similarly sets certain restrictions – temporal and contextual – on 
the skepticism. The temporal restriction follows from the limited human attention span. 
Similar to Baroque exercises that instruct intense meditation only for certain brief 
periods, with rest in the middle, to secure the meditator’s attentiveness and vigilance, 
Descartes does not expect his readers to go through the exercise in one sitting. “Our 
mind is unable to keep its attention on things without some degree of difficulty and 
fatigue; and it is hardest of all for it to attend to what is not present to the senses or 
even to the imagination” (Principia I, §73: AT VIIIA, 37; CSM I, 220). Skeptical 
meditation is possible only for a limited time before one’s laboured attention begins to 
lapse and one’s concentration loosens. 
The temporal limitation likewise induces the contextual restriction. The exercise is an 
“arduous undertaking”, so a certain laziness brings the meditator “back to normal life” 
from time to time (AT VII, 23; CSM II, 15). Similar to the spiritual exercises, the 
meditator is not intended to spend six actual days, or indeed several weeks or months 
as Descartes suggests, in thorough suspension but is to repeat the exercise in several 
short intervals over many different days. The meditator thus requires time away from 
the attentive meditative effort as a way to contextually separate the “arduous” skeptical 
exercise from “normal life”. The meditative person is to live as a common man in the 
street in the “normal life” context, taking the world as it appears in the common-sense, 
everyday attitude while genuinely suspending, or ‘bracketing’, the same issues in the 
“skeptical exercise” context. (See chapters 2.5.2, 3.3, and 4.5 for more on contextual 
and temporal restrictions to skepticism.)  
Of course, one might wonder why anyone would undertake the Meditations’ 
contextual inquiry? Even Descartes notes that “no sane person has ever seriously (seriò) 
doubted [that there is an external world and human beings have bodies]” (AT VII, 16; 
CSM II, 11). So, what would make ‘a sane person’ seriously doubt such things even if 
only as a meditative exercise secluded from everyday life? 
The Meditations, as a meditational text, promises certain results for those who 
undertake the exercise. Spiritual exercises are read to find spiritual peace and improve 
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self-awareness, closeness with God, and religious experience. A cognitive exercise is to 
be read for similar reasons: To discover epistemically solid ground, to improve 
knowledge of oneself and God, and to gain a metaphysical-cognitive experience, 
allowing for a stable metaphysical basis for all our true cognitive states. However, if the 
results were just these, a hardened “man on the Clapham omnibus” could question the 
exercise’s utility: If he cares not for the metaphysical cognitive basis, what use would it 
be to go through the meditation? Nevertheless, especially in the case of the volitional 
powers, the exercise promises equal results not just in establishing stable science but 
also in well-founded moral behavior. The meditative goals are not simply metaphysico-
epistemological but ethical, providing fruits for scientific practices as well as for a 
virtuous everyday life. (See Davies 2001; Araujo 2003; Vitz 2015.) 
Attention (atte0ntio) for Descartes is our cognitive and volitional powers directed 
towards the same object or goal, working in internal unison (AT XI, 361; CSM I, 344). 
Such an attentive cognitive grasp is necessary not only for discovering a metaphysical 
epistemic basis but also for behaving virtuously. Virtue, and consequently happiness, 
results from the right use of the will and the intellect – from striving to judge well 
(finding the best course of action) and being decisive (executing firmly whatever course 
one has chosen). (Letters to Elizabeth, 1645 and Christina, 1647: AT IV, 263–296, V, 
83–84; CSMK; 256–267; 325; cf. Discourse: AT VI, 28; CSM I, 124–125.)  Inattention 
leads to error, irresponsibility, and moral wrong, all which challenge the Cartesian 
notion of happiness as virtuosity (Fourth Meditation and Letter to Mesland, 1644: AT 
IV, 117, VII, 59–60; CSM II, 41, CSMK, 234). We need a better understanding of our 
cognitive and volitional capacities in order to act virtuously and be happy, thus requiring 
a reliable epistemic guide to perceive what the good is (power of understanding and its 
capacity to distinguish errorless and erroneous cognition) and a free ability to follow the 
good (power of will and its attentive control over our cognitive states and agency over 
our acts). The meditational exercise of purging these two powers is, then, not only 
essential for us as true cognisers (beings capable of knowing how things are) but also as 
moral agents (beings capable of acting virtuously and living a happy and tranquil life). The 
skeptical exercise is not simply directed at finding truth but also at avoiding error, both 
cognitive and moral. Before the metaphysical cognitive basis is found, suspension of 
judgment becomes a moral responsibility. (See chapters 2.5.2, 3.3, and 4.5. Cf. Naaman-
Zauderer 2010; Svensson 2011; 2015; Christofidou 2013; Secada 2013.) 
The fact that the Cartesian epochē is not a ‘way of life’ like its the ancient counterpart 
does not diminish from the “seriousness” of suspension as a meditative exercise. 
Cartesian skepticism, while insulated from interactions of life, is to likewise lead the 
participant to a more virtuous and ethically good life, with skeptical inquiry intended to 
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have a genuine effect even on our common-sense thinking. However, the meditator will 
also be able to slide in and out of the epochē as she wills, because, unlike in the ancient 
tradition, the common-sense perspective survives outside of the suspension context.18 
1.4. Structure of the Work 
The work is structured around four chapters that analyse the first three Meditations. 
Preceding them are two chapters discussing the historical tradition relevant for 
understanding Descartes’s goals.  
Chapter 2 concentrates on the history of skepticism, beginning with ancient 
traditions and developing through Medieval and Scholastic discussions to the 
Renaissance and then to early modern skepticism. I also discuss Descartes’s use of 
skepticism and his relation to the skeptical tradition. 
Chapter 3 discusses the role and importance of the two main powers of the 
meditator’s thinking, her cognition or understanding and her will. I begin with the role 
of understanding and will in late Medieval and Baroque scholasticism to make the use 
of these capacities in the Cartesian context more understandable, then move on to 
discuss Descartes’s conception of these powers. 
Chapter 4 analyses the First Meditation, conentrating on the three levels of doubt 
(particular, systematic, and ultimate). I also discuss the modification of Pyrrhonian epochē and 
the psychological tool of the Demon, intended to ease the still laborious suspension. 
Chapter 5 analyses the Second Meditation, dividing it into two chains of discovery: The 
first focuses on the existence of the ‘I’ and the second focuses on the example of the 
wax. I also discuss how the modification of Pyrrhonian epochē from the previous 
Meditation develops and progresses into the more concentrated Cartesian epochē, leaving 
what is cognitively evident outside of the suspension. 
The analysis of the Third Meditation is divided between chapters 6 and 7. Chapter 6 
analyses the first half of the Meditation, focusing on the preliminary discussion of 
distinguishing between different features of cognition while suspending their truth value 
and on the first of the causal arguments for God’s existence. While discussing the latter, I 
distinguish two main causal principles, Principle of Causal Dependence and Principle of Causal 
Adequacy, on which the causal arguments lean. 
Chapter 7 analyses the last half of the Third Meditation, focusing on the change of 
perspective from cognitive features to the existence of ‘I’ and the second causal 
 
18 See, however, Eichorn (2014; 2020) who reads the ancient skeptical writer Sextus Empiricus as a sort 
of a “proto-contextualist”. 
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argument for God’s existence. I also discuss the progress of the skeptical exercise 
through the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Meditation. 
Finally, the conclusive chapter 8 discusses the intended changes in the meditator’s 
attitude and view of the world as she finishes with the meditative inquiry, especially 
concentrating on how far-reaching on one’s common-sense perspective the genuine 
effect is to be after the Meditations and how the results of the exercise are to be repeated 
in an everyday, morally virtuous life. 
25 
2. Preliminary Considerations I: Doubt and Skepticism 
It is beneficial to present a brief history of skeptical thought up to Descartes’s time 
before embarking on the skeptical exercise in the first three Meditations. I see a double 
benefit in such a presentation. Firstly, it provides us an understanding of the historical 
and intellectual context that Descartes, for better or for worse, accidentally or 
deliberately (as I argue), sets for himself. Secondly, it demonstrates that his choice of 
skepticism is not accidental but is due to a deliberate effort to answer the skeptical, 
especially atheistic skeptical, threat still prominent in the scientific intellectual climate of 
his time.  
Descartes’s relation to the skeptical tradition is one of the most intriguing 
components of the meditative exercise and the interest towards it has been strong in 
recent years (e.g., Bermúdez; 2000; 2008; Fine 2000; Lennon & Hickson 2013; Brown 
2013; Stuchlik 2017). This interest is partly fed by the remarks Descartes makes towards 
his predecessors. Skepticism already had a long tradition by Descartes’s time, which he 
is the first to acknowledge. He even presents himself to be continuing the skeptical line 
from antiquity, hinting that the scenarios presented in the Meditations are merely a 
reheating of the “old cabbage” of the ancients (Second Replies: AT VII, 130; CSM II, 
94).  
Nevertheless, skepticism for Descartes is not just some trivial quibbling of ancient 
lore or even the remains of Renaissance humanism. He treats skepticism as a living issue. 
“[W]e should not suppose that sceptical philosophy is extinct. It is vigorously alive 
today”. Descartes presents the “atheistic sceptics” as needing refutation and himself as 
the first philosopher to successfully answer their doubts (AT VII, 548–550; CSM II, 
374–376).1 Descartes’s concern with skeptical issues was both epistemo-
logical/metaphysical and moral. He considered skeptics a threat not only for their 
challenge to science but also for their challenge to the ethical and virtuous life. (See 
chapter 1.3.) 
I take a closer look in this first preliminary chapter at the history and tradition of 
skeptical philosophy, starting with ancient discussions, moving to Medieval and 
Renaissance developments, and ending with early modern adaptations, to gain a clearer 
view of the issues and to better understand Descartes’s willingness to employ these 
methods. My focus is especially on two questions: 1) Where does skepticism begin (its 
motivation), and 2) Where does skepticism lead (its results)? 
 
1 Cf. the Conversation, Third Replies, and the Comments (AT V, 165, VII, 172, VIII, 366–368; CSM I, 309–
310, II, 121, CSMK, 347). See also the Letters to Hyperaspistes, August 1641, and to the Curators of 
Leiden University, 4 May 1647 (AT III, 430–431 & V, 9; CSMK, 194–195, 316–317).   
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2.1. Ancient Skepticism: The Garden and the Porch 
The roots of ancient skepticism can be traced to Pre-Socratic philosophies, such as the 
questioning of motion by the Eleatic school founded by Parmenides (c. 5th century BC) 
but known mostly through Zeno’s paradoxes (e.g., Achilles and the turtle). Later on, 
certain epistemologically wired dialogues by Plato (c. 438–347 BC), such as the 
Theaetētus, would likewise question sensory experience as the basis of knowledge (Tht. 
151d–186e). The aspiration to epistēmē (ἐπιστήμη), a state of knowing, or a body of 
knowledge, that was lasting and unchanging, was generally running in the background of 
these discussion. If there is truth, the thought went, what is true cannot change and 
become untrue. If I know the truth (taken that the truth is knowable), how could my 
knowledge change and become unknown? Just as truth is unchanging, so is true 
knowledge. This eternal epistēmē was, especially after Plato, contrasted with doxa (δόξα), 
usually translated as belief or opinion. Doxa is the kind of common belief that one could 
be persuaded to hold but that is subject to change and instability. The visible, ever-
changing world consisted only of doxa for both Parmenides and Plato, far removed from 
the true reality of eternal Being or Forms, that one could only reach by the equally 
eternal epistēmē. (E.g., Rep. V, 476e–478e.2) Robert Pasnau has described that ancient 
theories were set to form an epistemic ideal – knowledge as a systematic framework 
(science, if you will). To have epistēmē is to grasp the unchanging principles or essences 
underneath (2017, 3–6). Doxa, then, is to be avoided and epistēmē is to be aspired to. A 
wise man should live “without beliefs” (adoxaston, gr. ἀδóξαστον).3  
Another goal in ancient philosophy, arguably even more important, was to attain 
eudaimonia (εὐδαιμονία), usually translated as happiness but including stronger and more 
specific connotations. The kind of happiness one attains by eudaimonia is eternal, 
unchanging and reliable spiritual tranquillity. It is, in a sense, divine, the sort of happiness 
enjoyed by philosophical deities. It is typically tied to aspirations for epistēmē, because 
one aspect that leads to unhappiness, frustration, and disturbance in human life is the 
hunger for answers. Similar to knowledge by epistēmē, the kind of tranquillity gained by 
eudaimonia is reliable and stable, something that remains the same no matter one’s 
circumstances or fortune. This similarly upped the ante for epistēmē, for to be absolutely 
sure about something was to be both happy and to rest on something truly eternal. 
 
2 For early skeptical antecedents, see Lee 2010. For Plato’s influence on later skeptical currents, see Vogt 
2012, esp. 7–9. Note that for Plato, doxa does not necessarily pertain solely to the visible and epistēmē solely 
to the Forms. As with any other Platonic doctrine, there is contention of the true meaning of this 
distinction. See Moss 2014; 2020. 
3 This epistemic ideal was later assimilated into Scholastic discussions as scientia. See Pasnau 2017, 6–7. It 
still resonates in Descartes, who purports an epistemic distinction similar to doxa/epistēmē. See chapter 3.4. 
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How to gain, or at least approach, eudaimonia and live a good, pleasant life is a topic 
that unifies practically all the ancient philosophical sects. It came into particular 
prominence during the Hellenistic period, occurring after Aristotle (384–322 BC) but 
before the emergence of Neo-Platonism by Plotinus (c. 204–270 AD). The Hellenistic 
period came to be known, from the point of view of skeptical history, specifically by 
the debate between certain “dogmatic” schools, that claimed that happiness and 
tranquillity can be gained by knowing a certain criterion of truth and sticking to it (e.g., the 
Stoics and the Epicureans) and the skeptical orientation that questioned them. 
We customarily mean two “factions” – Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism – when 
speaking of ancient skepticism specifically (instead of skeptical leanings in ancient 
thought). This same distinction was also used during Descartes’s time and he clearly was 
aware of both skeptical factions. 
[G]eneral doubts would lead us straight into the ignorance of Socrates or the uncertainty 
of the Pyrrhonists. (Search: AT X, 512; CSM II, 408. Cf. AT X, 519–520; CSM II, 413.) 
Although the Pyrrhonists reached no certain conclusions from their doubts, it does not 
follow that no one can. (Letter to Reneri for Pollot, 1638: AT II, 38–39; CSMK, 99.) 
Although I had seen many writings by the Academics and Sceptics on [the doubts of the 
First Meditation] and was reluctant to reheat and serve this cabbage, I could not avoid 
devoting one whole Meditation to it. (Second Replies: AT VII, 130; CSM II, 94. 
Translation modified.) 
I return later to how familiar Descartes was with these doctrines. First, I will discuss 
ancient skepticism and its influence on skeptical history. However, for a full 
understanding of the ancient skeptical current, we must begin the story in a painted 
porch on the side of the Athenian Agora. 
2.1.1. Stoicism and Academic Skepticism 
The beginning of the skeptical phase has much to do with their “dogmatic” opponents. 
The Academics’ direct opposition was the Stoic school, founded by Zeno of Citium (c. 
334–262 BC) and named after the painted colonnade hall or stoa (ἡ ποικίλη στοά) in 
Athens where he taught. The Stoics, though branded by the Academics as dogmatic, 
were already skeptically inclined. They appreciated skeptical concerns and considered 
epistemic caution as one of the main components of being a “sage” (i.e., a wise, virtuous 
person). According to the Stoics, a sage should never give in to mere doxai, seen as weak 
and malleable assenting, considering those states of mind where assent could be given 
to be attainable but hard to achieve. (See Vogt 2012, 8, 159. Cf. Frede 1983; 1997b.) 
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The Stoics think there are fundamentally two kinds of impressions (phantasia, gr. 
φαντασία) we encounter, either by our senses or our rational capacities: kataleptic, or 
cognitive, and akataleptic, or non-cognitive. Cognitive impressions (φαντασία καταληπτική) 
occur and are “imprinted” on one’s soul precisely and in full detail according to how 
things are – they firmly grasp (katalambanein, gr. καταλαμβάνειν) what is true. Non-
cognitive, “ungrasping” impressions, such as what one experiences in states of delirium, 
drunkenness, or dreaming, or when one’s vision is blurry, one is tired, in a rage, or does 
not fully understand the argument, are not “imprinted” in this way. These cognitive and 
non-cognitive impressions appear as rational for all persons – they are thoughts on which 
one’s reason is free to either give, deny, or withdraw assent. (DL VII, 45–46, 50–52.)   
The Stoics recognized three kinds of assent: epistēmē (knowledge), doxa (belief) and 
katalēpsis (κατάληψις, comprehension, lit. taking hold of), typically translated as cognition, 
which is assenting to cognitive impressions and is “stationed between” (methoriai 
tetagmenēn, gr. μεθορίᾳ τεταγμένην) the two. Someone who forms and holds beliefs is 
unable to improve on their state and reach knowledge; beliefs are weak and changeable 
assents, whereas knowledge requires firm and true assenting. A believer cannot be a 
knower. Cognition, in contrast, is careful assenting to cognitive impressions which have 
some sort of conformity to real objects. One ought only to assent to cognitive 
impressions in order to be a sage and withhold assent on the various non-cognitive 
ones. Grasping the truth by assenting to a clear and distinct cognitive impression is, then, 
the Stoic suggestion for the critērion (κριτήριον) of truth and reality. (M VII, 151–152. Cf. 
Acad. I, 11.41–42, II, 6.17.) 
However, just because someone gives assent to a cognitive impression does not 
mean they possess epistēmē. Both a sage and a non-sage might assent to several cognitive 
impressions, but a non-sage does so inconsistently. Say that Calvin is a non-sage and 
Hobbes is a practiced Stoic. Both Calvin and Hobbes assent similarly to a cognitive 
impression, for example, understand a complex argument equally well. However, in 
Calvin’s case, since he has also given assent to several non-cognitive impressions, and 
might do so as a consequence of the cognitive impression (e.g., understanding the 
argument makes him happy4), his grasp of the matter does not rise to epistēmē and 
become knowledge but falls to doxa, becoming belief.5 If one were to ask Calvin the 
next day how the argument goes, he would be at a loss and would have to work to gain 
the same grasp of it all over again. Hobbes, as a practicing Stoic sage, can fit the 
cognition into the framework of cognitive impressions, firming them into place so they 
 
4 Emotions, as opposed to rational feelings, are also non-cognitive impressions. See Vogt 2012, 178–181. 
5 According to Vogt (2012, 162), cognition is not a separate doxastic attitude improving on doxa. Instead, 
cognition figures in both epistēmē and doxa: both a knower (sage) and a believer (non-sage) assent to several 
cognitive impressions.  
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become incorporated in a systematic body of knowledge. A singular cognitive 
impression may grant one truth, but it does not guarantee that one knows the truth, as 
knowing the truth includes assent so firm and strong one never has to change one’s 
mind. The Stoic epistēmē, just like the Platonic and Aristotelian one, represents an ideal 
state that can (and must) be aspired to.6 (Vogt 2012, 159–162; Baltzly 2019, 4. Cf. 
Broughton 2002, 34–35; Perin 2008, 57.) 
Academic skepticism, formed in Plato’s Academy (originally founded in a public 
garden in nearby Athens) during the so-called Middle Academy period (c. 268–155 BC), 
argued heavily against the Stoic cognitive impressions.7 The crux of their objections is 
that no impression is of an infallible “grasping” quality; thus, all impressions are non-
cognitive: ungraspable and incomprehensible (akatalēpsia, gr. ἀκαταληψία). 
Incomprehensibleness for the Academics does not mean that we would not understand 
the impressions, for example, that I would not realise that an impression of Donald 
Trump is an impression of the former President of the United States. Rather, no 
impression for the Academics is such that it certainly grasps a true quality of an object. 
The Stoics described cognitive impressions as those that (1) proceed from a real object 
and (2) are impressed or “stamped” exactly in agreement with the object itself. The 
Academics argued back that no impression is such that it could not be mistaken for 
another exactly similar but non-cognitive one. Typical examples included two or more 
identical eggs, twins of known people, and so on. The Stoics then included a third clause 
in the description of cognitive impressions, that (3) they are of such a kind that could 
not arise from what is not (i.e., could not turn out to be false). (M VII, 152 & 247–252; 
PH II, 4; DL VII, 50.8) Still, the Academics pressed on that no impression satisfies even 
the third clause. Moreover, according to the Academics, there is nothing less convincing 
or real about delirious, drunken, or dreamt impressions while they are being perceived 
to distinguish cognitive impressions from them. 
[P]resentations seen by people asleep and tipsy and mad are feebler […] How? […] As if 
anybody would deny that a man that has woken up thinks that he has been dreaming 
[…]. But […] what we are asking is what these things looked like at the time when they 
were seen. (Acad. II, 27.88.9) 
 
6 Zeno is said to have likened an impression to a stretched-out hand, assent to a hand with the fingers 
bent, cognition to a fist, and knowing to a fist clenched by the other hand. Acad. II, 47.145 For Aristotelian 
axiomatic science as an epistemic ideal, see An. Post. I, 71a1–71b9. Cf. Pasnau 2017, 3–6. Descartes also 
makes an epistemic trichotomy (persuasio, cognitio, scientia) that is similar to the Stoics’. See chapter 3.4. 
7 The Academic skeptics saw themselves as following the model of Socrates, which is why Socrates is 
sometimes included as the first “Academic skeptic”. See the French Preface and the Search (AT IXB, 5–6 
& X, 512; CSM I, 181 & II, 408). 
8 Cf. Broughton 2002, 34; Hankinson 2003, 60–61; Vogt 2012, 159–160; 2018, 3.1. 
9 Similar scenarios of madness and dreams are conjured up in the First Meditation. Cf. chapter 4.2. 
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Cognitive impressions, then, cannot act as the criterion of truth. The Academics argued 
that to be coherent, a sage would have to suspend assent on every and all impressions. 
The Academic plays the part of a judo master in a way, using the strength of the Stoic’s 
doctrine to flip him into suspending judgment on everything. (Acad. II, 26–27.84–87. M 
VII, 409–410. Cf. Broughton 2002, 35–36.)  
Arcesilaus (c. 316–240 BC) was the first leader of the Academy in the Middle period 
and the founder of its skeptical phase around 268 BC. His thinking survived only 
through second-hand sources, most of which are biased in one way or another, so it is 
not surprising that confusion and disagreement exists about his actual teachings (see 
Ioppolo 2018; Vogt 2018). Certain sources indicate him purporting radical skepticism 
according to which truth has no criteria, nothing can be known, and one should 
withhold assent on everything (e.g., Acad. I, 12.45; PH I, 232–234). He would have, 
thus, been a representative of negative dogmatism, which denies the possibility of 
knowledge or epistēmē. However, recent commentaries tend to read him with a more 
moderate dialectical interpretation, not forming firm conclusions himself either way but 
arguing that it is the Stoics who, by their own doctrine, must give up on epistēmē. 
Arcesilaus himself would merely possess a slight suspicion that epistēmē might not be 
possible.10 Either way, the method to acquire in the face of knowledge claims is epochē – 
a complete suspension of every assent, belief, and judgment. (DL IV, 28; M VII, 150–
158. Cf. Couissin 1983; Thorsrud 2010, 58–59; 2014, 53–55; Perin 2010, 145–146.)  
Carneades (c. 214–128 BC) is the second important leader of the skeptical Academy 
we know of, taking over some one hundred years after Arcesilaus, during the so-called 
New Academy period (c. 155–90 BC).  Like Arcesilaus, he wrote nothing down but was 
especially known for his argumentative skills (e.g., DL IV, 62–63). He continued and 
strengthened the skeptical method of Arcesilaus, purporting a thorough going epochē 
while also making some modifications to it.  According to Carneades, a skeptic does not 
assent to anything as knowledge and, thus, withholds or suspends on all dogmatic truth 
claims. However, there are certain impressions that a skeptic can assent to in order to 
live and act in the world. Here, Carneades distinguishes between incomprehensibleness and 
clarity of impressions, arguing that while all impressions are akataleptic, not all of them 
are unclear (adēlon, gr. ἄδηλον). Certain impressions appear more clear (hikanon, gr. 
ἱκανόν) to us than others and, thus, are more persuasive or plausible (pithanon, gr. 
πιθανόν). Cicero (106–43 BC), whose work Academica is the main existent source on 
Academic skepticism, later translated pithanon as veri simile, truthlike (Acad. II, 10.32, 
 
10 This would be based on a reading of the Platonic dialogues by which no interlocuter, not even Socrates, 
is able to justify their knowledge claims. Note that the Stoic teachings were reportedly also based on 
Socrates. The dispute was, then, in a way on the correct interpretation of Plato. See Frede 1983, 65–66; 
Sedley 2003; Thorsrud 2010, 59–63; Vogt 2012, 5–9. 
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31.99).11 Skeptics can, thus, follow certain convincing impressions, while not 
considering them true but merely as plausible. Carneades, then, apparently narrowed 
the scope of epochē, articulating a way a skeptic can live an everyday life.12 (Acad. II, 
31.99–32.104. Cf. Hankinson 1995, 94–96; Thorsrud 2010, 58–74; 2014, 76–81; 2018.) 
2.1.2. Pyrrhonian Skepticism 
Pyrrhonian skeptics opposed not only the Stoic and Epicurean epistemology but also 
the Aristotelian axiomatic view of science and even the Academic skeptics themselves. 
The name Pyrrhonism derives from Pyrrho of Elis (c. 360–270 BC), often considered 
the first skeptic, being some 50 years Arcesilaus’s senior. Unlike other Hellenistic 
skeptics, he seems to have been so committed to his skepticism that not only did he not 
leave anything written, but he also did not even form a school around his philosophy. 
Whatever little we know of him has survived through his disciple Timon (c. 320–235 
BC) and later skeptical writers he inspired.13 Pyrrhonism as a philosophical school was 
founded by Aenesidemus (c. 1st century BC) around the time of Cicero’s death. He is 
considered to have been a former member of the Academy, who later went renegade 
and formed his own skeptical doctrine in opposition to the Academics of the time, 
specifically Philo and Antiochus, whom he considered to hypocritically assent to 
persuasive impressions while unambiguously claiming thorough akatalēpsia (PH I, 235). 
(See, e.g., Decleva Caizzi 1992; Striker 1983; Castagnoli 2018, 70.) 
 
11 For the history of Academica, see Schmitt 1972; Thorsrud 2014, chapter 5; Wynne 2018. Pithanon has also 
been described as “probable”, following Cicero’s other translation of it as probabile (e.g., Acad. II, 11.32). 
As probability today refers to statistics, which is not what Carneades meant, I have decided to avoid the 
term. Cf., however, Obdrzalek 2006. 
12 There are two traditions on what following convincing impressions means, one by Carneades’s pupil 
Clitomachus, the other by an Epicurean convert Metrodorus and Clitomachus’s pupil Philo (Cicero’s 
teacher). Cicero follows the Clitomachean “radical” reading, taking Carneades to follow what appears as 
convincing but not espouse any views. Metrodorus and Philo saw Carneades as following convincing 
impressions because they appear more reasonable than the others, holding fallibilistic opinions. Acad. II, 
18.59, 24.78. Cf. Lévy 2010. Later, the Metrodorian-Philonian “mitigated” reading became influential for 
the Renaissance and early modern skepticism. See Caluori 2007, 32–33; Maia Neto 2014. 
13 As Pyrrho is an obscure character, there is no clear understanding of his skeptical philosophy. Ancient 
reports describe him as living a life of constant danger, taking no precaution with carts or wild dogs and 
nearly falling from precipices if his friends were not to save him. However, these are most likely from his 
philosophical opponents and are thus hardly trustworthy. Aenesidemus reports Pyrrho to suspend 
judgment only in philosophical matters, while not lacking “foresight in his everyday acts” (DL IX, 62). 
There is also debate whether Pyrrho was a skeptic like the later Pyrrhonists, suspending judgment on how 
things are while registering how they appear (an epistemic reading), or whether he held that things by their 
nature are unknown to us (a metaphysical reading). For this interpretive issue, and the so-called “Aristocles 
passage”, see Hankinson 1995, 59–65; Bett 2000a, chapter 1; 2000b; 2018; Svavarsson 2010; Thorsrud 
2014, chapter 2; Perin 2018; Castagnoli 2018, 68–69.  
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Along with the foundation of the Pyrrhonian skeptical faction and its divergence 
from the Academic line, Aenesidemus is most known for the Ten Modes of Skepticism, 
attributed to his now-lost work, Pyrrhonian Discourses (Pyrrhōneoi logoi, gr. Πυῤῥώνειοι λóγοι). 
These modes, or tropes, aim to demonstrate how things appear different from different 
perspectives, to different animals, to different humans, and even to the same human in 
differing states and locations. Their basic form is: 
1. A thing x (e.g., honey) appears F (e.g., sweet) to Calvin 
2. To Hobbes, x (honey) appears F* (e.g., bitter)  
3. One cannot decide whether either, or none, of these testimonies has authority over the other 
4. One is not able to either accept or deny that x is F or that x is F*14 
With this basic form, the modes show how nothing is infallibly grasped as certain: by 
different animals having different senses (first mode), by different persons experiencing 
things differently (second mode), by the senses of one person disagreeing with each 
other (third mode), by things appearing different in different circumstances (fourth 
mode), by them appearing different from different perspectives (fifth mode), by coming 
across them only indirectly through intermediary mixtures (sixth mode), by their 
qualities differing on quantity and constitution (seventh mode), by everything being 
relative (eighth mode), by being less impressed by things the more frequent they occur 
(ninth mode), and by the societies’ differing customs and laws (tenth mode). (PH I, 35–
162. Cf. DL IX, 79–88.15) One would have no option but to suspend judgment by epochē. 
Pyrrhonist Agrippa (c. 1st century AD) later augmented the Ten Modes with an 
additional Five: from dispute, from regress ad infinitum, from relativity, from assumption 
of hypothesis, and from circularity. The first (dispute) and the third (relativity) appear 
to be condensed from the Ten, whereas the other three seem more original. By them, 
every knowledge claim must be justified, for which there appear only three possibilities: 
1. assuming an axiomatic foundation (i.e., refusal of response), 2. circular reasoning (i.e., 
repetition of an earlier claim). or 3. vicious infinite regress (i.e., supporting the 
knowledge claim with another ad infinitum). (PH I, 164–177; cf. DL IX, 88–93; Thorsrud 
2014, 150–160.) These are known in contemporary epistemology as Agrippa’s trilemma.16 
The best-known representative of Pyrrhonism is, however, Sextus Empiricus (c. 
160–210 AD), whose works, Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against Mathematicians, are the 
 
14 Just as with Pyrrho, there are similar interpretive issues regarding Aenesidemus, whether he should be 
read as suspending judgment on everything due to an undecidable balance of testimonies or as seeing that 
no x is by nature F or F*. I have tried to present the Ten Modes neutrally to both readings. See Striker 
1983, 98–105; Woodruff 1988; Hankinson 1995, 127–128; 2010, 109–113; Bett 2000a, 189–222; Thorsrud 
2014, 102–103; Castagnoli 2018, 72–76. 
15 See Annas & Barnes 1985, 26–30, 39; Striker 1983, 100; Hookway 1990, 7–10; Castagnoli 2018, 71–72. 
16 For the trilemma in contemporary discussion, see, e.g., M. Williams 1991, 60–68; 2001, 61–63. I argue 
in chapter 3.4 that to be successful, Descartes’s project has to overcome this trilemma by proving it false. 
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main source of Pyrrhonian skepticism surviving to contemporary times (see Floridi 
2002).  It is difficult to say how much of what Pyrrhonism Sextus describes in these 
works was already present in the thinking of the earlier skeptics such as Aenesidemus 
and Pyrrho (cf. Bett 2000b, 12; Pellegrin 2010, 121–122; Brennan & Roberts 2018, 125–
127). Thus, the following description of Pyrrhonism should be understood as how 
Sextus reports it and not as a description of historical Pyrrhonism as a whole. 
  Sextus distinguishes three types of philosophers: those who think truth has been 
discovered (Dogmatists), who claim it is inapprehensible (Academics), and who still 
investigate (skeptikos, gr. σκεπτικός) (Pyrrhonists or Skeptics) (PH I, 1–4).17 Pyrrhonism, 
unlike Academic skepticism, does not propose akatalēpsia – they neither affirm nor deny 
that things can be grasped or that truth can be gained. It appears that attempts to gain 
truth have been unsuccessful, yet acquiring truth may still be possible. However, since 
truth is not found, the Pyrrhonist practices epochē and suspends judgment. 
Pyrrhonism, like other Hellenistic philosophies, aims at tranquility and freedom from 
mental disturbance. However, the Pyrrhonist recognises that since one aspect causing 
disturbance and frustration in human life is the hunger for answers and knowledge, 
which are not found by the dogmatic methods, one must live without any dogma (δογμα) 
to live happily. A skeptic first notices an unevenness, anomaly (anōmalia, gr. ἀνωμαλία), 
in how things appear: For Calvin honey appears sweet, whereas for Hobbes it appears 
bitter. The two impressions are contrary to each other (antithesis, gr. ἀντίθέσις) (but not 
in contradiction; it is also possible that both impressions are false). Since neither 
impression is more convincing than the other, they result in isostheneia (ἰσοσθένεια), 
equipollence or equal balance. Impressions being equally balanced, the skeptic suspends 
judgment on whether honey is bitter or sweet by means of epochē. The skeptic then 
notices the resulting state to be complete tranquility and peace of mind (ataraxia, gr. 
ἀταραξία) when judgment is suspended.18 
The peacefulness of ataraxia appears to be a step below full eudaimonia, because the 
state of tranquility the skeptic reports feeling is not stable and unchanging; impressions 
force themselves on him, and a new disturbing anomaly might appear at any point to 
disturb his peace, making him repeat the process. The Pyrrhonian skeptic then follows 
 
17 The term “skeptic” was not used during the early Middle Academy, and not, apparently, even in 
Aenesidemus’s time (Castagnoli 2018, 67). By the time of the Renaissance rediscovery of Sextus, “skeptic”, 
Academic” and “Pyrrhonian” had become synonymous terms (Schmitt 1972, 8; Limbrick 2008, 67–68; 
Caluori 2007; 2018; Naya 2009, 24). It later became common place to refer to Pyrrhonists as “Skeptics”, 
to distinguish them from Academics. Cf. AT VII, 130; CSM II, 94.  
18 Whether or not suspension results causally is questionable. The connection is closer to causal than 
logical or argumentative, yet the Pyrrhonist creates no dogma on the suspension, not closing out the 
possibility that sometimes equipollence might not result in suspension. See, however, Thorsrud 2014, 126–
130; Eichorn 2020. 
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the path from antithesis to isostheneia to epochē to ataraxia continuously, until full eudaimonia 
is reached. Even here, the skeptic makes no dogmatic claims on how eudaimonia is to be 
gained; if some true knowledge is found and leads to eudaimonia, the skeptic would be 
happy to get on board. Until that though, the skeptic suspends judgment in each case, 
reaching ataraxia. (PH I, 8–12, 29–30.) Skeptics do not even form a belief that 
suspension necessarily leads to ataraxia – they merely hope to gain ataraxia, suspend 
judgment due to disturbing anomalies in seeking it and notice that ataraxia follows “as 
a shadow follows a body” (PH I, 29).19 
However, there are large debates on what the claim of living without dogmas means. 
The Pyrrhonist, while suspending judgment on dogmas, can assent (synkatatithetai, gr. 
συγκατατίθεται) to the feelings forced on him (katēnankasmenois pathesi, gr. 
κατηναγκασμενοις παθεσι) by the impressions of things (PH I, 13). The traditional reading, 
also known as the “No Beliefs” view, holds that the Pyrrhonist lives completely without 
beliefs, including those about everyday life (Burnyeat 1983; 1997; Barnes 1997; 
Thorsrud 2014). Assenting to forced feelings means that the Pyrrhonist suspends on 
how things truly are and reports only how things appear to him. A Pyrrhonist who burns 
his mouth with bean soup would not say that the bean soup is hot, but that “it appears 
that the soup is burning my mouth now”, not assenting to a belief but simply expressing 
the state he appears to be in.  
Still, because it is difficult to defend the skeptic not at least assenting to the feeling of 
being impressed, others hold a so-called “Some Beliefs” view of the Pyrrhonian epochē. 
This view has been proposed in two forms. 1) The skeptic has beliefs over how 
something appears (Fine 2000; 2003b; Perin 2010). The skeptic, then, assents to the 
bean soup appearing to be hot but suspends judgment that it really is hot. 2) The skeptic 
suspends judgment on scientific theorisation and unclear (adēlon) views (which the 
dogmatists hold) but has beliefs concerning everyday life (Frede 1997a; 1997b; Brennan 
2000; Tuominen 2016; Morison 2019). According to this, call it the “No Unclear 
Beliefs” view, the skeptic assents to ordinary, everyday life beliefs while withholding 
assent on the dogmatic claims of going from the appearances to the natures of the things 
themselves. These would cover all theoretical claims, for instance, that gravitation 
affects objects (to which “Some Beliefs” 1 skeptic could assent, taken that the 
qualification “it appears that” is added to the beginning), and other non-apparent views, 
such as generalisations. The skeptic assents that the bean soup is hot right now but not 
that the bean soup is always hot or that it is naturally hot or that it is hot because of the 
 
19 Sextus demonstrates this with a story about the painter Apelles: After unsuccessfully trying to portray 
foam in a horse’s mouth, he angrily flung his sponge at the canvas, accidentally creating the desired 
representation of lather (PH I, 28). 
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speed of the atoms that constitute it. This latter reading has the advantage of fitting 
rather well with how Sextus describes the differences regarding assent between the 
dogmatists and the skeptics: “[The Skeptics] do not hold beliefs in the sense in which 
some say that belief is assent to some non-apparent object of investigation (zētoumenon, 
gr. ζητούμενον) in the sciences (epistēmas, gr. ἐπιστήμας); for the Pyrrhonists do not assent 
to anything non-apparent” (PH I, 13). (Cf. Tuominen 2016, 95–108.) 
2.2. Ancient Skeptics and Epochē: Living in the World 
Both Academic and Pyrrhonian skeptics then recommend epochē as a way of life, a 
dialectical strategy, and even as a therapeutic method for dealing with disturbances and 
anomalies. One would withhold assent on dogmatic claims in epochē, avoiding forming 
(theoretical) beliefs on how things truly are, concentrating on how they (convincingly) 
appear to be. Whether the two should be considered as separate factions or whether 
such a distinction is more or less artificial has generated some hot debate in recent 
decades (see esp. Striker 1996; 2010; Klein 2003; Thorsrud 2014, 7–14). Be that as it 
may, the distinction between Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism does appear rather 
thin. Sextus accused the Academics of negative dogmatism (PH I, 226), yet whether the 
Academics truly held such a view is rather suspect. The main dispute between the 
factions seems to have been in proclaiming or not proclaiming akatalēpsia, and even 
then, it is unclear and debated whether the Academics themselves truly held to the 
incomprehensibleness of everything or whether they only maintained that their Stoic 
interlocutors are required to hold it. One should also remember that the distinction has 
political, rather than just philosophical, features, as Aenesidemus attempted to separate 
his own faction from his ex-colleagues in the Academy (cf. Castagnoli 2018, 69–70). If 
some real difference existed, it could have been in that Academic skepticism was more 
dialectically oriented, using skeptical strategies to oppose other claimed followers of 
Socratic-Platonic philosophy, whereas Pyrrhonism appears more ethical living oriented – 
a way to an undisturbed, tranquil life.20 
However, there are still two issues worthy of discussion regarding skeptical epochē: 1. 
How does the skeptic live without beliefs (a so-called problem of apraxia)? 2. How wide 
is the ancient skeptical epochē (does it extend to the existence of the world)? Both of 
 
20 See DL IV, 33; PH I, 234. Cf. Hankinson 1995, 75; Ioppolo 2018, 36. See also Burnyeat 1997, 34; Striker 
1996; 2010. Note, though, that Carneades and “No Beliefs” Sextus would react to a hot bean soup very 
differently. Carneades could view it convincing that the bean soup is hot and refrain from eating it, whereas 
“NB” Sextus would merely “go along” with the impression that it appears hot and, as it has been reported 
that it may burn, refrain from eating it. See PH I, 227–230. 
Doubt and Skepticism 
36 
these issues are related to a larger frame question: How does ancient skepticism differ 
from modern (Cartesian) skepticism (cf. chapter 1.3)? 
As mentioned, the traditional distinction between ancient and modern skepticism is 
to see the ancient variant as a way of life, contrasted to the Cartesian instrumental use 
of skepticism as a methodological affair with no practical concern (i.e., insulated, chapter 
1.1). By seeing skepticism just as an epistemological tool, Cartesian skepticism is, 
consequently, able to bypass a counter argument the ancient skeptics faced: If the 
skeptic suspends on everything, how can he take action? This argument is also known 
as the apraxia (ἀπραξία) or inactivity charge. If the skeptics truly suspend on everything, 
they could not be able to act, as being active requires beliefs. A skeptic who suspends 
all belief would be incapable of even speech, resembling a house plant more than a man 
(a so-called classic or plant apraxia) (e.g., Aristotle, Met. 4.4, 1008b8–17). Apraxia became 
a major tool in the arsenal against skepticism in both the Stoics’ quarrel with the 
Academics and the dogmatists’ critique of the Pyrrhonists. For example, Sextus reports 
of the skeptics being presumed to reject life and “remaining like a vegetable” by 
withholding from desiring and avoiding (M IX, 163–164). 
However, the charge would take different forms based on the charger’s philosophical 
framework. Besides the classical version where the skeptic is incapable of acting 
whatsoever, there were forms of the charge that could be titled pragmatic apraxia, 
allowing the skeptics action but in a disparaging way. Pyrrho was not reportedly inactive 
but took no precaution with his action, being self-destructive (pragmatic self-destructive 
apraxia) (DL IX, 62). Meanwhile, the Stoics consider that rational action presupposes 
an impression (visual or mental) that such-and-such would be good or beneficial, with 
the impulse to act following the assent to such an impression. Both impression and 
assent are relevant for rational agency, and refraining from either abolishes human 
action, relegating skeptics to the level of irrational animals (pragmatic irrational apraxia) 
(Acad. II, 12.37–39; M VII, 158). 
The apraxia charge, by implication, makes the skeptics vulnerable to two other 
charges: insincerity and non-eudaimonism. An apraxia charger can also charge the skeptics 
with being inconsistent because they do move and act, even rationally and with 
precaution, and, thus, even they do not sincerely and faithfully follow their philosophy 
(Met. 4.4, 1008b8–17; M IX, 164; Acad. II, 38). The apraxia charger can similarly charge 
the skeptics with being unable to live a good and happy life, one where the person 
chooses good and virtuous actions instead of bad and vicious ones (Acad. II, 39). (Cf. 
Fine 2000, 213–214; Striker 2010, 197–198; Vogt 2010, 166–168; Obdrzalek 2012.) 
The skeptics, as earlier implied, had various strategies to answer the inactivity charge. 
Arcesilaus held that the impulse to act can occur without assent, solely by impression. 
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If a Stoic opponent insisted that this position still leaves him vulnerable to the 
irrationality and the non-eudaimonist charges, Arcesilaus would refer to regulating one’s 
actions by “the reasonable” (to eulogon, gr. το εὐλόγον)  as a criterion for the conduct of 
life and, by performing prudent (phronēsin, gr. φρόνησιν) and correct (katorthōma, gr. 
κατόρθωμα) actions, attaining happiness (Col. 1122A–D; M VII, 158). Carneades 
distinguishes between unclear and inapprehensible impressions, referring to some 
impressions as more convincing than others; the skeptic is then able to follow the more 
convincing impressions and live a rational and happy life while refraining from assenting 
to them by practicing epochē (Acad. II, 10.32).21 Sextus, like Arcesilaus, distinguishes the 
criterion of truth from the criterion of action, referring to the latter as being guided by 
what is apparent (phainomenon, gr. φαινόμενον). Apparent impressions, being passive and 
involuntary, are not objects of investigation (azētēton, gr. ἀζήτητον) for the Pyrrhonists; 
thus, the skeptic lives in accordance with “everyday observances” without assenting 
dogmatically. Sextus lists these observances to be seemingly fourfold: [1.] guidance by 
nature (e.g., the ability to sense and think), [2.] necessitation by feeling (e.g., hunger, 
thirst, tiredness), [3.] following laws, traditions and customs (e.g., from an “everyday 
point of view” piety is good and impiety bad), and [4.] teaching of technical expertise 
and skill (the life of a skeptic is active and acute). (PH I, 21–24.) A skeptic in epochē can, 
then, live and act in accordance with what appears to him, without committing to the 
truth of those appearances. The skeptic not only has an active and rational life but can 
even be happier and more moderate than the dogmatist, because while the skeptic has 
the same impressions of pain and hunger, he suspends the belief that these conditions 
are bad (which would drastically raise one’s anxiety and frustration). (Cf. Fine 2000, 
219–220; Obdrzalek 2006; Thorsrud 2010, 67–78; Vogt 2010, 168–178.) Academics and 
Pyrrhonists had resources for replying to apraxia-type charges, allowing them to live an 
assent-free life while recommending thorough epochē. Moreover, although the traditional 
account assumes that Cartesian skepticism does not even bother with apraxia arguments 
(e.g., Thorsrud 2014, 7), I argue in chapter 2.5 that Descartes was similarly worried 
about the ethical and practical-political concerns of radical skepticism.  
Let us turn now to the other issue previously presented: How thorough, actually, is 
the ancient epochē? More specifically, did the ancients suspend judgment on the existence 
of the external world; were they external world skeptics? The answer can depend on 
how we describe external world skepticism. Ancient skepticism, and Pyrrhonism 
specifically, is traditionally described, following an influential reading by Myles Burnyeat 
 
21 By dialectical reading, Arcesilaus and Carneades could simply point out the apraxia being a problem for 
the Stoics. By responding, they appear to acknowledge it as a problem for themselves. (Hankinson 1995, 
113; Thorsrud 2010; 2014, 81–82.) 
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(1982, 25–26; 1983, 128–130; 1997, 97–98), as what is called property skepticism: 
Skepticism that raises comparisons between contrary impressions and suggests that one 
cannot be preferred over the other but does not question whether the source of the 
impressions actually exists or not. Their sort of skepticism pays attention to honey 
appearing to taste sweet in one condition and bitter in another but does not question 
the honey being there. Instead, it presupposes the existence of the honey.22 A specific 
aspect of Cartesian skepticism is its wide-reaching generalised nature: Skeptical doubt does 
not merely consider each perception on its own (locally) but extends to consider every 
and all instances of perception (globally). It is difficult to find such generalisations in 
either Cicero’s reporting on the Academics or Sextus’s reporting on the Pyrrhonists. 
Furthermore, related to the practical aspect of skepticism as previously described, since 
ancient skepticism constitutes a way of living in the world, it must stop short of 
questioning the very existence of the world. According to this reading, it is tedious to 
ascribe external world skepticism, as it is usually portrayed (either in the early modern 
or today) to the ancients. Their skepticism questions the nature, or essence, of things, not 
their existence.23 Burnyeat even considers that the ancients had resources for 
generalising skepticism to the external world but did not “dare” to do so (1982, 37).24 
Recently, however, the Burnyeatian reading tradition has been disputed and the lack 
of external world skepticism for the ancients questioned. Gail Fine has particularly 
challenged the divide of practical life skepticism vs. theoretical external world skepticism 
as uncomfortable. That the ancient skeptic must believe the external world exists in 
order to take evasive action not to fall from a precipice seems unjustified to Fine. The 
skeptic in epochē could just non-dogmatically follow the appearance of there being a 
precipice or that the honey exists or even that he has a body and the external world 
exists (2000, 229–231).25 The skeptics could even be read as conceiving a kind of 
external world skepticism, based on passages in which Sextus describes what is outside 
the skeptic’s intellect, referring to “all external objects” and “the nature of external 
 
22 Notice that in the classic apraxia, why the skeptic won’t just walk into a well is based on the equal balance 
of positive and negative outcomes (falling/not falling); the skeptic is not expected to question the existence 
of the well itself (see Met. 4.4, 1008b8–17). Hume’s modern version of the apraxia comparably sees a (true) 
skeptic questioning whether he would even fall at all if he left from the window instead of the door (D 
1.5–6). Cf. Gassendi (AT VII, 282; CSM II, 197). 
23 Cf. Annas & Barnes 1985, 7–9; M. Williams 1986, 118–122; 2010, 288–290; Larmore 1998; 2006, 17; 
2014, 49–50. 
24 Burnyeat refers to an argument in the Academica by which a deity could send the sage false presentations 
disguised as plausible (Acad. II, 15.47). Cf. Fine 2000, 228–230; Bermúdez 2000, 338–342; 2008, 64–67. 
However, see chapter 2.3.3. 
25 Note that Fine does not maintain that the ancients do generalise their skepticism, or even that they do 
non-dogmatically follow the appearances of external objects. She merely finds the Burnyeatian distinction 
unjustified (2000, 230; 2003a). 
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existing objects” being non-apparent (e.g., PH I, 163, 215; M VII, 191–194; 366). A 
similar reading can be drawn from his discussion of physics by which the skeptic 
suspends judgment on motion, rest, place, and time, among other things (PH III, 63–
150). (Fine 2003a; 2003b; Thorsrud 2014, 182–183; Vogt 2018).  
Nevertheless, it can be questioned whether these discussions lead to a wide enough 
skepticism of the external sphere. Both Academics and Pyrrhonists treat each 
impression of a seeming external object separately from each other. “We oppose what 
appears to what appears, or what is thought of to what is thought of, or crosswise” (PH 
I, 13). Nothing that Sextus says excludes external nature from this method. He 
sometimes refers to external things in plural, but a Pyrrhonist’s suspension is clearly not 
generalised in the same sense as in the Cartesian discussion. The same is true for physics. 
The skeptic should suspend judgment independently on motion, rest, place, and time 
(e.g., “Parmenides states that there is no motion, Aristotle states there is motion, this 
cannot be settled”), but only as local cases, separate from each other. The skeptic cannot 
just pile the suspensions up for a coherent skepticism of the whole physical nature. 
Even by the “No Beliefs” reading, though radical on their own, the Pyrrhonists’ tropes 
are not sufficiently far-reaching to question the whole of nature, not to mention the 
external world. (Cf. Bermúdez 2000, 337–342; 2008, 63–67; Vogt 2016, 266.) 
However, unlike what Burnyeat and others seem to think, just generalising the 
skeptical strategies from local cases to global suspension does not yet give us the modern 
external world skepticism.  Even if, for argument’s sake, we granted a generalised 
reading of epochē for Sextus’s Pyrrhonists (e.g., by Agrippan modes) or Cicero’s 
Academics (e.g., by the indistinguishability of plausible and false) and considered 
applying it in terms of the external world, there would still be something off about this 
ancient external world skepticism. One way to put the issue is by analysing the required 
aspects of modern, and at the same time contemporary, external world skepticism. The 
first aspect is a distinction between ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ scopes – the former inside the 
perceiver’s mental conception and the latter outside of it. The second aspect is that these 
scopes could be fully distinct: The outer scope might not exist at all while the inner scope 
remains unchanged and vice versa. The result could be called extreme external world 
skepticism. Now, even if we read the ancients as suspending judgment generally, they 
seemingly would not conceive the extreme version. At most, the skeptic that Sextus and 
Cicero describe would say that the external world might be different from our 
impressions of it. It may seem that there is a precipice in front of me, but the ground 
might actually continue (yet, I can still follow my natural tendencies that make me avoid 
what seems like a precipice). Even if I widen the scope generally to each sensation at 
the same time, I am still left with the weaker claim that reality merely might not be as I 
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perceive it. Call this moderate external world skepticism. The two may seem only a small 
step apart, yet to move from one to the other requires a huge conceptual leap. The 
extreme version requires a more clear-cut division between the internal and external 
spheres, in which the outer world could even be reduced or absorbed into the mind’s 
inner world. Just moving from local to generalised suspension does not yet grant us 
extreme external world skepticism (a lesson we will return to with Descartes’s dream 
skepticism in chapter 4.2).26  
2.3. Medieval Skepticism: External World and Divine Deception 
The ancient skeptics, particularly the Academics, were then perhaps the first to conceive 
the so-called indistinguishability argument: For every perceptual experience, there can be a 
phenomenally indistinguishable experience that is non-veridical. The argument forms 
the backbone of the Academic critique of Stoicism and Epicureanism, appears in Sextus 
(e.g., M VII, 403–411), and later returns as the main principle in Descartes’s dreaming 
scenario.27 However, unlike Descartes, the ancients did not generalise their skepticism, 
and even if they did, it would have only resulted in moderate external world skepticism, 
not yet holding a clear-cut distinction of inner and outer scopes. One must make two 
transitions for the distinction to be possible: first from particular objects to the nature 
of objects in general and then from the general nature to its status as the external world 
sufficiently separate from the mind. Ancient philosophers held what has been called 
physicalism of mind, considering mind and the external world to be parts of the same 
structure (Everson 1991; Vogt 2016; cf. Bermúdez 2000, 335–342; 2008, 62–67).28 They 
might have made the first transition but not the second. 
   I describe in this chapter how the second transition and the clear-cut distinction 
became possible, arguing that the critical accounts of skepticism in late antiquity and 
the Middle Ages played a significant role in it. I concentrate first on Augustine’s critique 
of Academic skepticism, then moving to discuss high and late Medieval epistemological 
debates, especially versions of the famous deceiver argument traditionally considered 
essential for external reality skepticism and generalised doubt. 
 
26 As is seen in Aristotle and Laertius (Met. 1008b16; DL IX, 62) skeptics falling from precipices was a 
common caricature. Cf. Montaigne (Apologie: 1907, 236; 1991, 563); Descartes (AT VII, 351; CSM II, 243).  
27 Cf. Acad. 2.28.90; AT VII, 19; CSM II, 13. Contrast with PH (I, 104). Cf. chapters 2.5.2. and 4.2.2. 
28 Fine (2003b, 201–209) has argued the ancients had to have had a certain concept of subjectivity (e.g., 
PH I, 170). Even so, the concept alone is not enough for the skeptics or their interlocutors to conceive 
the mind as sufficiently distinct from the rest of the world. Cf. Remes 2007; Thorsrud 2014, 182; Vogt 
2016, 266–267. See also Matson 1966. See Bermúdez (2000, 339–340; 2008, 65–66) for differences 
between the Pyrrhonian and the Academic tropes regarding this issue. 
Doubt and Skepticism 
41 
2.3.1. Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages: Augustinian Critique 
Ancient skeptical thought was preserved for later periods mainly through three sources: 
Cicero’s Academica, Sextus’s Outlines and Against Mathematicians, and biographical sections 
on Arcesilaus, Carneades, Pyrrho, and Timon in the Lives of Eminent Philosophers by 
Diogenes Laertius (probably 3rd century AD).29 By the time of the late antiquity and 
early Medieval periods, Cicero’s Latin work had become the most known and read, 
spreading Academic thought as the skepticism most known to philosophers and 
theologians. This came at the expense of Pyrrhonism, particularly Sextus’s Greek texts, 
though Laertius’s account was also affected (“Life of Pyrrho” remained virtually 
unknown until the 15th century, see Schmitt 1983, 227; Blackwell 1993, 327–328). As a 
result, Academicus became synonumous with “skeptic”, this linguistic use being retained 
until the 17th century (see note 17). 
Another early player in the circulation of Academic over Pyrrhonian thought was 
Augustine, whose first known work, Contra Academicos, became a fourth major source 
of ancient skepticism (though its description of skeptical arguments was lifted straight 
from Cicero). As a devastating critique of Academical skepticism, it was also one of the 
last efforts to deal with the movement as a living issue (until the rediscovery of 
Pyrrhonian skepticism during the 15th and 16th centuries) (Schmitt 1983, 226). Thus, the 
skeptical terminology and argumentative arsenal became to be based on Cicero’s and 
Augustine’s Latin works. (Floridi 2002, 13–14; 2010, 267–268.30)  
Augustine appears to have delved into skeptical questions early on, aided by his 
reading of Cicero’s works. He was first attracted to the pursuit of wisdom as an 18-year-
old student in Carthage by the (now lost) Hortensius, and about ten years later while 
residing in Rome was inclined to believe that “‘The Academics’ were wiser than the rest 
in holding that we ought to doubt (dubitandum) everything” (Conf. 5.10.19). The skeptical 
hold did not last long though, for soon afterwards Augustine was exposed to Neo-
Platonism and later converted to Christianity around 386–388 (Conf. 3.4.7, 7.9.13, 
8.12.29; C. Acad. 1.1.4, 2.9.23, 3.20.43). (Cf. Kirwan 1983; 1989, 15; Floridi 2002, 13.)  
Nevertheless, the early skeptical crisis affected Augustine’s writing throughout his 
life, for he never ceased to consider skepticism a challenge for both knowledge and 
faith. Augustine, while not a skeptic, contributed to the history of skeptical thought in 
three crucial ways: first, by taking skepticism as a serious threat and seeing fit to answer 
 
29 There are passing remarks on skepticism also in the works of Plutarch (c. 46–120 AD), Ptolemy (c. 100–
170 AD), Aulus Gellius (c. 125–180 AD), and Galen (c. 129–210 AD). See Schmitt 1983, 226.  
30 Other early Christian authors who mention skepticism include Tertullian (c. 155–240), Lactantius (250–
325), Eusebius of Caesarea (c. 260–340), and St. Jerome (c. 347–420). See Schmitt 1972, 23–28; 1983, 226; 
Svavarsson 2010, 37. 
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it; second, by these efforts, enabling the circulation and spread of skeptical arguments; 
and third, through his reflections, conceiving a new form of skepticism –  skepticism as 
a thought experiment of the inner ‘self’. (Marchand 2018, 175.) 
Contra Academicos was written around the time of Augustine’s conversion31 and 
heavily relies on Cicero’s Academica, so much so that it can be actually seen answering 
Cicero’s defense of the Academics rather than the Academics themselves. Partly due to 
Augustinus’s mediocre skill in Greek, he was unaware of both Sextus’s and Laertius’s 
accounts of Pyrrhonism, and did not include it into the discussion, further cementing 
the Academics as “the skeptics” for the subsequent period (see Schmitt 1972, 24 & 29–
30; Kirwan 1983, 206; 1989, 16–17; Floridi 2002, 13; Lagerlund 2010a, 5).32  
Augustine takes the dogmatist side in the ancient rivalry between the Garden (the 
Academic skeptics) and the Porch (the Stoic dogmatists), though not in a particularly 
Stoic way.  The discussion does begin rather Hellenistically, with Augustinus’s students 
Licentius and Trygetius, following the eudaimonistic model, arguing whether a man who 
merely seeks the truth without gaining it can be happy, but this debate ends in the 
temporary victory of the skeptical side, represented by Licentius. Augustine seemingly 
considers the earlier Stoic and other Hellenistic answers to skepticism to be inadequate, 
for they seek to simply trim the definitions of happiness, desire, truth, and so on. 
Although siding with the dogmatists in considering that a wise man cannot be happy if 
he is still trying to discover the truth, Augustine feels that the argument eventually leads 
to the skeptics’ advantage, and the assistance of additional arguments is required. (C. 
Acad. 1.3.7–9, 1.8.22–23, 1.9.24–25.) Augustine derives one from the Carneadean 
concept of pithanon, especially its Ciceronian translation as verisimilitude, or truth-likeness 
(Acad. II, 31.99). According to Augustine, to accept something to be ‘like truth’ would 
require one to also know what truth is, because in order to say that someone looks like 
their father, one would have to have met the father in question. The question for 
Augustine is not just about words either. Following something as seemingly true is to 
assent to it, but to assent to it as seemingly true, one must know what truth is (as we 
can see, Augustine has already began to somewhat reform the skepticism of the ancients 
in his critique).33 (C. Acad. 2.7.16–19, 2.10.24–2.11.26, 3.18.40; cf. Kirwan 1983, 206–
211; 1989, 17–22; Lagerlund 2010a, 6.) 
However, even the argument from verisimilitude makes only a dent in the Academic 
armour, and Augustine proceeds to his main attack against what he considers the 
Academic position: that (1) nothing can be comprehended (i.e., known) and (2) a wise 
 
31 The year of the conversion is debated (see, e.g., Kirwan 1983; 1989, 15; Floridi 2002, 13; Vogt 2016). 
The work was composed in the villa of Classiciacum near Milan, most likely just before the conversion. 
32 There were sporadic references to Pyrrhonism, but it was dying out. Floridi 2002, 12–14; 2010, 267–269 
33 Lactantius takes a more approving attitude towards the skepticism in Cicero. See Schmitt 1972, 24–28. 
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man ought to suspend assent on everything (C. Acad. 2.13.29). The argument against (2) 
is rather run-of-the-mill, with Augustine conjuring his own versions of the plant apraxia 
and the Ciceronian non-eudaimonism charge,34 but the argument against (1) proved to be 
truly influential. Augustine begins it by defending the Stoic criterion of truth: Some 
things can be understood with such details that they could not be false, referring, like 
the Stoics to assent-compelling, evident cognitions (e.g., M VII, 257). Unlike the Stoics 
and other Hellenistic schools, however, Auugustine relies on a priori knowledge and 
necessary logical truths (the definition is either true or false, there is either one world or 
more than one world, etc). Every similar disjunction is necessarily true, so there are 
things that can be known. Skeptical contrarities, with a possible third option, the become 
disjunctive “either or” contradictives. (C. Acad. 3.9.21–3.10.23.) 
Augustine takes the argument even further, asking by the Academic’s mouth, “if the 
senses are deceptive, how do you know that this world exists?” and answering “by the 
term world, I mean this totality which surrounds us and sustains us […] [w]hatever its 
nature may be” (C. Acad. 3.11.24). Even though our knowledge of the external world is 
mediated through the senses and can be deceptive or even false, whatever we think of 
its existence, it is nevertheless true that we have subjective presentation of something 
we can call “a world” and of which we can have knowledge (even if dreaming or mad). 
Augustine still presents the question to be more about knowing the nature of the world, 
rather than its existence, but his discussion drastically reforms the skeptical framework, 
allowing a distinction between the ‘external’ (presented by the bodily senses) and the 
‘internal’ (known by the spiritual mind). Thus, while somewhat misrepresenting the 
skeptical argumentation, Augustine allows subjective mental states to satisfy the 
conditions of knowledge. My appearance that it is now raining might be non-cognitive, 
but it is still true that it appears so to me. Subjective and mathematical-logical truths are, 
for Augustine, irrefutable to the cogniser, whether she is dreaming or not. “[E]ven if 
the whole human race were fast asleep, it would still be necessarily true that three times 
three are nine, and that this is the square of intelligible numbers” (C. Acad. 3.11.25–26).35  
Another line of argument pertaining to subjective states, appearing underdeveloped 
in Contra Academicos but taking prominence in other writings of the period, is self-referential 
knowledge: Knowing, for example, that “I am alive” and “I think” (e.g., Beat. Vit. 2.7).36 
 
34 C. Acad. 3.14.32–3.15.34. Cf. Heil 1972; A. Curley 1997; Yrjönsuuri 2000, 229; Marchand 2018, 178. 
35 Cf. Kirwan 1983, 213–218; 1989, 24–29; Marchand 2018, 176–177. See also Bolyard 2006. Brown (2008, 
31–33) calls this Augustinian content dogmatism, for one is always capable of grasping the truth condition of 
logical and subjective states. This is often taken to be Descartes’s view as well (see, e.g., Burnyeat 1982, 
28–29, 32–33) but see chapter 4.3.2. 
36 One reason why this argument might be mostly missing from C. Acad. is that the work’s goals are meant 
to be meagre, demonstrating the inconsistency and impossibility of skeptical position (likely as Augustine’s 
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This anti-skeptical theme continues later in his intellectual career. In De Trinitate, 
Augustine lists things that cannot be doubted, including that one lives, remembers, 
understands, wills, knows, and judges (Trin. 10.10.14, 15.12.21–22). In De Civitate Dei, 
Augustine notes most famously that even if he is mistaken or deceived, as an Academic 
suggests, that he could be wrong about something demonstrates that he necessarily 
exists (si enim fallor, sum) (Civ. Dei, 11.26). Self-knowledge, for Augustine, is direct, simple, 
transparent, and effortless, equal to logical and mathematical truths, as something one 
knows for certain and cannot doubt or be mistaken about.37 (Cf. Yrjönsuuri 1999; 2016.) 
Several components make it possible for Augustine to separate the internal and 
external spheres more prominently. One is the Platonic/Neo-Platonic concept of mind 
or soul, more real than mere material body, which Augustine adopts as an inner spiritual 
‘self’ (contrary to, e.g., the Aristotelian understanding of the soul as the principle of life, 
see chapter 3.1.1; cf. Lagerlund 2007, 3–4). Augustine reworks the ancient skeptics’ 
traditional arguments to a form he can answer by laying claim to internal knowledge, 
severing the ‘internal’ and ‘external’ spheres to be sufficiently independent. Skepticism 
becomes a pathway to the interior, a passage to one’s own immortal soul and origin in 
the image of God. (Yrjönsuuri 2000, 230–231; Marchand 2018, 182.) Another 
component is Augustine’s tendency to ask questions that are different from those of 
the ancients. Stoic and Academic discussions center around which cognitions, if any, 
can be irrefutably true. Augustine innovates by asking what can and cannot be doubted. 
The term “doubt” rarely, if ever, comes up in the ancient discussions, but does appear 
in Cicero as dubitari (e.g., Acad. II, 9.27). Reflecting on the Academics through Cicero, 
Augustine inadvertently includes doubt as an essential component of the skeptical lingo, 
setting up much of the following epistemological stage (Vogt 2016, 261–270; 2018).38 
Augustine retains many Stoic-Hellenistic doctrines, despite the partial remodelling 
of the traditional ancient picture, particularly an eudemonistic conviction of the happy, 
ethical life as an investigation of the truth, and its discovery by reaching a highly set 
epistemic ideal, adopting the Ciceronian Latin translation of scientia for the idealised 
Greek epistēmē (e.g., C. Acad. 2.5.11, 3.2.3–3.3.5; Beat. Vit. 4.33). Eudemonism would 
eventually make room for other ethical theories, especially voluntarism (see chapter 3.2), 
 
way of clearing his personal skeptical crisis for accepting Christianity). C. Acad. 2.9.22, 3.14.30, 3.20.43; 
Conf. 7.10.16; Retract. 1.1.1; cf. Schmitt 1972, 30; Kirwan 1983; 1989, 15–16; Hookway 1990, 35; Marchand 
2018, 175–176. See also A. Curley 1997, 14–18. 
37 Cf. the Second Meditation; chapter 5.1.2. Self-awareness for Augustine is more meagre, though, not 
intended for further realisations. Cf. Kirwan 1983, 218–221; 1989, 31–33; Yrjönsuuri 1999, 48–51; 2000, 
227–229; Marchand 2018, 181–182. For Augustine and Descartes, see Hatfield 1986; Matthews 1992; 
Menn 1998; Brown 2007; 2008; C. Wilson 2008.   
38 The Platonic-Augustinian and Aristotelian concepts of the soul would later get more or less united in 
the Scholastic discussions. Cf. Lagerlund 2007, 4; Martin 2007, 97; Leijenhorst 2012, 144. 
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but the concept of scientia as an ideal form of knowing would come to represent much 
of the following Medieval, Renaissance, and early modern discussion in the West.39 
2.3.2. High and Late Middle Ages: Medieval Debates 
It is questionable whether Augustine’s critique was wholly or even partly responsible 
for the skeptical school’s disappearance. However, his refutation coincides well with the 
growing disappearance of the original skeptical writings in Greek, and even today 
Augustine is still seen as the last (Western) writer to deal with ancient skepticism as a 
real, living philosophical school of thought. Augustine’s role was thought even larger in 
the late Medieval discussions on skepticism: As demonstrating how certain knowledge 
can be found, proving skeptical teachings wrong and immoral, dissipating the school 
(e.g., QF: 1957, 43). (Cf. Yrjönsuuri 1999, 49; 2000, 228; 2016, 179.) 
The late medieval picture of Augustine as a demolisher of skepticism is considered 
fanciful today, but Augustine’s influence on the vanishing of the skeptical school can 
be traced in another way. Direct knowledge of Cicero’s Academica was relatively rare 
before the 14th and 15th centuries, and the work was mostly known through indirect 
accounts such as Augustine’s and Lactantius’s. Meanwhile, the growing grip of 
Christianity affected attitudes and epistemological interests, replacing skeptical 
considerations with robust realism and, especially in the late Medieval period, what has 
been called “epistemological optimism” (Adriaenssen 2017) – that human knowledge does, 
at least in optimal conditions, reliably reach the truth about God’s creation.40 Even the 
term scepticus, while still occurring in Gellius, was absent from Medieval vocabulary, 
becoming common currency only in the 1430s by the circulation of Ambrose 
Traversari’s (1386–1439) translation of Laertius’s Lives. (Schmitt 1972, 12–24; 1983, 
226–233; Blackwell 1993, 327–328.) 
Academica was little known and referenced despite Cicero being one of the most 
widely read ancient authors throughout the medieval period. Several sporadic references 
to the work occurred throughout the Middle Ages (though most were probably based 
on secondary sources) and copies were included in several Medieval libraries, with few 
manuscripts from before the 14th century still extant, but the text was not included in 
any authoritative collections. There was also a Latin translation of Sextus’s Outlines in 
the late 1200s, (surviving as three manuscripts, one of them also including fragments 
 
39 See Pasnau 2017, 6–7, 26–27; Carriero 2009, 348. Cf. A. Curley 1997; Vogt 2016, 261. While I 
concentrate on Stoicism, other Hellenistic philosophies, like Epicureanism, are likewise to be found in 
Augustine’s influences. See Bolyard 2006.  
40 See Floridi 2002, 14–15; 2010, 268–269, 274; Adriaenssen 2017, 239–246. Cf. chapters 3.1, 4.1, and 4.2. 
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from Against the Mathematicians) but it seems to have had almost no influence or 
circulation. Sextus’s works mostly gathered dust in the far corner of gloomy library. A 
few (non-surviving) translations of Laertius likewise existed before the Traversari 
edition, but those were barely known, and “Life of Pyrrho” faded into obscurity. These 
led to Pyrrhonian skepticism playing an insignificant role during the western Middle 
Ages, discounting a few mentions of Sextus and Pyrrhonism, until the transmission of 
Greek manuscripts to Italy from Constantinople in the 1420s (Sextus and Laertius 
among them), leading to the Renaissance recovery of Greek culture in the west.41 
It would be a mistake, however, to say that the Latin Middle Ages were devoid of 
skeptical topics, and the description of the Medieval period as an “Age of Faith” during 
which no skeptical considerations were entertained due to religious dogma, gullibility, 
or acritical thinking is, happily, behind us. Almost no authors identified themselves as 
bona fide skeptics, yet several raised skeptical discussions in an attempt to either criticise 
someone else’s epistemological doctrines or to justify their own.42  
By the time of the 13th century, most of the epistemological debate concerned how 
knowledge is acquired rather than whether it is possible, with most authorative authors, 
 
41 Cf. Hookway 1990, 35; Copenhaver & Schmitt 1992, 241; Blackwell 1993, 327–328; Popkin 2003, 17–
18; Yrjönsuuri 2016, 180; Machuca 2018, 165–166. See Schmitt (1972, 35–36) for a listing of medieval 
manuscripts of Acad., For the same of Sextus’s works, see Floridi 2002, 14–25, 64–70, 79–80; 2010, 268–
277; Wittwer 2016. For DL, see Long 1972, xxvi. For C. Acad., see A. Curley 1997, 1–3. Reasons for losing 
the original texts include destruction of the Library of Alexandria and the sacking of Constantinople in 
1204. Note that due to limited resources, our knowledge of these periods is rather defective.    
   Meanwhile in the east, Pyrrhonism remained as a main skeptical influence of Islamic and Byzantine 
Christian traditions. Sextus’s and Laertius’s texts were more available for the Greek Orthodox theologians 
in Constantinople, with even Aenesidemus’s Discourses still existent. Research is lacking in these parts but 
we know that several Byzantine writers, like Gregory Nazianzen (c. 330–389), opposed the influence of 
“Sextuses and Pyrrhos” to religious thought, with renewed interest in the topic during the 1300’s. Such 
comments suggest there to still have been some Pyrrhonists in the east at the beginning of 4 th century. 
Schmitt 1972, 34–35; 1983, 227–235; Floridi 2002, 12–28, 63; 2010, 269–278; Wittwer 2016. 
   On the Arabic side, while no flesh-and-blood skeptics seem to have existed, skeptical thought played a 
central part in the tradition of classical Islam. Important Islamic skeptical themes include Avicenna’s (c. 
980–1037) “floating man” (bringing him close to Augustinian self-knowledge), and al-Ghazali’ (c. 1058–
1111) autobiographical Deliverance from Error describing how he was cured from a personal skeptical crisis 
by God (Deliverance, II). However, no evidence exists of Islamic skepticism’s direct influence on western 
skeptical thinking, Descartes included (but see anyway Menn 2003, Moad 2009, and Ruddle-Miyamoto 
2017). For al-Ghazali, see also Halevi 2002; Kukkonen 2010; Heck 2014; 2018. 
42 Among the earliest to tackle skepticism seriously was John of Salisbury (1120–1180), who extensively 
dealt with Cicero’s Academica (though he apparently knew the work only through secondary sources) and 
even considered himself an Academic skeptic. Salisbury, while not a genuine skeptic in the ancient or early 
modern sense (several issues are beyond doubt for him, such as logical truths, immediate perceptions, and 
religious dogma), recommends intellectual modesty by suspending judgment on dubitabilia sapienti, 
regarding truth to exist but to be attainable only for God. Humans, however, have an inclination towards 
the truth and can approach it by holding reasonable, probabilistic beliefs in everyday life and natural 
science. Adopting a Metrodorian-Philonian style fallibilism, Salisbury acts as an important antecedent for 
Renaissance and early modern fideism and mitigated skepticism (cf. Machuca 2018, 167; Bloch 2018). 
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especially Thomas Aquinas (1225– 1274), obtaining an Aristotelian view that the 
cognitive process is fundamentally a reliable one (see chapter 3.1.1). Some exceptions, 
though, existed, such as Siger of Brabant (c. 1240–1285), who, while not taking 
skepticism as a serious threat, devotes some space to confront it to strengthen his own 
position. Most importantly, Henry of Ghent (c. 1217–1293), a contemporary of both 
Siger and Aquinas, begins his Summa Quaestionum Ordinariarum with the question of 
whether a human can know anything (SQO, a.1, q.1). Henry engages with several 
traditional skeptical arguments to analyse the question, drawing them from Cicero. 
However (unlike Salisbury and probably Siger), Henry’s assessment of Academic 
skepticism seems to come not only from Augustine’s refutation or other indirect sources 
but he also appears to have had direct access to the Academica itself, quoting passages 
tha do not appear in Contra Academicos (cf. Schmitt 1972, 39–42; 1983, 227).  
Henry, though, does not just settle for the traditional skeptical arguments; he 
constructs his own. 
One who doesn’t perceive the essence or quidditas of a thing, but only its image, can’t 
know (scire) the thing. For one who has seen only a picture of Hercules doesn’t know 
(novit) Hercules. But [a] human being perceives nothing of a thing except only its image 
– that is, a species received through the senses, which is an image of the thing and not 
the thing itself. (SQO, a.1, q.1, VII.) 
The argument Henry depicts is not found in the Academic skeptic’s quiver but rises 
from the Aristotelian-Scholastic species theory: A perceived object is not present to the 
senses itself but sends an image-like sensible species to the perceiver’s eye. This is how, 
for example, Aquinas sees perceptual cognition occurring. However, Henry recognises 
a worry here: If all we are acquainted with are images of the external objects, and not 
the objects themselves, can we really know external reality? Henry, following the highly 
idealised form of scientia, considers that knowing is cognizing a thing as it is, without any 
falsity or deception (SQO, a.1, q.1). However, to cognise something as it is requires a 
grasp of that thing’s essential nature – to know x is to know what kind of a thing x is; 
seemingly an impossible task if one only has an image of x and not x itself. Henry solves 
the puzzle of grasping essences by way of “reading them off” from images, holding on 
to the species as cognitive intermediaries and remaining optimistic about the intellect’s 
ability to distinguish their veridicality. However, later writers grew more critical of the 
Aquinian-Ghentian depiction, seeing species as coming between the cogniser and the 
thing cognised. Among these critics were the Franciscan tradition of Peter John Olivi 
(1248–1298), John Duns Scotus (c. 1266–1308), Petrus Auriol (1280–1322), and 
William of Ockham (c. 1287–1347), composing various forms of diaphanous cognition, 
against the assumed mediated views of Aquinas and Henry (though without referring to 
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Cicero).43 There is, however, something common to all these cognitive frameworks: 
They all were directly realistic, taking external reality to be depicted by the senses more or 
less directly as it is, with perception, like knowledge, becoming a success term – something 
that, when properly executed, cannot be false.44 (Adriaenssen 2017, 29–39, 82; Bolyard 
2017, 4.1.1–4.1.2. For direct realism, see also chapter 1.1.)  
2.3.3. Late Middle Ages: God as Deceiver 
Henry was also a central figure in another crucial aspect of late Medieval intellectual 
history, with long-extending skeptical ramifications down the road: the Condemnation 
of 1277. The more conservative theological faculty rose to oppose the merging of too 
many Aristotelian elements into the still prominent Augustinianism due to Aristotle’s 
certain, less Christian orthodox doctrines, aided by the rediscovery of previously 
unknown Aristotelian texts, starting to make their way into universities in the 13th 
century. Henry, the regent master of the University of Paris and a more faithful follower 
of Augustine than Aquinas and Siger, was at the frontline of these matters, contributing 
to the 219 propositions condemned as heretical. Among the condemned were Aquinian 
doctrines considered to synthesise Aristotelianism inappropriately with Christianity, as 
well as several propositions that were to limit God’s potential. The somewhat 
unexpected (and ironic) consequence was that the most historically significant effect of 
the Condemnation’s emphasis on God’s omnipotence was the expansion of the realm 
of possibility in Medieval discussions, leading to an entirely new skeptical concern: If 
God is omnipotent, could he not be deceiving us in any single particular case or even 
on a general and systematic scale? (Normore 2007, 113; Bolyard 2017, 4.1.2.)  
The idea that a higher being (God or Demon) might be feeding fabricated 
information and globally deceiving me is typically taken to be an essential and 
distinguishing feature of modern (Cartesian) skepticism (a contemporary alternative is 
a mad scientist controlling a brain in a vat or a Matrix-like virtual reality). The potential 
deceit by a (nigh-)omnipotent god-like entity, combined with the strong mental-external 
divide, allows the Cartesian skeptic to bring the questioning to the external reality, 
including the skeptic’s own corporeal body, and even doubt the contents of 
 
43 See chapter 3.1.2. See also Yrjönsuuri 2000, 232; 2016, 186–188; Adriaenssen 2017; Pasnau 2017, 73–
74. Ultimately for Henry, although humans are capable of sensory knowledge by their natural condition, 
divine illumination is required to gain truly certain knowledge (SQO, a.1, q.2). Cf. Pickavé 2010. For Henry 
and illumination, see Pasnau (1995). 
44 Thus, even Henry did not commit to what would be called indirect realism, by which all we have of 
externality are the intermediary ideas, leaving a gap between the mind and the world for extreme external 
world skepticism. Cf. chapter 1.1. 
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mathematics and geometry (considered certain by Augustinian refutation). The ancients, 
in comparison, are considered not to have had the scenario at hand (or not daring to go 
as far à la Burnyeat), setting Cartesian skepticism apart by reconfiguring the ancient 
scenarios. Descartes is also often credited with acknowledging his originality, reportedly 
commenting that to cast the readers into as many doubts as possible, he raises “not only 
the customary difficulties of the sceptics” but also every difficulty that can be raised, 
implying the deceiver to be a novel addition (Conversation: AT V, 147; CSMK, 333). (Cf., 
e.g., Burnyeat 1982; M. Williams 1986; 2010; Larmore 1998; 2006; 2014; Grene 1999.) 
However, Descartes was by no means the first to propose the possibility of a 
deceitful deity, and several commentators have noted that divine deception does have 
ancient antecedents (e.g., E. Curley 1978, 68–69; Bermúdez 2000, 341; 2008, 66; 
Broughton 2002, 43; Brown 2013, 27). Take Plutarch, for example: “Again Chrysippus 
says, however, that both god and the sage induce false impressions” (De Stoic., 1057). 
Likewise, Cicero outlines the following counter argument towards the Stoics:  
[As it is accepted that] some presentations (visa)  are sent by the deity […] how […] can 
the deity have the power to render false presentations probable and not have the power 
to render probable […] those which do not differ from them at all? […] [T]he mind may 
also be set in motion in such a manner that not only it cannot distinguish whether the 
presentations in question are true or false but that there really is no difference at all 
between them… (Acad. II, 15.47–48.) 
Both of these passages are targeted against a rather obscure Stoic doctrine of accepting 
revelations from a deity. The Ciceronian one is especially interesting; it suggests a deity’s 
potential ability to induce presentations that would not come from any real object 
(being, thus, false by the Stoic definition) but that would be indistinguishable from true 
kataleptic presentations, even in the best of circumstances and under the utmost care. 
Plutarch is less clear on the matter, yet he does not hint that the deity induced false 
impressions could be distinguishable from kataleptic ones, either.  
However, the ancient examples do not really support Cartesian generalisation 
(contra, e.g., Burnyeat 1982). They question whether any given presentation might be 
caused by a non-veridical source indistinguishable from a veridical one, following the 
standard Academic strategy. The Ciceronian/Plutarchian deity works on a local, rather 
than a global level, questioning perceptions individually instead of simultaneously. (Cf. 
Bermúdez 2000, 342; 2008, 67; Brown 2013, 28.) 
The Condemnation of propositions in 1277 that set limits to God’s omnipotence 
offers, conversely, a more fertile ground for potentially generalised deception. For 
example, take proposition 22, “That God cannot be the cause of a newly-made thing 
and cannot produce anything new”. An essential significance for the subsequent debates 
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was also condemning proposition 69: “That God cannot produce the effect of a 
secondary cause without the secondary cause itself”. Our experience of the external 
world, the whole set of our impressions and beliefs, is a paradigm example of an effect 
of a secondary cause, which God can produce without the correct operation of the 
secondary causes (our senses and our intellect). Étienne Gilson (1999, 61–91) has also 
emphasised the condemning of proposition 28, “That from one first agent there cannot 
proceed a multiplicity of effects”, because it allows Christian God to create the totality 
of the world and all of its multiplicity of effects and beings in a single stroke (instead of 
acting through several mediating causes like Greco-Arabic God does), and, more 
importantly, intervene freely in its natural constitution at any instance, either by creating 
an effect in the mental sphere without a correlating secondary cause, or by performing 
miracles in the physical. (Klima, Allhoff & Vaidya 2007, 182–184. Cf. Bermúdez 2000, 
345–347; 2008, 68–70.) 
Epistemological theories became subtler in the aftermath of the 1277 
Condemnations, having to account for the possibility of God’s intervention in the 
cognitive process. For example, Olivi’s objection to the species theory relies on an 
assessment that the species become a barrier between mind and object. An Aristotelian 
ontological assumption, that cognised species is instantiated by a form-corresponding 
object in physical reality, is then open to a skeptical challenge of God presenting an 
image-like species to the intellect without a present corresponding object, prompting 
Olivi to opt for disjunctivist direct realism with occurrent perceptions, dispensing species 
as intermediaries (in post-perceptual cognition, like memory and imagination, Olivi is, 
though, happy to rely on species as a cognitive medium). Other species critics such as 
Scotus and Ockham demonstrate similar sensitivity towards Academica-like local 
deceptions. Ockham especially is noted for thinking God could bring about intuitive 
knowledge of a non-existent object (e.g., by preserving the perception of an object that 
has changed or ceased to exist), although, due to the nature of intuitive cognition, one 
would then correctly judge the object to not exist. Later Ockhamists, such as Robert Holcot 
(1290–1349) and Adam de Wodeham (1298–1358), however, held that if God brought 
about intuitive cognition of the non-existent, we would not be able to distinguish 
between true and false cognition, making the false judgment that the non-existent object 
does exist (neither, though, deviated from seeing the cognitive process as generally 
reliable). (Lagerlund 2010a, 17–19; 2018, 227; Perler 2010, 179–181. Cf. Normore 2007, 
120–121; Panaccio & Piché 2010; Slotemaker & Witt 2019. See also chapter 3.1.2.)  
It is not surprising that such localised cases of God’s deception were common in the 
Medieval discussion. After all, Academic arguments were rather widely known due to 
Augustine’s influence, and Henry’s account of them was likewise well-spread, especially 
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as a consequence of the Condemnations. However, were there also global, generalized 
examples of deception in the Middle Ages?  
It is possible to extract one such case from the writings of Nicholas of Autrecourt 
(1299–1369). Whether Autrecourt was a skeptic himself has been a hotly debated 
matter. What is certain is that he raises several radically skeptical issues, especially in two 
surviving letters to Fransiscan Bernard of Arezzo, a colleague at the Parisian Faculty of 
Theology. We know of Bernard’s views only through Aurtecourt’s summary, but based 
on the presented account, he agreed with later Ockhamists that one would judge a thing 
to exist by intuitive cognition, whether it did or not. Autrecourt infers two further 
propositions from Bernard’s: we cannot distinguish when our awareness of the 
existence of external objects is true and when false by our “natural light” (the 
constituting nature of human intellect), and every impression we have of the existence of 
objects outside our minds can be false. (B I, 2–3.) While the former is reminiscent of 
Academic arguments and Descartes’s dreaming, the latter draws a comparison with the 
Cartesian global deceiver possibility. According to Autrecourt, Bernard is unable to 
know not only his surroundings and own body (whether he has a head or a beard) but 
also his own intellectual acts, because he has maintained that cognition of one’s acts is 
less clear than cognition of things in the world (B I, 13–14). Autrecourt can then be seen 
as the first to originate a new kind of skeptic – a modern who generally questions 
whether the external world exists and whether he has a body or performs reliable 
cognitive acts. (Thijssen 2000; Bermúdez 2008, 68–69; Grellard 2010.) 
However, Autrecourt’s arguments were not meant to propagate radical skepticism 
but to reduce Bernard’s position ad absurdum. Autrecourt notes that Bernard’s thinking, 
especially regarding cognitive acts, leads to a position even more absurd than that of the 
Academics (as inherited from Augustine, B I, 15). Autrecourt’s Second Letter moderates 
the skepticism of the First, suggesting a probabilistic foundationalism, in which the 
principle of non-contradiction founds all certain knowledge, and other sorts of clear 
and intuitive cognitions remain merely plausible or hypothetical (B II, 2, 8, 25). 
Nevertheless, Aurtecourt’s comments against Bernard strongly affected the late 14th 
century epistemological discussions, with later authors often presenting them as 
arguments for radical skepticism. One of the large-scale ramifications of Autrecourt’s 
account was the partial relinquishing of the pursuit for scientia as an idealised epitome of 
certainty. Particularly influential in this approach was John Buridan (c. 1300–1361), who 
opted to distinguish between different types of knowledge and evidence, with multiple 
founding principles, instead of a foundationalist approach.  
Bernard already appealed to cognition in normal circumstances against Autrecourt, 
arguing that God would be performing a miracle by intervening in the cognitive process. 
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Autrecourt was not satisfied, for this still leaves open whether we ever know anything 
in the absolute sense (we cannot distinguish when God is doing miracles and when not). 
(B I, 8–11.) Buridan’s answer is to separate between absolute or divine evidentness and 
evidentness by natural constitution or (his preferred choice of words) the common course of 
nature. The move is based on a distinction between God’s absolute power (potentia 
absoluta), by which God can do anything (barring a contradiction), and his ordained 
power (potentia ordinata), limited to what God has prescribed by the set laws of nature. 
According to Buridan, God could turn of the sun at 9pm while conserving its 
perception, so we can never have absolute certainty of things like the sun’s brightness. 
Nevrtheless, with the common course not altered, the laws of nature applying, and being 
in my typical condition, I can access the truth using cognitive abilities and know that 
the sun is bright, such naturally constituted knowledge being sufficient for science 
(scientia). (SD 8.4.4; QM II, 1: 9ra–b.) Buridan further distinguishes moral evidentness 
which, while weaker than the previous two, suffices for moral behaviour in everyday 
life, allowing me to act calmly on, say, the belief that my cup contains the tea I poured 
there, even though one of my colleagues could have changed the liquid within or God 
could have transformed the tea into battery acid. Buridan abandons previous infallibilist 
attempts at founding knowledge, arguing for a reliabilistic fallibilism. After Buridan, the 
approach of separating absolute from conditional relative evidentness to counter 
skepticism was followed by writers such as Albert of Saxony (1320–1390) and Peter of 
Ailly (1350–1420), remaining a common response until the 16th century. (Cf. Zupko 
1993; Floridi 2002, 24; 2010, 276; Grellard 2007; 2018; Klima 2010; Karger 2010.) 
In summary, several Medieval writers took it as evident that God could, or even 
actively does, deceive us, even perhaps on a global scale. These include, along with those 
previously mentioned, names such as William Crathorn (fl. c. 1330) and John Rodington 
(c. 1290–1348). The possibility of God’s deception was also discussed by Gregory of 
Rimini (1300–1358) and Gabriel Biel (c. 1420–1495), who are among the examples that 
Mersenne raises against Descartes’s solution to his own version of the deceiver 
argument, that God’s nature as infinitely good bars any deception (Second Objections: 
AT VII, 125; CSM II, 89–90). Holcot and Rodington even hasten to say that benevolent 
God’s deception is not with bad intention; maybe it is beneficial that God’s deceives us, 
like a parent lying to their children for their own good (cf. AT VII, 126; CSM II, 90). 
Descartes is therefore gravely mistaken when claiming to be in agreement with “all 
metaphysicians and theologians past and future” on this doctrine (Second Replies: AT 
VII, 142; CSM II, 102). (Gregory 1992a; Perler 2010.45)  
 
45 Cf. Lagerlund 2010b; 2018; Pasnau 2017, 117–121. Ironically though, both Rimini and Biel agreed with 
Descartes on this matter. 
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Global scale deception was definitely in the air in the late Medieval Scholastic 
discussions, with even demonic deception a common topic, yet it never really 
materialised as the sort of wide-ranging skepticism that occurs in the First Meditation. 
The main reason for this is the Medieval background supposition of epistemological 
optimism – that the sensory cognitive process is generally and naturally reliable. Even 
the possibility of God deceiving us did not relinquish this overall confidence in natural 
cognitive processes, divine deception being a matter of interfering with the natural order 
by which we can obtain true knowledge of how things are in the world. The case of 
demonic deception is similar for the Scholastics, the common view being that while 
God or the angels could affect even matters pertaining to our intellect, or in God’s case 
even our will, demons could merely affect us on a sensory material level.46 Unlike 
Descartes, the Medieval writers did not engage in discussion of the general 
erroneousness of our cognitive framework. Their skeptical worries rose from the efficient 
cause of our cognitions, not from the efficacy of cognitive capacities as a whole.47 
None of the Medieval authors, then, seem to have articulated global deception as 
radically as Descartes, but their debates did, in any case, advance the distinction between 
the mind and the world, allowing for a type of extreme external world skepticism 
previously unseen.48 Moreover, while the common response to skepticism somewhat 
gave up the idealised scientia, it was not completely abandoned (see Grellard 2007, 341; 
2018, 218; Karger 2010; cf. Perler 2010, 190–191). The concept remained essential, 
rising to prominence in the Renaissance discussions on the intellect’s limited prospects 
at gaining truth of the created reality (even of one’s intellectual acts). These discussions 
also returned eudaimonistic questions of a happy, ethical life to the forefront, aided by the 
distinction of a practical life moral certainty from the certainty of scientific endeavours 
and a “God’s-eye view”. 
The skeptics were practically fictional challengers during the Middle Ages – shadow 
fencers against whom to test the sharpness of one’s epistemological and theological 
 
46 Cf. Scarre 1990. Even if we limit Burman’s report to the Demon (AT V, 147; CSM II, 333), Descartes 
comes off as less innovative than commonly assumed. See also the use of demonic deception in Teresa of 
Ávilla’s Castillo. Cf. chapter 1.2.1. In chapter 4.5, I argue that Descartes follows the late Medieval 
distinction between the scope of deception by demons and God. 
   Another aspect of the skeptical range is that all medieval examples of divine deception consist of God 
sending for or producing in us false impressions, actively deceiving us. In chapter 4.3, I argue that Descartes’s 
Deceiving God suggests passive deception instead, by which we are deceived qua our created imperfect 
nature. Cf. Gregory 1992b; Bermúdez 1997, 767; 2000, 343–351; 2008, 67–72; Pasnau 2017, 117–121; 
Adriaenssen 2017, 239; Machuca 2018, 165, note 2. 
47 In chapter 4, I take the Buridinian approach as the background for Descartes’s Deceiving God. 
48 Gregory (1992a) suggests Descartes was harking back to these debates when introducing God’s possible 
deception by “long-standing opinion (vetus opinio)” that there is an omnipotent God who has created her 
(AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14). 
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blades – but not for the Renaissance. Several Renaissance authors were influenced by 
and adopted openly skeptical positions (though only a few radical ones). Skeptical 
arguments also became important hammers of political-religious arguments of the 
Reformation and Counter-Reformation movements of the 1500s when the Protestant 
factions challenged the power of the Catholic church. (Cf. Machuca 2018, 168–169.) 
2.4. Renaissance Skepticism: Scientist, Gentleman, Physician, 
Priest 
The beginning of the Renaissance skeptical period is typically located with Fransisco 
Filelfo (1398–1481) bringing a Greek manuscript of Sextus’s to Italy from Ottoman-
sieged Constantinople in 1427. It should be noted, though, that the exchange between 
Greek scholars coming to Italy (who knew of the original skeptical sources), and Italian 
humanists obtaining Greek manuscripts (Sextus among them), also included several 
other names, including Georgius Gemistus Plethon (c. 1360–1452) on the scholar side 
and Fransesco Patrizi da Siena (1412–1494) on the humanist side. The transmission of 
manuscripts, influenced by the renewal of skeptical controversies in the 14th century 
Byzantine tradition, guaranteed in any case that all the main skeptical sources were again 
fully available for western writers. Soon after this, Traversari’s Latin translation of 
Laertius distributed scepticus as a colloquial term. Translations of Sextus followed in the 
15th century but attracted little interest, having at the time only a few serious readers in 
Girolamo Savonarola (1452–1492), his disciple Gianfransesco Pico della Mirandola 
(1470–1533, nephew of the more famous Giovanni Pico) and Francesco Robortello 
(1516–1567). (Popkin 2003, 17–36; Schmitt 1983, 233–237; Cao 2009).       
In 1562, Henri Estienne (1531–1598) made the first printed Latin translation of 
Sextus’s Outlines, in the middle of the Catholic-Protestant dispute. An instant success, it 
spread skeptical argumentation further than before, influencing many of the following 
philosophical discussions. Laertius’s “Life of Pyrrho” as part of the Lives had seen 
several manuscripts since the first translation and an early printed edition in 1533; it was 
also included with Estienne’s translation of the Outlines. Estienne compiled a print of 
the whole Lives with Greek and Latin combined in 1570, and nine years after Estienne’s 
printed edition of the Outlines, it was republished with Gentian Hervet’s (1499–1584) 
translation of Against Mathematicians. Cicero’s Academica likewise became more popular 
with the growing interest in Pyrrhonism, having been named one of Petrarch’s (1304–
1374) favourite books in the 1330’s, and it regained importance in the 16th century with 
authors such as Omer Talon (1510–1562) and Pedro de Valencia (1555–1620) writing 
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studies of and commentaries on the work. Nevertheless, although a printed edition of 
Cicero’s philosophical works (Academica included) was published in 1471, it was only in 
the 1530s when the Academica began to garner any serious philosophical interest, and its 
role as a source for skeptical ideas lessened significantly (though Cicero’s overall 
influence remained strong) after Estienne’s first printing of Sextus. Augustinus’s Contra 
Academicos, meanwhile, was rather neglected during the 15th and 16th centuries, being 
referred to but seldom cited, with the exception of Joannes Rosa’s (1532–1571) 
commentary on Academica printed in 1571. (Harwood 1778, 72; Schmitt 1972; 1983; 
Blackwell 1993; A. Curley 1997; Floridi 2002; 2010; Laursen 2009a; 2009b.) 
European philosophy was not, then, suddenly overtaken by skeptical doctrines, or, 
adopting Richard Popkin’s suggestion (1960; 2003), had fallen into a “Pyrrhonian 
crisis”. Skeptical interests had been brewing for a long period, and the rediscovery of 
original material in the west merely made them flourish. Indeed, one textual tradition 
with ties to the skeptical development but which thus far is quite under-researched, is 
the history of late Scholastic and Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle’s Posterior 
Analytics. Constance Blackwell (2009) has demonstrated how this tradition translated 
Aristotle’s concept of puzzlement (aporia, gr. ἀπορία) into dubitare, folding the terms into 
one for the 16th and 17th centuries and, especially through commentators such as Petrus 
Ramus (1515–1572) and Benito Pereira (1535–1610), influencing the skeptical 
discussions in these periods. (Cf. Lagerlund 2010b; Bolyard 2017, 5; Grellard 2018, 218; 
Paganini 2018a, 240.). Further reasons for why an overarching crise pyrrhonienne in 
Renaissance and early modern philosophy has been challenged include that the 
development of skeptical themes in the 16th and 17th centuries was rather heterogenous, 
with different authors having differing strategies, goals, sources, and influences for their 
skepticism (Perler 2004; Ayers 2004; Maclean 2006; Naya 2009; Lennon 2010).  
Nevertheless, while there might not have been a Pyrrhonian crisis per se, skepticism 
in general, and Pyrrhonian skepticism in particular, was one of the driving forces of 
Renaissance and early modern discussions, and the printing of skeptical works, 
particularly by Sextus, undoubtably expanded skeptical argumentation in a more 
compelling and systematic way than before. Usage of skepticism became more varied 
than in Medieval times, away from merely epistemological or theological considerations 
and back to questions of moral life, utilised to promote the cause of Counter-
Reformation, criticism of Aristotle, Neo-Platonism, and the propagation of New 
Science alike. Development of these events coincided with the reappraisal of skepticism, 
and rather than being more central to the times, stealing the spotlight, they favoured 
and took full advantage of newly discovered skeptical thought. (Machuca 2018, 169–
170; Maia Neto 2015, 62–63. Cf. Marcondes 2009.) 
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I concentrate on two of these developments – skeptical fallibilism and skeptical 
fideism – that carried over to the early modern period, greatly influencing Descartes’s 
intellectual environment. Neither was truly a new development. The concept that we 
can approximate the truth by following the plausible, refining our abilities and 
discounting our errors, arguably originated already with Carneades, with probabilistic 
fallibilism promoted by the Metrodorian-Philonian line of interpretation (and later by 
Salisbury as the type of skepticism that can be lauded). Discussions of fideism – 
skepticism clearing the mind from reasons to prepare for the reception of mere faith – 
likewise had an early origin. Lactantius already thought Academica’s critique of stiff 
dogmatism an entryway to true knowledge and propaedeutic for accepting the Christian 
religion, seeing skepticism differently from Augustine, for whom true knowledge and 
firm faith are acquired only by slaying the skeptical beast. Lactantius’s and Augustine’s 
different ways of using skepticism preceded the 16th and 17th century pro-/contra- 
debates, in which ideologically neutral skeptical doctrines were seen to both defend and 
undermine religious faith, becoming the instrument of Catholics and Protestants, 
liberals and conservatives, theists and atheists, scientists and non-scientists. (See chapter 
2.3.1. Cf. Schmitt 1972, 24–28; 1983, 240; Maia Neto 2015, 63; Clarke 2016, 35–36.49) 
Fideistic and fallibilistic tendencies received new interest during the 16th century due 
to the rediscovery of skeptical materials combined with religious controversies and 
scientific developments (especially the critique of Aristotelianism) of the time. Similar 
to all Renaissance skeptical interest, these directions began with Italian humanism, 
fideism propagated by Savonarola and the younger Pico in their conflicts with papal 
authorities, and empirical, Aristotle-critical New Science promoted by the natural 
scientists such as Bernardino Telesio. Aided by the printings of Pyrrhonian sources in 
France, however, they had become specifically French territory by the end of the 16th 
century. The Buridanian-style fallibilistic concept of knowledge, which rapidly took over 
epistemological discussions as an aftermath of Autrecourt’s radical skeptical worries, 
was challenged early in the 16th century by new scholars at the University of Paris, such 
as Spaniard Antonio Coronel (d. c. 1550), arguing that we cannot know even by natural 
evidentness that perceived effects are caused by finite objects and not by God. 
Combined with growing criticism of Aristotelian views by science-oriented thinkers 
such as Giordano Bruno (an Italian but prominent mostly in Northern Europe), this 
consequently provided ample ground for infallibilist thinking to creep back into 
philosophy. On the religious side, Hervet’s translation of Sextus was already motivated 
 
49 However, important to notice, especially in the largely secular contemporary environment, is that 
skepticism would not become allied with criticism of religious doctrines until the 18th century and especially 
Hume. Cf. Schmitt 1983, 240. 
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by the Counter-Reformists goals, with Pyrrhonian skepticism harnessed as a weapon 
against Protestant dogmatism, Catholic conviction based on “faith alone” and, thus, 
immune to it. (Schmitt 1972, 37, 1983; Floridi 2002; 2010; Karger 2004; Clarke 2016, 
36. Cf. Rowland 2008; Dagron 2009. See chapter 1.1.) 
The French philosophical current was also the breeding ground of the three most 
important and influential skeptical works of the Renaissance period: Montaigne’s 
Apologie de Raimond Sebond (1580), Sanches’s Quod Nihil Scitur (1581) and Charron’s De la 
Sagesse (1601). All three texts made their mark on early modern philosophical thought, 
especially in the religious and scientific orientations, influencing not just Descartes but 
also his peers, such as Mersenne and Gassendi. 
Michel de Montaigne (1533–1592) is considered the most significant skeptical writer 
of the Renaissance period. Unlike earlier skeptically oriented thinkers, such as Pico and 
Hervet, who used skeptical arguments to advocate their dogmatic views, Montaigne was 
a genuine skeptic (how radical is disputed, see e.g., Larmore 1998; 2004; Rosaleny 2009; 
2011; Eva 2009; Clarke 2016, 39). He is mostly known from his massive collection of 
personal, autobiographical writings, Essais, published for the first time in 1580 but 
revised several times until his death (second edition in 1588 and third, posthumously, 
in 1595). Apologie, the clearest exposition of Montaigne’s skeptical thinking, forms the 
twelfth essay of the second book, and is the longest text by a good measure.  
Written during the Catholic-Protestant skirmish, Apologie is framed by a book on 
natural theology, Theologia Naturalis (1484), by one Raymond Sebond (c. 1385–1436). 
The work caused an uproar among the fideistically aligned religious authorities, who 
regarded Sebond’s arguments as weak and considered his reconciling of Christian faith 
with naturalistic reason as heretical. Montaigne’s “apology” for Sebond consists in using 
traditional skeptical means for arguing that Sebond’s attempts are no better or worse 
than any other arguments based on reason. Montaigne aims to defend Catholic faith, 
yet he is surprisingly tolerant of Protestantism, going so far as to adopt a Pyrrhonistic 
maxim that one were to follow the customs and religion of the country one were born 
in. A later passage, though, problematises this conclusion, and Montaigne’s final stance 
on the issue, as with many others, is left quite unresolved. (Apologie: 1907, 110–132, 372–
376; 1991, 490–502, 652–654.) Such irresolution is a strong feature through-out the 
essay (and Essais), prompting a variety of different interpretations of his views.50  
Montaigne’s influence on later skeptical writers was large. The latter half of the 
Apologie consists mainly of the unsystematic retelling of various skeptical arguments, 
 
50 Montaigne has especially been seen as a fideist (e.g., Popkin 2003, 44–56; cf. Larmore 1998, 1150), a 
reading that lately has been questioned (Rosaleny 2009; Cardoso 2009; Bermúdez Vázquez 2015. Cf. 
Penelhum 1983; Hookway 1990, 36). 
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mostly Pyrrhonian ones, greatly contributing to the spread of skeptical material. 
Montaigne was also instrumental in the 17th century understanding of the ancient 
skeptical term phainomenon, which he translated as ‘appearances’ (apparences, after 
Estienne’s apparentia instead of Ciceronian visa), arguing that we have no knowledge 
(science) beyond these. Phainomenon, for Sextus, are passive and involuntary impressions 
(phantasia) that do not belong to the objects of skeptical investigation (see chapter 2.2). 
In Montaigne’s hands, they come to mean the apparent qualities of things, which reveal 
nothing about underlying structures or how things actually are – they give us 
appearances but not essences (Apologie: 1907, 408; 1991, 676). This understanding of 
appearance became important for the following skeptical trend and was shared by 
Charron, Mersenne, Gassendi, and La Mothe Le Vayer.51    
Montaigne’s probable main influence on Descartes was his radical emphasis on 
God’s omnipotence that drew a difference between the human and the divine and 
maintained it is not up to us to say what God can or cannot do, resulting in the question 
“Que scay-je? (What do I know?)”. This widened divine potency even further from the 
Medieval discussions – instead of God sending or maintaining false impressions for us, 
“deception” could derive merely from the created, faulty human nature.52    
Yet another Montaignian influence on Descartes is the result of skeptical resolution: 
Unlike the ancients’ suspension, Montaigne’s doubt leads not to joy and tranquility but 
to confusion and misery due to human condition. The solution for anguish is a skeptical 
ethic, to live by the laws and customs of one’s society, making one as comfortable as 
possible in the midst of indeterminable controversy. (Apologie: 1907, 268–278, 340, 408–
418; 1991, 585–592, 633, 676–682. Cf. Sextus: PH I, 23.53) 
The intellectual environment that birthed Montaigne’s Apologie would a year later see 
the publication of another important skeptical work. Fransisco Sanches (c. 1550–1623) 
was a Spanish-Portugese physician, a professor of philosophy and (later) medicine at 
the University of Toulouse (a colleague of Bruno for a while) and Montaigne’s distant 
cousin. In Quod Nihil Scitur (That Nothing is Known), he uses several traditional skeptical 
arguments to argue against the Aristotelian concept of science as discovering the 
necessary causes and inherent natures of events and objects. Such underlying factors 
remain hidden for us, as our senses only have access to the outward appearances 
(apparentia, exteriora), not to internal substances or essences. Sanches follows the 
infallibilist definition of knowledge as an idealisation: “Scientia est rei perfecta cognitio 
 
51 Burnyeat (1997, 99) calls this Montaignean reading of appearances the country gentleman’s interpretation. 
52 See note 46. Montaigne is though consistently moderate regards to external reality. Cf. Pascal (Entretien 
Pascal, 43). 
53 Descartes likewise describes modern skeptics as “embracing all that is apparent” (AT VII, 549; CSM II, 
375; translation modified). 
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(Knowledge is the perfect awareness of a thing)” (QNS, 23). Nevertheless, perfect 
awareness is beyond us due to the restrictions set by the objects, the mediating element, 
and the unreliability of the senses and human nature. We don’t even possess self-
knowledge, because the content of such cognitio constantly escapes from our grasp and 
we don’t know what the “self” amounts to.  (QNS, 43–44, 51–58.)  
Quod Nihil Scitur, as a skeptical text, differs from the Apologie: The latter is 
unsystematic in its approach and targets all knowledge claims, not just Aristotelian ones 
(although Aristotle is singled out as the “Prince of Dogmatists”; 1907, 240; 1991, 566), 
while the former is a concentrated effort to use skeptical tropes to undermine 
Aristotelian doctrines. Nevertheless, there are also similarities. Unlike the title might 
suggest, Sanches’s thesis propagates not negative dogmatism but a thoroughly 
questioning attitude similar to Montaigne’s. The work even begins by Sanches declaring 
in Arciselean fashion, “I do not even know this one thing, namely that I know nothing” 
and ends with an interrogative question “WHAT? (QUID?)”, reminiscent of 
Montaigne’s Que scay-je? (QNS, 1, 100). The questioning of reasoning and self-
knowledge is likewise similar to Montaigne, who notes equivalent problems in knowing 
himself. Both even consider awareness of the mind’s inner contents inferior to the grasp 
of sensory objects (Apologie: 1907, 390, 410–414; 1991, 633, 677–680). However, unlike 
the ethical-religiously oriented Apology, Sanches’s work stays out of the counter-
reformist frame, advocating a kind of fallibilism in scientific endeavours. Aligned with 
Montaignian view of appearances as observable qualities, this proved extremely 
influential for later mitigated skeptics such as Mersenne and Gassendi, using similar 
skeptical weapons to oppose the prevalent Aristotelianism. Most likely Descartes also 
found an example of skepticism in Sanches as a personal experience against 
Aristotelianism. Additionally, the Sanchesian distinction of cognitio and scientia, with only 
the latter allowing for essences, would turn up almost the same in the Meditations. (QNS, 
99–100. Caluori 2007, 37; 2018, 261; Paganini 2009a; 2018a, 237–239; Clarke 2016, 43.) 
A prevalent debate regarding Sanches’s skepticism, due to certain isolation from the 
perceived dominant narrative and the propagation of fallibilistic remedy, has been 
whether it is Academically or Pyrrhonistically inclined (Carvalho 1955; Limbrick 2008; 
Copenhaver & Schmitt 1992, 249; Popkin 2003, 41–43; Caluori 2007; 2018; Buccolini 
2017; Machuca 2018, 171). Recent readings have questioned the previously common 
view of Pyrrhonism as the dominant form of skepticism in the later Renaissance period, 
arguing for more importance for Academic skepticism (e.g., Naya 2009; Maia Neto 
2009a; 2014; 2015; Smith & Charles 2017). This debate is also significant regarding the 
author of the third influential Renaissance work, Pierre Charron (1541–1603), a French 
Catholic priest and Montaigne’s friend, disciple, and heir apparent. He published De la 
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Sagesse (Of Wisdom) in 1601, a moral philosophical work that systematised and developed 
Montaigne’s counter-reformist skepticism. A revised edition followed in 1604. (See 
Larmore 1998, 1152; Paganini 2018b, 247.) 
Whereas Montaigne’s partaking in fideism is questionable, De la Sagesse is a strongly 
fideistic work. Charron emphasises the need to make oneself an empty slate by 
skepticism, to clear out all previous prejudices, passions, and popular opinions in order 
to receive wisdom. He recommends making a distinction between the public and private 
spheres to accomplish this: One is to externally live by the common practices and follow 
the customs of society in actions of life while internally being indifferent to everything 
(e.g., DLS II, 1–2: 1986, 377–394; 1998, 52–59). One becomes a blank sheet by 
withholding assent to prepare for the acceptance of God into one’s soul. Cleaning out 
reason allows for the acceptance of Christian doctrines as heaven-sent, which is why 
“[a]n Academic or a Pyrrhonist can never be a heretic”. An objection could be raised 
that they would not necessarily be Catholic either, but this does not worry Charron. 
There might not simply be any choice on the matter – God can just force divine truth 
on the wisdom seeker. (DLS II, 2: 1986, 405, 1998, 62.)  
Despite the popularity and influence of De la Sagesse on later thinkers (Gassendi 
preferred it to Montaigne’s Essais and the libertins érudits such as Le Vayer greatly admired 
the work), Charron’s contribution to skeptical history was seen for a while as 
systematising and straight-lining the rambling skepticism of Montaigne, making it more 
accessible but losing the subtlety of the original, developing further the movement of 
nouveaux Pyrrhoniens in France (e.g., Larmore 1998, 1152–1155; Popkin 2003, 57–63). 
However, more attention has recently been put on Charron’s originality, propagating a 
new form of Academic skepticism and influencing almost all of the following 17th century 
French philosophers, Descartes included. By this reading, Charron was influenced by 
Talon as much as by Montaigne, adopting an (Metrodorian-Philonian) Academic 
skeptical wisdom, in which the wise man is to follow propositions that are most 
plausible, persuasive, or convenient, while practising epochē on the rest (DLS II, 2: 1986, 
385–411; 1998, 56–65; Maia Neto 2003; 2009a; 2014; Bahr 2017; Paganini 2018b, 253–
254.) A similar Academic reading has been proposed, as mentioned, also on Sanches 
and even on Montaigne (Limbrick 1977; cf. Floridi 2002, 48; 2010, 281–282).54 
 
54 Sanches can be read in a dialectic fashion, targeting the Aristotelians instead of the Stoics (“nothing is 
known by Aristotles’s criteria”). Nevertheless, insistence on a continued search despite the absence of 
knowledge and adherence to a highly idealised scientia are strong hints of Pyrrhonian influence. Caluori 
(2007; 2018, 263–264) reads Sanches as a “No Unclear Beliefs” Pyrrhonist, skeptical about (Aristotelian) 
scientific knowledge but not about everyday ordinary beliefs. Cf. Popkin 2003, 40–42; Machuca 2018, 171. 
But see Limbrick 2008; Buccolini 2017. Montaigne is difficult due to the eclectic writing and Augustinian 
criticism of Academic verisimilitude (Apologie: 1907, 338–340; 1991, 632–633), but see Vazquez (2015, 54–
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2.5. Cartesian and Early Modern Skepticism: The Battle of Gods, 
Giants, and Leviathans 
Interest in ancient skepticism shifted north of the Alps, especially to France, at the 
beginning of the 16th century while the Italian skeptical savor gradually waned. Such 
geological change has previously appeared surprising, even baffling, but taking into 
account the late Scholastic skeptical debates in the Parisian theological faculty that 
continued well into the 1500’s, it was only a matter of time that a similar interest would 
manifest with the recovered Greek and Latin material. The University of Paris ended 
up in a type of crisis from 1540 to 1562 after the challenging of Buridanian solution to 
skepticism, with Ramus criticising Scholastic Aristotelianism and proposing to reform 
the curriculum. This led to the compatibility of Academica’s skeptical content with 
Christianity and science being debated between the nouveaux Académiciens, such as Talon, 
and their opponents, especially Pierre Galland (1510–1559) and Guy de Brués, who 
published Les Dialogues contre les nouveaux Academiciens in 1557. Outside the University, 
Pyrrhonian ideas spread due to Estienne’s and Hervet’s publications of Sextus and 
Laertius, leading to a similar philosophical current of nouveaux Pyrrhoniens in France, with 
skeptical works becoming almost fully Northern domain by the end of the century. 
Montaigne’s Apologie, Sanches’s Quod Nihil Scitur, Valencia’s Academica and Charron’s De 
la Sagesse were all printed in the North, three of them by philosophers prominent in 
Southern France.55 The same locational specialisation would continue in the 17th century 
skeptical debates, with Gassendi, Mersenne, Hobbes, Le Vayer, Silhon, Campanella, and 
Herbert of Cherbury all residing in Paris at various times, their works printed in France, 
Germany, and the Netherlands. (Cf. Schmitt 1972, 78–108; 1983; Floridi 2002, 35–37; 
Blackwell 2009; Maia Neto 2014.) 
However, the neo-Academic and neo-Pyrrhonian movements in France were by no 
means separate. Ramus turned Protestant in 1561 and fell victim to the St. 
Bartholomew’s Day Massacre in 1572. Counter-reformists such as Hervet saw the 
Calvinists as part of the New Academy, finding in Sextus counters to both the 
Protestants and nouveaux Académiciens. Even Montaigne’s Apologie is arguably a reaction 
to the neo-Academic probabilism of certain Calvinists apologists. (Cf. Popkin 2003, 36–
37; Maia Neto 2013.) Later, the Academic and Pyrrhonian currents were largely 
combined, and even when considered as separate, any true distinction between the 
factions remained fuzzy (see note 17).  
 
62, 139–142); Prat (2017). Panichi (2009) reads Montaigne as a Neo-Plutarchian. Like Montaigne’s, 
Sanches’s skepticism results in despair about the faulty human condition (QNS, 57–58). Cf. Lupoli 2009. 
55 Valencia’s Academica from 1596 was printed in Antwerp and Rosa’s commentary from 1571 in Frankfurt, 
just like later 1618 reprints of QNS. See Schmitt 1972, chapter 6; Limbrick 2008; Laursen 2009a; 2009b.  
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In the middle of this was also Descartes, who likewise arrived in Paris in 1625 and 
began to socialise with people associated with skepticism in various forms. Previous 
chapters have been establishing the history of skepticism until Descartes’s childhood. 
Now, the main character enters the scene. 
2.5.1. Early Modern Skeptical Scene 
A strong influence on the later tradition, as mentioned, was considering the phantasia of 
the ancients as equivalent to appearances as observable sensory qualities, tying 
skepticism to a sort of empiricism (cf. chapter 4.1.2). Sextus comparably reports that 
phantasia can be intellectual, covering even the skeptic’s thoughts. Such a development, 
along with skepticism becoming characterised more by doubt than suspension,56 led to 
skeptical activity turning into mental experience instead of discursive practice, conducted alone 
in privacy instead of in public philosophical discourse. This culminated with Charron 
expanding the Augustinian interior-exterior distinction of Montaigne and Sanches to a 
separation between the skeptic’s (or, wisdom being the goal of Charronian practice, the 
sage’s) inner and outer life, following customs and behaving in an as-if-judgment-forming 
manner publicly while remaining undecided and suspended privately. These 
developments led to the abandonment of ataraxia as the  highest goal and standard of 
success of skeptical inquiry, replaced by Stoic-influenced personal moderation, 
unmoving of the will in the face of indetermination, and finding final solace in God’s 
grace.57 This change from public discourse to private meditation fits the difference 
between ancient and modern skepticism the best. (Cf. Paganini 2008b; 2018a; 2018b.58) 
Popkin’s influential study of skeptical rediscovery (1960; 2003) described skepticism 
in the early modern period as means to dogmatic ends, used to clear away reason and 
prejudice in preparation for a leap of faith. Thus, early modern skepticism for Popkin 
is associated with fideism, giving fideistic readings of several Renaissance and early 
modern thinkers. However, Popkin’s assessment of early modern skepticism being 
specifically fideistic in nature has been challenged by later reinterpretations of those 
philosophers and by putting more attention on non-fideists in the early modern picture. 
(E.g. Cardoso 2009; Maya 2009. Bermúdez Vazquez 2015. Cf. Maia Neto 2015, 63.) 
 
56 Estienne followed the Ciceronian-Augustinian tradition, translating Sextus’s aporein as dubitare (Paganini 
2018, 240). 
57 Note that Charron, unlike Montaigne and Sanches, nevertheless emphasises the happiness and peace of 
mind that results from the indifference and freedom of judgment (DLS II, 2: 1986, 404; 1998, 61). 
58 Maia Neto (2003; 2008; 2014), argues for the cogito ensuing from Charronian subjective freedom as a 
metaphysical interpretation of his epochē. Paganini (2009a; 2016) argues similarly about Sanches’s reflexive 
analysis of the self. 
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Instead of simply fideism, the skeptical uprising in the late Renaissance generated three 
reactions in the early 17th century, closely resembling the philosophical triumvirate of 
Academic, Pyrrhonist, and Dogmatist (PH I, 4.): mitigated fallibilistic skepticism, libertine 
fideistic skepticism, which certain anti-skeptical factions considered atheistic, and anti-
skepticism, which regarded skepticism as a threat and metaphysically, epistemologically, 
and morally reprehensible. The opponents of skepticism obviously included several 
defenders of Aristotelian Scholasticism, but the most important anti-skeptics (and even 
mitigated skeptics) of the time sought to work out a third alternative, a middle way 
between Scholasticism and full-blown skepticism (cf. Larmore 1998, 1155). 
I briefly discuss these reactions starting with the mitigated one. Metrodorian-Philonian 
plausibility began to gain more support as the guideline to follow while remaining 
indeterminable due to the blending of Pyrrhonian and Academical themes. Charron 
shared Montaigne’s criticism of taking the plausible as truthlike (verisimile); nevertheless, 
he considered that limited human cognition is only able to attain plausible presentations, 
while acknowledging, in Montaignian fashion, the difficulty of withholding assent due 
to human psychology. Simply following appearances and opposing them against one 
another would result not in balancing the scales but in constant flux and instability, with 
each new (more or less plausible) appearance superseding the previous one. Charron 
emphasises the active role one must take, due to this, in judging everything by 
“balancing reasons for and against”. The ancient Pyrrhonists considered suspension as 
a natural, involuntary occurrence and the skeptic as being merely cast into it as a passive 
spectator. The modern Montaignian-Charronian skeptic comparably casts suspension 
voluntarily, taking an active role in the skeptical inquiry. The skeptic has agency instead 
of being a spectator, performing an active assessment of how things appear and turning 
down inadequate reasons while following the more plausible ones.59  (DLS II, 2: 1986, 
386–411; 1998, 56–65. Cf. Paganini 2008a; 2008b; 2018b, 249–253; Maia Neto 2013.)  
Later, Charron influenced, skeptically inclined propagators of New Science 
combined probabilistic skepticism with their projects, developing “mitigated” skeptical 
views on the uncertainty of underlying features while grounding scientific certainty on 
plausible appearances. The trend occurred in a circle of correspondents in Paris around 
Marin Mersenne (1588–1648), a French Minim who, while mostly known for his 
friendship with Descartes, also developed mitigated skepticism as an anti-skeptical 
strategy himself. He admits in La vérite des sciences contre les sceptiques ou pyrrhonienne (1625) 
that underlying essences are unknowable in the Sanchesian sense, because we do not 
 
59 Note that Academic skepticism seemingly allows the skeptic performing actions. Cf. Vogt 2010; Gómez-
Alonso 2011; 2016). Cf. the meditator being persuaded (persuadeor) vs. persuading (persuasi) herself (AT 
VII, 25; CSM II, 17; chapter 5.1.2).  
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possess a perfect understanding of them, but claims we can have knowledge (fr. science) 
of how objects of the senses appear, avoiding the dangers of Charron and his followers 
in science and faith. Nevertheless, Aristotelianism is incapable of taming Pyrrhonism in 
this way, and should be replaced by New Science when appropriate (La vérite I, 2, 9: 
1998, 154–159, 163–165; cf. Dear 1984; 1988).  
The mitigated skeptical approach was also acquired by Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), 
whose earliest work, Excercitationes paradoxicae adversus Aristoteleos (1624), used Sextus’s 
Pyrrhonian tropes and ideas to oppose Aristotelianism. However, Gassendi was more 
susceptible to skepticism than Mersenne was, and while the latter’s main critical target 
might have been the skeptical uprising, with criticism of the followers of Aristotle more 
of a side issue, it was the complete opposite for Gassendi. He was an enthusiastic 
follower of Charron, not merely aiming to tame skepticism but to use it against the 
dogmatic Scholastics. Thus, while both shared the Sanches-style empirical fallibilism, 
Gassendi’s early skepticism was even more Sanchesian than Mersenne’s. (Exerc. Preface; 
II, vi, 1 & 7.) Gassendi modified his stance on skepticism in later works, following 
Mersenne’s line of finding a middle way between skepticism and dogmatism by claiming 
that we can discern regularities among the apparent qualities of things. However, he 
aimed to found Epicureanism as the main philosophy of the Catholic faith, leading him 
to make atomistic conjectures about deeper features of things, whereas Mersenne 
opposed all speculation on the underlying nature. (Cf. Walker 1983; LoLordo 2018.) 
If mitigated skepticism is closer to (Metrodorian-Philonian) Academic skepticism, 
libertine fideistic skepticism shares more ties with Pyrrhonism; relevant questions 
surrounding it are ethical rather than scientific in nature, although it was equally affected 
by the blending of the skeptical factions. Fideistic skepticism is also intimately associated 
with anti-skepticism, due to the assumption of it leading to immorality and atheism. 
Theologians had been divided on skepticism since Augustine and Lactantius, as 
established, some seeing it as irreligious and a threat to the Christian faith, others 
praising it as a pious weapon against the heathen masses, demonstrating the impotence 
of reason alone in the lack of faith. Nevertheless, Renaissance and early modern periods 
saw definite growth in discussions of the moral ramifications of skepticism. This is not 
to say that there were no ethical readings of skepticism in the Middle Ages (see, e.g., 
Salisbury), but the tradition was feeble due to the lack of ancient skeptical material and 
wider access to skeptical literature in the 16th and 17th centuries allowed ethical-religious 
readings to return to the forefront. (Floridi 2002, 48; 2010, 282.60) 
 
60 Following Charron, Neo-Stoic ethics became popular, adopted by, e.g., young Gassendi (Exerc. Preface) 
and young Descartes (AT VI, 25–27; CSM I, 123–124). See Larmore 1998, 1154–1158; Kambouchner 
2008; Paganini 2018b, 255–257. 
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Debate about skeptical fideism had already occurred in the early 1520s exchange 
between Erasmus of Rotterdam (1466–1536) and Martin Luther (1483–1546). Erasmus 
praised the Academic skeptics for their discretion, but Luther considered the skeptical 
approach incompatible with faith and atheistic in nature (Schmitt 1972, 59–62; 
Penelhum 1983, 293–295; Bermúdez Vázquez 2015, 68–81). Counter-Reformist 
movements began to accept skeptical fideism as a basis against Protestantism after 
Charron, with his ideal skeptic, who voluntarily participates in the traditions and 
formalities of the society, having a profound influence on early modern French moral 
thought. It particularly inspired thinkers known as the “libertins érudits”, anti-Aristotelian 
free-thinkers, who saw themselves spiritually superior to unthinking conformists and 
Aristotelian-Scholastic dogmatists due to their inner freedom and sought to break away 
from tradition in both theoretical and political matters.  
The most (in)famous of these libertine philosophers is François de La Mothe Le 
Vayer (1588–1672), a self-proclaimed skeptic who wrote Dialogues faits à l’imitation des 
anciens (1630–1631) under the pseudonym Orasius Tubero, which included not only 
fideistic passages but also several irreligious remarks. Le Vayer agreed with Montaigne’s 
Augustinian criticism of verisimilitude, but like Charron, he thought that human cognition 
is capable only of approaching the plausible, and blended Pyrrhonian and Academic 
skepticism together.61 Le Vayer, similar to Mersenne and Gassendi, views appearances 
(phainomenes) as passive, observable affections, and shuns dogmatist attempts to go 
beyond them. However, he claims no knowledge of them and conforms to what is 
apparent even in ordinary life, extending these to moral and religious matters 
(phainomenes morales), publicly complying with them while privately remaining undecided. 
Le Vayer even summarises the Baconian paradox that atheism is preferable to 
superstition. Such open-mindedness has made recent scholars question Popkin’s (2003, 
82–87) earlier verdict on Le Vayer as a fideistic Christian Pyrrhonist and consider him 
as truly one of the libertinage.62 (Dialogues: 1988, 242, 273, 330–331. Cf. Paganini 2008a; 
2008b; Maia Neto 2013; 2014; Clarke 2016, 46–47; Giocanti 2018.) 
Even discounting the skeptical notions of religion inherent in Le Vayer, many shared 
Luther’s critical stance on skepticism and genuine faith. Suspicions grew that neo-
Pyrrhonist skeptics were loyal to the Catholic faith not from sincere fideism but rather 
from outward conformity while privately entertaining atheistic thoughts. These 
accusations extended to Charron as well, with De la Sagesse seen as corroding all belief 
(religious and non-religious), the reader finally hoaxed into an atheistic, tradition 
undermining libertinism. Jesuit priest François Garasse (1585–1631), the most 
 
61 It is debated if he is closer to Montaigne or Charron. Maia Neto 2013; 2014; Giocanti 2001; 2017; 2018. 
62 The libertins érudits were part of a larger libertine movement in 17th century France. See Pintard 1983. 
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outspoken of such critics, regarded Charron as a secret atheist and patriarch of all free-
thinkers. These fears caused several writers to attest to what they saw as atheistic skepticism 
and its negative ethical ramifications. If mitigated skepticism can be seen as combining 
skeptical thought with science and skeptical fideism as combining it with religion, 
atheistic skepticism would see itself as incompatible with both. 
The main force of anti-skeptical reaction was, then, raised against the perceived 
atheistic skeptical threat, including Mersenne’s La vérité and L’impiété des déistes, athées, et 
libertins de ce temps (1624).63 Similar efforts were undertaken by Jean de Silhon (1596–
1667), a Parisian friend of Descartes whose Les deux vérités (1626) were to establish God’s 
existence and immortality of souls as indubitably true (LDV I, i: 1998, 177) and Edward 
Herbert of Cherbury (1582–1648), an English natural theologian, ambassador to France, 
and Mersenne’s acquaintance, whose De Veritate, printed in 1624 for small circulation 
in Paris, set out to lay metaphysical truth for science and natural religion with the so-
called notitae communes, targeting especially “insanos & Scepticos” (Prop I: 1645, 8).64  
Certain texts reveal Descartes similarly targeting libertine skepticism. He rants in the 
Seventh Replies about the skeptics “nowadays (hodierni)” not having “any doubt in 
practice” of whether they have heads or that 2+3=5 but treating “such claims as if 
(tanquam) true because they appear (apparent) to be so” without accepting them as certain.  
[T]hey do not see the existence of God and the immortality of the human mind as having 
the same appearance of truth, and hence are unwilling to treat these claims as true for 
practical purposes unless and until they have seen them proved by means of arguments 
more reliable than any of those which lead them to embracing all that is apparent. (AT 
VII, 549; CSM II, 375.) 
Treating these “atheistic sceptics (Atheorum Scepticorum)” merely as lost souls would not 
answer their doubts or demands for demonstration and would set a “very bad example 
(valde mali example)”, being basically a white flag of surrender for Descartes.65 It is not 
difficult to place the object of Descartes’s contempt here in the libertine érudits, and 
specifically on Le Vayer. Montaignean-Charronian skepticism had for long followed 
pausible appearances, but concepts such as God and the human soul had been 
intentionally kept out of the sphere of phainomenes until Le Vayer and the other libertine 
skeptics, who considered religious and moral matters to fall inside of moral phenomena. 
 
63 Anti-skeptical efforts had obvious antecedents in the 16th century Parisian controversies regarding 
Academic skepticism. See also Giulio Castellani’s disputation of Academica from 1558 (Schmitt 1972, 109–
133; 1983, 230–231). 
64 See Larmore 1998, 1153; Popkin 2003, 61, 80–142; Hutton 2015, 103–105; Clarke 2016, 47–54; Paganini 
2018b, 248. A somewhat separate anti-skeptical project was by Tommaso Campanella, an Italian natural 
philosopher who dedicated the first book of Metaphysica (1602–1638) to answering classical skeptical 
problems. See Paganini 2005; 2008b; 2009b. 
65 Descartes also connects skepticism and atheism to the Leiden Curators (AT V, 316; CSMK, 316–317). 
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Of course, even Le Vayer in the Dialogues does not state what Descartes accuses, that 
God and an immortal soul belong to the adēlon (unclear or non-apparent) of the ancients; 
he merely says that, as part of phenomena, they can be followed in practical life. 
However, the implication is clear: By extending “what appears” to touch not only 
physico-mathematical but also immaterial, moral-theological concepts, the libertine 
skeptics welcome rampant atheism, in which God’s existence and religious truth are 
either followed non-dogmatically (a paradoxical claim) or considered inside the set of 
things to which we have no access. Both are ethically untenable results. Thus, as 
previously discussed, while the skeptics’ error is more ethical than epistemological, 
moral error in relation to skepticism cannot be put aside as marginal from the 
epistemological and/or metaphysical errors in the project of the Meditations. The earlier 
traditional view that Descartes wanted to answer skepticism has been questioned in the 
recent scholarship but reading the main skeptical current of the 17th century not fideistic 
(à la Popkin) but libertine gives the attempted skeptical rebuttal in the Meditations 
plausibility. (See chapter 1.1. Cf. Paganini 2008a, 176–186; Maia Neto 2015, 63–65.66)  
This assessment is also supported by the Dedicatory Letter to Sorbonne, describing 
the Meditations’ goal: 
[I]n the case of unbelievers (infidelibus), it seems that there is no religion, and practically 
no moral virtue, that they can be persuaded to adopt until [that God exists and that soul 
and body are distinct] are proved to them by natural reason. (AT VII, 2–3; CSM II, 3–4.) 
The description of unbelievers goes perfectly together with the preceding portrayal of 
atheistic skeptics as those who do not see God’s existence or the mind’s immortality as 
apparent unless they are demonstrated by arguments more reliable than “whatever is 
apparently true”.67 
2.5.2. Cartesian Skepticism: Moral Certainty and Everyday Life 
The skeptics that Descartes directly opposes are not, then, the ancients or the 
Renaissance ones, but the libertine “atheists” of his own time.68 The reason he opposes 
them is not simply due to science or metaphysics, but also to ethics – to what leads to 
 
66 Cf. Hookway 1990, 36–37. Paganini considers the link between atheism and skepticism to be more 
explicit in Le Vayer’s later work, De la vertu des Payens (1641), which considers pyrrhonism a-religious in spirit. 
67 Silhon also sees Pyrrhonism undermining belief in God and the soul (LDV I, i: 1998, 178; Clarke 2006, 
74; 2016, 54). 
68 The skeptical focus has been on the ancients or Montaigne and Charron (e.g., E. Curley 1978; Gilson 
1987; Broughton 2002; Lennon 2008. Cf. Paganini 2008a, 176–178. See Rodis-Lewis (1998) for atheism 
disconnected from skepticism. 
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a good and virtuous life. Still, some questions remain on the skepticism of the Meditations 
in relation to everyday life and happiness. We must look into Descartes’s sources on 
skeptical thought (ancient and modern) and how he relates to them for these.  
Skepticism had already been used to oppose Aristotle’s authority, including by the 
younger Pico and Agrippa von Nettesheim (1486–1535) in the 1520s, Ramus and Talon 
some 20 years, and Sanches another 40 years later. Montaigne’s Apologie includes similar 
anti-Aristotelian passages, abandoning the epistemologically optimistic notion of species 
(or its alternatives) as the carrier of form from the object to cognition, severing the 
reliable bridge between appearance and reality.69 Charron’s skeptical attack on the 
unreliability of the senses also directly targeted Aristotelian Scholasticism, which made 
the senses the source of all knowledge. Descartes was most likely aware of and probably 
had read all of these previous challenges. (Cf. Larmore 1998, 1154; Popkin 2003, 60; 
Paganini 2018a, 237–239.)  
Of the ancient works, he most likely read Laertius’s “Life of Pyrrho” reiterating the 
story of skeptics almost falling of precipices were it not for the intervention of their 
friends (Fifth Replies: AT VII, 351; CSM II, 243; cf. DL IX, 62).70 He probably also 
knew Augustine’s Contra Academicos and references the Saint numerous times, although 
always unrelated to skepticism.71 Much research has been conducted on Descartes’s 
relation with Sextus and Pyrrhonism (e.g., E. Curley 1978; Burnyeat 1997; Grene 1999; 
Fine 2000; Popkin 2003), yet no evidence exists that Descartes ever read either the 
Outlines or Against Mathematicians. The best indirect citation is a reference to the ancient 
painter Apelles in the Fifth Replies, but the context is completely different and could 
easily be a coincidence (Apelles was not exactly unknown). Descartes does describe a 
fourfold “provisional moral code” in the Discourse to be followed while remaining 
undecided in his judgments for living “as happily as [he] could”, similar on the surface 
to Sextus’s reporting of the Pyrrhonists’ fourfold observances (PH I 23–24; cf. chapter 
2.2), but a deeper look reveals the closer source to be Charron. Descartes makes the 
same distinction between the private and public spheres while deciding to follow the 
plausible in everyday actions, adhering to a Stoic ethic of self-mastering (AT VI, 22–28; 
CSM I, 122–124; cf. DLS II, 2, 1986, 385–401; 1998, 56–61; see Apologie: 1907, 234–
236; 1991, 563). Descartes most likely knew Sextus’s name and reputation but might 
 
69 See also Sanches (QNS, 33) and Mersenne (La vérité I, 2:1998, 154–155). Cf. Lupoli 2009, 171–176. 
70 See note 26. Montaigne notes Pyrrho standing on the edge of a precipice and neither he nor Aristotle 
mention the interfering friends. 
71 Descartes mentions to have gone through books “concerning the subjects that are considered most 
abstruse and unusual” while studying in La Flèche (1607–1615), which might be a reference to skeptical 
works (AT VI, 5; CSM I, 113). Note that Greek and Latin edition of Laertius’s Lives from 1594, and a 6 
volume Opera Augistini from 1571 might have been included in the La Flèche library during Descartes’s 
stay. Cf. Harwood 1778, 72. 
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have known his views only through second-hand sources (such as Charron and 
Montaigne).72 (See also Maia Neto 2015, 65–67.) 
Nevertheless, the most important ancient skeptical source for Descartes seems to 
have been Cicero’s Academica. The first five years of study in a Jesuit school such as La 
Flèche concentrated on grammar, rhetoric, and Latin and Greek classics, with Cicero’s 
works being “the one model of style” (Ratio, 73). One could assume that parts of the 
Academica were among these works. (Cf. Gouhier 1999; Gaukroger 1995, 48; Clarke 
2006, 17–18.) Descartes likewise refers directly and indirectly to Cicero in several places 
(e.g., AT III, 274; CSMK, 166), and his dream argument is closer to Cicero’s than 
Sextus’s, depending on the indistinguishability of epistemically different dream and 
awake states at the moment of the experience (see chapter 2.3.2).73 He also eschews the 
classic plant version from Aristotle and Sextus when charging the ancient skeptics with 
apraxia, going with pragmatic apraxia and non-eudaimonism charges, viewing skeptics not as 
inactive but their actions as either self-destructive (AT VII, 351; CSM II, 234) or 
impractical and fruitless as they wander aimlessly, unable to live a happy, prosperous, 
and virtuous life. (AT IX, 6, X, 512–520; CSM I 182, II, 408–414).74  
However, a full awakening to the skeptical discussion and its application in criticising 
Aristotelianism most likely did not occur before Descartes returned to Paris in 1625 and 
joined Mersenne’s circle of likeminded Aristotle-critical mechanists and 
corpuscularians, who took the skeptically charged critique of the Renaissance authors 
and combined it with endorsing New Science. It is not overt speculation that Descartes 
as a member of Mersenne’s circle had access to La vérité and Gassendi’s Excercitationes 
(cf. Rochot 1959, vii; Larmore 1998, 1157; Fine 2000, 201). He also probably saw Le 
deux vérités, being a friend of Silhon. We know that Descartes tried to read the tortuous 
Latin of Herbert’s De Veritate (expanded in 1633 with copies given to Mersenne and 
Gassendi) and later read Mersenne’s French translation of it in 1639 before starting on 
the Meditations  (AT II, 566, 570–571, 596–599, 648–649; CSMK, 137–140).75 Another 
mechanistically aligned regular visitor of Mersenne in Paris was the Englishman Thomas 
Hobbes (1588–1679), best known as the writer of the political philosophy treatise 
Leviathan (1651; for Hobbes’s relation to skepticism, see Paganini 2003; 2008b). The 
 
72 Descartes was gifted the DLS by a Jesuit, Jean Molitor in 1619 (Rodis-Lewis 1998; Grayling 2006; Clarke 
2006). The Discourse includes indirect reference to it and Montaigne’s Essais (e.g., AT VI, 1–2; CSM I, 11). 
73 Scenarios of dreaming and madness are already found in Plato (Tht. 158b–d) and are later discussed by 
Aristotle (Met. 1010b3–12). See also C. Acad., 2.5.11, 3.11.25; Trin, 15.12.21; Deliverance II; Apologie: 1907, 
404–412; 1991, 674–679. Cf. Galen (Annas & Barnes 1985, 86), Siger (Pasnau 2017, 117–118; Bolyard 
2017), and Campanella (Paganini 2009b). 
74 Cf. Fine 2000, 217. Descartes also makes the insincerity charge in a few places (e.g., AT III, 434. VI, 29; 
CSM I, 125, CSMK, 196–197). See also Lennon 2008, 66–67; Lennon & Hickson 2013, 16. 
75 See Correspond. VII, 435–436; Bedford 1979, 57; Popkin 2003, 134; Clarke 2006, 185; Hutton 2015, 104.  
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participation in the Mersenne circle was, then, influential for Descartes in another way 
as well, as four of the seven Objections to the Meditations were either penned or 
compiled by members of the circle (Hobbes with the Third, Gassendi with the Fifth, 
and Mersenne himself with the Second and the Sixth).76 (Cf. Larmore 1998, 1155–1164; 
LoLordo 2005; Maia Neto 2014; LoLordo & Duncan 2016; Clarke 2016, 43–52.) 
Descartes is critical of the mitigated plausible empiricism of Mersenne and Gassendi, 
yet, as previously discussed, his main gripe with the “modern” skeptics is ethically 
oriented. The discussion in the 1630 Mersenne Letters, in which Descartes first 
mentions his “little treatise on Metaphysics”, also involves a “wicked book” (fr. meschant 
livre), which Descartes thought included atheistic content and initially saw needed a reply 
while boasting to have discovered a proof for God’s existence “with more certainty than 
[…] any proposition of geometry” (AT I, 145, 148–149, 181–182; CSMK, 22–24, 29). 
Some people, myself included, suspect this book to have been none other than Le 
Vayer’s Dialogues, whose first edition came out that year, setting for Descartes a model 
of skepticism to be answered (see, e.g., Paganini 2008a; 2008b). However, dominant 
“atheism” at the time was skeptical libertine, so whether or not the tome is actually the 
Dialogues matters little; even if it was some other work, Descartes’s contempt and 
willingness to refute it would have been skeptically inclined anyway. Moreover, while 
Descartes is not as concerned about the ancient skeptics as he is about the moderns, 
considering them mostly lost souls as shown by the non-eudaimonism charges, his 
grievances with the ancients are likewise ethical in nature. His warnings about the 
“weaker intellects”, who “would remain lost all their lives” if they started to doubt their 
principles, also indicate that Descartes considers the skeptical procedure suitable only 
for certain people, “the finest minds”, able and willing to meditate seriously and 
attentively. The worry Descartes has here is clearly that the weak minds would take the 
skeptical inquiry too rigorously and follow the ancients by extending it even to the actions 
of life. (AT VI, 15, 32, VII, 7–9; IXB, 6; CSM I, 118, 126, 182, II, 7–8.77 See chapter 1.) 
Descartes’s comments suggest two things about the skeptical inquiry in the 
Meditations. First, that the skeptical inquiry is genuine and serious. One must use serious 
skepticism to overcome skepticism. Second, that Descartes’s usage of skepticism does 
have ramifications for everyday life, promising ethical results in what the ancients called 
ataraxia – happy, peaceful, and virtuous life. Nevertheless, Descartes considers 
 
76 Lennon (1993) argues that the contest between the supporters of Descartes and Gassendi regarding 
which system should replace the undermined Aristotelian model formed one of the most important 
philosophical debates of the 17th century, continuing what Plato called the perennial battle of Gods 
(rationalist friends of the Forms) and Giants (empiricist materialists). 
77 Cf. AT VII, 549; CSM II, 375. Ancient skeptics, then, were not excessive by scope but instead by 
extending the doubt to practical life. 
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skepticism that is extended to practical life an error, even a vice. The ancients lost their 
lives to doubt, and the moderns even question God’s existence and the immortal soul 
for “practical purposes” (AT VII, 549; CSM II, 375). True and lasting happiness, 
tranquillity, and virtuosity for Descartes can only be discovered in absolute certainty 
(epistēmē/scientia) by overcoming the skeptical arguments (see the Letter to Dinet: AT 
VII, 573–574; CSM II, 387). In Cartesian skepticism, filtered through Montaigne, 
Sanches, and Charron, the First Meditation general suspension brings only anxiety and 
“inextricable darkness”, while both the Third and the Sixth Meditation end in joy and 
spiritual peace (AT VII, 23–24, 52, 89–90; CSM II, 15–16, 36, 61–62). 
However, Descartes also draws a larger distinction between the public and the 
private than do Montaigne, Charron or Gassendi, due to considering even private 
suspension a laborious and unnatural disposition for humans. The Cartesian exercise 
requires cutting oneself off from everyday activites, with skeptical meditation kept apart 
from practical conduct of life (see chapter 1.3). His comments on the earlier skeptics 
demonstrate that true skepticism, if extended and exhausted to its apex, is in the 
practical and moral sense untenable for Descartes. Instead, the search for truth and 
conduct of life, in a Buridanian fashion, heed different standards of certainty: metaphysical 
certainty for the former and moral certainty for the latter. Metaphysical certainty for 
Descartes is equivalent to reality and concerns the highest possible epistemic notion 
(scientia).  Moral certainty, meanwhile, has its origins in Buridan’s moral evidentness, 
describing what suffices for acting morally well in everyday conduct, but whereas for 
Buridan it can still give rise to scientia, Descartes, following the later developments by 
the Jesuits, separates it into its own domain (Pasnau 2017, 36, 198–200; Maryks 2008). 
Basing scientific endeavours or the nature of the soul simply in the moral domain will 
not suffice for Descartes, as it does for Gassendi in the former and Silhon in the latter, 
due to differing standards. We must discover something more solid than mere 
plausibility (which might just as well be false) to be secure even in the public domain. 
One is required, in order to succeed in the metaphysical quest, to suspend not just in 
the case of “inner natures”, knowledge claims, and scientific matters, but even in the 
case of “highly probable” opinions. (See AT VI, 37–38; VII, 22, 476, 548, VIIIA, 327; 
CSM I, 130, 289–290, CSM II, 15, 320, 374.) 
I suggest, as previously discussed, that the distinction between practical conduct and 
skeptical inquiry is contextual. Partaking in everyday life’s obligations, the meditator acts 
according to common-sense thinking and regards things “from a practical view” not 
doubtful, trusting that the tea in her mug exists and is not battery acid. Nevertheless, 
when partaking in the skeptical exercise, she commits to it seriously, genuinely following 
the inquiry and changing her attitude regarding the issues at hand. What motivates the 
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‘insulation’ from everyday life is not skepticism as a method or an epistemological 
instrument, but the nature of the skeptical consideration as a fully devoted meditative 
exercise, to be practiced free from obligations and practical considerations. Moreover, 
the motivation for why even the most hardened man in the street should undertake the 
project is the promise of fruits not just in the establishment of science but also in moral 
behavior. (See chapter 1.3; cf. chapter 8.2.) 
The many Academic elements in Descartes’s skepticism have led to reading him as 
intentionally following their tradition over the Pyrrhonists, some even going so far as to 
claim him having been a genuine (early modern) academic skeptic (Groarke 1984; M. 
Williams 1986; Lennon 2008; 2011; Maia Neto 2003; 2014; 2015; Davies 2017; Giocanti 
2017; Stuchlik 2017). Descartes’s skepticism, like Academic and especially Charron’s 
modern French Academic skepticsm, is active – a skeptic retains agency over her 
suspension and cognitive states – and allows for degrees of persuasion.  Suspension is 
voluntary and retains the freedom to act and judge, both physically (in practical life) and 
mentally (in private suspension). Even the plausible must be suspended, yet some 
cognitions (the clear and distinct type) are so persuasive that one cannot but be 
convinced of them being true. One way to read skeptical Descartes is, then, to see him 
as the first Academic skeptic who found a reliable way to distinguish cognitive from 
non-cognitive impressions, discovering epistēmē/scientia (truth/reality).    
However, based on my study, the forcing of an equal balance (isostheneia) of 
impressions as the first step in suspending judgement appears to have been fully a 
Pyrrhonian element, absent from the Academic formulations of the issue. Academic 
skepticim is based mostly on indistinguishability arguments and on generating 
theoretical counter measures to any (specifically Stoic) dogmatic claims, resulting in 
indifference of opinion and epochē, in which the followers of Carneades saw the 
possibility of more or less persuasive views.78 However, the Pyrrhonists do more; they 
set contrasting beliefs or reasons against each other, resulting in no side being more 
persuasive than another. The same strategy appears in Montaigne as scales (Apologie: 
1907, 276, 340–344 1991, 591, 633–635) and in Charron as balancing reasons (DLS II, 
2: 1986, 386; 1998, 56). Counter-balancing also forms an important part of Descartes’s 
skepticism (see especially chapter 3.3)79, however,  for him, the following suspension is 
 
78 Followers of Augustine saw the Academics as ‘hidden dogmatists’, protecting the Platonic soul-body 
dualism during the materialistic Hellenism (C. Acad. 3.17–18.38–41). Cf. A. Curley 1997, 127–132; Maia 
Neto 2014, 19–21. 
79 Note that the meditator admits plausible opinions only to force them into balance. Only persuasiveness 
that forces itself on us so that we cannot doubt it while being present can upset the balanced scales of 
indifference. AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15; cf. chapter 4.4. See also Passions III, §170 (AT XI, 459–460; CSM I, 
390–391), where irresolution has a beneficial function but is to be avoided in actions of life.  
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a voluntary action, not a forced-on passive state, due to the equalisation being filtered 
through Montaigne and Charron (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15; cf. AT VII, 158, 465; CSM 
II, 112, 312–313; but see Thorsrud 2014, 127–130; Eichorn 2014; 2020). Descartes’s 
skepticism as an amalgam of Academic and Pyrrhonian positions does not appear 
strange when one considers that the factions, while discussed distinctly, were not 
properly distinguished during the 17th century. 
Descartes adopts the general tactic of Renaissance and early modern skeptical 
literature of moving into oneself, questioning everything previous, and seeking a new 
method of cognising, connecting this with the written tradition of meditative exercises 
(see chapter 1.2.1; cf. Limbrick 2008, 55–56; Lupoli 2009, 151; Paganini 2009a, 257; 
Clarke 2016, 37–43). This allows him to draw a stronger distinction between everyday 
life and the skeptically driven quest for truth than his predecessors, leading to a further 
development in skeptical history: Skepticism not just as a private, subjective deliberation 
but as an attention-requiring meditative exercise, disjointed from the practice of 
everyday life and conducted in the peace and solitude of one’s study chamber. 
Exhausted skeptical exercise, for Descartes, is the optimal route in overturning both the 
morally questionable skeptical tradition and the scientifically suspect Scholastic 
cognitive picture while also providing ammunition against the naïve realism of the pre-
meditative viewpoint. However, the French Preface reveals that there is one aspect in 
which Descartes’s anti-skeptical project agrees with mitigated skeptical doctrines: He, 
too, wants to find a third way between skepticism and Scholasticism (AT IXB, 5–7; CSM 
II, 181–182; cf. the Sixth Meditation AT VII, 77–78; CSM II, 54). 
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3. Premilinary Considerations II: Cognition and Will 
Before a more detailed analysis, one must first have a sense of the cognitive equipment 
the meditating enquirer is required to have to understand the meditative exercise taking 
place in the Meditations. Firstly, the meditator needs an ability to perform what the exercise 
requires. This turns out to be her power of will, enabling her to suspend judgment when 
she is in hazard of falling into error. Secondly, she needs an ability to recognise potentially 
errorless cognition. This turns out to be her power of understanding, especially her 
intellect’s capacity for intuitive clear and distinct perception.1  
According to Descartes, thinking (cogitatio) can be divided into two principle modes: 
perception (perceptio), or the operation of understanding (operatio intellectus), and volition 
(volitio), or the operation of the will (opratio voluntatis). All thought acts can be reduced to 
these two basic ways of thinking: volitions include desiring, averting, asserting, denying, 
and doubting, and perceptions include understanding, sensation, and imagination. I also 
call the general perceiving act cognition. (Principia I, §32: AT VIIIA, 17; CSM I, 204.)  
Though often overlooked in analysis, correct use of the will is just as important for 
the exercise’s success as the correct form of cognition is. Part of what is going on in the 
Meditations is that we recognise our own free agency and then attempt to discover the limits 
of that agency. The free agency aspect is especially important in the Second Meditation, 
in which the meditator recognises her existence from her agency in creating the doubt, 
and in the Third Meditation, in which she tests the limits of her agency in the production 
of her ideas and cognitive nature. Another aspect in which the importance of the will 
becomes apparent and is crucial for the First Meditation is that, as previously argued, 
the project has not only metaphysical and epistemological concerns but also moral ones. 
Habitual following of possibly error-ridden prejudices and skepticism that extends to 
practical life are both morally condemnable vices. Even if my prejudices would be 
correct, I would not deserve any praise or credit for following them, as my being right 
was merely a case of what in contemporary epistemology would be called epistemic luck. 
Successful and morally laudable cognition requires practice and the correct use of one’s 
cognitive tools. (Cf. the French Preface: AT IXB, 6; CSM I, 182; Letter to Elizabeth, 
1645: AT IV, 291; CSMK, 265). Descartes then brandishes a version of virtue epistemology, 
though one were moral responsibility has a large role.2 (Cf. chapter 2.5.2.) 
 
1 Davies (2014, 3) also recognizes the need for two-part special equipment but draws it differently. 
2 Cf. Sosa 2015, 233. Descartes also differs from contemporary virtue epistemologists in that virtuous 
cognition for him does not in itself guarantee the truth. For the importance of will in Descartes’s 
Meditations, see also Alanen (2003; 2009; 2013); Shapiro (2008); Schüssler (2013); Christofidou (2013); 
Ragland (2016). For moral responsibility and skepticism, see Davies (2014); Araujo (2003). For will and 
virtue, see Naaman-Zauderer (2010) and Vitz (2015). 
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I discuss Descartes’s theories of cognition and will in this second preliminary 
chapter, articulating how they come together to perform error-free and virtuous, 
morally responsible cognising. Both are indispensable for the exercise’s cognitive 
success. I first discuss how their correct use was conceived in the late Scholastic theories, 
which form both the basis and the target of criticism for Descartes’s doctrines, to gain 
a better understanding of these powers. I then turn my attention to the powers 
themselves, starting with the use of the will and its role in suspending one’s judgement. 
I lay out my reading of Descartes by what I call indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV), 
concentrating on indirect negative voluntarism (-IV): The will must direct attention to 
the reasons for doubt in order to suspend judgment. The will comes face-to-face with its 
own freedom by attending to these reasons, recognizing the inherent free agency. Lastly, 
I discuss Descartes’s doctrine of the correct use of cognition, the core of which is the 
intellect’s capacity for intuition and the clear and distinct perceptions it provides. 
However, these clear and distinct perceptions should not yet be considered knowledge 
because of Descartes’s understanding of truth as a conformity-relation between thought 
and object. They provide internal compelling cognition or conviction (what Descartes 
more specifically terms persuasio) but not yet knowledge in its full sense (scientia). 
3.1. Late Scholastic Views of Cognition 
The Scholastic theories of perception mostly followed the Aristotelian scheme but saw 
further development and even deviation from Aristotle in the late Scholastic thinking. 
The proper object of human cognition was generally taken to be the material world, 
with the natural and distinctive way for human beings to gain knowledge being through 
sensory perception of things, from which intellectual and abstract notions could be 
derived. Our access to reality was thought to run exclusively through the senses, so that 
whatever the intellect possessed had been acquired by sensory perception. These views 
carried all the way to the early 1600s, shaping Descartes’s own stance on the matters. 
3.1.1. Cognition and Sense Perception 
The late Medieval doctrines of cognition were strongly influenced by Aristotle’s theory 
of perception according to which the soul (psychē, gr. ψυχή), defined as “the first actuality 
of natural body potentially possessing life”, is divided into three hierarchical capacities: 
the vegetative (nutritious capacity), the animal or sensitive (capacities of sensation and 
desire) and the human or intellectual soul (the capacity of understanding). Plants possess 
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only the first capacity, while animals have also the second, and humans are the only 
beings with all three. (De An. II.1, 412a28–29; II.3, 414a29–414b19; III.1, 424b22–24). 
Aristotle takes sensation (aisthēsis, gr. αἴσθησις) to be reliable for the most part, viewing 
it in true cases to be the same as the sensible object (aisthetōn, gr. αἴσθητών), with 
veracious perception being the actualisation of perceptual potency. The soul then, in a 
way, becomes all the things it is thinking, sensing, and perceiving. (Cf. Knuuttila 2008; 
Carriero 2009, 11.) 
Similarly, in the Aristotelian tradition, especially following Aquinas, knowledge was 
considered as assimilation of the cognised by the cogniser, requiring there to be 
something in common between the two. This similarity was typically understood as a 
formal identity: The cogniser assimilates the form of the cognised thing in a cooperation 
between the lower sensory faculties and the higher intellectual faculties. Aquinas depicts 
this assimilation as the perceived object, say a rock, sending sensible species to the senses, 
which are in turn refined in the common sense (sensus communis) and presented to the 
mind as a corporeal image, or a phantasm. The intellect then abstracts a universal, an 
intelligible species, of the perceived rock. This universal is the matterless form of the 
external rock presented in the mind. The intellect can now think of any rock, as the 
same rock form is presented in them as well. However, knowledge is always aimed at 
universals, which provide the real structure of the world to the mind. Particular objects 
are only indirectly reachable for the intellect. (ST I, Q.85–86.) 
The sensation-produced real structure is stored as phantasms in the imagination 
(phantasia sive imaginatio), which also contains memory. When the intellect thinks of 
universals, it turns to these phantasms, which work as a sort of a gateway to the world. 
If the senses did not function properly and the intellect happens to lose its phantasms, 
not only would the connection to the world be severed but, due to the necessity of 
phantasmal conversion, no understanding could take place. Aquinas then adopts the 
famous Aristotelian-Scholastic maxim of Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu 
(nothing is in the intellect without first being in the senses) (e.g., DV, Q.2, a.3, ad.19). 
According to the Aristotelians, cognitive abilities are inherently tied to the material 
world, sensory reality being their natural object. Cognitive faculties could not function 
as they are intended to without the senses and the phantasms, the subject being unable 
not only to remember and imagine but also to abstract, cognise, and understand. The 
nature of the human intellect is to work through the senses in the late Aristotelian-
Scholastic context. (ST I, Q.84, a.7; Q.87, a.1. Cf. Carriero 2009, 11–16 & 34.)  
It is easy to see why one would have to first acquire some structure through the 
senses to cognise the natural world of material bodies. However, this is so even 
regarding the cognition of intellectual concepts such as mathematics, and immaterial 
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things such as God and the intellect itself. For Aquinas, mathematics concerns intelligible 
matter (sensitive matter restricted solely to quantity) and is abstracted from the particular 
somewhat similarly to sensory material. Conceiving mathematical entities is to consider 
perceived matter in terms of accidents that can be quantified. When reducing other 
accidents, the mathematician is able to reason a priori (in the traditional sense) from 
cause to effect (from definitions of quantified matter to their consequences), whereas 
the natural philosopher is bound to reason a posteriori, from effect to cause (from the 
sensible world to the underlying essence or nature causing it). Mathematical concepts 
are then mental constructs, yet they have a real, remote foundation in the sensible world. 
Despite methodological differences, both the mathematician and the natural 
philosopher depend on the senses and abstraction for gaining cognition of their subject 
matters. (Boet. Trin. Q.5, a.3. Cf. Maurer 1993; Carriero 2009, 13.)  
The cognition of immaterial things works a bit differently for Aquinas. The mind’s 
acquisition of phantasms is sensory; thus, it is best suited for cognising the material 
“outside” world. However, it is not fully devoid of any knowledge of immaterial things; 
that is just not the primary object of its function. The knowledge we have of God and 
of ourselves is always mediated and indirect. The way knowledge about God is oblique 
is also different from the way one’s intellectual self-knowledge is oblique.3 
Unlike in the case of sensory-based cognition, where we can grasp the essences or 
natures of things through the particular by way of abstraction, Aquinas thinks we have 
no way (at least in this mortal life) to grasp God’s essence (i.e., grasp what God is). In 
this, he is following a tradition in Medieval philosophy whereby we cannot have positive 
knowledge of God’s essence; we can know God only negatively (e.g., Pseudo-
Dionysius) or as the cause of our created attributes (e.g., Maimonides). Aquinas similarly 
states that we can merely infer certain aspects about God, such as his existence. In the 
Summa Theologiae, Aquinas lists five ways we can know that God exists: based on change, 
causation, necessity of being, gradation of observable perfection, and teleology. All 
these ways are a variation of what we now call the cosmological argument – they are based 
on an observation of something perceivable by the senses and argue for the source of 
the thing in the necessary First Cause (the Aristotelian unmoved mover, i.e., God). (ST 
I, Q.2, a.3.) However, the strategy does not really tell us anything about that First Cause, 
just that the Cause must exist. In Boetium de Trinitate, Aquinas supplements the five ways 
of knowing God exists with three principle ways of having inferred knowledge about 
God: that God is the first cause of all bodies by way of causation (similar to the five 
ways), that God is not a body by way of negation, and that God transcends body (being 
 
3 The Scholastics would then agree with Descartes on the ideas of God and the soul not having been in 
the senses (see AT VI, 37; CSM I, 129). 
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more perfect than it) by way of transcendence (Boet. Trin. Q.6, a.3). We start with 
knowledge of body and work our way up in all three ways, just like in the five ways. Our 
knowledge of divinity operates through the images we acquire by sensory experience. 
The dependence here is not simply genetic either. We only come to understand God 
through these images, or likenesses (similitudines), that enable our understanding of body. 
Lacking the stockpile of images, we would lose cognitive access not only to material 
bodies but to God as a being that causes, excludes, and transcends body. Images are the 
“starting point of our knowledge” (Boet. Trin. Q.6, a.2, ad.5). (Cf. Nolan & Nelson 2006, 
105; Carriero 2009, 13–14, 168–182, 195–196; Nolan 2014, 130.4) 
Regarding the intellect’s knowledge of itself, Aquinas denies the Augustinian ability 
of the mind to know itself directly, viewing that the materially directed abilities (vision, 
hearing, and so on) are not capable of reflecting on their own acts. However, the mind 
can know itself by two routes: singularly, when “Socrates or Plato perceives that he has 
an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands”, and universally, when “we 
consider the nature of the human mind from the act of the intellect” (ST Q.87, a.1). 
The first is easily acquired from the “mere presence of the mind” through its acts, while 
the second is more difficult, requiring “a careful and subtle inquiry”. This strenuousness 
is due to our thoughts not being the immediate, primary object of our understanding. 
There is no phantasm of one’s own mind, so we can only ever have an indirect grasp of 
it. “[I]t is connatural for our intellect in the present life to look to material, sensible 
things” (ST I, Q.87, a.1; cf. DV Q.10, a.8). Since our grasp of the intellect as this sort 
of faculty is based solely on the senses so, too, is intellectual self-knowledge (Yrjönsuuri 
1999, 56–59; 2000, 231–232; 2007, 143–144; Carriero 2009, 14–15.5) 
3.1.2. Intuitive Cognition and Self-Knowledge 
Aquinas’s thought came to influence most of the subsequent philosophy, but many of 
his doctrines were also challenged. One discussion that emerged in opposition to 
Thomistic thought was intuitive cognition (cognitio intuitiva), related to perceiving particular 
 
4 Descartes departs from the Scholastics here, viewing us as having direct access not just to God’s existence 
but also to his essence. 
5 Note that, according to Aquinas, if there were not acts in the mind, it would not know itself, this being 
the standard rejection of Avicenna’s “floating man” (see chapter 2.3.2). However, to be precise, Aquinas 
does allow human intellect to have other modes of cognition beyond its natural capacities, such as 
supernatural assistance from God’s divine light, which is available (in this life at least) only for the blessed. 
See Pegis 1974. Though it could be argued that these other forms of cognition bring Aquinas closer to 
Descartes, what seems most important for our understanding of Descartes’s Meditations is how the intellect 
functions in natural conditions for Aquinas and Descartes. Cf. Carriero 2009, 15–16 
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objects and grasping one’s own mental states, brought to the forefront by Scotus.6 
Scotus followed Aquinas quite faithfully in knowledge by abstraction but denied the 
Aristotelian principle that our direct knowledge can only concern universals and not 
particulars, viewing the human mind to be able to directly cognise the particular and the 
general (e.g., Lect. II, d.3). I know what a rock is by abstracted knowledge through 
phantasmal image without there being a single rock to be perceived. Knowing that the 
exact particular rock that is rolling right behind me on a narrow slope exists is a job for 
intuitive knowledge. Scotus even takes imagination to be a form of abstractive cognition 
and sensation to be a form of intuitive cognition. (Yrjönsuuri 1997; Pasnau 2003, 297.) 
On intuitive self-knowledge, Scotus follows an older Fransiscan tradition, such as 
Olivi and Matthew of Aquasparta (1240–1302), preferring Augustinian thought over the 
systemised Aristotelianism of the Dominican Aquinas (cf. chapter 2.3). Aquasparta 
particularly considered self-knowledge in the straightforward Augustinian way while 
being critical of the position of “great men” (which just happened to be similar to 
Aquinas’s). He held that intuition, using Augustine’s analogue of “mental vision”, grants 
direct access to its object, allowing knowledge of both existence and essence. However, 
for him, the direct intuitive knowledge considers only the intellect itself, whereas matters 
of the corporeal world can be known through the senses only by abstraction. (QC: 1957, 
285–286, 300–309.) Scotus follows Aquasparta in that the intellect becomes aware of 
itself and its nature through intuitive cognition but also held that certain intuitive 
cognition, for instance of particulars, is possible even of external reality. Scotus then 
intriuingly suggests that the intellect is capable through the senses of having direct non-
phantasmal access to particular reality. (Ord. IV, d.45, q.3. Cf. Yrjönsuuri 1999, 60–62; 
2000, 232–234; Adriaenssen 2017, 29–80; Pasnau 2003; 2017, 79–81.) 
Scotus’s doctrine of intuitive cognition was influential for much of the later 
Scholastic discussion of the intellect’s understanding of particulars and of itself for 
thinkers like Auriol and Ockham. Ockham particularly (no pun intended) viewed 
matters of particular cognition and self-knowledge in a generally Scotian manner, using 
the term intuitive knowledge (notitia intuitiva) typically in connection with sensory access 
to external things but likewise extending it to the mind’s perception of its own activity. 
‘I understand’ is a statement that can be directly and immediately known to be true for 
Ockham. However, as is made clear by the other use of the concept, intuition had as 
much, if not more so, to do with sensory faculties, particularly vision. The topic even 
sparked a debate in the 14th century between Ockham and Walter Chatton (1290–1343), 
who claimed that only the senses are capable of intuitive cognition, whereas the intellect 
is restricted to abstractive cognition of universals.     
 
6 A kind of intuition is already found in Henry of Ghent (Pasnau 2003, 297; Adriaenssen 2017, 29–39). 
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Ockham admits that the immediate “gaze” directed at the mind’s activity is 
structurally the same as the one directed at external reality; only the object differs. This 
did not bode well for Chatton, who noticed an infinite regress worry: If every act is the 
same and one direct act can be directly perceived with another, the direct act of 
awareness would be directly perceived with another, that with another, et cetera. Chatton 
views that no extra perceptive act is required to experience the intellect’s act of 
awareness. Seeing a rock, one experiences the visual impression and does not need to 
perceive the experience itself separately. The awareness arises from the content of the 
experience itself when experiencing one’s own thoughts. However, Chatton preserves 
the Scotian notion of intuitive cognition in terms of sensory awareness of particular 
objects. These 14th century debates then developed the concept of intuition as relating 
to sensory visualisation of material objects. The paradigmatic object of intuition was not 
the mind or its acts but the external particular things, such as the rock. These 
developments still influenced the 17th century and probably affected Descartes’s 
rejection of the earlier uses of “intuition” in the Regulae. “By ‘intuition’ I do not mean 
the fluctuating testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgement of the imagination 
as it botches things together, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind” (AT X, 
14; CSM I, 368; cf. Yrjönsuuri 2007, 144–149).7 
Of course, these 14th century debates were no longer actively present in Descartes’s 
intellectual surroundings. Nevertheless, it becomes apparent that these themes were still 
at play in the philosophy of the time by looking at the 16th century Baroque Scholastic 
thought. Fransisco Suárez (1548–1617), one of the leading Jesuit thinkers and familiar 
to Descartes through the latter’s education, especially followed Aquinas for the most 
part with self-knowledge while demonstrating the subtle influence of Scotus’s and 
Ockham’s Fransiscan position. Suárez shares Aquinas’s view that the proper object of 
the intellect’s natural function is the material world, making self-awareness mainly 
indirect. The act of vision, for example, is non-material, and the intellect cannot 
naturally perceive it other than indirectly. However, he was not a faithful Thomist, 
accepting the Ockhamian/Chattonian concept that mental acts are in principle 
individual qualities of one’s mind, and carry not only immediate directedness to the 
object of the act but also immediate awareness of the act itself. An act of seeing a rock 
carries along an awareness of seeing the rock in question, which is not produced by a 
separate act. However, for Suárez, going against Augustine, such an act neither gives a 
clear view of the mind, nor delivers us the nature or essence of intellect. The best the 
 
7 Cf. Thijssen 2000, 202; Adriaenssen 2017, 99–110. Scholars have been tracking the roots of the 14th 
century development of intuition in the 13th century theories of vision (e.g., Tachau 1988), but see 
Yrjönsuuri (1999). 
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act can accomplish is an obscure and incomplete picture of our thinking due to the 
natural object of the act being material reality. In Suárez, then, we have direct intuitive 
cognising of particular individual things and immediate awareness of our cognitive act 
à la Scotus, Ockham, and Chatton, along with there being no clear perception of the 
mind, leaving us without the mind’s essence and with the requirement of material images 
for our cognition to work properly à la Aquinas. Descartes’s understanding of self-
awareness seems practically anti-Suárezian. (Yrjönsuuri 1999, 63–65; 2000, 234–236; 
Leijenhorst 2012, 142–143.) 
All in all, it is evident that the late Aristotelian-Scholastic thinkers, just like Augustine 
before and Renaissance skeptics after (or in Suaréz’s case, concurrent with), accepted 
the privileged understanding of one’s thinking (see chapters 2.3 and 2.4). However, they 
heavily debated whether such understanding was direct or indirect, mediated or 
immediate, clear or obscure. Intuition became direct sensory access to particular, 
individual material objects in these discussions. Comparing Medieval and Baroque 
Scholastic accounts with Descartes’s in the Second Meditation allows credibility for the 
view of him wanting to secure an account of intuitive cognising that is completely 
separate from sensory means, and grants us an unmediated and evident access to our 
existence and nature as cognising beings, specifically against these discussions (I discuss 
Descartes’s objection to the Aristotelian accounts of cognition more in chapter 3.4). 
(Cf. Yrjönsuuri 1999, 63.) 
3.2. Late Scholastic Views of the Will 
Let us now turn to the will, the second important utensil in our cognitive toolbox. 
Descartes is generally considered a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some 
kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt (e.g., AT VII, 22, 
59–60; CSM II, 15, 41). Voluntarism as a philosophical school of thought assigns 
individual power to the will apart from emotions and the intellect. Most voluntarists 
describe the will to be in some form superior to the others, so it can override or not be 
affected by them. Thus, per strong or radical voluntarism, the will is free to make its 
own choices without being tied to follow rational or emotional impulses. Regarding 
doxastic voluntarism, I refer to the strong voluntarist position as direct doxastic voluntarism, 
in which doxastic states are affected directly by the mere act of the will. I will defend in 
the next chapter a view that Descartes, despite the classic account portraying him as a 
direct doxastic voluntarist, is actually purporting indirect doxastic voluntarism, maintaining 
that the will can affect a doxastic state indirectly by making one concentrate on essential 
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tasks to form that state, such as gathering up and paying attention to strong reasons and 
evidence. However, I first present an account of the discussions on voluntarism and the 
will’s freedom that were heavily debated in Medieval and Baroque Scholasticism and 
became key concepts for moral responsibility that influenced Descartes on the issue. 
The following section is influenced by three accounts of the Scholastic antecedents 
to Descartes’s theory of will: Alanen (2003) on Scotist voluntarism, Carriero (2009) on 
Thomistic intellectualism, and Schüssler (2013) on the 17th century Jesuit discussion 
uniting the other two. All of these accounts advance an important part of the preceding 
influence on Descartes’s thought, but I have yet to see an account that puts all three 
together in a single frame. I would like to propose my own. 
3.2.1. Saint in a Pear Tree: Road to Voluntarism 
Voluntarism became a key concept in the late medieval context, especially for questions 
of moral responsibility and motivation, when thinkers such as Scotus and Ockham 
challenged some of the earlier views on those topics. The two aspects used to explain 
both moral and immoral behaviour (i.e., virtues and vices) in ancient philosophy were 
reason and emotions. For example, the Socratic model asserted that since human beings 
are rational, if they know what is good, they pursue it. The reason why humans do evil 
is out of ignorance or because their reason is affected by their emotional responses, not 
malice. Aristotle, even though critical of Socratic ethics, especially in regard to acting 
against one’s good judgment, still considered these aspects (reason and emotion) as the 
building blocks of moral behaviour and emphasised the importance of reason for 
virtuous behaviour. The will to act, for Aristotle, is part of reason (De An. III, 9. 432b5). 
A previous chapter (2.1) noted that the Hellenistic philosophy schools dealt with the 
issue in similar terms. Just like Aristotle, the Stoics and the Epicureans defined the 
desired ultimate good to be human happiness by eudaimonia, and whatever contributed 
towards that goal was considered morally good behaviour. However, when a Stoic 
encounters a cognitive impression, the decision to assent to it is up to his reason and 
when a Pyrrhonist recognises the equilibric state of disturbing contrarieties, suspension 
of judgment is not a voluntary action but is naturally and automatically forced on him 
due to the balance of reason. The will does not really play a part in either picture.8 
This ancient picture of morality was still used in early Medieval philosophy; however, 
it had already started to cause problems, especially in connection with theodical matters 
 
8 Although an Academic could retain agency over suspension, voluntariness might not be implied, but see 
Dihle (1982), Thorsrud (2014, 128–132), and Eichorn (2014; 2020). See also Alanen (2003, 220–224). 
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on the origin of sin. Another issue through which the ancient model was considered 
problematic was a person’s voluntary decision to act morally wrong. A famous example 
of this is Augustine’s story of how he and his friends stole pears from a nearby tree not 
because they were externally motivated to steal them (e.g., they looked juicy, he was 
hungry), were overtaken by emotion (e.g., for the sake of someone else) or were ignorant 
of the act’s wrongness, but simply for the pleasure of stealing the pears (Conf. 2.4.9). 
Augustine dealt with most cases like this, like bodily temptations, in terms of 
Aristotelian akrasia (ἀκρασία), a lack of self-control or weakness of will. According to 
Aristotle, an acratic person acts without sufficient reason and, thus, still acts badly while 
knowing the good. Akrasia is not really a vice, but neither is it virtuous. Augustine 
supplements this with a three-part view on vice – confusion between virtue and vice 
(ignorance), ineffectual knowledge of virtue (akrasia) and a lingering attachment to vice 
(temptation) – without making a sharp distinction between vice by ignorance and vice 
by weakness of will (Wetzel 2008, 60–62). However, the pear case is more puzzling 
because it appears that the wrong-doing was due not to ineffectual use of reason or 
weakness in following what is good but to an actual will to do bad – to sin out of pure 
joy of malice. (See H. Schmid 2018; Wills 2002. Note that Augustine still followed the 
eudaimonistic model, seeing pleasure as the ultimate motivator.) 
The aspect of will and its freedom were added to the Aristotelian-Augustinian picture 
to effectively explain how and why even the highly educated and capable were able to 
commit sins. The issue became especially important with Anselm of Canterbury, who 
was one of the first to give the will some sort of power of its own in moral agency. Part 
of Anselm’s analysis was to distinguish what makes a subject morally responsible for its 
actions (i.e., what makes it a moral agent). Medieval tradition, generally following 
Aristotle, considered rationality as the requirement for someone being the subject of 
praise or blame. One must know what good and bad are and how to gain them in order 
to be morally responsible (thus, brute animals, lunatics, and infants were not considered 
moral agents). However, rationality is insufficient by itself for Anselm. The subject also 
requires the will to do good or bad to be a moral agent; that is, to have a wilful motive 
for the right or the wrong thing, to have done the act willingly for a reason, and to have 
had other options. Anselm’s view is that every subject is given a motive by God and is, 
therefore, in a way hard-wired for that motive. A cat’s nature is to pray on mice; they are 
designed to have mouse catching as their motive. A cat cannot on its own gain a 
different motive, say, for car chasing, or be unmotivated to catch mice. A cat also always 
prefers more mouse catching to less. However, a subject that is hard-wired for its motive 
is not, strictly speaking, a moral agent, since it could not choose otherwise. Cats are not 
good or evil when catching mice; they are merely acting on their God-given structural 
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motivation. A moral action must be a free action. Anselm then adopts a so-called two-
wills theory according to which a moral agent requires two types of willing, just and 
beneficial. An agent that only willed justice would not be a moral but a justice hard-wired 
agent and not an apt recipient for either blame or praise. Likewise, if an agent only willed 
benefit, its attempts to gain happiness in an unjust way would not be a moral wrong. 
Only when the agent has two conflicting willings, one within the moral norms and one 
directed at the agent’s (non-moral) self-benefit, can the agent be morally responsible. 
(De Casu I–V, VIII: 2000, 216–226, 229. Cf. King 2010, 361–362; Ekenberg 2016.) 
Scotus accepts Anselm’s account of moral responsibility almost directly: Morality 
requires freedom, and a moral agent must have willing towards (or affection for) justice 
and personal advantage. Unlike Anselm, though, he saw these affections as aspects of 
the same will. Scotus defines affection for advantage as desiring happiness, and affection 
for justice as providing the will’s freedom, which it would lack if it only desired what is 
beneficial for itself. However, he also sees affection for justice as more noble than 
affection for advantage. Affection for justice causes us to will something that is directed 
outside ourselves; thus, it has moral priority over affection for advantage, effectively 
moderating and restricting the latter. The moral agent possesses affection for justice, so 
it can act not only out of self-love but also out of love for something in its intrinsic 
worth. (Ord. II, d.6, q.2. Cf. T. Williams 2006, 345; Kent 2006, 356; Irwin 2008, 162.) 
Affection for justice evidently becomes the innate freedom of the will for Scotus. 
Moral wrong is not merely pursuing personal benefit for a rational reason over what 
ought to be pursued. Scotus distinguishes willing from the willed action and locates 
moral wrongdoing in the act of the will itself. Thus, he challenges the classic (Stoic-
Aristotelian) eudaimonistic moral motivation by distinguishing the two affections: For 
Scotus, the highest good is not personal happiness (self-love) but happiness for others 
(friendship-love), especially in its highest form as love for God in himself. (Ord. II, d.44. 
Cf. Irwin, 2008, 160–164; King 2010, 372.)  By willing to pursue personal benefit over 
justice, one also, with a separate act, wills to sin. What matters for moral responsibility 
for Scotus is that the will is always free; nothing undermines it. Whatever habits we have 
developed, be they virtuous or vicious, the will is free to act or not act according to 
them (see T. Williams 2006, 348). For Scotus, as for Augustine and Anselm, the will’s 
freedom comes from its power to do the opposite. However, unlike the previous two, 
Scotus views the will to be the efficient cause of moral behaviour (both good and bad). 
Even an intellectual understanding of the good does not hinder the will, as it can simply 
not take the reason’s suggestions into account – we can always just choose not to follow 
the righteous path. What amounts to moral responsibility for Scotus is that we freely 
will to follow what is just. 
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3.2.2. Compatibilism Debate 
Scotus’s account was extremely influential on the Fransiscan tradition of the will, with 
later thinkers such as Ockham also purporting a strong version of voluntarism. The 
radical voluntarism of the Scotists, as just seen, was based on seeing the will’s freedom 
as a two-way power to do otherwise in any given situation. This understanding of freedom 
is likewise called libertarian or incompatibilist. However, the Fransiscan-Scotist voluntary 
freedom was heavily debated by the Dominican-Thomist intellectual line that 
maintained that the will is free when it is determined to choose what the intellect apprehends 
as the best course of action. This understanding of freedom is then called compatibilist, 
since will’s freedom is compatible with the will being intellectually determined by what 
is good. (Cf. Wee 2014, 187–188.) Aquinas, the foremost authority for the compatibilist 
camp, viewed the will as a special sort of orientation, a natural aptitude, towards the 
good, which is expressed in different ways for different sorts of beings. The nature of 
the tree is oriented towards maintaining its form and kind; thus, its natural “appetites” 
are nourishment and spreading seed. Intellectual beings are related to the good on a 
different level from trees and can grasp their good intellectually. The will as a faculty is 
necessarily directed at its proper object. In the case of humans, this proper object, the 
inclination it is naturally striving for, is happiness and whatever comes with it, such as 
the knowledge of the truth (cognitio veritatis). Unlike the later Scotus, Aquinas saw one’s 
eudaimonistic happiness to be in line with the truth and the highest good due to the 
nature of our will being optimised towards them. (ST I, Q.19 & Q.59; DV Q.22 & 23.) 
However, since our will is necessitated like this, what happens to free decision 
(liberum arbitrium) and moral responsibility? Can we be worthy of praise or blame if we 
just necessarily go for the right choice? For Aquinas, that we characteristically have an 
intellectual orientation to the truth and the good does not mean there would be no 
indeterminacy regarding the will. Happiness comes in many shapes and forms, giving 
us multiple options to define, and various ways to attain, it under them. Such 
indeterminacy is inherent for the intellectual being’s condition and requires some power 
to settle the relation to the will’s proper object; that is, free decision. One must figure 
out what one’s happiness consists in and choose the appropriate means for attaining it. 
Free decision is compatible with the larger picture of morality, requiring understanding 
of the good and ways to gain it (Aquinas then, like Scotus, fuses Anselm’s two wills 
together into one). We freely will even those things that our will is necessitated towards. 
Accordingly, we do not gain praise or blame by willing necessarily what we naturally 
desire but by working out the best intellectual grasp of what the truth or the good is. 
Our will follows necessarily (but freely) when we have this figured out and we are 
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morally responsible for our actions. (ST I, Q 59, 83; DV Q.22, 24. Cf. Carriero 2009, 
243–264.) Aquinas’s account is similar to the Aristotelian-Augustinian one, still viewing 
happiness as the highest virtue and seeing freedom as not a question of the will but of 
choice, ultimately done with the consultation of reason and not by the will on its own 
(ST I, Q.59, a.1, ad.1). After the Scotist voluntarists separated from the Thomist 
intellectualists, the issue of the will’s freedom was debated for the last part of the 
Medieval period, with some of the debates continuing into the Renaissance and early 
modern Scholasticism as well (cf. Alanen 2003, 233–236). Is the will essentially free by 
indifference (i.e., having the power to do otherwise) or by spontaneity (i.e., self-moving so 
that nothing violently forces it against its nature but is compatible with being internally 
determined to follow the good)? 
However, as Rudolf Schüssler (2013, 164–168) has argued, clear lines between 
Scotism and Thomism got somewhat blurred by the 17th century. As in the case of 
cognition, many Jesuit philosophers, Suaréz among them, had adopted Scotian ideas 
while generally following Aquinas, considering the will indifferently free. The Jesuit 
voluntarists of Baroque Scholasticism also began to emphasise the will’s role in not just 
moral action but also in doxastic belief-formation, contributing to the discussion 
between will’s power to elicite (elicire) and command (imperare) action. Scholastics such as 
Aquinas distinguish between two acts of will: choosing to, say, raise my arm (directly 
elicit) and attempting to carry out the chosen action, so actually raise my arm (indirectly 
command). Assenting and dissenting are acts of reason for Aquinas, though: The will can 
immediately elicit a decision to exercise contemplation but only command assent and 
dissent in cases that are not immediately spontaneous (therefore, determined by nature), 
leaving potential room for doubt. The former is known as freedom of exercise (exercitium) 
and the latter as freedom of specification (specificationem). (ST I–II, Q.10, a.2, co, Q.13, a.6, 
ad.3, Q.17, a.6, co.) However, with Suaréz and other leading Jesuits, such as Luis de 
Molina (1535–1600), the will’s power to directly elicit passing or suspending judgment 
became part of its freedom of exercise, with assent, dissent, and suspension being acts 
of will. (Cf. Freddoso 2004, 25; Vitz 2010, 111; 2015, 74–75; Ragland 2016, 177.) 
I view that this Jesuit picture, with influences from both Scotist voluntarism and 
Thomist intellectualism, was largely inherited by Descartes from the Jesuits at La Flèche 
and incorporated as sort of a combination of libertarian and compatibilist freedom into 
his philosophy. As with cognition, the thinking by which Descartes was mostly 
influenced was not Medieval but early modern.9 
 
9 There are good reasons to see the influence on both cognition and will coming from Baroque rather than 
Medieval Scholasticism. Descartes rarely mentions medieval thinkers other than Augustine and Aquinas, 
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3.3. Will and Suspension of Judgment 
We saw earlier that Descartes considers willing and perceiving as the two “general 
headings” of thinking. However, unlike in the late Scholastic tradition, they are not to 
be thought really distinct faculties or  active agents within the same soul (for Descartes, 
the mind is a single substance without parts) but more like constantly manifest powers 
(cf. SPQ: 1998, 85–86; see Perler 2013; S. Schmid 2015). For Descartes, then, the will is 
a capacity; moreover, a free capacity. Nevertheless, there is a debate on how exactly the 
will is free, especially on a famous paragraph from the Fourth Meditation:  
[T]he will simply consists in our ability to do or not to do something (that is, to affirm or 
deny, to pursue or avoid); or rather, it consists simply in the fact that when the intellect 
puts something forward for affirmation or denial or for pursuit or avoidance, our 
inclinations are such that we do not feel we are determined by an external force. (AT VII, 
57; CSM II, 40). 
Descartes seems to give two contrary accounts of the will’s freedom from both sides of 
the compatibilism debate. Does he then follow earlier (direct) voluntarists, such as 
Scotus, Ockham and Suaréz, and consider the will’s freedom to be essentially indifferent 
(like the first part suggests), or the Thomistic intellectualists, and consider it to be 
spontaneous (like the second part suggests)? 
There is, though, further complexity regarding the will and its acts to tackle before 
advancing in this issue. Merely following voluntarism does not yet commit one to a 
libertarian or incompatibilist notion of the will’s freedom, as alluded, because one’s 
voluntarism can be either direct or indirect. 
3.3.1. Direct and Indirect Doxastic Voluntarism 
Descartes, like the 17th century Jesuits and unlike Aquinas, does not view judgment 
solely as a chore of the reasoning power. According to him, our ability to make 
judgments becomes more the area of will than of cognition in distinguishing thinking 
to cognizing and willing powers or capacities. 
 
once referring to his possession of Summa Theologiae (AT II, 630; CSMK, 142), but he mentions several 
Renaissance and early modern Jesuit thinkers, like Fransisco de Toledo (1532–1596), Rubius (1548–1615), 
and the “Conimbricenses”, a set of commentaries on Aristotle done by Jesuits at the Portugese University 
of Coimbra, among them leading Jesuit thinkers Suárez and Molina (both voluntarists). He also famously 
refers to Suárez in the Fourth Replies and mentions purchasing Sancto Paulo’s SPQ as an abstract of 
Scholastic philosophy, commenting it to be “the best book of its kind ever made” (AT III, 185, 232, VII, 
235; CSM II, 164, CSMK, 154, 156). The book, while not a Jesuit work, combined many elements from 
Thomism and Scotism. See Perler 2015, 258. Cf. Kenny 1972, 134–135; Wee 2014, 187–188. 
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[O]ver and above perception, which is prerequisite of judgment, we need affirmation and 
negation to determine the form of the judgment […] [W]e are often free to withhold our 
assent, even if we perceive the matter in question. Hence I assigned the act of judging 
itself […] to the determination of the will rather than to the perception of the intellect 
(Comments: AT VIIIB, 363; CSM I, 307.) 
Judgments result from the cooperation between understanding and will. “[T]o make a 
judgment, the intellect is of course required since, [if] we do not in any way perceive, 
there is no judgment we can make. However, the will is required so that, once something 
is perceived in some manner, our assent may be given” (AT VIIIA, 18; CSM I, 204). 
Coming across something that inclines toward judgment is an act of cognition while 
forming or withholding judgment on that inclination is an act of the will. 
Allow me to elucidate. I gain a sense impression of a tree growing next to the railway 
track when I happen to turn my attention from writing this chapter and look outside 
the balcony window. I see that it has certain qualities, such as size, figure, and the colour 
of leaves. My belief in the tree’s existence is a judgment when a sense impression of a 
tree is conveyed to my understanding and I accept it to be real and existing by my will. 
My will is free and has the independent freedom of choice, so I may also voluntarily 
deny said proposition as false (the tree does not exist) or suspend my judgment on the 
existence of the tree altogether. If I, say, consider that my perception of the tree is too 
obscure and confused, I can decline the judgment that the tree exists (it is merely a 
telephone pole that I mistake for a tree) or, considering that I might only dream of 
seeing the tree (and even of writing the chapter, perhaps), I can wilfully suspend 
judgment on whether the tree exists or not.  
Descartes, then, is a doxastic voluntarist; but is he a strong voluntarist in line with 
the 16th century Jesuits, or is he more in line with the Thomistic theory, viewing reason 
also playing a crucial part in forming and altering doxastic states? A long-held tradition 
reads Descartes as committed to direct doxastic voluntarism (DDV) or direct 
voluntarism (DV) for short, viewing that we are capable of assenting, dissenting, and 
suspending based only on our will to do so. Thus, these acts would be utterly volitional. 
DV can be divided into two further positions, direct positive voluntarism (+DV) and 
direct negative voluntarism (-DV). +DV deals with the act of forming judgments, 
maintaining that one can accept or deny a proposition wilfully and either believe or not 
believe something merely voluntarily. -DV deals with the act of suspending judgment, 
maintaining that it can likewise be accomplished by a simple act of will. (For DV 
readings of Descartes, see, e.g., Frankfurt 2008; E. Curley 1975; M. Wilson 1978; B. 
Williams 2015; Broughton 2002; MacArthur 2003.) 
I read Descartes instead as committed to indirect doxastic voluntarism (IDV) or 
indirect voluntarism (IV) for short, considering the will and reason working together in 
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forming and suspending judgments, with the will affecting doxastic states indirectly by 
deciding to exercise concentration and pay attention to reasons and evidence for the 
state in question. IV is also divided into indirect positive voluntarism (+IV) and indirect 
negative voluntarism (-IV). Per +IV, the will must direct attention to reasons for 
accepting or denying some belief. Likewise, by -IV, in order to suspend judgment, the 
will must direct this attention to reasons for doubt and suspension. (Cf. Araujo 2003, 
31–34; Newman 2008, 343; Vitz 2010, 107–108; 2015, 73–74; Schüssler 2013, 148–150.) 
Because this is a work on Descartes’s skepticism as methodic suspension of 
judgment, I will concentrate on -DV and -IV. Note that defending IV in suspension 
does not commit one to supporting IV in formation of doxastic states. One can read 
Descartes as an indirect negative voluntarist and a direct positive voluntarist at the same 
time (or vice versa). Nevertheless, I do view Descartes as following IV in both positive 
and negative judgment processes, for reasons I will not elaborate here.10 
Support for -DV seems to be found in the Fourth Meditation, when the meditator 
refers to her God-given “freedom to assent or not to assent” in cases where there is 
insufficient clarity and distinctness, stating that if she simply refrains from making a 
judgment in such cases, she is behaving correctly (AT VII, 59–61; CSM II, 41–42). 
Descartes also states in a Letter to Clerselier (12 January 1646): 
[I]t is evident that [suspension] is something in our power. For [...] to get rid of every 
kind of preconceived opinion, all we need to do is resolve not to affirm or deny anything 
which we have previously affirmed or denied until we have examined it afresh. (AT IXA, 
204; CSM II, 270.) 
Remarks like these have made many commentators see the will as having direct control 
over the meditator’s suspension of judgment. Suspension of judgment by -DV could 
then work in the following way. When the meditator states in the beginning of the First 
Meditation that earlier acquired knowledge is full of falsehood and, due to this, decides 
to overthrow everything previously learned, a general overthrow of all opinions would 
be accomplished by this mere decision (AT VII, 17–18; CSM II, 12). The meditator 
suspends judgment on earlier beliefs because she decides to suspend them, with the 
resolution being itself already the act of overthrow. No further steps are required. This 
provisional suspension of judgment would then be distinct from the following skeptical 
scenarios, occurring even before their consideration. (See Frankfurt 2008, 24–31. Cf. 
Broughton 2002, 58.) 
 
10 See, however, Forsman (2015; 2017). Note that -DV does not need to hold that we can directly suspend 
on every perception, and many proponents of DV agree that clear and distinct perceptions are utterly 
irresistible for the will. 
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3.3.2. Indirect Negative Voluntarism 
However, it seems that -DV simplifies and causes tension in Descartes’s account in an 
unwarranted way. Indeed, indirect negative voluntarism, that suspending on a 
perception requires one to attend to reasons for doubt, is gaining growing support in 
recent discussions (e.g., Kenny 1998; Halbach 2002; Araujo 2003; Della Rocca 2006; 
Newman 2008; Carriero 2009; Naaman-Zauderer 2010). 
Support for -IV can be found in the First Meditation. Right at the beginning, the 
meditator states: “[F]or the purpose of casting aside all my opinions, it will be enough 
to find in each of them at least some reason for doubt (rationem dubitandi)” (AT VII, 18; 
CSM II, 12; translation modified). According to Descartes, the meditator first requires 
reasons for doubt, provided by the skeptical scenarios, to cast her prejudices aside, this 
applying to every opinion one wishes to suspend. 
Descartes also emphasises the reasons for doubt in the Search: “[O]pinions first 
received in our imagination remain so deeply imprinted there that our will cannot erase 
(effacer) them on its own, but can do so only by calling on the assistance of powerful 
reasons (puissantes raisons) (AT X, 509; CSM II, 496) and in the 1646 Letter to Clerselier 
“[B]efore we can decide to doubt, we need some reason for doubting (raison de douter); 
and that is why in my First Meditation I put forwards the principal reasons for doubt 
(les principals)” (AT IXA, 204; CSM II, 270). Descartes clearly holds that one requires 
strong reasons in order to succeed in the suspension. The scenarios precede the 
suspension because the former are necessary for the latter. This becomes evident in the 
Fifth Replies when answering Gassendi on why not just briefly state the previous 
knowledge to be regarded as uncertain: “Is it really so easy to free ourselves from all the 
errors which we have soaked up since our infancy? […] [M]ost people, although verbally 
admitting [to the suspension], never do so in fact, because they do not spend any care 
or effort (studium aut laborem) on the task…” (AT VII, 348; CSM II, 242). The difficulty 
of the general overthrow is likewise emphasised in the First Meditation, described as 
both an “enormous task” (ingens opus) and “arduous undertaking (laboriosum […] 
institutum)” (AT VII, 17, 23; CSM II, 12, 15). Descartes then denies the ease of 
suspension and holds it to require more than a simple, solitary act of will. (Cf. Della 
Rocca 2006, 149; Newman 2008, 344.) 
However, the proponents of -DV do not have to surrender this quickly. Firstly, they 
do not have to commit to the ease of suspense – that voluntariness is direct does not 
mean it is not difficult. Secondly, in more than an uncomplicated act of will being 
required, they can rely on what I call the memory argument. Say that Hobbes decides to 
stop eating tuna by an uncomplicated act of the will at noon on the 1st of Janurary. 
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Based on just the decision, can we say that Hobbes really did stop eating tuna? If 
Hobbes opens a new can at 12:30, the answer would be no. However, if by the next 
New Year’s Eve Hobbes had not eaten any tuna, we could say yes – Hobbes did indeed 
stop eating tuna. A proponent of -DV can see the meditator in a position similar to 
Hobbes: she can make the decision to suspend judgment on all beliefs, but if she 
immediately accepts another belief, she would not have suspended her judgment after 
all. Descartes indeed puts emphasis on remembering the resolve in several places: 
[I]t is not enough merely to have noticed [the need to suspend]; I must make an effort to 
remember it […] I can avoid error [in a way], which depends merely on my remembering 
to withhold judgment on any occasion when the truth of the matter is not clear […] [N]o 
matter how much we have resolved to assert or deny anything, we easily forget our 
resolution afterwards if we have not strongly impressed it on our memory. (AT VII, 22, 
61–62, IXA, 204; CSM II, 15, 43, 270.) 
Per the memory argument, the scenarios help with the suspension, but only in 
reinforcing the resolution and avoiding formation of new beliefs. (Frankfurt 2008, 29–
30; cf.  Broughton 2002, 58.) 
However, such a line of argument is an insufficient response to the second source 
of tension for -DV, namely the order of skeptical scenarios and suspension. The reason 
why Descartes presses the meditator with the skeptical scenarios in the First Meditation 
is that one first requires reasons for doubt to be able to suspend judgment. Descartes 
clearly places the scenarios before the suspension; thus, it would be incoherent on his 
part if suspension occurred as a distinct act before them. Harry Frankfurt has, though, 
challenged this order on account of the so-called basket-of-apples analogy. 
Suppose [Bourdin] had a basket full of apples and, being worried that some of the apples 
were rotten, wanted to take out the rotten ones to prevent the rot spreading. How would 
he proceed? Would he not begin by tipping (rejiceret) the whole lot out of the basket? And 
would not the next step to be to cast his eye over each apple in turn, and pick up and put 
back in the basket only those he saw to be sound, leaving the others? (Seventh Replies: 
AT VII, 481; CSM II, 324.) 
According to Frankfurt, the analogy suggests that the project of overthrowing opinions 
has two phases: phase 1, where the “basket” is tipped over and judgment is suspended 
on all earlier beliefs, and phase 2, where the earlier beliefs are closely examined to see 
what can be reinstated. The skeptical scenarios, according to Frankfurt, would belong 
to phase 2 and if the scenarios take place before the suspension, the mistake is 
Descartes’s, confusing the two phases of his project. (Frankfurt 2008, 24–31.)  
However, Frankfurt’s account leaves unnoticed that the basket-of-apples analogy is 
unrelated to the First Meditation but is, instead, a reply to an objection considering the 
Second. When the meditator there considers what she is, she first ponders what she 
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thought she was before beginning the project (AT VII, 25; CSM II, 17). Bourdin objects 
that is the meditator not now referring to things already rejected from the mind? The 
basket of apples is Descartes’s reply: To examine preconceived conceptions, it is 
necessary to tip the “basket” and empty its contents, yet, overturning the basket does 
not mean throwing the apples away. They stay on the side for later inspection. (Cf. AT 
IXA, 204; CSM II, 270.). Frankfurt’s ‘second phase’ happens then in the Second 
Meditation with the meditator going through her previous sense-based notions of 
herself and the world, while the ‘first phase’ occurs in the First, and there is no reason 
to consider it occurring distinctly from the skeptical scenarios. 
Regarding the memory argument, the difficulty in remembering the decision is not 
due to the memory itself (cf. Conversation: AT V, 148; CSMK, 334). Neither Hobbes nor 
the meditator seem to have poor mnemonic abilities. The difficulty is due, rather, to the 
restricted attention span and the mind’s natural propensity to believing habitual 
opinions (e.g., that sensory perception is reliable). 
I am aware of a certain weakness in me, in that I am unable to keep my attention fixed 
(defixuss inhaerere) on one and the same item of cognition (cognitioni) at all times; but by 
attentive and repeated meditation (attentâ & fraepius iteratâ meditatione) I am nevertheless able to make 
myself remember it as often as the need arises, and thus get into the habit of avoiding error. 
(Fourth Meditation: AT VII, 62; CSM II, 43. Translation modified. Emphasis added.) 
The mind’s grasp of the meditation easily loosens, which makes the suspension difficult 
to retain. However, when the meditation is replicated often enough with sufficient 
attention, one becomes more competent in the suspension and can accomplish it for 
longer periods of time. Still, it is not easy to diverge from the earlier inclinations (that, 
in a sense, are even justifiable), and the mind’s grip from the suspension easily slackens 
(see chapters 1.3 and 2.5.2). Suspension is then cumbersome not because it is difficult 
to remember but because it is mentally laborious. Making oneself remember the 
suspension is specifically paying attention to the reasons for doubt against the reasons 
for belief, recalling the vitality of withholding assent and once again vigorously 
concentrating on it. This effort is likewise what Descartes means in the Letter to 
Clerselier by impressing the resolution strongly on memory not to affirm or deny 
anything (cf. the First Meditation: AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). 
   Indirect negative voluntarism is, thus, a textually stronger and a more coherent way 
of reading Descartes’s understanding of the will and suspension of judgement. More 
than just an act of will is required to suspend on the tree’s existence, namely, to find 
reasons to consider the experience of the tree to be in some way in error or disconnected 
from the way reality might truly be. The commitment to suspend judgment may be easy 
to make, yet, its actual success is the result of arduous and attentive meditative practice, 
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and even then, one can suspend judgment only temporarily. The will can then affect a 
negative doxastic state indirectly by deciding to seek and contemplate evidence for that 
state.11 (Cf. AT VII 62; CSM II, 43; see also chapter 4.1.1.) 
3.3.3. Indifferent vs. Spontanious Freedom of the Will 
Let us now return to the previous issue on the will’s freedom: Is the will free to suspend 
and assent indifferently or spontaniously? Descartes’s answer here is somewhat 
complicated by his picture of cognition. One can gain either completely clear and 
distinct perceptions, in which no room for doubt or error seem to be present at the time 
of the perception, or more or less obscure and confused perceptions, which do have 
room for doubt and error and, thus, are merely plausible (probabile) but suffice to base 
action and avoid blameworthiness in morally certain everyday life. Regarding clear and 
distinct perceptions, most commentators consider the will assenting to them out of 
necessity being so irrestistably inclined it has no choice but to assent (e.g., Kenny 1998; 
B. Williams 2015; M. Wilson 1978; Rosenthal 1986; Araujo 2003; Carriero 2009; 
Naaman-Zauderer 2010; Christofidou 2013). Thus, the will would  be spontaneously 
free at least regarding clarity and distinctness –  the will is ‘forced’ by the intellect’s 
(natural or ordained) recognition of the good and the truth but is not inclined by 
anything external to it. This reading is supported by the Meditations: 
In order to be free, there is no need for me to be inclined both ways; on the contrary, the 
more I incline in one direction – either because I clearly understand that reasons of truth 
and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of my inmost 
thoughts – the freer is my choice. Neither divine grace nor natural knowledge ever 
diminishes freedom; on the contrary, they increase and strengthen it. (Fourth Meditation: 
AT VII, 57–58; CSM II, 40). 
Some have even extended the intellectual determination to acts of suspension in that 
we have no choice but to suspend judgment if we fully recognise how obscure and 
confused the perceptions are (e.g., Halbach 2002, 557; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 107–
108, 113–115). Descartes would then leave no room for voluntary decision in assent or 
suspension and would be on the side of compatibilism. 
However, several commentators have instead read Descartes as a libertarian, viewing 
the will to be indifferently free (e.g., Davies 2014; Alanen 2003; 2013; Wee 2014). The 
libertarian reading is based around another set of texts. Descartes comments in the 
 
11 This is the case at least with habitually made judgments, e.g., the existence of a familiar tree by a railway 
track. Schüssler (2013) reads Descartes holding -IV with entrenched habitual beliefs, and -DV with newly 
formed (non-C&D) beliefs. 
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Principia that automatons performing designed actions perfectly are not deserving of 
praise or blame due to their movements occurring necessarily, whereas humans are 
deserving since they are the “author” of their own actions. “[I]t is a supreme perfection 
in man that he acts voluntarily, that is, freely…” (I, §37: AT VIIIA, 18–19; CSM I, 205). 
The strongest support for libertarianism comes from a particularly notorious Letter to 
Mesland in 1645, in which Descartes admits the will has “a positive faculty of 
determining oneself to one or other of two contrarieties”, not only with those actions 
in which it is not pushed by any evident reasons on either side but also with “all other 
actions”. Here, Descartes seems to allow a two-way voluntary decision between assent 
and suspension not only with obscure and confused, but even with clear and distinct 
perceptions, considering it “always open to us” to “hold back from pursuing a clearly 
know good, or from admitting a clearly perceived truth, provided we consider it a good 
thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so doing.” (AT IV, 173; CSMK, 245.) 
Now, an important clarification. Descartes appears happy to speak of the will’s 
freedom as both spontaneous and indifferent in the Fourth Meditation. Even when 
considering the will freer the more it is inclined in one direction, the meditator 
comments that “the indifference I feel when there is no reason pushing me in one 
direction rather than another is the lowest grade of freedom” (AT VII, 58–59; CSM II, 40–
41). Even in the best support for compatibilism, Descartes does not deny the freedom 
of indifference from a Cartesian agent but grants it as a lower grade, compared to the 
higher grade of spontaneous freedom. The debate, then, is more about whether the 
will’s freedom is in essence in line with compatibilism or libertarianism, trying to press 
Descartes into holding one over the other. 
However, Descartes distinguishes between two senses of indifference to Mesland: 
[N]otice that ‘indifference’ in [the Meditations] context seems to me strictly to mean that 
state of the will when it is not impelled more (magis) one way rather than another by any 
perception of truth and goodness. This is the sense in which I took it when I said that 
the lowest grade (gradum) of freedom is that by which we determine ourselves to things 
to which we are indifferent. But perhaps others mean by ‘indifference’ a positive faculty 
of determining oneself to one or the other of two contrarieties… (AT IV, 173; CSMK, 
245. Translation modified.) 
There is, then, ‘indifference’ 1) as not being strongly impelled in either way due to an 
equilibrium of reasons and 2) as self-determination to one or the other of two contraries (e.g., 
affirm-deny), with 1) being a mental state, the lowest grade of freedom described in the 
Fourth, and 2) being a power in the positive Jesuit sense (which Mesland probably 
supported). Typically, commentators have wanted to strictly separate these two sorts of 
‘indifference’, with the supporters of compatibilism reading Descartes to use only the 
first sense when referring to indifference (e.g., Naaman-Zauderer: 2010, 106–107), while 
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the supporters of the libertarian reading extend the second sense to cover not only cases 
of a rough equal balance but even of strongly impelling clarity and distinctness (e.g., 
Alanen 2003, 230–233; 2013, 191–193). (Cf. Ragland 2013; 2016, chapter 6.) 
However, Descartes’s comments make it clear that the two senses are intimately 
linked. The previous quote demonstrates that Descartes does not deny the positive 
power of self-determination “with respect to those actions to which it is not pushed by 
any evident reasons on one side rather than on the other”. Instead, he contextualises 
the distinction by separating freedom before (antequem) the acts of the will are elicited 
(eliciantur) and during (dum) the elicitation, with the positive self-determining power 
available before the elicitation. (AT IV, 173; CSM II, 245.) What Descartes seems to have 
in mind here is similar to the Scholastic distinction between freedom of exercise and 
freedom of specification, supported by the term elicitation with the acts of the will (see 
chapter 3.2.2). We recall that freedom of exercise for the Dominican compatibilism 
refers to attentive control: The will has direct elicitative control over what to contemplate 
and for how long, being free to exercise attention and concentration but not free to 
control assent. Only in cases of hesitation does the will have freedom of specification 
and be able to indirectly command assent in some direction. Jesuits, such as Súarez, later 
modified the account, allowing the will direct elicitation of even acts of assent.12  
I read Descartes here as trying to combine these two accounts. The will can freely 
exercise attentive control (i.e., choose where to direct the attention), before assent or 
suspension is elicited and, thus, decide what reasons or evidence to focus on (doxastic 
control being indirect). This is what Descartes refers to ‘indifference’ as self-determination 
(not as indifference in the Jesuit sense). However, the will is capable of choosing either 
assent or suspension if the reasons pro and contra happen to be equally balanced. This act 
of will, unlike in the Dominican model, also seems to be a direct elicitation. Therefore, 
although he generally is an indirect voluntarist, when it comes to the state of equalised 
indifference, Descartes follows the Suárezian-Jesuit model of granting the will direct 
power to act. This may sound incoherent with indirect voluntarism, but note that assent 
or suspension is in the direct control of the will only if the attended reasons are balanced 
out. Any doxastic voluntarism that relies on the direction of attention is indirect. (See 
Della Rocca 2006, 149; Schüssler 2013, 158.13)  
However, neither sense of indifference is entailed during the moment of elicitation, 
as freedom then consists simply in “ease of operation”, with “freedom, spontaneity and 
 
12 Descartes exchanges “elicit” with “exercise (exerceantur)” in a variant of the 1645 Letter (AT III, 705).  
Mesland, though, was a Jesuit priest, so the terminology might be Descartes’s way to humor the recipient. 
13 Vitz (2010; 2015, 75–78) argues for -DV by reading the reasons for doubt as a necessary and effective 
precondition: Performing an elicited act of will alters the intellect’s perception not to be clear and distinct, 
enabling a separate suspension act. However, this turns -DV into a form of -IV. Cf. Schüssler 2013, 159. 
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voluntariness” being the same thing” (AT IV, 174–175; CSM II, 246). It is then not only 
in the Meditations that Descartes describes the will as having both indifferent and 
spontaneous freedom. Likewise, in the Principia, we have “such close awareness (conscios) 
of the freedom and indifference which is in us that there is nothing we can grasp more 
evidently or more perfectly” while “the minds of all of us have been so moulded by 
nature that whenever we perceive something clearly, we spontaneously give our assent 
to it and are unable to doubt its truth” (I, §§41 & 43: AT VIIIA, 20–21; CSM I, 206–
207; translation modified).14 Even in §37, alleged as evidence for libertarianism, 
Descartes writes “[w]hen we embrace the truth, our doing so is much more to our credit 
than if we were not able to not embrace it (quam si non possemus non amplecti)” (AT VII, 
19; CSM I, 205; translation modified).15 Descartes’s reference to automatons is that 
humans (unlike, e.g., animals), have autonomy over their actions, and are not designed 
to just churn out reaction or assent based on clear and distinct perception (one can 
always fail to see things clearly). That human action differs from brute mechanical 
activity does not mean the act cannot be spontaneous (i.e., due to reasons). (See Letter 
to Mesland, 2 May 1644: AT IV, 117; CSMK, 234. Cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 125; 
Christofidou 2013, 155–156; Cunning 2014, 81–82.) 
3.3.4. Indifferent and Spontaneous Freedom of the Will  
We have seen that Descartes consistently asserts both views in a single text.16 
Historically such a combination is out of the ordinary, but it is not impossible 
considering Descartes’s education combined Thomist and Augustinian-Scotist elements 
(cf. Ragland 2016, 195–205). I then follow so-called moderate compatibilism/incompatibilism, 
that spontaneity and indifference are both part of the will’s freedom (e.g., Shapiro 2008; 
Newman 2008; Schüssler 2013; Ragland 2016; Fogal 2017). I particularly read both types 
of freedom as playing important parts in the meditative skeptical exercise. 
Descartes notes in the Fourth Meditation that the mental state of indifference may 
come in several ways. “[T]his indifference does not merely apply to cases where the 
intellect is wholly ignorant, but extends in general to every case where the intellect does 
not have sufficiently clear knowledge at the time when the will deliberates” (AT VII, 
59; CSM II, 41; cf. 1644 Letter to Mesland: AT IV, 115; CSMK, 233). The indifference 
 
14 Descartes, though, also considers all our volitions pre-determined by God, but insists that this does not 
hinder our freedom, even though we do not grasp why. Cf. AT IV, 314; CSMK, 272. See chapter 7.3. 
15 CSM translates “than would be the case if we could not do otherwise”, leaving a libertarian impression. 
16 It is, then, unlikely he changed his mind between the Meditations and the Mesland Letter (contra, e.g., 
Alquié 1950; Beyssade 1994). Cf. Kenny 1972, 153; Shapiro 2008, 25; Naaman–Zauderer 2010, 121. 
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can occur if one is ignorant of the subject matter (for example, if I am living in Leiden 
without access to a weather forecast, and were to judge whether or not it currently rains 
in Amsterdam, or as a non-expert were to judge how the weather is on Jupiter, I would 
be at a complete impasse) and also if neither side is sufficiently persuasive over the 
other, as in there is room for doubt and error. Descartes also admits that indifference 
comes in degrees: the less inclination there is, the more indifference there is. This seems 
to support the compatibilist reading, in that the more indifference there is, the less the 
will is (spontaneously) free, with complete indifference being “the lowest degree” (the 
will having almost no freedom whatsoever). However, note that the will is not passive 
regarding the evidence – it actively attends to it. The will can choose which evidence to 
more keenly attend to, even to try forcing the reasons in balance like pushing one side 
of the scale with a finger. At the end of the First Meditation, when the “reasonable” and 
“highly probable” habitual opinions force themselves on the meditator, she decides in 
return to “turn [her] will in completely the opposite direction” by “pretending (fingere) 
for a time” that these opinions are false “until the weight of preconceived opinion is 
counter-balanced (aequatis utrimque)” (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). Because the issue is 
about “pretending”, the meditator does not truly believe the opinions are false (assent 
to their falsehood) but directs her attention to the supposition and imagine it to be real. 
(Compare with 16th century spiritual exercises, chapter 1.2.1. Cf. Shapiro 2008, 26–28.) 
Descartes holds the will capable of assent in cases of incomplete indifference (the 
reasons incline but not clearly and distinctly), similar to complete indifference. After all, 
the source of errors is that we extend the will further than the intellect clearly perceives, 
assenting to things we do not fully understand, and “[s]ince the will is indifferent in such 
cases, it easily turns aside from what is true and good” (AT VII, 58; CSM II, 40–41). 
However, the assent is clearly made for a reason, having at least an ‘appearance’ of truth 
or good even if we do not sufficiently understand why (AT I, 366: CSMK, 56). Fully 
indifferent suspension is available only by evenly balancing the reasons for assent and 
dissent, which might require extra work initially but with practice we can eventually 
reach equilibrium merely by noticing the insufficient manner of our habitual thinking.  
[A]lthough probable conjectures may pull me in one direction, the mere awareness that 
they are simply conjectures, and not certain and indubitable reasons, is itself quite enough 
to push my assent the other way. My experience in the last few days confirms this: the 
mere fact that I found all my previous beliefs were in some sense open to doubt was 
enough to turn my very most confidence (quammaxime credideram) in their truth into the 
supposition (supposui) that they were false. (AT VII, 59; CSM II, 41; translation modified. 
Cf. Shapiro 2008, 32; Cunning 2014, 82.) 
The Medievals and early moderns traditionally connected doubt with a roughly even 
balance of reasons pro and contra (being aequiprobabilis, equally plausible) in which a 
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direct decision is either difficult or impossible, even in the sphere of moral plausibility 
(see Schüssler 2013, 171). The subsequent state would be similar to the Pyrrhonist 
isostheneia, making them suspend judgment on contrary impressions due to 
indeterminable tension. Descartes’s ‘state of indifference’ clearly follows this historical 
tradition. However, for him, since the context of inquiry (governed by metaphysical 
certainty) is to be distinguished from the context of every day action (governed by moral 
certainty), such evenness should cause pause and deliberation only in the search for 
truth, for in ordinary life, mere plausibility suffices for compellingess. And “[f]rom time 
to time we may even have to make a choice between two alternatives, even though it is 
not apparent that one of the two is more probable than the other” (Principia I, §3: AT 
VIIIA, 5; CSM II, 193). (Cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 105–108. See chapter 2.5.2.17)   
Furthermore, nothing about the suspension seems voluntary for the Pyrrhonists, and 
while the intellectualists grant the will freedom of exercise (deciding what to 
contemplate and for how long), suspension would be up to the intellect which the will 
only indirectly commands. However, suspension is an act of the will for Descartes, and, 
as such, includes voluntary control. The will is free to choose in the state of indifference 
to affirm or deny either alternative or suspend judgment over them; nothing compels 
or determines it. Unlike some have argued (e.g., Naaman-Zauderer 2010), even at a state 
of complete equilibrium, recognising how much doubt and error might be involved 
there, the suspension is not determined or forced on us but is a voluntary action. We could 
choose one alternative over another and hope that we are betting on the right horse.  
Nevertheless, while the suspension is not determined, it is still the morally right choice. 
If […] I simply refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not perceive the 
truth with sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly 
and avoiding error. But if in such cases I either affirm or deny, then I am not using my 
free will correctly. If I go for the alternative which is false, then obviously I shall be in 
error; if I take the other side, then it is by pure chance that I arrive at the truth, and I shall 
still be at fault... (AT VII, 59–60; CSM II, 41.18) 
When the reasons for pro and contra appear to be in stasis, with insufficient clarity and 
distinctness on both sides, the morally secure decision is to avoid error on both sides by 
withholding the assent for the time being, at least until further reasons or evidence can 
be discovered. Even if the meditator would happen to bet on the right horse by chance, 
her success would not be due to the right reasons or be the result of a reliable process 
but would be merely a case of epistemic luck. She would still misuse her freedom by 
making judgments without full understanding and be just as blameworthy and morally 
 
17 Descartes views indifference in the moral-religious sphere a vice in itself (AT V, 159; CSMK, 342). 
18 Note that this morally correct use of the will applies even if we read Descartes as a strict compatibilist. 
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responsible as if she would have chosen the wrong alternative. Thus, while the 
suspension is not spontaneous and one can make an indifferent voluntary decision, the 
suspension is still morally normative, at least with insufficiently clear or distinct 
perceptions. The meditator requires a reason to suspend judgment (seeing it potentially 
beneficial) for motivating assent withholding as a higher strategy of avoiding errors. (See 
chapters 4.1.1 and 4.4. Cf. Araujo 2003, 58–59.) 
Descartes’s understanding of the will’s freedom is, then, a sort of a combination of 
Dominican intellectual spontaneity and Jesuit voluntaristic indifference. The will’s 
freedom is exercised spontaneously with clear and distinct perceptions, those being 
irresistible reasons and evidence for something. However, when we are not determined 
towards either side due to having equally persuasive or equally non-compelling reasons, 
we are able to exercise the “lesser” (yet true) freedom of indifference and choose 
between assent, dissent, and suspension. Judicious behavior is, then, a collaboration 
between the understanding and the will, in which they follow a precise order of labor. 
The will has attentive control over the direction and duration of mental concentrative 
activity until elicitation of judgment, after which understanding takes charge. With clear 
and distinct perceptions, voluntary assent to overwhelming evidence is then a matter of 
necessity, but if the evidential reasons are deemed incomplete or insufficient (less than 
optimally clear and distinct), the will can direct attention to conflicting possibilities, 
balance the scales, and result with capacity for indifferent choice.19 
Descartes emphasises to Gassendi, when the latter defends probabilistic 
determinism in the Fifth Objections, that indifferent freedom is not something to be 
proved by a rational argument but, being self-evident, ought to be experienced by 
attending to it. (AT VII, 316, 377–378; CSM II, 220, 259–260. Cf. Conversation and 
Principia I, §§39–41: AT V, 159, VIIIA, 19–20; CSM I, 205–206, CSMK, 342). Such 
experience is important in discovering our agency on the path to our existence and 
nature (cf. chapter 5.1.2). However, due to the temporal limitation of human 
attentiveness, such indifference, like suspension of judgment, can be upheld only 
temporarily, until the persuasiveness of certain habitual opinions begins to unbalance 
the scales again (cf. chapter 4.4). By sticking to the cognitive exercise of avoiding error 
by withholding on incomplete reasons, at least until more evidence presents itself, we 
eventually discover the true essence of our will as being spontaneously free and 
determined towards the truth and the good in a higher manner, with the experienced 
indifference being only the lowest grade of freedom.  (Cf. Letter to Elizabeth, 15 
September 1645: AT IV, 295–296; CSMK, 267. See Schüssler 2013, 157, 167; Shapiro 
2008, 30–35; Alanen 2013, 185–186; Cunning 2014, 83–84.) 
 
19 What causes this modification of redirection seems to be the meditator’s recognition of insufficiency. 
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3.4. Perception and Cognition  
Descartes comments in a Letter to Elisabeth from 1645 that there are only two things 
we require for judging well: “knowledge of the truth” and “practice in remembering and 
assenting to this knowledge whenever the occasion demands” (AT IV, 291; CSMK, 
265). The latter depends on our will, requiring self-constraint and practice to suspend 
judgment on all potentially error-ridden perceptions, while the former depends on our 
understanding’s cognitive capabilities. (Cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 183.) However, to 
successfully ‘know the truth’, we first must be able to reliably distinguish between error-
ridden and errorless cognition. Thus, after analysing Descartes’s understanding of the 
will and its freedom, let us now consider what amounts to true Cartesian cognition.  
 Descartes, as we know, is strongly critical of the Aristotelian tradition when it comes 
to cognising things as they are, particularly the strong reliance on sensory material, 
image-like phantasms, and the late Scholastic concept of intuition as sensation-based 
visualisation of particular objects. For him, the mind has intuitive access to reality 
independent of the senses. Descartes extends his criticism of sensory reliance not only to 
the self-appointed followers of Aristotle (traditional Scholastic thinking) but also to all 
those “saturated with his opinions in their youth”, such as sensation-reliant proponents 
of New Science (e.g., atomistic materialists and mechanists), because “these are the only 
opinions taught in the Schools” (AT IXB, 6–7; CSM I, 182). (Cf. chapter 2.5.) 
The irony, of course, is that Descartes was likewise a product of the Aristotelian 
school system. Indeed, in his early writings Descartes still seems to hold on to the 
Aristotelian style sensory reliance, taught by the school masters at La Flèche (see CM & 
CP: AT X, 91–92, 218–219; CSM I, 5; cf. Larmore 2006, 20; 2014, 52; Hatfield 2007, 
11). However, he was growing more critical of Aristotelian doctrines by 1625 while 
living in Paris. This early critique is most prevalent in the opening chapter of the World, 
titled “The difference between our sensations and the things that produce them”, and 
in the Regulae Rules 2 and 3, which contain the earliest rendition of the doctrine of 
intuitive clear and distinct perceptions (AT X, 362–370, XI, 3–6; CSM I, 13–15, 81–82).20 
3.4.1. Clarity and Distinctness 
Descartes, in a Sanchesian manner, describes true knowledge (scientia) as certain and 
evident cognition (cognitio) (AT X, 362–364; CSM II, 10–12; cf. chapter 2.4), but whereas 
 
20 Gaukroger argues that the Regulae’s early parts are composed 1619–1620, but he also considers the initial 
C&D different from the one after the early 1630s (1995, 111–112, 202). Cf. Alanen 2000, 260, note 17. 
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Sanches saw such epistemic ideal as practically unattainable, evident cognition is 
attainable by clear and distinct (C&D) perception for Descartes. Perception is clear 
“when it is present and accessible (praesens et aperta) to the attentive mind”, like when 
something is in plain view and cannot be unnoticed. A perception is both clear and 
distinct when “it is so sharply separated from all other perceptions that it contains within 
itself only what is clear.” Clearness, therefore, refers to the strength of the manifestation, 
which in certain cases can be controlled by attention, while distinctness refers to the 
sharpness of distinguishability from other perceptions. Perceptions can be clear without 
being distinct but not distinct without being clear. For example, a feeling of intense pain 
manifests itself as if something in the painful limb that resembles the pain, being clear 
but not distinct, while ‘self-evident’ mathematical truths can be clear and distinct if 
attended to with sufficient care and segregation. Both clearness and distinctness, like 
inclination, have degrees: Perceptions can be more or less manifest, more or less 
complete in their manifestation, and more or less carefully attended to. The clearer and 
more distinct our perception is the more attentively aware of a thing we are and the 
more perfect our clear cognition of its features is. (Principia I, §§45–46: AT VIIIA, 21–
22; CSM I, 207–208. Cf. Alanen 2003, 66.) 
Neither sensation nor imagination, the two main pillars of Aristotelian-Scholastic 
cognitive theory, appears sufficiently clear or distinct. Our sensory perception can be 
clear but not distinct, being usually accompanied by precipitated habitual judgments 
about its nature and origin (from “things outside us”), whereas imagination is neither 
clear nor distinct. Our ability to perceive clearly and distinctly is, then, based on another 
capacity, and the only mode of cognising left is pure understanding (pure intelligere) (AT 
VIIIA, 17; CSM I, 204). It is our intellect, instead of the senses or imagination, that 
grants us true cognition and reliable access to reality, especially on the three main tenets 
of human knowledge: God, the mind, and the body. (Cf. Carriero 2009, 3, 16). 
What is it about our understanding that acts as the primary source of clear and 
distinct cognition? Descartes notes in the Regulae that, of “all the actions of the intellect 
by means of which we are able to arrive at cognition of things with no fear of being 
mistaken”, we recognise two: intuition (intuitus) and deduction (deductio). Descartes 
distinguishes intuition from the senses and imagination, wanting to separate his “novel” 
use of the term from the way it is “lately used in the Schools”, considering it “the 
conception of clear and attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be 
no room for doubt about what we are understanding”. Deduction, conversely, is the 
process of inferring what necessarily follows from the intuited certainties through a 
“continuous and uninterrupted movement of thought” in which “each individual 
proposition is clearly intuited”. Intuition, then, is the source of evidently cognising some 
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self-evident and certain truth, such as that ‘I’ exist or that 2+3=5,  whereas deduction 
is a continuous chain of interconnected intuitions hung together that allows us to have 
certainty about truths that are not immediately self-evident. Even deduction is 
something one cannot perform erroneously (taken it is done with enough care and 
attention), yet intuition, being simpler, is more certain, being “the indubitable 
conception of a clear and attentive mind which proceeds solely from the light of 
reason”. (Rule Three: AT X, 368–370; CSM I, 14–15. Translation modified.) 
Of course, it is still rather difficult to fully determine the conditions under which 
intuition is perfect and reliable and we can be certain our perception is clear and distinct. 
Descartes is notoriously unclear about the criteria for clearness and distinctness and was 
criticised for the notion’s subjectivity and ambiguity by Hobbes, Gassendi, and Leibniz 
(AT VII, 192, 278, 318; CSM II, 134, 194, 221; AG, 26–27). However, such vagueness 
is partly intentional and, especially in the Meditations, a feature of the cognitive exercise. 
Descartes prefers to demonstrate C&D by examples, instead of definitions or Stoic-like 
formal rules (an easy target for the skeptics), wanting the readers to experience and 
become accustomed with distinguishing clear perceptions from obscure ones (Second 
Replies: AT VII, 145–146, 164; CSM II, 104, 116; cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 11–12). 
What Descartes refers to in the Regulae as “certain”, “errorless”, and “indubitable” is 
clearly the absolute peak of clarity and distinctness, when the inclination is the most 
irresistible and assent the most spontaneous. For clarity, I will be referring to such a 
cognitive peak as (completely) clear and distinct, with all other degrees considered more 
or less obscure and confused, thus, merely plausible (i.e., doubtful). (Cf. chapter 3.3.4.)21 
It is no wonder that clear and distinct perception has been taken as an infallible mark 
of truth in certain readings, given this emphasis on the indubitability of intuition and its 
role in clarity and distinctness that Descartes places in these passages (see, e.g., Gueroult 
1953; Kenny 1968; M. Wilson 1978; B. Williams 2015; Broughton 2002). Descartes is 
often read to take full certainty as the result of indubitability, so that clarity and 
distinctness of, say, my existence, cannot be doubted would make it fully certain. Such 
a reading is favoured by those seeing Descartes as an epistemic internalist (although not 
exclusively), with C&D providing indispensable internalist evidence. This internally 
accessible infallibility of clarity and distinctness is also referred to as Descartes’s Truth 
Rule: Whatever is perceived clearly and distinctly is true (see AT VII, 35; CSM II, 24). 
Such intuitive infallibility tends to centre on the cogito, with the existence of the thinking 
‘I’ taken as the first full certainty, a foundationalist truth (cf. chapter 5.1.2). 
 
21 Descartes, then, does not consider all of our thoughts to be transparently clear and distinct, unlike he is 
sometimes presented (e.g., McDowell 1998). Cf. Fine 2003b, 210–214; Rozemond 2006; Paul 2018. See 
chapter 1.1. 
Cognition and Will 
103 
A version of this epistemically internalist foundationalism often credited to 
Descartes, which I call cogito foundationalism or clear and distinct foundationalism, can be found 
in early works such as the Regulae, as seen earlier, and the Discourse, which includes the 
first pronouncement of the mentioned Truth Rule (AT VII, 33; CSM I, 127). However, 
as argued earlier (chapter 1.1), by 1628 Descartes would have realised a radical skeptical 
concern in infallible intuitive cognition, namely, how do we know that our most evident 
intuition corresponds with the reality of things? Just as the Stoic concept of clear and 
distinct impressions as the criteria of truth was challenged by the skeptics, questioning 
the indistinguishability of cognitive and non-cognitive impressions, Descartes making 
peak clarity and distinctness the foundation of certain knowledge would become 
problematic for similar reasons: How can I rest assure that even at my highest cognitive 
peak, I actually do get things right? For all I know, more persuasive clarity and 
distinctness could be just as uncertain as obscurity and confusion. 
Such a worry can particularly be seen rising with so-called created eternal truths, which 
Descartes had supported at least from 1630 onwards, that God was indifferently free in 
a non-motivational way in creating the truths of, for example, mathematics and the law of 
contradiction. Descartes considers human and divine will equal as an ability to “do or 
not do something”, yet God’s indifference diverges from, and is greater in extent, than 
ours. Humans always have reasons and motivations for something, whereas God never 
has any reasons (perception of truth and goodness) for his actions. God’s indifference 
is therefore unlimited.  (See Fourth Meditation and Sixth Replies: AT VII, 57, 431–433; 
CSM II, 40, 291–292. Cf. Alanen 2013, 186–187; Cunning 2014, 77; Ragland 2016, 98–
100.) Thus, while the eternal truths are necessary (and are so independently of the 
existence of material objects), they are still metaphysically contingent. Our thinking is 
dictated by these eternal truths; thus, we cannot conceive them differently (and should 
not even try), but we should also not expect God’s power of creation to be limited by 
what appears necessitated for humans. God creates not only what is actual but also what 
is possible. (Letters to Mersenne, 1630: AT I, 145–153; CSMK, 23–26).22 
Descartes went against most Scholastic tradition with such doctrine, especially 
Aquinas and Suaréz, who considered logical necessity part of God’s essence, necessary 
for created and divine minds alike, with not even God capable of contradictions. 
However, it is not as if this view had no predecessors. Scotus and Ockham considered 
God to voluntarily dictate what the good is (T. Williams 2013), and Buridan saw God 
able to make us doubt the non-contradictive principle (QM II, 2: 9vb), opening the door 
 
22 Cf. Replies (AT VII, 380, 432–436; CSM II, 261, 291–294), Conversation (AT V, 160; CSMK, 343), and 
Letters to Mesland, 2 May 1644, Arnauld, 29 July 1648, and More, 5 February 1649 (AT IV, 118–119, V, 
224, 272–274; CSMK, 235, 358–359, 363–364).  
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for Descartes’s more radical view. The largest influence on Descartes’s position was 
likely Montaigne, separating human understanding from divine, considering it 
impossible for mere mortals to grasp, and, therefore, be in no position to say, what God 
can and cannot do (see chapter 2.4).  
However, if human understanding in no way bounds God’s creation, how can we 
know that our intuitive cognitive peak truly grasps what is true? Descartes’s 1639 Letter 
to Mersenne describes truth as conformity-relation, likening truth to being in the sense that 
if something (thought of) exists, it is true (AT II, 597; CSMK, 139). Truth for Descartes 
is, then, a metaphysical rather than a propositional attribute; yet, God could have arranged 
a set of logical necessities for our understanding that do not correspond with any actual 
features of reality. What is to stop truth from also being different for us and for God if 
necessitation is? Descartes does vehemently reject such a consideration in the Second 
Replies (AT VII, 144–145; CSM II, 103), but the thought seems to have bothered him, 
being a probable reason for abandoning the Regulae in 1628, moving on to the ‘larger 
project’ (see chapter 1.1). (Cf. Frankfurt 1977; Alanen & Knuuttila 1988; Alanen 2008.) 
Descartes’s general outlook is closer to the Stoic Dogmatists than to their skeptical 
rivals, in that he views humans as naturally construed to attain the truth and live a good 
life, yet he sides with the skeptics in a very important detail: Just because one appears 
to have grasped the truth, that does not mean the truth has been grasped. One must 
demonstrate how and why the truth has been grasped. Descartes’s cognitive project is 
required to clear all three horns of Agrippa’s trilemma to succeed: the regressive, the 
axiomatic, and the circular (chapter 2.1.2). We require a reliable basis for cognition that 
relies on nothing else and that demonstrates why it is reliable without arguing in a circle. 
Clear and distinct intuition might fulfil the first but not the latter two. The basic problem 
in the Meditations project is, then, not so much about epistemological justification as it 
is about metaphysical grounding. (Cf. E. Curley 1978, 37–40, 72; 2006, 31–34; Gaukroger 
1995, 202–210; Alanen 2000, 258–261.23) 
3.4.2. Cognitio, Persuasio, and Scientia 
However, if the cognitive peak of clarity and distinctness is indubitable, and we 
necessarily assent to it whenever presented with one, how can clear and distinct 
 
23 Descartes then shares similar considerations with Carneades and Autrecourt in that convincing 
perceptions appear only plausible unless reliably grounded. See chapters 2.1.1. and 2.3.3. Cf. Bermúdez 
1997, 746, note 5; Menn 1998, 218–220. Note that Descartes discusses created eternal truths in the same 
letter as the ‘larger project’, mentioning them to be part of his treatise on physics (AT I, 137–138, 146; 
CSM II, 21, 23). For created eternal truths, see also Forsman 2016. 
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perceptions be doubted? Descartes, in fact, states that clarity and distinctness are 
impossible to doubt only at the moment they are perceived. 
[I]f we see very clearly that a thing is good for us, it is very difficult – and, on my view, 
impossible, as long as one continues in the same thought – to stop the course of our 
desire. But the nature of the soul is such that it hardly attends for more than a moment 
to a single thing; hence, as soon as our attention turns from the reasons which show us 
that the thing is good for us […] we can call up before our mind some other reasons to 
make us doubt it, and so suspend judgment, and perhaps even form a contrary judgment. 
(Letter to Mesland, 1644: AT VII, 115–116; CSM II, 233–234; cf. Seventh Replies; Letter 
to Voetius, 1643: AT VII, 460, VIIIB, 170; CSM II, 309, CSMK, 223.) 
Our attentive span is restricted, so we easily loose C&D from sight; wherefore it can 
come under doubt once again. This is especially problematic for deductive reasoning, 
since during the continuous chain, we could not be certain of the previous clear and 
distinct evidence on which the later steps are based on. However, it is likewise 
problematic for intuition, for whenever the cognitive peak fades, we can doubt not only 
the memory of being certain but also the truth itself. Cognitive metaphysical grounding 
is necessary exactly for this reason: To fix the momentary and fleeting evident cognition 
as something stable and lasting (i.e., epistēmē or scientia, as an ideal state of knowledge).  
What does, then, constitute a cognitive ground if internal evidence is insufficient? A 
potentially successful route would be to discover the origin, the source, of our native 
cognitive powers. Descartes famously claims this source to be an infinitely powerful, 
non-deceitful God. We can be certain, because the source is infinitely powerful, that it 
could have granted us a reliable access to true reality, and because it is non-deceitful, we 
can be certain that it indeed has done so. If God would have arranged a set of logical 
necessities for my thinking without creating them as necessary features of reality, then, 
according to Descartes, God would be a deceiver, which would go against the nature of 
God as infinitely omniperfect (i.e., devoid of any defect that comprises deceit). We 
cannot be absolutely or fully certain, then, of even our clear and distinct cognition 
before confirming the origin of our nature by a non-deceiving God: Otherwise, we 
could always be deceived. Descartes does not reduce truth to mere psychological states, 
such as indubitability, but considers it a metaphysical conformity-relation of thought 
and object; thus, his project is epistemically externalist, with the external reliability of 
clarity and distinctness being verified by God’s existence and nature.24 
 
24 In chapter 7, I call this reading God foundationalism. Note that the Stoics were similarly epistemic 
externalists: cognitive impressions are true because they are in accordance with the nature of things in full 
detail. Cf. chapter 2.1.1. 
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The goal of the grounding project becomes clear in the Second Objections’ and 
Replies’ discussion on an atheist’s cognition of a triangle. The discussion begins with 
Mersenne’s remark that as long as the meditator is uncertain of God’s existence, she 
cannot know anything clearly and distinctly by her own admittance (see Third 
Meditation: AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25; cf. chapter 6.1.2). Mersenne draws an objection 
from this: “[A]n atheist is clearly and distinctly aware that the three angles of a triangle 
are equal to two right angles; but [as for] the existence of God […] he completely denies 
it” (AT VII, 125; CSM II, 89). The atheist denies God’s existence but can clearly and 
distinctly demonstrate correct truths about a triangle, so he seems to have an argument 
against Descartes. Facing mathematical and geometrical proofs, one’s mind could tell 
the potential deceiver to “go hang himself”, as Gassendi in the Fifth Objections 
eloquently writes (AT VII, 327; CSM II, 227). What is the epistemic advantage that the 
Cartesian agent would have over the atheist mathematician here? 
Descartes’s reply does not deprive the atheist of an evident perception of the 
triangle’s geometrical features, but he maintains that his cognition (cognitio) is not true 
knowledge, since “no act of awareness that can be rendered doubtful seems fit to be 
called knowledge (scientia)” (AT VII, 141; CSM II, 101). Descartes then distinguishes 
two states: isolated, momentary awareness of p (cognitio), which can be rendered 
doubtful, and systematic, lasting knowledge of p (scientia), which cannot.  
[A]n atheist […] cannot be certain that he is not being deceived on matters which seem 
to him to very evident… [A]lthough this doubt may not occur to him, it can still crop up 
if someone else raises the point or if he looks into the matter himself. So he will never 
be free of this doubt until he acknowledges that God exists. (AT VII, 141; CSM II, 101.) 
The atheist does not know the origin of his nature and cannot be certain that his 
cognition is true or, as Descartes puts it, constitutes ‘metaphysical’ knowledge.25 The 
result is a gap between cognising well by using one’s native resources and cognising 
truly. According to Descartes, the atheist cannot bridge the gap himself. (Cf. the Third 
and the Sixth Replies: AT VII, 196, 428; CSM II, 137, 289. See chapter 2.5.2.) 
This distinction also surfaces in the Third and Fifth Meditation: in the former, the 
meditator states that “[i]n this first cognition (cognitione) there is simply a clear and 
distinct perception of what I am affirming”; in the latter, with the existence and nature 
of God already verified, she states that “[without knowledge (ignorare) of God,] I should 
thus never have true and certain knowledge (vera & certa scienta)”, later commenting “all 
knowledge (omnis scientiae) depends uniquely on my cognition (cognition pendere) of the 
 
25 Descartes uses scientia, metaphysical certainty (fr. certitude metaphysique: AT VI, 38; CSM I, 130), full 
certainty (plane certus, plane nota & certa), perfect knowledge (perfecte scire: AT VII, 36, 71; CSM II, 25, 49) 
and metaphysical knowledge (Metaphysico sciendi: AT VII, 475; CSM II, 320) interchangeably. 
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true God, to such an extent that I was incapable of perfect knowledge (perfecte scire) about 
anything else until I cognized him” (AT VII, 35, 69–71; CSM II, 24, 48–49; translation 
modified). However, it is the most apparent in a Letter to Regius from 1640: 
[I]f we lack knowledge (ignoremus) of God, we can imagine that the conclusions are 
uncertain even though we remember that they were deduced from clear principles: 
because perhaps our nature is such that we go wrong even in the most evident matters. 
Consequently, even at the moment when we deduce them from those principles we did not 
have knowledge (scientiam) of them, but only a conviction (persuasionem) […]. (AT III, 64–65; 
CSMK, 147. Emphasis added.) 
Context clarifies persuasio being used here in the same sense as cognitio above. Indeed, 
cognition is an umbrella term for Descartes, not a label for a ‘state’ of certainty, referring 
to a variety of attentive grasping, and can be either persuasio (compelling assent) or scientia 
(unshakable certainty). 
   What seems to me the most crucial aspect of this distinction is stability: Persuasio is 
unstable while scientia is stable (firmus) and lasting (mansurus) (AT VII, 17; CSM II, 12; cf. 
chapter 4.1). Cognitio as persuasio is certain in the sense that it (momentarily) compels 
assent. For example, the meditator states in the Third Meditation, “[y]et when I turn to 
the things themselves which I think I perceive very clearly, I am so convinced (persuadeor) 
by them that I spontaneously declare…” (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25). A clear and distinct 
conviction constitutes strong internal evidence, but, even if she has access to evident 
cognition that imposes assent, the meditator’s mind is easily distracted by the 
preconceived opinions. Some commentators have argued for clear and distinct 
cognition vs. unshakable certainty to be a question of temporality (e.g., B. Williams 2015, 
186–187, note 15; Christofidou 2013, 179–186; Wagner 2014, 102), but the main issue 
between persuasio and scientia is seemingly not the time truth is attended to but whether 
there is reasonable room for doubt. The Cartesian agent’s scientia of God is not temporally 
extended more than the human attention span allows but is rendered certain by the 
removal of powerful reasons to doubt what we evidently perceive (AT VII, 69–70, 140; 
CSM II, 48, 100; cf. Principia I, §30: AT VIIIA, 16–17; CSM I, 203). 26 
[T]here is conviction (persuasio) where there remains some reason which might lead 
us to doubt, but knowledge (scientia) is conviction based on a reason so strong that it 
can never be shaken by any stronger reason. Nobody can have the latter if he lacks 
knowledge (ignorare) of God. But a man who has once clearly understood the reasons 
which convince us that God exists and is not a deceiver, provided he remembers the 
 
26 See the Conversation for temporal extension of thought (AT V, 148–149; CSMK, 335). Descartes also 
uses persuasio right before the passage on the meditator’s existence in the Second Meditation (AT VII, 25; 
CSM II, 16–17). Tradition exists for distinguishing cognitio and Scientia, but how persuasio fits with these 
terms has not been sufficiently traced. 
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conclusion ‘ God is no deceiver’ whether or not he continues to attend to the reasons 
for it, will continue to possess not only the conviction but true knowledge of this and 
all other conclusions the reasons for […] clearly perceived. (AT III, 65; CSMK, 147.) 
The Cartesian agent’s ultimate advantage over the atheist is that her knowledge is 
permanent and lasting, whereas the atheist’s conviction is unstable and remains partly 
in doubt.27 Nevertheless, we require a powerful reason to doubt the clear and distinct 
perceptions, which is provided by the initial ignorance of the origin of our natural 
capacities. With that reason proven false by discovering the nature of God, our most 
evident perceptions are guaranteed to grasp the truth. The meditator, then, can fix 
unstable cognition into permanent, lasting metaphysical certainty by cognizing God’s 
existence and nature. (See though chapter 7.3.3.) 
Of course, it still remains to explain Descartes’s 1645 comments to Mesland on the 
Cartesian agent’s ability to withhold judgment even with (current) clear and distinct 
perceptions that hint at a rather radical libertarian two-way power of the will: It is always 
possible to do otherwise, even resist the peak clarity and distinctness. The most notable 
reading of this kind is by Lilli Alanen (2003, 245–246; 2013, 189–199), who considers 
the Cartesian agent capable of suspending judgement even on clear and distinct cognitio 
(uniformly instead of piecemeal) by changing our aims and motivations and forsaking the 
pursuit for the truth. After all, it is by the will, experienced as “not restricted in any way” 
that humans are in the image of God (AT VII, 56–57; CSM II, 39–40).28 
However, Descartes relativises the possibility of going against our strongest 
inclinations in the controversial Letter, considering it to be morally impossible yet 
absolutely (metaphysically) possible. 
When a very evident reason moves us in one direction, although morally speaking (moraliter 
loqeuendo) we can hardly move in the contrary direction, absolutely speaking (absolutè) we can 
[…] provided we consider it a good thing to demonstrate the freedom of our will by so 
doing. (AT IV, 173; CSMK, 245.) 
Those who support a strong libertarian reading take “morally speaking” as referring to 
the dichotomy between moral/absolute certainty so that while a morally oriented 
rational person could not but follow their evident reasons, one’s mind has a 
metaphysical possibility of withholding one’s assent even from the most irresistible 
evidence (i.e., by altering our directives). (Cf. chapter 2.5.2.) 
However, this radical libertarian reading is problematic for at least three reasons. 
Firstly, there are many texts in which Descartes is clearly committed to it being impossible 
 
27 Chapter 2.5 discussed that putative atheism at the time was skeptically inclined, and Descartes wants to 
deal with it properly. We will meet the atheist again, particularly in chapters 4.3.2, 5.1.2, 6.1–6.2, and 7.3. 
28 See Davies (2014, 129–134) and Wee (2014) for libertarian readings somewhat different from Alanen’s. 
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not to assent to a clear and distinct perception while having one (e.g., Fifth Meditation, 
Second Replies, 1640 Letter to Regius and 1644 Letter to Mesland: AT III, 64, IV, 116, 
VII, 65, 145, 165; CSM II, 45, 104, 117, CSMK, 147, 233). Secondly, a radical libertarian 
reading such as Alanen’s raises several questions regarding the skeptical project of the 
Meditations. Say that I start the meditative exercise for discovering the truth, and in medias 
res would realise I am more interested in money, fame and/or the Presidency of the 
United States, and, thus, abandon the project. Would this mean I could not recognise 
that 2+3 equals 5 or that a triangle’s three angles add up to 180 degrees? Thirdly, notice 
that the Scotist-Jesuit description of a libertarian indifference is a choice made for no 
reason. However, displaying the will’s freedom or being enticed more by money and fame 
are reasons, supporting the indirect power of diverting attention from the clarity and 
distinctness (at which point it would cease to appear clear and distinct) over direct one 
(choosing something else while keeping one’s intellectual gaze “fixed”). 
Previous chapters (2.3.3 and 2.5.2) discussed that historically moral certainty referred 
not only to a kind of cognitive certainty that is tantamount to avoiding moral reproach, 
but also to practical necessity or implausibility. I think Descartes’s reference to the 
moral/absolute distinction in the 1645 Letter should be read in these lines, so that 
withholding one’s assent or going for the opposite while one is explicitly cognising 
clearly and distinctly is practically impossible. However, since the will does have direct 
attentive control over the direction of mental scrutiny, it is possible, in the absolute 
sense, for it to cut off the deliberation of understanding; thus, prohibiting the assent to a 
clearly and distinctly cognised thing by diverting the attention to a differing reason.29 
After all, by the moderate compatibilist/incompatibilist reading, the will does possess a 
capacity for indifferent freedom; it just is not in a position to exercise this capacity in clear 
and distinct cases. (Cf. Araujo 2003, 53–54; Newman 2008, 349–350; Carriero 2009, 
262–264; Wee 2014, 192–193; Fogal 2017, 515–516.30) 
 
29 Alanen is on the right track, as the diversion could happen due to an alternate motivation or goal. The 
skeptics, according to Descartes, were able to doubt endlessly due to not being after the truth but 
suspension itself, thus not caring for clarity and distinctness (AT III, 433–434, VI, 29, X, 520; CSM I, 125, 
CSM II, 414, CSMK, 196–197). Descartes even claims that no skeptic has had clear and distinct cognition, 
and if they did, they would not be able to suspend and would cease being (radical) skeptics (see Seventh 
Replies and Conversation: AT V, 146, VII, 477; CSM II, 321, CSMK, 333). 
30 To be in a position to exercise a power, one must have no internal or external impediments to exercising 
it. As argued, the position to exercise indifference for Descartes comes about only if the reasons for both 
sides are completely equal. Cf. Kenny 1998, 150–152; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 129–130; Schüssler 2013, 
157–175, esp. 162; Ragland 2013; 2016, chapter 6. Schüssler goes a step further, holding that while 
practically impossible, Descartes wants to postulate a possibility of direct suspension of judgment on 
current C&D under ideal conditions. However, I read Descartes to hold direct suspension possible only in 
cases of complete equilibrium, requiring us to force C&D into balance with some other reasons, at which 
point it would not be C&D anymore. 
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We have now come to better terms by this analysis not only on the cognitive 
equipment of the meditative agent and its correct and responsible use, but also on how 
closely the skeptical problem is likewise tied to problems of reliable cognition and free 
will for Descartes. Conquering skepticism requires both a metaphysically grounded 
theory of cognitive behavior and a confirmatory experience of our active autonomous 
agency. If God would have created a reality that does not correspond with my most 
evident peak cognitions or if a similar entity would even actively feed me falsified 
cognitive input, I might not even be responsible for my own errors (see chapter 5.1.2; 
cf. Hookway 1990, 81, 144; Araujo 2003, 36). With these considerations in mind, let us 
now turn to the text, starting with the First Meditation. 
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4. First Meditation: Dreams and Demons 
The First Meditation is a crucial step in setting up the meditational cognitive exercise. 
However, the meditator is first required to put aside certain forceful beliefs she has for 
it to succeed. Common-sense thinking is so strong that if we did not sort of ‘bracket’ it, 
the exercise would go nowhere (a man in the street would wonder why he should doubt 
such things). Thus, the meditator must cut away from everyday activities and distinguish 
the meditative exercise from ordinary life attitude to initiate the meditative doubt. The 
motivation for this is the promise of stable and lasting knowledge (scientia). The skeptical 
exercise promises to get to the bottom of our errors and uncover why we commit them, 
providing a metaphysical ground for our correct epistemic states with results likewise 
extending to the moral life in terms of virtue and happiness. (See chapters 1.3 and 2.5.2).  
At the beginning of the First Meditation, Descartes’s meditator proceeds through 
three levels of doubt. Each level deepens the doubt, making it constantly more enclosing. 
The three levels direct the cognitive exercise and lead the meditator to think about 
cognition and will in the way Descartes wants, offering control over skepticism. Unlike 
the Pyrrhonist, who suspends judgment to avoid contrariety, Descartes’s meditator 
chooses to confront skepticism (cf. chapter 3.3.) 
On the First Level, only particular sense perceptions are questionable. The meditator 
searches for the basis of her beliefs and finds this basis to be the senses. Because we 
sometimes confront occasional sensory errors, we can cast doubt on a particular sense 
perception and not trust it uncritically. On the Second Level, doubt is cast generally and 
systematically on sensation and imagination by the dreaming scenario. On the Third Level, 
the whole process of reliable cognition is under doubt by the Deceiving God scenario. 
Consequently, the First Meditation comprises three levels of affect by error: locally in 
our particular perceptions, systematically in our general view of nature and reality, and 
ultimately in our cognitive capacities as a whole. As the meditative exercise continues, 
the meditator overturns three basic principles her earlier beliefs were based on: the 
Empirical Principle (overturned by the Second Level, questioning sensation and 
imagination with dreaming) the Rational Principle (overturned by the first aspect of the 
Third Level, questioning the intellect with the allowed deception by God) and the 
Theological Principle (overturned by the second aspect of the Third Level, questioning 
authority with an imperfect nature by faith or chance) (cf. Christofidou 2013, 16).  
However, even though the narrative proceeds through three levels, the First 
Meditation is not strictly the three-phase structure it is commonly read to be (cf. B. 
Williams 1983; Bermudez 1997; 1998; 2008). Such a reading misses three other 
important parts of the narration: the madness scenario, the painter analogy, and the Deceiving 
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Demon.1 Two of these, madness and painting, work as transitional scenarios between 
different levels, developing the meditator’s thinking from one level to another. These 
passages possess a similar character, with the meditator resisting the full force of the 
earlier skeptical onslaught by seemingly reasonable counter arguments that eventually 
must be dropped due to the following level of doubt. Descartes’s skeptical project is, 
after all, a very gradual process.  
The third part of the narration, the Demon, is introduced somewhat outside of the 
skeptical scenarios, as a tool to assist with the psychologically difficult general suspension 
of judgment. The skeptical scenarios in the three levels fulfil reasons for doubt, balancing 
out the meditator’s will between reasons to believe and not believe and resulting in her 
suspending judgment. However, she quickly realises that the pull towards her habitual 
opinions is much stronger than towards non-belief in them. Thus, she is required to 
create a stronger equal balance between her reasons to believe and not believe in order 
to succeed in the suspension in a more reliable and temporarily extended fashion. Thus, 
she decides to imagine the things in doubt to be non-existent, thereby offsetting the pull 
of her will towards belief with an even stronger pull towards denial. For this, she 
conjures up an imaginary scenario in which a malevolent Demon is deceiving her in 
what she thinks she cognises evidently. This scenario aids her self-deception as a strong 
psychological instrument, intended to level out her will between an equally strong 
reason for assent and non-assent. During this process, she discovers that she has 
(indifferent) freedom of the will, allowing her to suspend her assent. 
The First Meditation then has the following structure: 
Introduction: Observation of the lack of stability and a call for something certain 
Resolve 1: Preliminary decision to suspend judgment on doubtful matters 
Level 1: Occasional sensory errors and particular doubt of the senses 
Counter argument and transition 1: Madness scenario 
Level 2: Dream scenario and systematic doubt of the senses 
Counter argument and transition 2: Dreaming as painting 
Level 3: Deceiving God/Imperfect Nature scenario and doubt of rationality and theology 
Conclusion 1: General suspension of judgment 
Alteration: The need for stronger equilibrium between reasons for belief and disbelief 
Resolve 2: Deceiving Demon as a psychological instrument to help out the suspension 
Conclusion 2: Reliable general suspension of judgment 
The tale of doubts and discoveries Descartes tangles the reader in is easy to follow 
and set oneself into, yet it comprises different layers that require intricate examination. 
A close analysis of the First Meditation is then required to dissect the meditative exercise 
that Descartes wishes the mediator (and the reader) to practice with careful attention. 
 
1 Lennon and Hickson (2013) draw a similar conclusion but with two missing challenges, leaving out the 
painter analogy. 
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4.1. First Level of Doubt: Foundations of Knowledge and 
Unreliability of the Senses 
The first paragraph of the First Meditation uncovers the Cartesian metaphor of the 
foundations of knowledge, on which all other things are built. 
Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as 
true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had 
subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my 
life, to overturn everything and start again right from the foundation if I wanted to 
establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last. (AT VII, 17; CSM 
II, 12. Translation modified.) 
The first phase of the method is aimed at reaching the supporting base of cognition, 
toppling it over and starting again from the first foundations (primis fundamentis). One 
must overturn (evertenda) everything believed and learned earlier to achieve this.2 The 
architectonic metaphor is consistent for Descartes, recurring throughout his works.3 
The eventual goal, then, is to establish something stable and lasting (firmum & mansurum) 
in the sciences (in scientiis). The stable certainty that Descartes is after is more 
metaphysical in nature than epistemological: It considers scientia (cf. chapter 3.4). 
4.1.1. Preliminary Decision to Overthrow Opinions 
The task of overturning appeared enormous, so the meditator waited for a “mature 
enough age”. Now the project should not be put off any longer and she devotes herself 
fully to the general overthrow (generali eversio) of opinions. (AT VII, 17–18; CSM II, 12.) 
Certain commentators, as previously discussed, see the overthrow as provisional with 
the meditator suspending on earlier beliefs and opinions merely by deciding to do so 
However, such an account would leave us with a great deal of tension, suspension 
appearing easier than Descartes describes it to be, requiring the meditator to have waited 
for a “suitable” age to engage in the inquiry. One requires powerful reasons to 
successfully overthrow one’s preconceived opinions.4 (Cf. chapter 3.3.) 
 
2 CSM translates evertenda as “demolish”. I consider demolishing to be misleading, because I do not see the 
doubt as rejecting former beliefs. See also the Letter to Mersenne, 24 December 1640 (AT III, 268; CSMK, 
164), in which Descartes discusses the phrases erutis fundamentis and suffosis fundamentis, choosing the latter. 
3 See, e.g., AT II, 380 & VI, 22; CSM I, 122 & CSMK, 124. See also the Seventh Replies (AT VII, 536; 
CSM II, 366): “Throughout my writings I have made it clear that my method imitates that of the architect”. 
4 The ease of suspension seems to originate from the general overthrow being viewed as a natural extension 
of our everyday evaluations (Frankfurt 2008, 24; cf. B. Williams 2015, 46; Cavell 1979, 191; Stroud 1984, 
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What about the general overthrow of opinions? If the suspension does not happen 
here, why does Descartes have the meditator make this commitment from the 
beginning? Better yet, how can the meditator know that she can find reasons to doubt 
her opinions by examining them? Following Descartes’s architectonic metaphor, I see 
it as quite an intuitive conclusion that one must bring down the old structure to reach 
the first foundations. However, the decision is merely preliminary, introduced as a 
devotion to make the required effort for the overthrow.5 The general overthrow of 
opinions requires careful attention and considerable mental effort that the meditator 
must promise to provide. The six Meditations, after all, are a cognitive exercise, 
requiring practice and training. 
Trusting Descartes’s guidance, the meditator makes the decision to devote herself 
“seriously and freely (seriò tandem & libere)” to the following overthrow (AT VII, 18; 
CSM II, 12; translation modified). Suspension of judgment requires commitment that 
is sincere and without reservation. The overthrow is not a mere mind game or a 
psychological sham but a real and earnest meditative exercise to gain metaphysical 
certainty.6 If the meditator were like Gassendi, acknowledging the need for suspension 
but not taking the skeptical scenarios seriously, she would be unable to properly and 
genuinely suspend her judgment according to Descartes (AT VII, 257–258, 348–351; 
CSM II, 180, 241–242). Like the ancient skeptics, Descartes has in mind an internal 
skeptical evisceration aimed at reaching an equilibrium between equally strong reasons 
for assent and non-assent that covers not only epistemic notions but all earlier beliefs 
(AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). However, he also significantly differs from the ancients in the 
basic supposition. The meditator maintains that something certain exists and that this 
certainty (at least in theory) can be gained. This is clearly a stronger postulation than the 
Academic and Pyrrhonistic possibility of knowledge that does not seem to be 
discovered yet. The influence of the later skeptical tradition from Augustine to 
Montaigne, Sanches, and Charron, and the other early modern anti-skeptical projects, 
are evident here. (Cf. chapters 1.3 and 2.) 
Descartes presents a central Cartesian principle at the beginning of the second 
paragraph: “Reason now leads me to think that I should hold back my assent from 
opinions which are not completely certain and indubitable just as carefully as I do from 
 
24–26). As argued, though, Descartes does not think general suspension is natural for humans. See, e.g., 
the Principia I, §§71–73 (AT VIIIA, 35–37; CSM I, 218–220). Cf. M. Williams 1986; 1991, 2–10; Broughton 
2002, 23, 72–93; Cunning 2010, 22. While -DV does not commit one to the ease of suspense, many of its 
proponents do imply easiness (e.g. Frankfurt 2008). 
5 Cf. the Discourse (AT VI, 13–15, 31; CSM I, 116–118, 126–127). See also Broughton 2002, 5. 
6 Cf. the Preface and the Second and Fifth Replies (AT VII, 9–10, 130, 350; CSM II, 8, 94, 234). Unlike 
sometimes read (e.g., Kenny 1968, 24; M. Wilson 1978, 33), doubt and suspension are not mere “play-
acting”. Cf. chapters 1.1 and 1.3. 
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those which are patiently false” (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12).  Reason leads the meditator 
to suspend judgment on opinions in which room for doubt can be discovered, and 
which thus are not indubitable. “So, for the purpose of casting aside (rejiciendas) all my 
opinions, it will be enough if I find in each of them at least some reason for doubt” (AT 
VII, 18; CSM II, 12; translation modified7). This commitment has also been called the 
strong maxim for withholding assent (Broughton 2002, 43–44). 
There are two reasons for the strong maxim. Firstly, what lies behind is a desire for 
scientia: Absolute, indubitable (metaphysical) certainty. This can already be seen in the 
first paragraph, aiming to establish in scientiis something stable and lasting (AT VII, 17; 
CSM II, 12). Secondly, unlike ancient skepticism, Cartesian suspension is not a reaction 
to contrary impressions but a recognition of a lack of metaphysical certainty and follows 
from finding room for doubt. Some conflicting considerations do play a role, especially 
in the First Level particular doubts, but just as Descartes does not think the suspension 
to be a natural state, he does not think the meditator can generally and systematically 
suspend judgment based only on conflicting impressions. (See chapters 2.1.2 and 2.2.) 
Nevertheless, reasons for doubt do not constitute reasons for suspending judgment.8 
I might find reason to doubt the moon landing (perhaps it was a hoax), but this does 
not make me suspend judgment on whether man has been to the moon. In order to get 
the meditator suspend judgment based on the skeptical scenarios, Descartes makes her 
commit to a maxim to withhold assent on every opinion in which one can find reason 
for doubt. A skeptical scenario succeeds as a reason for doubt if it can create sufficient 
room for doubting some set of beliefs (compelling evidence being stronger or at least 
equal for questioning rather than affirming). (AT VII, 473–474; CSM II, 319. Cf. Curley 
1978, 85–85; Broughton 2002, 44; Perin 2008, 63; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 114.) 
Notice that the second reason is motivated by the first. Descartes requires a special 
reason to move the meditator from attending to evidence, maybe even slight, that she 
might be wrong about something to wanting and obtaining suspension of judgment and 
withholding her assent on something. This special reason is conditioned by the desire 
for absolute certainty. The commitment of overthrow is not done in just any situation, 
but in the exceptional case of wanting to obtain something metaphysically certain. The 
 
7 CSM translates rejiciendas as “rejecting”. However, it is not a conjugation of the word rejectio but of the 
verb rejicere, which literally translates as “throwing back”. Descartes uses the same term in the basket-of-
apples analogy (AT VII, 481; CSM II, 324), referring to removing apples from a basket (ex corbe rejiceret) 
but does not mean a complete discarding of them. The meaning of the word appears less strong than 
rejection would imply. See chapter 3.3.2. 
8 Broughton (2002, 55–59) argues for -DV on this notion while disagreeing with Frankfurt that suspension 
would occur before the skeptical scenarios. However, it is unclear from her account why the meditator could 
not suspend on judgment merely by willing to. Note that Broughton acknowledges some of these 
difficulties. Cf. Vitz 2010; 2015, 75–78. 
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meditator has provisionally decided to overthrow her prior opinions, so it will be 
beneficial to withhold judgment where reason for doubt can be found. Of course, it 
might be that no convincing reason can be discovered for doubting the meditator’s set 
of beliefs. She cannot be sure that the inquiry will succeed before attempting it. The 
meditator can feel more secure if this is so, because her set of beliefs are not as suspect 
as she originally expected. The inquiry has proven beneficial, even if it did not succeed 
in her goal of general overthrow. However, if compelling reasons for doubt can be 
discovered, the meditator can safely assume that suspension of judgment is the correct 
action to take. The reasons for doubt would not contribute much without a reason to 
suspend judgment, or a reason to overthrow the prior set of beliefs.9 (Cf. chapter 3.3.4.) 
4.1.2. Empirical Principle: Scholastic, Naivë, and Skeptical 
Systematically going through each individual belief one by one would be a task much 
too arduous, something she might never accomplish, so she opts to handle them en 
masse. Following the architectonic metaphor, everything built on top collapses on its 
own when the foundations of the building are undermined. The meditator is potentially 
able to bring down the whole edifice of erroneous beliefs by combining the reason for 
suspending judgment (the strong maxim) with finding reasons to doubt the basic 
principles (ipsa principia) of her earlier preconceptions.10 
The basic principle that the meditator sets her sights on first is the Emprical 
Principle: “Whatever I have up till now accepted as most true I have acquired either 
from the senses or through the senses (vel a sensibus, vel per sensibus)” (AT VII, 18; CSM 
II, 12). All the things the meditator has the closest and most intimate relationship, and 
has come to know as most true, have been acquired through sensory experience. 
Descartes is reported as explicating the meaning of “from the senses or through the 
senses” in the Conversation. Something is acquired from the senses when there is a first-
hand sensation of it, such as a shape or a colour in sight. In short, from the senses means 
truths gained by personal sensory experience. Something is acquired through the senses when 
 
9 As previously noted, due to the cumbersome nature of suspension, the meditator eventully also requires 
some extra work, namely, self-deception by pretending her beliefs to be false in order to suspend judgment 
reliably and enduringly. 
10 One way to read this mention of principles is as a reference to the three cognitive tenets that the 
meditator discovers during the exercise: ‘I’ (the thinking mind), God, and body (the extended material 
reality). However, I do not think this is the full intention, as the meditator would not yet think of cognition 
or metaphysics in this Cartesian way. Descartes more likely aims to expound on the meditator’s previous 
epistemological principles, overturn them, and compensate his own metaphysical account, grounded on 
these three principles. Cf. chapters 1.2.2, 3.4.1, and 7.3.3. 
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there is a second-hand source, such as being heard from a parent or a teacher. Descartes 
leaves it unmentioned, but through the senses seems to also include information 
acquired by reading. In short, through the senses means truths gained by authorative 
testimony. (AT V, 146; CSMK, 332.) 
A famous criticism has been that Descartes is trying to implement an otherwise 
missing foundational theory of knowledge into the discussion by the architectonic 
allusion of principles and foundations (e.g., M. Williams 1986). After all, it does not 
seem self-evident that our beliefs and opinions have a foundation, a basic principle on 
which everything else is supported. Nor is it self-evident that once those basic principles 
are shaken enough, all of our other strong beliefs also crumble. However, this criticism 
fails to acknowledge that during Descartes’s time, having a foundation or a basic 
principle for all knowledge was, while perhaps not universally accepted, at least fairly 
common. More specifically, with the Empirical Principle Descartes has in mind a 
foundation akin to the Aristotelian-Scholastic maxim of Nihil est in intellectum nisi fuerit in 
sensu, according to which most beliefs and opinions the meditator has are based on one 
structural prop: sensory experience.11 
For Descartes, Aristotelianism is equally foundationalist, with the foundation of all 
knowledge lying in empirical sensation.12 Descartes views that Aristotelian metaphysics, 
epistemology, and science follow the so-called Resemblance Picture of Sensation (RPS): 
Reality, for the most part, resembles our sensations of how it appears. This resemblance 
critique is one of Descartes’s main criticisms of the Aristotelian doctrine and motivates 
the Meditations. “I used to assert […] that there were things outside me which were the 
sources of my ideas and which resembled them in all respects. Here was my mistake; 
[…] if my judgment was true, it was no thanks to the strength of my perception” (AT 
VII, 35; CSM II, 25). Desiring to undermine the RPS model Descartes places the 
meditator’s tentative worldview on an Aristotelian support beam; cutting the beam 
would bring down the whole structure.13 
 
11 See, e.g., Met. 1.1, 980a21–26; An. Post. 2.19, 996b20–100a14; ST I, Q.17, a.3; SQO, a.1, q1, I–II; B II, 
2–3; Apologie (1907, 390; 1991, 663); QNS, 51. Cf. Grellard 2007, 334–338. See the Letter to Mersenne, 28 
January 1641 (AT III, 298; CSMK, 173) for more evidence that the Empirical Principle is directed towards 
Aristotelianism. Note, though, that Descartes does not state that all of the meditator’s beliefs stem from 
this principle. In the earlier paragraph, the meditator states to dive into the basic principles (principia). Cf. 
the Synopsis (AT VII, 12; CSM II, 9). Unlike what some suggest (e.g., Frankfurt 2008; Larmore 1998; 
2014; Bermúdez 2008), it is not obvious that, e.g., mathematics would initially have a sensory basis in a 
robustly Scholastic manner (see chapter 3.1.1). Cf. Cunning 2007, 124; Christofidou 2013, 10–29. 
12 Descartes’s criticism of the Aristotelians applies also to, e.g., Epicureans and to non-Aristotelians 
nevertheless infected by Aristotelianism. See the Letter to More, 5 February 1649 (AT V, 271; CSMK, 
362) and the French Preface (AT IXB, 7; CSM I, 182). Cf. Cunning 2010, 32. See chapter 3.4. 
13 Obviously, this is a bit of a straw man of the Aristotelian position. See chapters 2.3 and 3.1. Cf. Zupko 
1993. 
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It is good to remember that Descartes also does not have to build the meditator 
character as a card-carrying Aristotelian to have her to commit to the Empirical 
Principle and RPS. In the Sixth Meditation, the meditator goes through the reasons why 
she earlier followed the Resemblance Picture. These reasons follow the Third 
Meditation description of being taught by nature, but none of them strike as particularly 
Aristotelian. Sensations and the ideas perceived by them simply seemed more likely, 
vivid, and more distinct than those derived from intellectual contemplation, and since 
the sole source of her knowledge of external things was the ideas gained by the senses, 
the supposition that those things resembled the ideas she had of them was bound to 
occur. Thus, she was easily convinced that she had “nothing at all in the intellect which 
had not previously been in sensation (nullam plane me habere in intellectu, quam non prius 
habuissem in sensu)”. (AT VII, 75; CSM II, 52.) The conclusion is Aristotelian in character, 
but the reasoning behind it is considerably less nuanced, not relying on a systematic 
theory of cognition. Finding the senses a reliable source for knowledge and believing 
the reality to conform to them accurately is quite a natural inclination for us, as 
embodied creatures relying on the sensory needs since infancy. As discussed earlier, 
Descartes seems to consider the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine to be a more nuanced 
elaboration of this naïve everyday life attitude. Both the Aristotelian and the naïve 
meditator are naïve realists, thinking the world mostly resembles our perceptions of that 
world. It can be seen as natural for the meditator (be she naïve or Aristotelian) to think 
that her connection to the world runs essentially through the senses. 
However, we also don’t need to read the meditator as holding onto naïve realism or 
RPS to make sense of the Empirical Principle. The Principle is likewise understandable 
from the third perspective:  the skeptic meditator. Skeptical writers of the Renaissance 
period can also be read as certain sort of empiricists: If truth is to be found, it is to be 
based on the senses, but since the senses are often in error and contradict each other, 
one should suspend judgment on their evidence. 
[K]knowledge is conveyed through the senses… […] Anyone who can force me to 
contradict the evidence of the senses has got me by the throat… […] The senses are the 
beginning and end of human knowledge. (Montaigne, Apologie: 1907, 390; 1991, 663.)  
All awareness is derived from the senses […]. If the sense was deceived, so is the mind 
[…]. (Sanches, QNS, 51; translation modified.)  
Later on, several early modern skeptics (e.g., Le Vayer) upheld a similar kind of 
empiricism, with mitigated skeptics such as Mersenne and Gassendi attempting to build 
science on appearances by the senses. It is more than likely that this empirical leaning 
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of skeptical thought likewise motivated Descartes to begin with the Empirical 
Principle.14 (See chapters 2.4 and 2.5.) 
Descartes, then, is not trying to smuggle a foundationalist model of knowledge into 
the picture,but instead relies on the principle that is already familiar to the meditator: 
the naivety of sense perception (be it Aristotelian, folk or skeptical ex-dogmatic). Using 
the Empirical Principle, Descartes is able to group the Aristotelian and the skeptical 
traditions, along with the naïve realism of our natural inclination, under the same 
heading and undermine them all. (Cf. chapter 1.2.3) 
4.1.3. Particular Doubts: Occasional Sensory Errors 
The target of the inquiry now set, the meditator moves on to the next step: finding out 
reasons for doubt and seeing how far they can be applied. The meditator considers 
various skeptical scenarios to discover these reasons which make her question the 
beliefs she previously held onto. 
One could be tempted to move right away to the dreaming doubt or the possibility 
of a deceiving deity. However, before the infamous scenarios of dreams and demons, 
Descartes offers a criticism of particular sensory perceptions that has had comparatively 
less careful attention. These particular doubts, or occasional sensory errors (OSE), do 
have an important role to play, and unlike other scenarios, questioning of the senses is 
not permanently resolved at the end of the Sixth Meditation. This skeptical scrutiny of 
particular sensory experiences comprises the First Level of doubt. 
As many have noted, Descartes’s criticism of particular sensory perceptions is 
neither long nor profound. The meditator merely draws a brief conclusion: “From time 
to time I have found that the senses deceive, and it is prudent never to trust completely 
those who have deceived us even once” (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12). As the senses 
occasionally deceive us and provide erroneous testimony, the first step in the 
metaphysical project for avoiding error is not to trust them on each occasion.15 
 
14 Cf. Gassendi’s comments in the Fifth Objections (AT VII, 267, 277–278; CSM II, 186, 193–194), where 
he defends the Empirical Principle against Descartes. See also the French Preface (AT IXB, 5–7; CSM I, 
181–182). See Stough (1969, 106–107, 147–148) and Ring (1991, 492) for this empirical underpinning of 
skepticism argued for ancient Pyrrhonism. Cf. M VIII, 60; PH II, 48. See Stough (1969, 41) for the same 
argued for the ancient Academic skeptics.  
15 In the Discourse, Descartes supplements OSE (“our senses sometimes deceive us”) with what could be 
titled occasional logical errors (OLE): “[T]here are men who make mistakes in reasoning, committing logical 
fallacies concerning the simplest questions in geometry…” OLE provides a comparable scenario to OSE 
in the sense that logical fallacies are typical for human cognition and anyone can occasionally commit 
them. Descartes also treats them as a legitimate reason for doubting demonstrative proofs because he is 
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Descartes elaborates more on the deceitful nature of particular sense perception 
when recalling and summarizing the skeptical evisceration in the Sixth Meditation: 
Sometimes towers which had looked round from distance appeared squared from close 
up; and enormous statutes standing on their pediments did not seem large when observed 
from the ground. In these and countless other cases, I found that the judgments of the 
external senses were mistaken. (AT VII, 76; CSM II, 53.) 
Cases like towers appearing both squared and rounded demonstrate that the senses can 
occasionally be in error. This applies not only to the external senses but also to the 
internal ones, since one can feel pain in a limb without the limb even being attached to 
the rest of the body. (AT VII, 77; CSM II, 53.) 
   Out of all the reasons for doubt presented in the First Meditation, the OSE 
scenario is the closest to the ancient skeptical tropes of comparing contrarieties. The 
First Meditation’a skeptical scenarios generally rely on creating reasonable room for 
doubting earlier beliefs, one being unable to rule out the possibility of such a case, as 
opposed to Pyrrhonian skepticism, which offers two ways in which things can appear 
to different people or the same person at different times, and points out that there is no 
way to decide between them (cf. Bemúdez 2000, 335). However, the OSE cases do offer 
two different ways in which things appear to the meditator at different times, in a 
manner not unlike the Pyrrhonian skeptical tropes. Sextus also uses the same example 
of a tower as Descartes does: 
[Suspension] comes about […] through the opposition of things. We oppose what 
appears to what appears, or what is thought of, or crosswise. […] [W]e oppose what 
appears to what appears when we say: ‘The same tower appears round from a distance 
and square from nearby’. (PH I, 31–32.) 
Granted, in the First Meditation, this phase is not precisely set up in the Pyrrhonian 
way of comparing impressions. In fact, a closer source is found in Montaigne: “If this 
appearance has once deceived me, […] why should I trust [it] this time […]. Is it not 
stupid to let oneself to be deceived so often by the same guide?” (Apologie: 1907, 342–
344; 1991, 634–635).16 Nevertheless, the implications of the First Meditation do include 
a similar comparison: “[T]he senses occasionally deceive us with respect to objects 
which are very small or in the distance” (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12). We can construct 
 
“just as a prone to error as anyone else”. (AT VI, 32; CSM II, 127. Cf. the Principia: AT VIIIA, 6; CSM I, 
194.) First Meditation omits OLE, but does make a similar reference later on, relating to the scenario of 
the Deceiving God: “What is more, since I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where they 
think they have the most perfect knowledge, may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and three 
or count the sides of a square…?” (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14.) Here, though, the assessment has a more 
general and systematic sense. 
16 Montaigne criticises Lucretius’s defence of the senses as true guides. Cf. Apologie: 1907, 390; 1991, 664. 
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this: “A tower in distance looks small but nearby huge. Thus, senses should not be 
trusted in every occasion”.17 
   The First Level of doubt by the OSE is the first step in undermining the 
meditator’s earlier conviction of cognitive access to reality running essentially through 
the senses. From the Aristotelian and the naïve positions, they would abandon those 
earlier belief when that connection is demonstrated to be insufficient, and when the 
connection to the world is eventually shown to be running through the intellect, the 
skeptic has to yield as well. Using OSE cases, Descartes can begin to show that RPS is 
too crude of a picture for expressing reality accurately, taking the initial step towards 
proving the insufficient nature of that previous conviction. The scenario of OSE, 
despite given less prominence, is equally important for the successful outcome of the 
inquiry, generating a serious skeptical puzzle.18 
4.2. Second Level of Doubt: Madness and Dream 
Aristotelians, however, would not have been very impressed by the First Level counter 
measure. It was widely acknowledged in the Medieval Scholastic discussions that senses 
can deceive from time to time, typically referring to cases inherited from the ancient 
skeptical tropes, such as large objects seeming small in the distance, islands seeming to 
be in motion when passed by in a ship and sweet things tasting bitter when sick. The 
common remedy for such doubts was to refer to sense perception in normal 
circumstances. Take, for example, Henry of Ghent: “[I]n a case in which the one sense 
is deceived in one condition, in another […] it indicates what is true” (SQO, a.1, q.1, 
IV).19 The Medieval Scholastics, as previously discussed, had an epistemologically 
optimistic attitude towards sensory perception, viewing that human perception is 
fundamentally veridical and reaches reality in a reliable fashion in the common course 
 
17 In fact, the round and square tower was a standard example of contrarieties for the ancient skeptics, 
along with large objects appearing small, honey tasting bitter when sick, and an oar appearing broken when 
submerged in water. See Acad. 2.25.79–26.82; M VII, 414. See also the Third Meditation and the Search 
(AT VII, 39, 510; CSM II, 27, 407). Cf. chapter 2.1. 
18 The particular sensory doubts, though, differ from the later scenarios in that whereas the latter two 
levels are eventually resolved by discovering the true nature of God and our own cognitive powers, the 
occasional sensory errors are never fully settled. And while they don’t pose a similar problem since the 
RPS model of reality has been overturned, they stay lingering even after the meditative exercise. Even 
though one can perform double-checks with the other senses, memory, and intellect to ensure the 
circumstances are optimal, occasional errors of particular sense experience are still bound to occur. They 
are not a puzzle but still remain a threat. (AT VII,77–78, 90; CSM II, 54, 62. See chapter 7.3.3.) 
19 Henry specifically refers to the relativities of the Pyrrhonists in relation to the deception of the senses. 
See also Augustine (C. Acad. 3.11.26; Trin. 15.12.21–22), Aquinas (ST I, Q.85, a.6), and Buridan (QM II, 
1: 8rb). Cf. Zupko 1993. 
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of nature. They admit that misperceptions, such as illusions, do occur, but are 
exceptional cases, required to be evaluated against the background of normal, veridical 
perceptive acts. (Adriaenssen 2017, 241. Cf. Pasnau 2017, esp. 70–94. See chapter 2.3.2.) 
In fact, the meditator will not swallow the First Level sensory doubts hook, line, and 
sinker either: 
[A]lthough the senses occasionally deceive with respect to objects which are small or in 
the distance, there are many other beliefs about which doubt is quite impossible, even 
though they are acquired through the senses – for example, that I am here, sitting by the 
fire, wearing a winter dressing-grown, holding this piece of paper in my hands and so on. 
(AT VII, 18; CSM II, 12–13.) 
Unlike sometimes accused, Descartes does not question the whole testimony of sense 
perception just because some sense data is deceptive (see, e.g., Rescher 1959, 230–231; 
Wash 1963, 91).20 That senses sometimes deceive does not mean they would not 
accurately testify to reality in optimal cases. Following a reasoning similar to epistemic 
optimism of the late Scholastics, the meditator rephrases the Empirical Principle based 
on the earlier critique: Despite certain occasional mishaps, the senses report reality fairly 
well as a norm, especially when the circumstances are optimal. OSE cases must be 
evaluated against this background of perception in normal, optimal situations. As an 
example, the meditator offers her present state of sitting here by a fireplace and writing 
on a piece of paper.21 
Unlike with later scenarios of dreaming and deceiver, there is a sense of casuality and 
normalcy, even naturalness, related to the OSE. Sensory errors are fairly common and 
while they can make the meditator perform double-checks when the circumstances are 
not optimal, even suspend judgment in certain particular cases, they do not make her 
doubt her perception to be systematically in error. The issue is driven home further in the 
French translation: “il s’en recounter peut-être beaucoup d’ autres desquelles on ne peut pas 
raissonablement douter”. Particular sense-error doubt is clearly reasonable and occurs in 
an unlaboured fashion merely from the experience of seeing a square tower rounded 
from afar or a straight oar bent in water. Meanwhile, the meditator finds no reasonable 
room for doubting that these are her hands holding the paper and this is her body sitting 
near a fire ([m]anus verò has ipsas, totumque hoc corpus meum esse) (AT VII, 18; CSM II, 13). 
 
20 The accusation was already raised by Gassendi (Disq. I, i, 5). For other critiques of the accusation, see 
Frankfurt 2008, 45–48; Kenny, 1968, 28; B. Williams 2015, 36–37; Cottingham 1986, 30–31; Dicker 2013, 
27–30; Christofidou 2013, 17. 
21 Cf. the Search (AT X, 510; CSM II, 407): “[T]he senses are sometimes deceptive if they are in poor 
condition, as when all food seems bitter to a sick person; or if their objects are too far away […]; or, in 
general, whenever they do not act freely in accordance with their natural constitution. But such defects of 
the senses are all quite easy to recognize, and do not prevent me from being quite sure at present that I 
am seeing you, [and] that everything which ordinarily appears to my senses is genuine.” Emphasis added. 
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Descartes’s next move with the upcoming dreaming doubt is therefore to suggest 
that instead of being reliable, senses systematically failing to grasp what is real might be 
the norm. However, since the meditator resists such a general doubt, Descartes cannot 
just seamlessly flow into the systematic error by dreaming; he must guide the meditator 
from the naturally occurring occasional doubts of the First Level to the metaphysical 
doubt of the Second Level for the general doubt to succeed. Following this guidance, 
the meditator will recognise that, despite her initial resistance, it is completely possible 
and reasonable for the senses to be systematically in error as a norm, undermining the 
recently rephrased Empirical Principle. 
4.2.1. First Transitional Scenario: Madness 
I read this transition as being fulfilled by the scenario of madness. Like the OSE 
scenario, madness has received only minor discussion in the literature without well-
driven attempts to place it in the larger narrative. Even when separation between 
everyday life and metaphysical inquiry is given attention, the role of the madness 
discussion in the exercise has been missed (e.g., MacArthur 2003).22 
The scenario of madness occurs in the fourth paragraph, between the OSE cases 
and the dreaming doubt, and its origin is in the meditator’s resistance. She wonders how 
she can find reason to doubt that the hand holding the paper and the body wrapped in 
a dressing-gown are hers: 
[P]erhaps I were to liken myself to madmen (insanis), whose brains are so damaged by the 
persistent vapours of melancholia that they firmly maintain they are kings when they are 
paupers, or say they are dressed in purple when they are naked, or that their heads are 
made of earthenware, or that they are pumpkins, or made of glass. (AT VII, 18–19; CSM 
II, 13.) 
The meditator considers that she might be insane, maintaining wearing a dressing-gown 
and holding a paper due to physiological defect (unbalanced vapour levels in the brain), 
whereas in reality she could be naked and not holding a paper at all.23 The madness 
scenario is then seemingly rejected, as the meditator considers insane people unfit to be 
equated with herself due to their condition. “But such people are insane (amentes), and I 
would be thought equally mad (demens) if I took anything from them as a model for 
myself.” (AT VII, 18–19; CSM II, 12–13.) 
 
22 Carriero (2009, 38–39) notices a similar heuretic value in the paragraph but does not take madness as an 
attempt at a skeptical scenario, considering the search for such a scenario as “overreading”. 
23 The examples of madmen’s delusions were common in the medical literature of the time, their source 
being André du Laurens’s (1558–1609) Discours des maladies mélancoliques (1594). See, e.g., Fabietti 2015. 
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Many readings treat madness as uninteresting and unworthy of analysis, apparently 
simply because the meditator seems to treat it as such. Others have taken madness not 
to be a serious attempt at a skeptical scenario, viewing it as being brought up and 
rejected in order to emphasise the meditator’s rationality.24 However, reading madness 
as contrasted to rational thinking is not really supported by the text. Comparing the 
madness paragraph to Descartes’s other discussions of madness and its cause conveys 
that the madmen have a disability in their sensation and imagination, not in rationality. 
[I]t is the soul which sees, and not the eye; and it does not see directly, but only by means 
of the brain. That is why madmen and those who are asleep often see, or think they see, 
various objects which are nevertheless not before the eyes: namely, certain vapours 
disturb their brain and arrange those of its parts normally engaged in vision exactly as 
they would be if these objects were present. (Optics: AT VI, 141; CSM I, 172.)  
[M]elancholic individuals who think themselves to be vases […] will swear that what they 
see and touch is just as they imagine it to be. To be sure, a good man would be indignant 
if you told him that his beliefs cannot have any more rational basis than theirs, since he 
relies, like them, on what the senses and imagination represent to him. (Search: AT X, 511; 
CSM II, 407.) 
Madmen do not think their head is a vase because they are irrational but because of an 
unbalanced distribution of vapours in their brains. Their faulty judgment is to do with 
defective causal capacities that corrupt cognitive mechanisms and can introduce 
systematic error in some people’s beliefs.25 
Madness, however, fails to create a sufficient reason for doubt and the meditator 
quickly disregards it. The meditator, to make systematic doubt of the senses possible, 
must be convinced that senses failing to perceive reality in the normal course of events 
might be more typical than she originally considered. However, madness is still an 
exceptional case – as a physiological impairment, madness is not a normal or natural 
state and implies a background of physically defectless minds. Thus, madness is 
unconvincing as a systematic scenario. (Cf. Lennon & Hickson 2013, 14–15.)26 
 
24 Frankfurt (2008, 51–54) is a strong influence here, later followed by, e.g., Ablondi (2007), Hatfield (2007, 
75–76), M. Williams (2010, 309) and Christofidou (2013, 35–36). Foucault (2006, 44–45) also treats the 
madness in a similar way. Classic readings not mentioning the madness scenario include, e.g., Gueroult 
(1953), B. Williams (2015), and Cottingham (1986). Classic readings that observe Descartes dismissing 
madness but seem uninterested in analysing it further include, e.g., Kenny (1968), M. Wilson (1978), E. 
Curley (1978), and B. Williams (1983). 
25 See also the Principia IV, §196 (AT VIIIA, 319–320; CSM I, 283). Cf. Carriero 1997, 4; Broughton 2005, 
12; Wagner 2014, 52. In the so-called Toulouse Manuscript (an unpublished draft of the Meditations) the 
term for insanity is furiosis which also hints at a causal link. 
26 Some, though, read madness as creating a genuine reason for doubt, which is not turned down but 
assimilated into the dreaming scenario. Influentially argued by Broughton (2002; 2005), this reading has 
been followed by, e.g., Scott (2009), Russo (2011), and Wagner (2014). Derrida (2005) also reads madness 
as a serious scenario in an answer to Foucault. 
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What is madness doing in the First Meditation if it is an unconvincing scenario? It 
feels strange that Descartes would waste space in such a short text for raising a scenario 
that fails. My reading is that madness is raised to transition the meditator from the 
practical life context to the metaphysical context of suspension of judgment, preparing 
her thinking for the upcoming dreaming scenario. Madness bridges the narrative, paving 
the way for moving from the First Level of doubt to the Second.27  
The need for transition, as discussed, is motivated by Descartes’s careful distinction 
between the meditative inquiry and practical life matters. The meditator’s thinking must 
be altered from the everyday context of moral certainty to the skeptical context of the 
general suspension of judgement, driven by the search for metaphysical certainty. Thus, 
a transition is required to move from the naturally occurring particular doubts to the 
metaphysically charged systematic doubt and from the common-sense naïve conviction 
(or ‘teachings of nature’, see AT VII, 38; CSM II, 26) to the meditative exercise, in which 
perception of reality and reality itself might be cut off.28 (Cf. chapters 1.3 and 2.5.2.) 
The preceding is a lot to ask and Descartes seemingly recognizes this. The meditator 
is expected to seriously consider that not only is her sensory cognition limited, but it 
might not even access reality regularly and systematically (not just exceptionally and 
occasionally). Just as in the beginning of the First Meditation and at its end, Descartes 
hints with madness that this sort of doubt is extremely difficult. It seems initially insane 
from the meditator’s perspective, going against what nature has taught us. It is, to an 
extent, an unnatural doubt. Descartes even points out in the Synopsis that to deny our 
everyday trust in the senses is quite mad and something that “no sane person (sanae 
mentis)” has ever seriously doubted (AT VII, 16; CSM II, 11).29 
The meditator’s decision not to take the mad as an example also works as a warning 
not to expand the metaphysical doubts to the everyday situation of practical living. 
Reading the madness discussion in this fashion likewise allows us to see in it an inherent 
critique of the ancient skeptics. 
 
27 Madness, of course, was one of the traditional weapons of the ancient skeptics, often found paired with 
dreaming. See Acad., 2.17.53–54, 2.28.88–90; PH I, 100–104; M VII, 403–407. Madness and dream are 
also paired in Galen, Plato, Aristotle, Augustine and Montaigne: Annas & Barnes 1985, 86; Tht. 158b–d; 
Met. 4.5–4.6., 1010b8–1011a7; C. Acad., 2.5.11, 3.11.2; Trin, 15.12.21; Apologie (1907, 404, 410; 1991, 674, 
677–678). Broughton (2002, 65–66; 2005) and Russo (2011) have suggested following this tradition as a 
sufficient motivation for Descartes to include madness in the discussion. However, this reasoning on its 
own comes off as ungenerous towards Descartes. 
28 Due to the work’s meditative nature, it would be expected of Descartes to make this separation in the 
beginning of the First Meditation. Indeed, this is what he does in the Discourse and the Principia (AT VI, 
25, 31 & VIIIA, 5; CSM I, 123, 126, 193). However, the First Meditation surprisingly does not include a 
similar distinction before the very end (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). Meanwhile, the Discourse and the Principia 
do not include the madness scenario. 
29 Cf. Seventh Replies; Hyperaspistes Letter (AT III, 422–423, VII, 460; CSM II, 309, CSMK, 188–189).  
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[W]e must note the distinction […] between the actions of life and the investigation of 
the truth. For when it is a question of organizing our life, it would, of course, be foolish 
not to trust the senses, and the sceptics who neglected human affairs to the point where 
friends had to stop them falling off precipices deserved to be laughed at. Hence I pointed 
out in one passage that no sane person ever seriously doubts such things. (Fifth Replies: 
AT VII, 350–351; CSM II, 243.) 
Descartes contrasts the practical doubts of the ancients with insanity, which is 
deservedly laughed at. The meditator’s decision not to follow the mad can then be 
likewise understood as a statement not to take the ancients as a model for skepticism. 
(Cf. Christofidou 2013, 18. See chapters 1.3 and 2.5.2.) 
4.2.2. Systematic Doubt: Dreaming and Waking 
Leading up to the fifth paragraph, the meditator is willing to side with the sane crowd 
and is, thus, resistant to considering herself a lunatic. However, while tentatively 
considering madness as the only way to succeed in the systematic doubt, she now 
realises a much more likely scenario: 
A brilliant piece of reasoning (preclare sane)! As if I were not a man who sleeps at night, 
and regularly has all the same experiences while asleep as madmen do when awake – 
indeed sometimes even more improbable ones. How often, asleep at night, am I 
convinced of just such familiar events […] when in fact I am lying undressed in bed! (AT 
VII, 19; CSM II, 13.) 
Insanity is not a convincing reason for doubting the background norm of reliable 
sensory cognition because it is a defect of our  natural capacities, affecting only some 
people for some of the time.30 One cannot make this same objection against dreaming, 
with the meditator sarcastically declaring how sane the earlier objection appears when 
compared with it (cf. the Search: AT X, 511; CSM II, 407–408). Dreaming, a feature of 
human cognition, just like occasional sensory errors, is something we all experience 
some of the time. Dreaming enables the meditator to consider that her senses might 
not work as she thought, allowing for the possibility that sense perception is unreliable 
as a norm even if the meditator’s (and everyone else’s) brain was physically defectless. 
Thus, it offers a more convincing challenge to the background of epistemic optimism 
than madness. (Cf. Lennon & Hickson 2013, 14–15.) The meditator, by considering 
 
30 Descartes makes use of two words in the madness passage, amentes and demens. The former designates a 
temporary attack of madness, whereas the latter is a more permanent state. The meditator would then be 
unwilling to follow those who from time to time suffer from defect in the brain in order not to be 
permanently insane (AT VII, 19; CSM II, 13). 
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madness, is able to ease into the attitude of the Second Level doubt on the senses and 
discover dreaming as a possible way to find their connection to the world as suspect, 
temporarily casting aside her naïve realist conviction of sensation. 
However, when sketching the dream scenario, the meditator is still struggling with 
the systematic doubt of the senses. Comparing the case of dreaming to her own sensory 
experience, she finds that at the moment she is “certainly wide awake” and does a series 
of tests to prove this to herself. 
All this would not happen with such distinctness to someone asleep. Indeed! As if I did 
not remember other occasions when I have been tricked by exactly similar thoughts while 
asleep! As I think about this more carefully, I see plainly that there are never any sure 
signs by means of which being awake can be distinguished from being asleep. The result 
is that I begin to feel dazed, and this very feeling only reinforces the notion that I may be 
asleep. (AT VII, 19; CSM II, 13.) 
Systematic doubt proves to be difficult even with dreaming as indicated by the 
meditator’s insistence that she is awake, and the description of being “dazed 
(obstupescam)” when concluding that she might be asleep. This is to be expected. The 
dreaming scenario is meant to suggest that the meditator’s senses might not generally 
access the reality in the ordinary common course of nature, as she thought they do. 
Cartesian suspension of judgment as an attentive meditative exercise is not intended to 
be easy for humans, ingrained with well-established habits and belief systems. Compare 
with Buridan, who views dreaming as an unfavourable state: “[T]he species of sensible 
things can be preserved in the sense organs in the absence of these things, as it is stated 
in [Aristotle’s] On Sleep and Waking. And then we judge that which is not there to be 
there” (QM II, 1: 8rb). As an epistemological optimist, dreaming is simply uninteresting 
for Buridan. He offers no criteria for distinguishing between waking and dreaming states 
and gives no direct answer to dream-based skepticism. He merely does not take it as a 
serious argument, because he views sensory perception as working reliably in the natural 
order of things, this being sufficient for scientific and moral certainty (QM II, 1: 94a).31 
Descartes, in contrast, compares the waking experience to errorless sensory 
cognition and the dream experience to sensory cognition that has been disrupted by 
error in some way, and suggests that dream experiences cannot be distinguished from 
wake experiences with any inherent features of sensation. In the paragraph from the Optics 
quoted above, Descartes considers dreamers to have causal hindrances similar to the 
 
31 However, unlike Ockham, Buridan does not commit to the direct, unmeditative access by intuitive 
cognition on the existence and non-existence of cognized objects. Buridan does account for simple 
apprehension as singular cognition of something being present to the senses, but this act fails to be 
veridical in the natural order because we can also experience it while dreaming (QM VII, 20: 45). See 
chapter 2.3. For intuitive cognition, see chapter 3.1.2 Cf. Zupko 1993, 212–216.  
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madmen’s, which arranges errors in cognitive mechanisms (AT VI, 141–142; CSM II, 
172–173).32 When I assume I am looking at a frozen lake from my balcony, due to a 
causal error in my perception, there might be no balcony, no lake, and no cat seeking to 
be caressed. Just as a naked madman may erroneously view himself to be clothed in 
purple due to the causal effects in his brain, I may have a similar systematic error that I 
am sitting by the fire writing on a piece of paper – or on the balcony, writing on my 
laptop – due to a causal error like dreaming.  
Descartes’s account of dreaming differs not only from Buridan’s but also from 
certain ancient considerations. Specifically, Sextus describes how “different 
appearances” occur depending on whether one is dreaming or awake. “[W]hen asleep 
we will see things which are unreal in waking life, not unreal once and for all. For they 
exist in sleep, just as the contents of waking life exist even though they do not exist in 
sleep” (PH I, 104). Sextus contends that one cannot be sure whether waking contents 
are truer than dream contents, satisfying the Pyrrhonian contrast of impressions. 
However, for Descartes, the difference between erroneous and errorless sensation 
cannot be pointed out by inherent criteria in the sensory experience. Senses failing to 
reach the reality might be more akin to the natural order than is assumed in the 
epistemological optimism of the Empricial Principle.33 
The dream scenario in the First Meditation is infamously sketchy and unclear, 
though, which has led to disagreement on the consequences of the indistinguishability. 
The text does not offer a clearly worked out argument, so many commentators have 
relied on their own resources and Descartes’s other texts to squeeze the argument out 
(cf. Carriero 2009, 44).34 An earlier common reading was to take Descartes as suggesting 
that we might be dreaming in every instance, our lives a continuous dream (e.g., Walsh 
1968, 91; Kenny 1968, 16; M. Williams 1986, 128). Since continuous dream reading proved 
difficult to maintain, many took Descartes to mean that we might simply be dreaming 
at any given instance, because dream experiences are sometimes indistinguishable from 
waking ones (e.g., Frankfurt 2008, 70–72; Hatfield 2007, 76). However, if Descartes’s 
 
32 Cf. Treatise on Man (AT XI, 173–174, 198–199; CSM I, 104–105). 
33 However, see Acad. 2.28.90. Cf. M VII, 403–408. Cicero does not generalize that our whole cognitive 
experience might be false but offers a version of the dream argument that is close to Descartes’s, though 
still running dreaming and madness together. Of course, Cicero’s argument is directed at the Stoic doctrine 
of cognitive impressions, which claims there to be inherent criteria to distinguish between veridical and 
non-veridical impressions. Note that in both Cicero and Descartes, the interlocutor does view dreaming 
as epistemically unreliable compared to being awake. (Cf. chapters 2.1 and 2.2.) 
34 Focusing on other instances of dreaming, Descartes’s willingness to experiment with the scenario comes 
apparent. He phrases the doubt as the indistinguishability of dreaming and waking in the Principia (AT 
VIIIA, 6; CSM I, 194), as a possibility of continuous dreaming in the Search (AT X, 511; CSM II, 408), and 
as a comparison between dream and waking experiences in the Discourse, approaching Sextus’s account of 
dreaming (AT VI, 32, 28; CSM I, 127, 130). 
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intention is to suggest that the meditator might have never perceived reality as it is (and 
neither has anyone else), the any-instance reading seems insufficient. Some have then 
questioned whether the scenario has to do with distinguishing dreaming and waking at 
all but, rather, whether even waking experience should be taken as providing reliable 
cognitive access to the world (e.g., M. Wilson 1978, 17–31; Stuart 1983). 
However, the simplest way to grasp the dreaming scenario in the Meditations is to 
look at its resolve. What most take as the resolution of dreaming comes at the end of 
the Sixth Meditation: “I now notice that there is a vast difference between [dream and 
awake], in that dreams are never linked by memory with all the other actions of life as 
waking experiences are.” (AT VII, 89; CSM II, 61). This resolve is seen by many as ad 
hoc (e.g., Hobbes: AT VII, 195–196; CSM II, 137; cf. Kenny 1968, 30), and it would 
surely be such, if it was the only resolution to the Second Level of doubt. However, by 
this point the meditator has discovered her true cognitive nature and has full use of her 
intellect, memory, and free will. Metaphysical knowledge of her epistemic character 
allows her to recognise the cause of her errors, which removes the reason for the Second 
Level doubt (inability to distinguish between reliable and non-reliable sensory 
cognition). She realises that in relation to natural habits, senses do reliably access reality 
more often than not (AT VII, 89; CSM II, 61; cf. 7.3.3).35 
The meditator is not searching for an epistemic criterion to distinguish between 
dreaming and waking. Rather, her inquiry is about delving into the causes of her errors 
in order to know whether she can reach errorless cognition. Dream experiences are 
clearly false; they do not reach a cognitive access to reality as it is.36 The dream scenario 
demonstrates that we are incapable of knowing whether we reach such errorless sensory 
access, because we cannot distinguish between those experiences that are veridical and 
those that are not. Reading the dream scenario as based on the indistinguishability of 
erroneous and errorless cognition, Descartes does not take the epistemic stand of 
dreaming and waking experience being the same (cf. Christofidou 2013, 21–22).37 
 
35 Cf. the Third Replies (AT VII, 195–196; CSM II, 137): “An atheist can infer that he is awake on the 
basis of memory of his past life [but not] that he is not mistaken, if he does not know that he was created 
by a non-deceiving God.” One has to be aware of the author of one’s nature and the reasons for one’s 
errors before the dreaming doubt can be resolved. 
36 Cf. the Third Replies (AT VII, 195–196; CSM II, 137): “[E]veryone admits that a man may be deceived 
in his sleep. But afterwards, when he wakes up, he will easily recognize his mistake.” 
37 Descartes seems to give a new version of the scenario in the Sixth Meditation: “[E]very sensory 
experience I have ever thought I was having while awake I can also think of myself as sometimes having 
while asleep; and since I do not believe that what I seem to perceive in sleep comes from things located 
outside me, I did not see why I should be any more inclined to believe this of what I think I perceive while 
awake” (AT VII, 77; CSM II, 53). This rephrasing, along with the version in the Discourse, have been taken 
as evidence for the reading of whether we should take even wakeful experience as veridical data (M. Wilson 
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Dreaming is intended to make us consider that things might not be as they appear and 
question the background of veridical sensation as a norm. Descartes then does not have 
to make the meditator consider that there have been actual cases of errorless sensation 
nor that she is dreaming all the time. It suffices that she is unable to tell whether her 
cognition is bereft of error and her experience of objects comes from outside or not.38  
Dreaming suggests that erroneous sensation might be the natural order, undermining 
the first of the meditator’s cognitive foundations and providing a reason to put aside 
her naïve convictions regarding access to reality. It prepares the meditator to distinguish 
between sensation and imagination, which was touched on in the madness paragraph 
and is brought up in full form in the following analogy between dreaming and painting.39 
The meditator, thus, commits to the Second Level, moving from questioning some 
sensory beliefs at certain times to questioning all sensory cognition at any given time, 
temporarily putting aside the common-sense view of everyday naïve realism. 
4.2.3. Second Transitional Scenario: Dreaming and Painting 
The meditator further develops the dreaming sketch at the beginning of the sixth 
paragraph, questioning her sensory experience as a whole. “Suppose then I that I am 
dreaming, and that these particulars – that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head 
and stretching out my hands – are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such 
hands or such a body at all” (AT VII, 19; CSM II, 13). 
However, just as after the First Level doubts, the meditator once again resists the 
full force of the skeptical scenario, concluding that even if she was dreaming “the visions 
which come in the sleep are like paintings” that must be fashioned “in the likeness of 
things that are real”. Here Descartes compares the meditator’s imagining (and, to an 
extent, her thinking) to painting, holding that even when painters create chimerical 
 
1978, 24; Stuart 1983, 99–101). However, we can also read the rephrase to support the indistinguishability 
reading: We do not take dream objects to be located outside of ourselves; thus, we should withhold 
judgment on sensory objects that we think we perceive while awake but could just as well be perceiving 
while asleep. 
38 Cf. Wagner 2014, 54–56. Wagner though suggests that Descartes’s “strong validation of reason” project 
means that he must always raise the strongest possible doubt; thus, that no external objects exist, and the 
meditator is dreaming all the time. However, I take the meditative exercise as not requiring the strongest 
doubt at every level due to its gradual process. 
39 Cf. the Treatise on Man and the Principia (AT VIIIA, 6 & XI, 174; CSM I, 105, 194). See also Christofidou 
2013, 22; Wagner 2014, 49, 52–53, 58. It is natural for both the naïve and the ex-dogmatic skeptic 
meditator to take the dream images as the result of her imagination. Likewise, Aristotelian tradition draws 
a difference between external and internal senses, with dreaming, imagination, and memory belonging to 
the internal ones. Thus, the same conclusion is also bound to occur to the Aristotelian meditator. See, e.g., 
Aristotle’s De Ins. I, 459a23; De Mem. I, 450a24. Cf. chapter 3.1.1. 
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creatures, such as satyrs and sirens, they jumble together body parts of real nature. Or, 
even if the artists come up with something wholly fictitious, at least they have to use 
real colours to depict them. Similarly, even if general things such as hands and bodies 
are imaginary, at least some “simpler and more universal things” would be real. “These 
are as it were the real colours (coloribus veris) from which we form all the images of things, 
whether true or false, that occur in our thought.” (AT VII, 19–20; CSM II, 13–14.) The 
meditator realizes in the analogy between dreaming and painting, also known as the 
painter analogy, that even if her senses might not work as she thought they would, her 
access to reality does not seem to be completely shut off. There is more to the fabric of 
reality than what the senses reveal (cf. Christofidou 2013, 24). 
The painter analogy has gained a surprisingly small amount of attention from the 
literature, possibly once again due to its placement between two major scenarios 
(dreaming and the deceiver).40 However, the passage is essential to the unfolding of the 
First Meditation. The analogy, similar to madness before it, acts as a transition between 
the Second and the Third Levels of doubt, bridging the narrative from systematic 
sensory doubt by dreaming to the ultimate doubt of the whole rational cognitive 
process. However, unlike the more condensed discussion of madness, the analogy of 
dreaming as painting also introduces new material into the narrative. It develops the 
dreaming doubt, with the meditator supposing that she in fact is dreaming and her 
cognitive access is systematically erroneous, it includes imagination among the doubted 
sensory cognitions, and it extends the skeptical consideration into the realm of external 
world skepticism (though, as I argue, only in the moderate sense, see chapter 2.2). The 
painter analogy requires the meditator to take seriously the scenario that her sensory 
access right now is, not just might be, flawed by causal disturbance such as dreaming. 
The scenario carries further than the previous scenario that she is presently mad, 
accounting for the longer length and novel material of the former. However, present 
dreaming turns out not to be enough for questioning the meditator’s whole experience 
of reality, which leads the way to the Deceiving God scenario. Failing to give the analogy 
between dreaming and painting a significant role leaves us without a proper 
understanding of the advancement of the meditative exercise, with stretches of text that 
appear more or less idle. Or, as Carriero states, standard readings that “do not explain 
how this moment on the discussion advances an overall argument” break away from 
the narrative just as the discussion is gaining steam (2009, 27). 
The meditator realises with the painter analogy that even if her sensation does not 
work as she thought it would, she can still rely on some of her capacities which have to 
 
40 The fullest treatment is by Carriero (1999; 2009, 46–53). Others have followed (e.g., Hatfield 2007; 77–
80; Cunning 2010, 56–59; Christofidou 2013, 22–25; Wagner 2014, 57–60), but it is still scarcely discussed. 
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do with sensation, namely imagination and, to a lesser extent, memory, to raise a 
counter-argument to the dreaming scenario. 
[I]t must surely be admitted that the visions which come in sleep are like paintings, which 
must have been fashioned in the likeness of things that are real, and hence that at least 
these general kind of things – eyes, head, hands and the body as a whole – are things 
which are not imaginary but are real and exist. (AT VII, 19–20; CSM II, 13.) 
The meditator is used to thinking that sensation and imagination have something to do 
with each other (either naively or in a more fleshed out Aristotelian form). Even if she 
might be dreaming, her dream images have to have some causal relation to real things. 
Perhaps, as a more Aristotelian meditator, she could rely on her stockpiled phantasmas 
to argue that the senses cannot be as dysfunctional as Descartes suggests. That she is 
capable of dreaming heads in the first place means that at some point in time she had 
to be in contact with a composition of a real head from the world. 
The meditator initially follows Aquinas’s thought, viewing that the intellect gathers 
the world’s structure through universal concepts and that our ability to cognise depends 
on the stockpile of likenesses (similitudines) we have gathered from the world (see chapter 
3.1). However, the discussion changes with the meditator’s realization that even if these 
general compositions did not exist, some simple and universal things (simplicia & universalia), 
like the painter’s real colours, must be true. She specifies these in the seventh paragraph 
to include extension and corporeal nature in general, the shape of the extended things, 
their quantity, size, number, place, the time they endure, and so on (AT VII, 20; CSM 
II, 14). Descartes reverses the Scholastic cognition at the end, viewing simple notions 
not as universals abstracted from sensory particulars but as singular natures, penetrating 
our cognitive features (cf. Secada 2000, 123–128; Christofidou 2013, 23–24). 
The essentiality of sensation for capturing reality diminishes throughout these 
paragraphs, including first entire particular parts, such as limbs and organs, and in the 
end mere spatial-temporality, which does not have as clear-cut a relation to sensation. 
The discussion of painting begins with Johannes Vermeer (hands, heads, pearl earrings), 
moves to Hieronymus Bosch (combinations as sirens, satyrs, and bird monsters), and 
ends with Jackson Pollock (mere shapes and sizes). The meditator begins to find not 
only sensation but also the internal sensitive features of imagination and phantasmal 
memory suspect during the painter analogy. Maybe even imagination does not have as 
much to do with the structure of reality as she thought. As the significance of sensation 
diminishes, the strength of sensory phantasmas also crumbles and the meditator begins 
to question any structure of the world coming from the senses. The analogy is set so 
that she recognises a familiar set of arguments while the main elements of her earlier 
world view are debunked. The way we depict reality might not be based on similitude 
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between real and sensory objects but on certain cognitive boundaries that structure the 
experience like colours in a pallet.41 (Cf. Carriero 1999, 27–29; 2009, 46–48.) 
Nevertheless, since these boundaries make certain features repeat in the meditator’s 
experience, she seems to be on the safe side as long as she concentrates on those 
features. She then concludes in the eighth paragraph that “physics, astronomy, 
medicine, and all other disciplines which depend on the study of composite things, are 
doubtful”, whereas “arithmetic, geometry, and other subjects […] which deal only with 
the simplest and most general things, regardless of whether they really exist in nature of 
not, contain something certain and indubitable” (AT VII, 20; CSM II, 14). 
There has been a strong divide in the literature about whether we should read the 
dream scenario as already questioning the existence of the external world or just 
questioning its resemblance to our sense experience (so called wide and narrow readings). 
This debate is tied to whether the scenario of present dreaming (coupled within the 
painter analogy) leaves the world of Cartesian physics unquestioned.42 However, to 
accomplish the undermining of the naïve realism of RPS, Descartes is not required to 
commit the meditator, at least yet, to the extreme version and thus to consider that she 
has no ground to expect that the physical reality exists at all. It suffices that the meditator 
follows moderate external world skepticism, having no reason to think we have reliable 
access to the external world through the senses alone (see chapter 2.2). The same is 
supported by the reading of dreaming scenario as indistinguishability of errorless and 
erroneous cognition. The corruption by error in the meditator’s cognition is causal in 
nature; thus, it is anchored in the existence of a body. Dreaming is a regular physiological 
state, requiring a brain operating in some kind of body.43 
Of course, in the Sixth Meditation, having sufficiently resolved the Third Level of 
doubt and beginning to resolve the Second, the meditator still must examine “whether 
material things exist” (AT VII, 71; CSM II, 50).44 However, by then, she already knows 
 
41 A stubborn Aristotelian might, though, still resist the questioning of the senses, imagination, and 
phantasmas because the mind would then have nothing to perceive. Descartes is quite impotent to convince 
such a reader. Thus, the painter analogy does not work as a full-on criticism of Aristotelianism, the major 
critique being saved for the Second and Third Meditations. However, an attentive and co-operative 
meditator, which Descartes calls for (AT VII, 9; CSM II, 8) should be able to get enough guidelines from 
the instructions to think about cognition in the correct way. Cf. Carriero 2009, 53. 
42 See Gueroult 1953, 34–35; Kenny 1968, 31–32; M. Wilson 1978, 13–17; Rozemond 1996; 1998, 64–75; 
Bermúdez 1997; 1998; Carriero 1999; 2009, 40–52; Cunning 2010, 30–32; Christofidou 2013, 22–25.  
43 Notice that even as she commits to the present-dream scenario, the meditator does not doubt the general 
existence of hands and bodies, just that she might not have such (talis) hands and such a body as she seems 
to perceive (AT VII, 19; CSM, 13). Dreaming empowered by the Deceiving Demon would then be 
dreaming without the existence of a body. 
44 See Carriero 2009, 54, note 29. Carriero defended the wide reading similarly in a private conversation. 
See also Stuart 1983, 104. I argue that in order to resolve the Third Level doubts, the meditator has to 
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(scire) that “they are capable of existing, in so far as they are the subject-matter of pure 
mathematics”, as her clear and distinct cognition is verified by the removal of the reason 
for the Third Level doubt. The painter analogy indicated possibility of something existing, 
at least as the subject matter of mathematical reasoning, is the extent of the Second 
Level doubt. The analogy of dreaming as painting suggests a discrepancy between the 
content of our sensory experience and the metaphysical structure of reality.45 
However, one should be careful not to assign too mechanistic a reading to the reality 
left behind by the painter analogy. The meditator discovers by the Sixth Meditation that 
the existing material reality is made of corpuscularist extended matter in which 
everything in her sensation does not have a real nature (e.g., colours). Some 
commentators have been eager to jump on the mention of simples in the First 
Meditation and view it as introducing Cartesian physics (e.g., Gueroult 1953; Bermúdez 
1997; 1998; 2008).46 Yet, the eighth paragraph reveals that the simples Descartes wants 
the meditator to concentrate on are geometrical and mathematical in nature. What 
survives the dreaming doubt are especially non-sensory intellectual concepts, exemplified by 
the Augustinian notion that the meditator’s capability to conduct correct mathematics 
remains the same, whether her sensory cognition is erroneous or not: “For whether I 
am awake or asleep, two and three added together are five, and a square has no more 
than four sides” (AT VII, 20; CSM II, 1; cf. C. Acad. 3.11.25; see chapter 2.3.1). It is 
possible to consider the concepts to also include mechanistic notions, such as motion 
and rest, or even Aristotelian ones, such as colour and taste, but this is more due to the 
universal role of the meditator rather than to any intentional implementing of 
Descartes’s physics into the discussion. (Cf. Cunning 2010, 57–59; Bermúdez 2008, 59.) 
Notice that the intellectual concepts at this point are non-commital. The meditator 
discovers for the first time that some of her notions of reality appear non-sensory and 
native, but in a neutral way, unburdened by any Cartesian theory. 
The painter analogy reveals that there are limits to dreaming, and the meditator is 
entitled to certain beliefs independent of sensory perception, imagination, and 
phantasmal memory. Certain intellectual features, such as spatial-temporality and 
especially mathematical reasoning, seem impervious to doubt, bridging the narrative 
between the Second and Third Levels. The meditator discovers that, although her 
sensory faculties might not provide a reliable foundation, she can still rely on her 
 
discover her full nature as a cognitive agent and the metaphysical tenets of that nature, which she succeeds 
in only by the Fifth Meditation. 
45 The Fifth Meditation, in which the meditator discovers that the simples (like size and shape), geometry 
and mathematics have a real nature independent of her, plays a major role here. Cf. chapter 7.3.3. 
46 Rozemond (1996) goes even further, suggesting the simple and universal things to include also Cartesian 
secondary qualities like colours and sounds, thus being close to the reality of the Resemblance Picture. 
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intellect and reason, which appear to get something right about reality. Even if the 
Empirical Principle has failed, she can recline on this Rational Principle and consider 
that even if we dream, certain “transparent truths (perspicuae veritates)”, such as our 
understanding of mathematics independent of the real existence of its objects, seem 
impossible to question (AT VII, 20; CSM II, 14).47 
Similarities to the madness paragraph are clear. Both painting and madness begin 
with a statement of limitations within the proceeding Level, demonstrating beliefs and 
their basis the doubt does not cover (background of optimal sensation, common 
features of imagining, reasoning). Both also lead the meditator to a desired thought 
process through a simile, preparing her for the subsequent Level. Of course, the painter 
analogy does more work, as it also prepares for the questioning of sensory imagination 
and leads to reality as a domain of spatial geometry, duration, and mathematics. After 
all, making the meditator, who is used to relying mostly on her sensory abilities, 
concentrate on more rational concepts is no easy task. The relative length of dreaming 
and painting is therefore justified. 
4.3. Third Level of Doubt: Deceiving God and Imperfect Nature 
A question emerges as we proceed to the Third Level of doubt: Why does Descartes 
include this level? If his goal with the skeptical scenarios is merely to lead the mind away 
from the senses, as he indicates in the Synopsis, or to prepare the reader’s minds for 
intellectual things and distinguish these from corporeal ones, as he puts it in the Third 
Replies, this seems to have succeeded by the Second Level (AT VII, 12, 171–172; CSM 
II, 9, 121).48 The meditator has turned away from sensory capacities and concentrates 
on non-sensory and rational concepts, especially geometry and mathematics, which do 
not much care whether their objects “exist in nature or not”. If the discussion on 
dreaming and painting proceeds from Scholastic abstractionism towards Descartes’s 
own nativism, as Carriero suggests (1999; 2009, 49–53), why would he need to push the 
meditator further? Would it not be sufficient to call the Resemblance Picture into 
 
47 Secada (2000, 138) assumes the simples to be intellectual. Christofidou (2013, 23–24) takes them to be 
material, separating them from mathematical simples. Wagner (2014, 57) reads all simples as non-sensory 
objects. Descartes seems to leave the true being of simples intentionally vague but indicates them to be at 
least comparable with intellectual concepts. However, reading the dream scenario as systematically 
questioning the resemblance of the world instead of its existence, the spatial-temporal simples would have 
some mind-independent reality, perhaps even materially. Cf. the French: “plus simples plus universelles, qui sont 
vrayes & existantes”. Carriero 2009, 51, note 25; Christofidou 2013, 28. 
48 Not fully, of course, as leading the mind away from sensory perception continues in the Second and 
Third Meditations. See, e.g., AT VII, 24, 34; CSM II, 16, 24; cf. Second Replies (AT VII, 131; CSM II, 94). 
Dreams and Demons 
136 
question and provide a route for cognising reality independently from the senses, 
namely through clear and distinct perception?49 
Indeed, Descartes thinks it would be insufficient for several reasons. Firstly, 
Descartes’s endgame is not only epistemological but also metaphysical, discovering the 
foundation of our cognitive nature and its possible errors. The meditator is to cast doubt 
on the reliability of all the abilities she has thus far trusted – senses, imagination, and 
reason – recognising that none of them alone can eliminate error in her views. The 
Scholastic tradition recognised self-evident foundational truths, such as the principle of 
non-contradiction or ‘I am thinking’, as indubitable (see chapter 2.3). To eviscerate the 
meditator’s whole cognitive landscape, Descartes also calls into question its rational 
foundations, not just empirical ones. “In the First Meditation reasons are provided 
which give us possible grounds for doubt about all things, especially material things, so 
long as we have no foundations for the sciences other than those we have had up till now” 
(Synopsis: AT VII, 12; CSM II, 9; emphasis added). 
Secondly, that the human mind might not be equipped to know the truth about 
reality became a common topic in the fallibilistic and fideistic discussions of 16th and 
17th century skepticism. Montaigne and Sanches accepted the mind’s mental activity as 
distinct from its perception of external things but considered our intellectual abilities 
too limited for reaching the truth (see chapter 2.4; cf. Yrjönsuuri 2000, 229; Popkin 
2003, 39–63; Lupoli 2009). The Third Level of doubt is an indication that Descartes is 
not just concerned about naïve sensory realism but about skeptical thinking as well.  
Thirdly, following the two earlier points, Descartes not only tries to provide reliable 
cognition by clarity and distinctness; he attempts to demonstrate the reliability of clear and 
distinct cognition. Descartes, as discussed (chapter 3.4.1), sees truth as metaphysical – 
as something that is real. By contrast, falsity is chimerical (chimarae) – either invented by 
jumbling up real material (as discussed in the First Meditation), non-existing (as noted 
in the Second) or participating in non-being (as defined in the Fourth) (AT VII, 20, 24, 
54; CSM II, 13, 16, 38). Truth for Descartes is a conformity relation of thought and its 
object, so me thinking of something that is false is me being in relation with something 
that does not exist, such as the head of a horse on the body of a brontosaurus (AT II, 
597; CSMK, 139).50 Just as the meditator considers mathematics to be true at this point 
in the First Meditation, mathematical reasoning would involve some mind-independent 
reality, whether or not singular triangles exist materially in corporeal nature. Similarly, 
 
49 Cf. the World (AT XI, 3–6; CSM I, 81–82); Bermúdez 1997, 756–759; 1998. See chapter 3.4. 
50 Traditionally, chimeras were fantastic but impossible beasts, hybrids of different animals like the head 
of a lion and the body of a goat. Such creatures would have no real nature and not be part of existing 
being. The word ‘chimerical’ is also used in paleontology to describe fossils from various animals put 
together as a single creature. Cf. Carriero 2009, 49–50. 
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the spatial-temporal simples would also be real, as fundamental geometrical elements of 
dream experience (cf. Christofidou 2013, 28). However, because of Descartes’s 
metaphysical understanding of truth, the meditator must confirm that her clear and 
distinct perceptions actually do correspond to reality. The nature of her errors would be 
left uncovered if she cannot do this. Descartes would, concurrently, be unable to answer 
the skeptic demanding a reason to trust the clear and distinct perception. 
One way to frame Descartes’s issue here is through the doctrine of created eternal 
truths. Just as there was no reason for God to choose one set of necessary truths over 
another, he could have also created them in another way, even granting us a set of 
seemingly necessary truths without actualising them as part of reality. However, 
according to Descartes’s definition of truth as a conformity relation, for the necessary 
truths to be true they must be true of actual reality. Thus, Descartes must confirm that 
our evident cognition is cognition of the reality as created by God. We can have a 
compelled feeling that we have reached the truth (a piece of reality) but cannot be 
completely certain that we indeed have without confirming the second-order reliability 
of our cognition. (Cf. chapter 3.4.1.51) 
4.3.1. Ultimate Doubt: Deceiving God 
Descartes then presents the meditator with a new scenario in the ninth paragraph: 
[F]irmly rooted in my mind is the long-standing opinion that there is an omnipotent God 
who made me the kind of creature I am. How do I know (scio) that he has not brought it 
about that there is no earth, no sky, no extended thing, no shape, no size, no place, while 
at the same time ensuring that all these things appear to me to exist just as they do now? 
(AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14.) 
The scenario begins by questioning not only the external reality (earth and sky) but also 
the previously mentioned spatial simples. Perhaps an omnipotent God has made it so 
that while shape, size, and placement of objects appear even when I dream, nothing 
external actually exists. The Deceiving God, though, questions not only the simples but 
also the mathematical and geometrical truths. 
[S]ince I sometimes believe that others go astray in cases where they think they have the 
most perfect knowledge (scire), may I not similarly go wrong every time I add two and 
three or count the sides of a square […]. (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14.) 
 
51 While truths about created reality are contingently necessary, truths about God are necessarily necessary 
and could not be otherwise (AT I, 150; CSMK, 24). See Alanen 2000, 258; Dicker 2013, 167–168; Cunning 
2014; Forsman 2016; 2019. 
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The meditator may have been created to erroneously assume that reality is spatial-
temporal and 2+3 is 5. At this ultimate level the most extreme form of doubt is targeted 
at reason itself, our very capacity of distinguishing truth from falsity, undermining even 
the Rational Principle (cf. Alanen 2000, 264). 
The nature of the Deceiving God scenario, unlike it has sometimes been phrased 
(e.g., Kenny 1968, 34; Frankfurt 2008, 119; Dicker 2013, 36–37; Wagner 2014, 11), is 
not that God specifically comes in the middle of each and all of my thought processes. 
Instead, God could have created me so that I am unable to grasp what is real and true 
even by using my natural abilities as they were intended and reached my cognitive best. 
The doubt is more about my own imperfect nature than about an evil and petty God.52 
How can we be certain we do not err even when we seem to reach our cognitive peak?  
 [I]f it were inconsistent with [God’s] goodness to have created me such that I 
am deceived all the time, it would seem equally foreign to his goodness to allow 
(permittere) me to be deceived even occasionally […]. (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14.) 
Even if deception seems alien to the meditator’s conception of God, allowing her to be 
occasionally deceived seems equally foreign to it. Deceiving God does not have to 
actively deceive us. It is enough that he merely allows us to be deceived by not creating 
things in a way that appears to us as evident.53 
Discussions of God’s possible deception, as established (chapter 2.3.3), were 
common in the late Scholastic landscape (cf. Second Objections: AT VII, 125; CSM II, 
89–90). However, the consensus was that by doing so, God would intervene in the 
common course of nature and perform a miracle. Descartes suggests, conversely, that 
perhaps my natural disposition is one in which my cognitive abilities are lacking and do 
not reach the truth. It might be more according to the common course of nature that I 
miss out what is actually real. Just as in the case of the dreaming scenario, Descartes’s 
aim is to go against the background assumption of getting things right and suggest that 
it might be more typical of us to err, either because of inability to distinguish between 
erroneous and errorless cognition or because our cognitive capacities might be authored 
so that we never reach the truth.54 
 
52 Cf. Carriero 1997, 16–25; 2009, 53–60; Newman & Nelson 1999; Hatfield 2007, 81. 
53 Descartes supports continuous creation in which God creates the world with the same act continuously 
(AT VIIIA, 61–62; CSM I, 24). Thus, active deception could theoretically be possible. However, the more 
natural reading of these passages is that God allows us to be deceived by not making what we clearly and 
distinctly perceive part of existing reality. 
54 This reading suggests a connection between the madness and deceiver scenarios, as the latter enables 
doubt about the meditator’s rational capabilities. Cf. Frankfurt 2008, 113–114; Christofidou 2013, 19, 33–
36; Lennon & Hickson 2013. 
Dreams and Demons 
139 
4.3.2. Theological Doubt: Atheist’s Imperfect Nature 
In the tenth paragraph, Descartes forms an atheistic rendering of the scenario. 
[T]here may be some who would prefer to deny the existence of […] God rather than 
believe that everything else is uncertain. Let us not argue with them, but grant them that 
everything said about God is fiction. According to their supposition […] I have arrived 
at my present state by fate or chance or a continuous chain of events […]; yet since 
mistake and error (falli & errare) seem to be imperfections, the less powerful they make 
my original cause, the more likely it is that I am also so imperfect as that I err (fallar) all 
the time. (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14. Translation modified.) 
Even if I am an atheist and believe to be at my present state by fate or chance, my nature 
could be so imperfect that I might still be deceived and would not grasp reality as it is. 
Why does Descartes include this atheistic rendition of the doubt? I see two reasons. 
The Sorbonne Letter makes it clear that atheism is one of the positions that the 
Meditations undermines. “[T]he only reason why many irreligious (impios) people are 
unwilling to believe that God exists […] is the alleged fact that no one has hitherto been 
able to demonstrate [it]” (AT VII, 3; CSM II, 4). Descartes expects some of his readers 
to be atheists, as he expects some of them to be Aristotelians and skeptics. As a previous 
chapter (2.5) discussed, atheism and skepticism for Descartes are closely linked, 
considering the “atheistic sceptics” in need of refutation (AT VII, 549; CSM II, 375.55) 
Descartes’s other reason for introducing the atheistic version of the imperfect nature 
scenario is that the final principle he wants to undermine from the meditator’s thinking 
is religious authority. The meditator should not rely on just the authority of earlier 
theological figures but grasp God with her own intellect if she is to find God’s existence. 
Thus, by also undermining the Theological Principle, the meditator can rely only on her 
own intellectual capabilities (as limited as they may be), questioning all other authorities. 
(Descartes is careful with the phrasing, never putting God’s non-existence in the 
meditator’s mouth. Nevertheless, she follows the suggestion that God may not exist.) 
The Third Level is, at its core, about the author of my nature, the generating cause 
of my natural abilities. Is God the author of my nature? If he is not, what is my origin 
and can something that is less than perfect author me to truly grasp the reality? If he is, 
how can I know he has not authored me so that I do not truly grasp the reality even at 
my cognitive best, with peak evident perceptions?56 
The Third Level is typically considered the most original of the First Meditation’s 
scenarios, but its originality is somewhat misplaced. The possibility of divine deception 
 
55 Cf. Gassendi’s and Descartes’s exchange on atheists and skeptics (AT VII, 328, 384; CSM II, 228, 263). 
56 Cf. Principia; Fifth and Sixth Meditation (AT VII, 69–77, VIIIA, 6–16; CSM I, 194–203; CSM II, 48, 53).  
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is not novel, though Descartes’s rendition of not knowing the full capacity of our 
epistemic nature gives it a new spin.57 The metaphysical goal of the Third Level comes 
clear from the Fifth Objections and Replies, in which Gassendi questions the necessity 
of God or a Demon tricking us, when it would have sufficed to “cite the darkness of 
human mind and weakness of our nature”, seemingly in the style of Renaissance and 
early modern skeptics. This would not suffice for Descartes, as it would be the same as 
saying we make mistakes because we are prone to make mistakes. “It is more helpful to 
pay attention […] to all the circumstances where we may happen to go wrong, to 
prevent our heedlessly giving assent in such cases” (AT VII, 258, 349; CSM II, 180, 
242). All the scenarios have a causal nature, providing a reason why we might fail to 
reach the truth. They are intended to make us withhold assent in places we are used to 
give it, suspending judgment at least until we know more about the nature of our errors. 
The Third Level calls into question those truths that seemed impervious to the doubt 
before, including mathematical and geometrical reasoning. Descartes does not specify, 
yet I think it safe to also include the law of contradiction among these questioned truths, 
as it is mentioned together with mathematics and the meditator’s existence as clear and 
distinct perceptions that make it out of the Second Meditation but that the beginning 
of the Third questions again (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25) 58.59 The Third Level goes deeper 
than the Second by this, questioning not merely the resemblance of the external reality 
but its very existence, resulting in extreme external world skepticism. It might be part of 
my nature that I fail to reach reality, so how can I be sure of the existence of any reality? 
However, the Third Level does not stop there. The strongest form of doubt in the First 
Meditation is not merely that our sensations might come apart from the world but that 
our thinking in general, our thought processes as a whole, might come apart from how 
reality actually is. My cognitive steps could be unreliable, or worse, I could be mistaken 
about the actual content of my thought (Is it really number 2 that I think about?). Either 
way, I cannot be sure that my thinking is all together coherent. Maybe there is no 
thinking, or even truth, whatsoever. Even the Augustinian move of accepting what 
 
57 Montaigne precedes Descartes here but does not give the possibility a systematic use. See chapter 2.4. 
58 One question that has caused debate is whether mathematics is already clearly and distinctly perceived 
in the First Meditation. I think that the meditator recognizes that her perception of mathematics is 
somehow more compelling than sensory perception but is yet unaware of why. She still assents to 
mathematics mostly habitually, keeping things “at arm’s length” (Carriero 2009, 55). After she concludes 
her existence and runs through the wax example, she works out the clearness of mathematics and 
appreciates this clarity. 
59 Viewing the Deceiving God scenario as questioning the reliability of created eternal truths supports this, 
since the law of contradiction is among the eternal truths (the Principia I, §XXII: AT VIIIA, 23–24; CSM 
I, 209). However, it is to be noted that the Deceiving God scenario works even without the doctrine of 
created truths. Cf. Forsman 2016. 
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appears to me as “my world” is not possible for the meditator at this ultimate level (C. 
Acad. 3.11.24; chapter 2.3.1). (Cf. M. Wilson 1978, 41; Brown 2013; Wagner 2014, 61.) 
4.4. Modification of a Pyrrhonian Epochē 
The meditator concludes at the end of the tenth paragraph: 
I […] am finally compelled to admit that there is not one of my former beliefs about 
which doubt may not properly be raised; and this is not a flippant or ill-considered 
conclusion, but is based on powerful and well-meditated reasons (validas & meditatas 
rationes). So in future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs jus as carefully 
as I would from obvious falsehoods, if I want to discover any certainty. (AT VII, 21–22; 
CSM II, 14–15. Translation modified.) 
The levels of doubt have succeeded in counter-balancing the meditator’s former reasons 
for belief with reasons for doubt. These reasons, as she mentions, are powerful, so 
powerful that they upset her earlier inclinations for believing that reality resembles her 
perceptions of it and that she has access to the world through the senses, imagination, 
and reason. She therefore decides to suspend her judgment on these issues until she can 
find some certainty. Her assent will be withheld as long as she has no more reason for 
belief than for doubt (cf. Seventh Replies: AT VII, 474; CSM II, 319). 
By countering the meditator’s former beliefs with equally strong doubts, Descartes 
has succeeded in what the meditator will call equal balance (aequatis utrimque) in the next 
paragraph. The meditator’s will is at stasis as the reasons for belief and disbelief balance 
each other out: Her evidence is insufficient to follow either option. However, she 
discovers that her will is indifferently free: She can make the decision to follow either belief 
or disbelief, or, as she does, to suspend judgment all together and await additional 
evidence for either side. The Cartesian suspension of judgment, as such, is comparable 
to the Pyrrhonian one, in which placing contrarieties against each other results in an 
equipollence (isostheneia) of equally strong reasons for both sides, wherefore the 
Pyrrhonist suspends judgment on the issue. I see the meditator’s suspension at this point 
emulating the Pyrrhonian one, so I call it a modification of a Pyrrhonian epochē. (Cf. chapters 
2.5.2, 3.3.4. See also Alanen 2016.) 
I identify the Cartesian suspension as a modification for certain obvious differences 
with the epochē of the ancient Pyrrhonists. Firstly, the scope of Descartes’s modified 
epochē is explicitly wider, covering not only essential claims but also existential ones, 
thanks to the Third Level. The meditator suspends her judgment on the external reality 
not only in the moderate but also in the extreme sense, questioning whether any external 
objects and reality exist. Secondly, as the meditator testifies in the next paragraph, 
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suspending judgment is not as simple as this as her earlier doxastic states begin to leak 
back. Unlike ancient skepticism, Cartesian skepticism retains the practical common-
sense beyond the philosophical enquiry, separating everyday life from the suspension 
(see, however, Eichorn 2014; 2020). Thirdly, the final difference relates to the manner 
of suspending judgment. According to Pyrrhonists, suspension results naturally, even 
accidentally, from the equipollence of equally contrary views. Descartes, however, does 
not view suspension as a naturally occurring state but instead as a voluntary decision. The 
meditator experiences the freedom of her will by placing the equally convincing reasons 
in balance. No reason convinces her over the other or pulls her decision, so she is 
indifferent towards which of the alternatives (belief, denial, suspension of judgment) is 
the correct one. Descartes indicates the meditator’s suspension to be normative instead 
of natural or causal. If no reason convinces her one way or the other, she ought to 
suspend her judgment to avoid choosing wrongly (so believing falsely). Suspension, 
when truth has not yet been found, is a moral obligation. (See chapters 2.5.2, and 3.3.)     
It is revealing that Descartes provides freedom of one’s will before the certainty of 
one’s existence in the Principia. No matter our origin, we have a self-evident experience of 
(at least) indifferent freedom to suspend judgment on matters that are not completely 
certain (thoroughly examined) that enables us to avoid error when more evidence is 
required. (I, §6: AT VIIIA, 6; CSM II, 194; cf. AT VII, 377–378, VIIIA, 19–20; CSM I, 
205–206, II, 259–260). Similarly, after summoning the Demon in the First Meditation, 
the meditator exclaims “even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least 
do what is in my power, that is, resolutely guard against assenting any falsehoods” (AT 
VII, 23; CSM II, 15). Suspending judgment, by forcing an equal balance of reasons, is 
not only in our power but is even the morally right choice. (Cf. Clarke 2003, 134; Shapiro 
2008, 26–27, 31–34.)60 
Based on the skeptical scenarios, the meditator comes to the conclusion that she 
should generally suspend her judgment. However, as indicated, she finds this 
suspension an arduously difficult task. The eleventh paragraph then finds the meditator 
struggling with the suspension. 
My habitual opinions keep coming back, and, despite my wishes, they capture my belief, 
which is as it were bound over to them as a result of long occupation and the law of 
custom. I shall never get out of the habit of confidently assenting to these opinions, so 
long as I suppose them to be what they are, namely highly probable opinions […] which, 
[…] [are] still much more reasonable to believe than to deny. [Thus] I think it will be a 
 
60 Later, the meditator finds out that her will is spontaneously free when she cannot but assent. Of course, 
even suspension can be a morally questionable choice in certain instances, e.g., C&D perception, if done 
for questionable reasons (such as suspending for the sake of suspension like the ancients). See chapter 
3.3.4. Cf. Cunning 2014, 84. 
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good plan to turn my will in completely the opposite direction and deceive myself, by 
pretending for a while that these former beliefs are utterly false and imaginary. (AT VII, 
22; CSM II, 15.) 
This passage is one of the most debated of the First Meditation. Some read it as 
indicating that Descartes’s whole project is insincere (the doubt is merely a theoretical 
endeavor or a game) that demonstrates how Cartesian skepticism is not really about 
suspension of judgment but of rejecting earlier views completely. Descartes’s aim would 
not be withholding judgment but a more epistemic idea of treating as false everything 
that can be called into doubt. Broughton also relies heavily on the passage, arguing that 
Descartes insists we have a reason to prefer the common-sense beliefs of waking life, 
concluding that the meditator is not in a Pyrrhonian stage of equipollent considerations 
for and against certain beliefs (2002, 69–70, 79–80).61 (See chapters 1.1 and 1.3.) 
I view this paragraph simply as revealing that the meditator’s attention on the 
meditative exercise is relaxing and her habitual views are leaking back. Attentive 
suspension is mentally tiring, and she easily returns to the morally certain teachings of 
nature, which, while doubtful, are still strongly persuasive to her in the common-sense 
attitude. The meditator discovers that her habit of finding the common-sense opinions 
more reasonable is too strong to be balanced by the skeptical scenarios. She still finds 
them preferable, which snaps her from the suspension without sufficient concentration 
and attention. Her freedom still appears to be somewhat limited.62 (Cf. chapter 3.3.) 
4.5. Deceiving Demon 
The meditator decides to turn her will to the other side to counter the pull of her 
habitual beliefs and pretend (fingam) that these beliefs are actually false, willingly 
practicing self-deception instead of merely suspending on them. This is done specifically 
to upset the habitual pull towards belief with an even stronger pull towards denial. “I 
shall do this until the weight of preconceived opinions is counter-balanced and the 
distorting influence of habit no longer prevents my judgment from perceiving things 
correctly” (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). In the Fifth Replies, Descartes uses the example 
of a curved stick, that we bend in the opposite direction to straighten it out. We are 
 
61 Broughton’s discussion criticises E. Curley (1978, 89, 117, 120-122), who sees the reasons for doubt 
required to overcome (in Broughton’s terms, “counterbalance”) our tendency to believe that, e.g., “here 
is a hand”. Curley does not use the term counterbalance, and I am not certain if his use of “overcoming” 
is to be understood this way. 
62 See Principia I, §73 (AT VIIIA, 37; CSM I, 220); cf. Araujo 2003, chapter 4. I can appreciate both the 
seriousness of the suspension and the commitment to the common-sense by reading the suspension as a 
meditative exercise. 
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required, in order to counter the stronger pull in one direction, to create an even 
stronger pull to the opposite direction if we want the stick to balance out. Similarly, “it 
is often useful to assume falsehoods instead of truths in this way in order to shed light 
on the truth, e.g., when astronomers imagine the equator, the zodiac, or other circles in 
the sky, or when geometers add new lines to given figures”. (AT VII, 349–350; CSM II, 
242. Cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 112–115; Schüssler 2013, 153–154.) 
Due to the meditator’s habitual commitment to form beliefs and give assent to 
preconceived opinions, the special reason (desire for ideal certainty) is insufficient to 
make her suspend in a reliable and enduring fashion. The suspension has a temporal 
restriction as it demands laborious attention. However, she gains competence in the 
suspension with practice (replicating the meditation with sufficient attention), 
succeeding in it for longer periods, so that by the Third and Fourth Meditations she no 
longer finds common-sense views preferable but as merely a blind impulse (caeco impulsu) 
and plausible conjectures (probabiles conjecturae) (AT VII, 40, 59–62; CSM II, 27, 41–43). 
Nevertheless, to get the suspension going despite the initial difficulty, the meditator 
also has to engage in some special work, namely, to pretend that most of what she thinks 
is false. She is quick, though, to remind herself that this self-deception applies only in 
the context of inquiry and does not cause harm in her everyday life. “I know (scio) no 
danger or error will result from my plan [to deceive myself], and that I cannot possibly 
go too far in my distrustful attitude. This is because the task now in hand does not 
involve action but merely the acquisition of knowledge” (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). 
However, to be able to “turn her will in the opposite direction”, she requires a 
specific psychological tool, a (made-up) reason to think her views are false and imaginary, 
that enables her self-deception and helps her to retract the habitual pull towards belief. 
The twelfth paragraph then opens: 
I will suppose then that not God, who is supremely good and the source of truth, but 
rather some malicious demon (genium aliquem malignum) of the utmost power and cunning has 
employed all his energies in order to deceive me. I shall think that the sky, the air, the 
earth, colours, shapes, sounds and all external things are merely the delusions of dreams 
which he has devised to ensnare my judgment. I shall consider myself as not having hands 
or eyes, or flesh, or blood or senses, but as falsely believing that I have all these things. I 
shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and even if it is not in my power to 
know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that is, resolutely guard against 
assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver […] will be unable to impose on me in 
the slightest degree. (AT VII, 22–23; CSM II, 15. Emphasis added.) 
The meditator decides to imagine herself under the deceit of a malicious Demon that 
actively manufactures all of her sensory input in order to make her assent to it. The 
created scenario of the deceiving Demon is combined with the dreaming scenario, 
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amplifying the power and scope of the latter, with the meditator now viewing that the 
external world, with all colours, shapes, and sounds, as well as her own body and its 
sensory functions, are just delusions of dreams (ludificationes somniorum). Dreaming and 
the Demon working in tandem, the meditator imagines herself dreaming without a 
body, severing physiological ties and expanding the dream scenario into extreme 
external world skepticism (cf. Carriero 2009, 41–42). The meditator persists in the 
meditation with this imagined scenario, countering the pull of habitual beliefs. Our will 
is free and allows us to suspend judgment and not err even if we are unable to know the 
truth or are even actively deceived.  
The Deceiving Demon is a very different scenario than the Deceiving God, despite 
being often treated similarly (see, e.g., Kenny 1968, 35; Frankfurt 2008, 119; Hatfield 
2007, 88; Cunning 2014). The Demon is a methodical tool, fabricated to help with the 
will’s pull towards earlier beliefs. It is not a convincing reason for doubt, but is 
introduced outside of the genuine scenarios, not intended to be taken seriously other 
than as an instrument of self-deception. This is also demonstrated by the use of the 
term fingere (to deceive, to pretend). Unlike the other scenarios, the Demon is not a what 
if -account; it requires actively imagining someone deceiving us. While form of the 
Demon argument is similar to the previous reasons for doubt, the psychological effect 
it produces and the purpose it carries in the exercise are different. The Deceiving 
God/Imperfect Nature works separately from dreaming, raising the possibility that we 
err in everything we consider as evident, whereas the Demon forms a tandem with 
dreaming, making us actively imagine that nothing we sense is real. Also note that in 
listing things she considers delusions of dreams, the meditator does not mention 
mathematics, which was explicitly questioned by the Deceiving God. This is not to say 
that mathematics is not suspended leading to the Second Meditation. Mathematics is 
not included in the Demon list because Descartes wants to put the meditator’s focus on 
drawing the mind away from judgments regarding sensory materiality for the following 
Meditation, in which mathematical entities are not in the forefront. Thus, the First 
Meditation follows the Medieval distinction between deception by God and demons.63   
The Demon is another often misunderstood moment in the First Meditation, partly 
for the abovementioned confusions. A surprising amount of detail has been put on the 
 
63 See chapter 2.3.3. Cf. Gouhier 1973; Carriero 2009, 57–60; Bermúdez 1998, 243–244; Hatfield 2007, 
87–88; Christofidou 2013, 31–33; Wagner 2014, 69–70; Cunning 2014, 74. Some commentators consider 
mathematics not to be questioned at all in the First Meditation (e.g., Olson 1988, 407–408; Grene 1999, 
567–569; Secada 2013, 205–207); yet, Descartes clearly states that mathematics is included in the scope of 
the Deceiving God. With the Demon, the meditator’s attention is merely drawn to refraining from sensory 
judgments for the Second Mediation, which is exercised within this redirected scope of the Demonic 
dream, in which the focus is on material things (including the simples and phantasmal memory), and even 
the meditator’s physical ties to reality are questioned (see also AT VII, 130–131; CSM II, 94). 
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notion that it is a demon that is deceiving the meditating person (e.g., Scarre 1990; Mercer 
2017). This is misleading. It makes no difference whether the meditator considers 
herself to be under the machinations of a malign spirit, a demiurge, or the Old Nick 
himself.64 For Descartes’s purposes, the contemporary trope of a computer simulation 
or a brain controlled by a mad scientist would equally do the trick (minus the existence 
of the brain, of course). Another mischaracterisation is that since the Demon is 
obviously a non-serious methodical tool, all earlier skeptical scenarios are like that. 
Descartes treats the Demon as a joke in the Seventh Replies, which is thought to imply 
that the other reasons for doubt are not to be taken seriously either (e.g., Hookway 
1990, 55; Watson 1993).65 However, as the Demon is introduced outside of the levels 
of doubt, it is no indication that the rest of the scenarios are similar psychological tricks. 
Descartes treats the Demon mockingly only in relation to how Bourdin uses it. 
[M]y critic regards doubt and certainty as being in the objects rather than our thought. 
[…] But perhaps the demon prevented him seeing the contradiction in his words. It is 
regrettable that the demon so often interferes with his thought processes. (AT VII, 475; 
CSM II, 319–320.) 
The criticism is that Bourdin misunderstands the meditative exercise, giving too much 
credibility to an assumption that was meant as a self-deceptive instrument, not to be 
confused with the “powerful and well-meditated” reasons. The third confusion is that 
because Descartes describes the meditators position here as treating earlier conceptions 
as false, this would apply to the whole skeptical project of the First Meditation (e.g., 
Gouhier 1973; Bermúdez 2000, 335–336). However, this is not necessarily the case. 
Treating doubtful things as false is part of the cognitive exercise only as the last measure, 
when the strength of earlier convictions is too much to counter with the skeptical 
scenarios. Suspension, not rejection, is what characterises a Cartesian skeptical exercise. 
(Cf. AT V, 9, VII, 465; CSM II, 312–313, CSMK, 316. See also Vitz 2015, 78–80.) 
With the Demon, the meditator has a reason to imagine her views to be false, 
counterbalancing the pull of believing them to be true. During the exercise, if she feels 
herself tempted by her earlier views, she can imagine the Demon deceiving her and 
experience her will’s free power to “guard against assenting to any falsehoods”. By 
practice, she later can reach a more genuine agnosticism because a “distorting influence 
of habit” no longer warps her assent. Meanwhile, the Demon does not replace any of 
the skeptical scenarios but empowers some of them (specifically dreaming) in case of 
 
64 The word genius indicates the intention as a malevolent spirit, similar to a djinn ( جن) in the Arabic tradition. 
65 Hookway also considers the Deceiving God doubt hypothetical because, unlike, e.g., dreaming, it lacks 
the connection to ordinary experience as we have no reason to suppose that God deceives us. This issue 
is solved by considering the scenario to instead be about our own imperfect nature due to either a divine 
or a mundane origin. 
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strong habitual beliefs.66 The Demon is not a superfluous addition, even if suspension 
succeeds before it (see Conversation: AT V, 147; CSMK, 333. Cf. Christofidou 2013, 33).67 
The meditator testifies, though, that guarding against false assent and suspending 
judgment is an “arduous (laboriosum) undertaking”, while “a kind of laziness” brings her 
back to normal life. 
I am like a prisoner who is enjoying an imaginary freedom while asleep; as he begins to 
suspect that he is asleep, he dreads being woken up, and goes along with the pleasant 
illusion […]. In the same way, I happily slide back into my old opinions and dread being 
shaken out of them, for fear that my peaceful sleep may be followed by hard labour when 
I wake, and that I shall have to toil not in the light, but amid the inextricable darkness 
[…]. (AT VII, 23; CSM II, 15.) 
Here Descartes presents a prisoner analogy, that is often either misunderstood or not taken 
seriously. The meditator considers herself like a prisoner who enjoys her illusory 
freedom of dreaming and dreads the harsh reality of waking life. It would be easy to 
read the cognitive exercise as the “pleasant illusion”, and the reference to dreaming is 
suggestive of this (see, e.g., Wagner 2014, 74). However, a close reading reveals the 
opposite: The pleasant illusion are the old habitual opinions, providing the meditator an 
easy life by the teachings of nature, while the meditative exercise is described as a hard 
labour, giving no immediate light but inextricable darkness. The analogy clarifies 
another difference between Descartes’s suspension and the Pyrrhonian epochē. 
According to the Pyrrhonists, epochē is fortuitously followed by tranquility from the 
mental distortions caused by contrary impressions (PH I, 29). For Descartes, the 
resulting state from suspension is not pleasant but fills the meditator with confusion 
and uneasiness, described in the Second Meditation as a “deep whirlpool” tumbling 
around her (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16). Like the Pyrrhonian epochē, the Cartesian cognitive 
exercise of suspending judgment is just as much an ethical journey as it is epistemic and 
metaphysical. However, for Descartes, human happiness and tranquility result not from 
suspension but from certainty. 
The prisoner analogy also reveals an important aspect of the meditative exercise. The 
suspension, as established, is hard labour requiring arduous attention and concentration, 
 
66 Some view Descartes summoning the Demon because the concept of God includes absolute good and 
is incompatible with deception. Belief in God would actually never be doubted after all (e.g., Kenny 1968, 
35; Hatfield 2007, 88). This view depends again on the Deceiving God and the Demon being the same 
scenario. Recalling that God as the source of good is among her habitual opinions, the meditator imagines 
a different entity to deceive her, as God’s nature and existence are suspended. (Cf. Christofidou 2013, 32.) 
67 Wagner reads withholding of assent not achieved before the “cognitive experience” of imagining the 
Demon (2014, 44, 63–70). However, this conflates with what Descartes writes right after the Third Level 
of doubt but before the Demon: “In future I must withhold my assent from these former beliefs…” (AT VII, 
21–22; CSM II, 14–15. Emphasis added). 
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and, even then, it is temporarily restricted. The meditator thus happily takes a break 
from suspending judgment from time to time, sliding back to her morally certain 
opinions of everyday life. Because the suspension is also contextually restricted, she can 
flip between the context of enquiry and the context of common life whenever her 
attentive potency decreases. The meditator can suspend judgment during the exercise 
by concentrating on the reasons to doubt and the stasis of indifference created by their 
equal strength with reasons to believe. If her attention begins to waver, she can rely on 
the imagined Demon to ease the meditation. Meanwhile, her normal everyday life 
continues as always, and she is able to slip out of the exercise whenever she wants to 
and continue on a later date. Descartes even states that considerable time should be 
spent on each Meditation (Second Replies: AT VII, 130; CSM II, 94). 
Where does this leave belief in the First Meditation? Is the meditator truly suspending 
judgment, for example, that she has hands, or is she simply in a position to entertain 
hypothetically that she has no hands, for the sake of the argument? Compare if I were 
to ask students to assume they are dreaming. Perhaps a few drowsy ones will be able to 
suspend judgment whether they are awake or not, but most will likely continue to 
believe they are awake, even as they go through the exercise. 
This depends on the contextual limitation, as indicated earlier. When the meditator 
slides back into her normal life and somebody were to ask the above, she would reply 
that of course she believes she has hands. However, while she practices the meditative 
exercise, and assuming the question does not snap her out of that state, she would 
answer that she does not believe she has hands as she is generally suspending judgment. 
The meditator does not assent to the non-existence of the world but refuses to commit to 
her cognition of it, even with imagining the Demon (see chapter 3.3.4). The pretended 
falsity is motivated by reaching an equal balance with the strong pull towards belief, 
resulting in withholding assent from sensory judgments. “[E]ven if it is not in my power 
to know (cognoscere) any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, that is, resolutely 
guard against assenting to any falsehoods (ne falsis assentiar)” (AT VII, 23; CSM II, 15). The 
French translation makes the case even clearer: “il es ten ma puissance de suspender mon 
jugement (it is in my power to suspend my judgment)”. The experience of a hypothetical 
case of deception helps the suspension, and even when pretending that everything the 
senses tell is false, the meditator’s resolution is to genuinely suspend judgment on the 
assumed falsehoods (cf. Schüssler 2013, 154; Wagner 2014, 72). (See chapter 2.5.2. 
Compare with the imagination-reliant spiritual meditation tradition, chapter 1.2.1.) 
The First Meditation builds the doubt layer by layer, moving from a common-sense 
position that some perceptions are deceptive, to saying that any of them could be, to 
finally stating that every perception, and even one’s whole cognitive grasp, might be 
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deceptive (cf. B. Williams 1983, 34; Dicker 2013, 30). These reasons for doubt create an 
equal balance with reasons for belief, with the meditator suspending her judgment to 
avoid erroneous and morally wrong judgment. However, the meditator’s conviction in 
the habitual beliefs is too strong to be upset with merely finding room to doubt them. 
Thus, the meditator forms a psychological technique to enforce the counter balancing 
of reasons by imaging her perception of external material reality to be a “dream” created 
by a deceptive Demon. This introduces a layer of denial similar to the third layer of doubt 
but only fixed on sensory-material elements, including the simple and universal things. 
The meditator unravels these layers one by one in the Meditations that follow. She 
clears the layer of denial in the Second Meditation, discovering her existence and nature 
as a cognising being, which overcomes the Deceiving Demon. In the Third Meditation, 
she compares the discovered clear and distinct cognition to the three Levels of doubt, 
starting with the outer and most radical Third Level. While the Third Level puts all of 
the Second Meditation results into doubt (including the cogito), cognitive certainty of 
clarity and distinctness enables her path to metaphysically certain scientia of God as a 
non-deceiver. In the Fourth Meditation, she contemplates the question of whether God 
allowing her to occasionally err is consistent with God’s non-deceiving nature. 
Discovering her errors as misapplications of will and intellect begins the process of 
unravelling the Third Level. She discovers the structures of reality present in her 
mathematical and simple universal notions in the Fifth Meditation, returning the 
discussion to the Second Level. Finally, in the Sixth Meditation, she unravels the Second 
Level by discovering the role of sensation and imagination and recognises the essence 
of her erroneous cognition. While the First Level doubts cannot be fully settled, they 
also no longer cause concern due to our ability to always rectify our judgments on them. 




5. Second Meditation: The Whirlpool, The Keyhole, and 
the Wax 
The Second Meditation continues the refinement of our common-sense thinking of the 
world with the skeptical meditation, challenging the naïve and Scholastic assumptions 
alike. The position of total skepticism is also challenged for the first time with the 
emergence of the meditator’s self-awareness, demonstrating the clarity and distinctness 
of certain perceptions (cf. Broughton 2002, 108–109). 
Unlike the First, the Second Meditation comprises of two distinct chains of discovery, 
demonstrating the nature of the mind as better known than the nature of body. The 
First Chain aims to prove the existence of incorporeal ‘I’ as more persuasively evident 
than the naively conceived corporeal self. The Second Chain aims to prove that the 
mind and its nature are more clearly and distinctly perceived than body and its nature.1 
The First Chain of discovery begins with a summary of the end of the First 
Meditation, reminding practitioners of the suspension by which the meditator operates. 
The meditator describes her anxious condition as if she is being whirled around by a 
whirlpool of doubt. However, she has an optimistic wish of a steadfast Archimedean point to 
use as a foothold. The Deceiving Demon and the layer of denial then return, through 
which the meditator realises her own existence, providing the sought Archimedean 
point of internal evidence and working as a keyhole to peek at reality. The meditator then 
delves into the nature of the existent ‘I’, discovering it to be a cogitating being. The Second 
Chain is introduced because it would be odd if doubtful corporeality was more distinctly 
known than the internally evident ‘I’. This notion leads to the discussion of the wax, 
explaining how the cogitating being (mind) is in fact clearer and more distinct than the 
extended bodies grasped by sense perception. 
I present here the structure of the Second Meditation, just as I did with the First: 
Introduction: Reminder of the suspension and the whirlpool of doubt 
Chain of Discovery 1: ‘I’ as the keyhole to the world 
Conclusion 1: ‘I’, as a cogitating being, am more evident than my doubtful corporeal self 
Alteration: Doubtful corporeality appears clearer and more distinct than the evident ‘I’ 
Chain of Discovery 2: The example of the wax 
Conclusion 2: Mind and its nature are clearer and more distinct than body and its nature 
The two chains build an interesting narrative that flows smoothly from one to 
another. However, to have a clearer picture of the presented argumentation, the chains 
 
1 The subtitle of the Meditation is De natura mentis humanae: quod ipsa sit notior quam corpus. The French 
translates corpus as “le corps” and CSM follows this with “the body”. However, Descartes discusses not 
only the (human) body, concentrated on in the First Chain, but also a body (a piece of wax) in the Second 
Chain. Cf. Carriero 2009, 65, note 1. 
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must be picked into their parts. This once again requires a close dissection of the 
cognitive exercise in the Second Meditation.  
5.1. First Chain of Discovery: The Whirlpool and the Keyhole 
The first paragraph begins with a short recap of the previous exercise, which has cast 
the meditator into almost a state of desperation. “So grave (tantas) are the doubts into 
which I have been thrown as a result of yesterday’s meditation that I can neither put 
them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them” (AT VII, 23; CSM II, 16; 
translation modified). She describes her situation as if falling “into a deep whirlpool 
(gurgitem) which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim 
up to the top.” (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16). The anxiety caused by the deepest skepticism 
makes her wish for at least one firm steppingstone to use as a foothold in the maelstrom. 
Even if she is unable to open the doorway to the truth, she hopes for a simple keyhole 
to peek through. 
5.1.1. Whirlpool of Doubt and the Archimedean Point 
Descartes’s description of a “deep whirlpool” is a clear indication of the psychological 
effect that the general suspension of judgment is to have on us. According to the ancient 
Pyrrhonists, epochē was a safeguard from the mental disturbance of contrarieties, a way 
to achieve tranquility and live a good life. For Descartes, well versed in Renaissance and 
early modern skepticism, it is the cause of disturbance itself, making one question the 
very prospects of a truly peaceful life. The uncertainty has clearly made the meditator 
very anxious and restless, being far from a tranquil state of ataraxia. Cast into the 
tumbling whirlpool of doubt, the meditator seems incapable of reaching neither the 
bottom (resolving the doubts by some certainty) or the surface (accepting the 
uncertainty and putting the doubts out of his mind, relying on sensory awareness). The 
whirlpool is too deep to find a quick and simple resolve and too fierce and disturbing 
to just leave the suspension hanging. (Readers who have done the meditative exercise 
seriously and properly should also feel as if falling into a deep whirlpool, seemingly with 
no evident way out. See E. Curley 1978, 43; cf. Maia Neto 2014, 59.) 
The meditator is left with one option: Continue the effort of the meditative exercise. 
I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I started on yesterday. 
Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to 
be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, or, if 
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nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty. (AT VII, 24; 
CSM II, 16.) 
The meditator reminds herself of the exercise she is currently operating in: Whatever 
admits reasons for doubt is to be set aside and suspended. However, the goals of the 
exercise slightly shift in this paragraph. The goal in the First Meditation was to see how 
far the suspension reaches, the result being that it can encompass every single former 
belief. Thus, the goal has to be altered for the Second, becoming to continue with the 
meditation so long that the meditator either recognises something as being beyond 
reasonable doubt or concludes that nothing is. 
There is still a ray of hope, even if things look bleak, emphasised by the analogy of 
an Archimedean point – one firm spot for levering the meditator to the surface. 
“Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the 
entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, 
however slight, that is certain and unshakable” (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16). Suspension 
being incapable of achieving solace or closure, the meditator ventures onwards, trying 
to uncover at least one certainty, even one of negative dogmatism. Even the seemingly 
self-defeating certainty of nothing being certain would provide some footing in the 
storming maelstrom. 
If the meditator is a skeptic, wouldn’t she call a foul here? The open-ended 
questioning, in which a third option is always a possibility, is seemingly replaced with 
assurance of some certainty and the possibilities limited to two, positive or negative 
dogmatism. This would appear as Descartes’s own dogmatic doctrine leaking into the 
skepticism, making it less sweeping than is admitted.  
Such a skeptical foul calling is not given though. The meditator’s move is very hand 
wavy, allowing for the exercise to potentially be nearly open-ended. It is unclear when 
in the project one could just declare all certainty non-existent; how long does one have 
to meditate before being convinced that nothing truly is certain? The meditator might 
end up endlessly suspending judgment. We also must remember that the skeptic 
Descartes concentrates on is not the ancient Pyrrhonian or Academic but the historically 
savvy Renaissance/early modern skeptic. Neither Montaigne’s nor Sanches’s skeptical 
project offers immediate solace; rather both leave one with anxiety about the uncertainty 
of human nature. Even with Charron’s French Academic epochē, final deliverance from 
inner turmoil comes not from suspension of the uncertain but from fideistic acceptance 
of the Christian faith. The Renaissance skeptical doctrine was generally not one of 
peacefulness but of turmoil, kept in line mostly by continuing the search. The meditator 
similarly experiences that tranquility is not found by suspending on uncertain matters; 
in fact, things seem more dire than ever, and thus she seeks certainty, any certainty, as 
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a better potential candidate for mental solace. For Descartes, true peace of mind can 
only be attained by discovering something certain. (See chapters 2.4. and 4.5.) 
It is typical to take the prospective Archimedean point to be the first absolute 
certainty discovered in the exercise. Some of Descartes’s wordings also point towards 
this view. The meditator calls for something “firm (firmum)” and “immovable 
(immobile)”, “certain (certum) and “unshakable (inconcussum)”. Compared with the 
beginning of the First Meditation, where the meditator yearns for in scientiis something 
“stable (firmum)” and “lasting (mansurum)” (AT VII, 17; CSM II, 12; translation 
modified), the indication seems to be that the Archimedean point (typically read as the 
soon to be discovered existence of ‘I’) would be a first instance of knowledge as scientia. 
However, one does not require lasting stability for the metaphor to work; even 
momentary stability would be sufficient for the levering. Indeed, I will later propose 
that in the Second Meditation the meditator does not yet know, in the fullest sense, that 
she exists, being still merely persuaded of this.  
The meditator then continues with the meditative exercise. However, she does so 
not by the means of the layers of doubt but by the layer of denial, going immediately 
for self-deception.  
I will suppose then, that everything I see is false. I will believe that my memory tells me 
lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, 
shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras (chimarae). So what remains true? 
Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain. (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16.) 
The meditator considers that she has no body and no senses. Everything she 
encounters, including simples such as shape, extension, and place, are chimerical and 
unreal. Even her memories are telling lies, reporting things that never happened. She 
then supposes not only that the senses do not function (she has no sense organs) but 
also that they never have. Corporeality, material bodies and their features generally, are 
non-existent. The desired effect is in fact the result of the dreaming-demon tandem, in 
which everything is merely a bodiless dream caused by the Deceiving Demon. One 
could point to the mention of “memory telling lies” as a hint that the deceiver has altered 
the meditator’s mnemonic process and the deception is not just sensory. However, I do 
not think that alteration of memory itself is the intention here. If everything ever 
experienced through the senses is spurious, all memories of such experiences are 
unreliable as well. Put in Aristotelian terms, since nothing ever experienced came from 
real objects, all the sensible phantasmas stored in the memory are of no help. Nothing 
seems to be true in such a situation except, perhaps, that no certainty exists. 
The last statement might come across as puzzling: Would there not be certainty that 
I have no senses and that material bodies are chimeras? We must remember Descartes’s 
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metaphysically committed view of truth and certainty to understand the intention. 
Descartes considers truth (verum) to be real and falsity (falsa) to be unreal. The whole 
prospect of truth is suddenly endangered if all external reality is chimerical. If the 
mediator thinks in the naïve and Aristotelian lines, that there are no existing objects that 
resemble her perceptions would mean that there would be no reality either. The same 
thing also applies to materialist and mechanist lines by including the simples among the 
chimerical things. There would be no truth without reality, and without truth there 
would be no certainty (cf. Carriero 2009, 41–46, 72–74). (See chapters 3.4.1 and 4.3.) 
A larger issue is, why does the meditator turn immediately to the denial of external 
reality? Following the reminder of the exercise in the previous paragraph, that 
everything doubtful should be “set aside (removendo)”, it would seem more sensible to 
proceed with the suspension of judgment by the three levels of doubt. There appears 
to be two reasons for this. Firstly, the meditator is still very inexperienced with the 
meditative exercise, finding her everyday beliefs almost irresistible. She is to make 
remarkable progress with the suspension during the Second Meditation and will not 
find the existence of the external world as obvious anymore by the beginning of the 
Third, but here she is still a novice with the exercise. Resolving to the psychological self-
deception from the beginning can help with the process. Secondly, it is clear that 
Descartes’s intention in the Second Meditation is to redirect the scope of the doubt to 
attend to sensory and material things, including the simples, phantasmal memory, and 
one’s own bodily ties. This is why the Second Meditation is exercised in the scope of 
the Demonic dream – its particular emphasis is to draw the mind away from the senses. 
In the Synopsis of the First Meditation, Descartes describes the greatest benefit of 
the extensive doubt to be “providing the easiest route by which the mind may be led 
away from the senses” (AT VII, 12; CSM II, 9). This is backed up in the Third Replies, 
when Descartes explains that one of the aims of the arguments for doubt is to “prepare 
my reader’s minds […] to distinguish [things related to the intellect] from corporeal 
things” (AT VII, 171–172; CSM II, 121). It is commonly assumed that this process of 
leading the mind away from the senses would be fully accomplished with the First 
Meditation skeptical scenarios (e.g., Rozemond 1996; 1998; Hatfield 2007, 71–72). 
However, the Synopsis comment merely states the doubt to be a way towards leading the 
mind from the senses, a first step in the process rather than a concluding argument. 
Likewise, as previously argued, the First Meditation doubt goes even further, 
questioning not merely sense perception and the accustomed corporeality but also the 
whole process of rational cognitive functioning by the means of the Third Level. These 
notions indicate that a large part of drawing the mind from the senses is actually carried 
out somewhere else. (Cf. Patterson 2008.) Indeed, in the Second Replies, Descartes 
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assigns the correct and unique method of drawing the mind away from the senses to be 
contained in the Second Meditation (AT VII, 131; CSM II, 94). The Synopsis of the 
Second Meditation is similarly described as “the mind uses its own freedom and 
supposes the non-existence of all the things about whose existence it can have even the 
slightest of doubt” and in doing so “notices that it is impossible that it should not itself 
exist during this time”, with this exercise being “of the greatest benefit, since it enables 
the mind to distinguish without difficulty what belongs to itself […] from what belongs 
to the body” (AT VII, 12; CSM II, 9). This description fills the role of distinguishing 
things related to the intellect from corporeality. Descartes requests the meditator to 
follow the persuasiveness of her intuition by diverting the attention to sensory-material 
issues. Just as suspension is crucial for establishing the authority of will, acceptance of the 
mind’s conviction is crucial for establishing the authority of reason, being the initial step 
towards discovering one’s true cognitive nature. Putting the attention on the reliability 
of the senses by the layer of denial (and away from the reliability of reason by the Third 
Level of doubt) simultaneously allows Descartes to circumvent the objection that the 
doubt is too strong and the whirlpool is too deep for anything to be salvaged from it, 
or that even if something could be salvaged, nothing could be reasoned from there on.2 
Self-deception is directed towards material things, so doubts about the reliability of 
reason have been put aside for the time being and the meditator is free to follow the 
compelling nature of her own evident intuition.3 
Specific attention should also be paid to the mention of mind using “its own 
freedom” in the Synopsis of the Second Meditation. Like the end of the First, where 
the meditator decides to do what is in her power and resolutely guard against assenting 
to falsehoods, the beginning of the Second asserts the will’s freedom as a power to 
assent or suspend.4 The meditator realises the strength of will as a direct power in the 
case of stasis of indifference. This power manifests as self-deception, supposing the non-
existence of all things of which existence can be doubted, directing the attention towards 
the realization of the existence of self. Freedom of will is then asserted before the 
existence of self not only in the Principia but also in the Meditations, providing an 
important step towards self-awareness (AT VII, 12, CSM II, 9. Cf. AT VII, 23, VIIIA, 
 
2 See, e.g., EHU, 12.1.3; Frankfurt 2008, 39. Cf. Wagner 2014, 65. Another objection has been that the 
strongest form of doubt is self-defeating. If raising the doubt requires reasons, doubting reasoning seems 
to erase those reasons from which the doubt is raised. See Frankfurt 2008, 39–40; M. Wilson 1978, 35–
37; Christofidou 2013, 33–36; Wagner 2014, 63–65. I discuss this issue in chapter 6.1.2.  
3 This is not to say that mathematical reasoning would be reliable at this point. This notion is important 
especially for the later point I make about the cogito not being based on logical or inferential reasoning but 
on a single intuition. 
4 Christofidou sees the end of the First Meditation being the realisation of the strength of reason (2013, 
36). I suggest the realisation to instead be of the strength of will. Cf. Wagner 2014, 72; Cunning 2010, 67. 
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6; CSM I, 194, CSM II, 15). What is often missed is that from the very beginning the 
Cartesian ‘I’ is not merely a reasoning subject but a willing one as well. (Cf. Christofidou 
2013, 39–42; Boehm 2014. See chapters 3.3 and 4.4.) 
5.1.2. ‘I Exist’: Keyhole to the World  
   The third paragraph of the Second Meditation is one of the most famous in 
Descartes’s entrie oeuvre. It begins by puzzling over whether there could still be 
something else she has not yet listed. 
[H]ow do I know (scio) that there is not something else which does not allow even the 
slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not some God, or whatever I may call him, who 
puts into (immittit) me the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I 
myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? (AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16. 
Translation modified.) 
To summarise, the meditator wonders even if everything material and sensory has been 
negated would something still exist outside any doubt? Supposing that I am deceived 
by “some God” (aliquis Deus)” or Demon that manufactures false information, even 
plants false thoughts into me, would not such a deceiver have to exist for me to have 
those thoughts? Wouldn’t there have to be a reason, some generating cause or author, 
for their occurrence?5 However, why would I assume this deceiver to be real since such 
a creature is my own pretense. For all I know, I could be the author of the thoughts. 
In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said I have no senses and no 
body. This is the sticking point (haereo tamen): what follows from this? Am I not so bound 
up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced 
(persuasi) myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, 
no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? Yet, if I convinced myself of 
something then I certainly existed (eram). (AT VII, 24–25; CSM II, 16–17. Translation 
modified.6) 
The realisation brings the meditating me to a standstill. As a being used to rely on senses 
and bodily needs since infancy, could I even exist without them? I have persuaded 
myself that there is nothing, not minds or bodies. My non-existence seems to follow as 
 
5 The Demon was identified as a “malign spirit (genium malignum)” (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15), leaving its 
relation to corporeality suspicious. Assuming all material bodies to be fictional does not mean there are 
no God-like entities. 
6 CSM translates as “No: if I convinced…”, as if the meditator affirms that she can exist without minds, 
bodies, or senses. However, the Latin has imo, which can indicate a sharper break, i.e., whatever the nature 
and relationships between bodies, minds, and senses turns out to be, if I convinced myself, I had to exist. 
Cf. Carriero 2009, 74, note 6. 
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well.7 But wait. If I persuaded myself, if I successfully and freely practiced self-deception 
– if I authored my own thoughts – I had to exist. 
But there is a deceiver, I do not know who (nescio quis), of supreme power and cunning 
who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if 
he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about 
that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything 
very thoroughly, I must finally establish (statuendum) that this proposition, I am, I exist, 
(Ego sum, ego existo) is necessarily true whenever it is put forward (profertur) by me or 
conceived in the mind (mente concipitur). (AT VII, 25; CSM II, 17. Emphasis in the original. 
Translation modified.8)  
Even if I assume a deceiver putting thoughts in me, I must exist to be deceived. It must 
be the case that I indubitably exist as long as I conceive the proposition in question.9 
There is a lot going on in the text that can be difficult to appreciate at first glance 
and is likewise challenging to summarise convincingly without the first-person 
narration. The line of thought is run in a sort of internal debate with the skeptical 
mediator. The existence of ‘I’ is first established in the past (I had to exist at that very 
moment) and then in the present and in the possible future (whenever I conceive myself 
as existing, I exist). This line of thought is obviously similar to Augustine’s refutation of 
skepticism in De Civitate Dei and De Trinitate (see chapter 2.3.1): If the meditator is made 
to go false, or convinces herself of going false, she has to exist. The self-deceptive step 
is then crucial in establishing one’s own existence, directing the attention from 
deception to the self. Taking the Meditations as a serious cognitive exercise is therefore 
essential for the discovery of the cogito. 
The delicate back-and-forth resembles of the interplay between the levels of doubt 
and transitive counter passages in the First Meditation, where the naïve and the 
Aristotelian meditator had to give in that things might not be as thought. In the Second, 
the skeptical meditator must likewise yield in that there is at least one thing that cannot 
be doubted when attended to: her own existence.10  
The reasoning in the Second Meditation is noticeably different from the famous 
phrasing Cogito, ergo sum. This broader and more general phrasing is found originally in 
 
7 Of course, the ‘I’ is a mind, but here the meditator still has no clear concept of what a mind is and how 
it relates to the body and the senses and will not have this sorted out until the Sixth Meditation.  
8 CSM omits nescio quis, translating statuendum as “conclude”, but the result needs not to be a demonstration. 
9 Broughton argues that Descartes does not consider the meditator’s existence immune from doubt 
because of her authorship of her own thoughts, as she is not yet in any position to settle the question of 
what is causally responsible for the occurrence of the thoughts in her (2002, 115).  Unlike Broughton, I 
do not consider the meditator to know her existence with full certainty before settling the question of 
God’s existence and deception. Thus, I do not consider the Second Meditation to settle the causal 
question. The meditator is intuitively compelled of her authorship and nothing more. 
10 Cf. the Hyperaspistes Letter and the Conversation (AT III, 434 & V, 146; CSMK, 196–197, 333). 
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French in the Discourse (Je pense, donce je suis) and later in its Latin form in the Principia 
(AT VI, 32 & VIIIA, 7; CSM I, 127 & 195)11 but does not appear in the Six 
Meditations.12 Instead, the epiphany takes a more measured form as Ego sum, ego existo. 
Unlike the broad phrasing suggests, in the Second Meditation the meditator’s existence 
is not a consequence of her thinking, but, as we later see, her thinking (cogito) is entailed 
from her existence (sum). It can be somewhat misleading for this reason to call the 
existence of the cognising ‘I’ in the Second Meditation the cogito and the passage it 
appears in the cogito passage, as is the custom. However, though there have been 
suggestions of other names (e.g., “I exist” passage, see Broughton 2002, 112), those 
have not caught on and most still refer to the Second Meditation realization as the cogito. 
I have likewise followed this established practice. 
The measured form in the Second Meditation actually brings Descartes even closer 
to Augustine’s Si enim fallor, sum than the superficially similar broad phrasing. Augustine 
does not exist because thinking requires existence, but because he was mistaken. He 
exists as the agent of a failed cognitive act or a mistaken assertation. Similarly, the 
meditator exists not because of an instance of thinking by her but because she realises 
her own free role in creating the make-believe, of actively authoring suspension of 
judgment, being the agent of a successful cognitive act.13 The meditator then recognises 
herself as a willing being, with agency and autonomy over her acts. (Cf. chapter 3.3.) Or, 
even if she did not author her thoughts, if the thoughts were indeed emitted from a 
distant source, she at least must be the recipient of those thoughts. She must exist to 
have been actively caused to err (though then she would be caused to act in a certain 
way and would not be morally responsible for her errors). 
 
11 The Search has Dubito, ergo sum, followed later by Cogito, ergo sum (AT X, 515, 523; CSM II, 410, 417). 
12 The famous phrasing does appear in the Objections and Replies., though. In the Second Replies, 
Descartes defends Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo against charges of deducing existence from thinking by 
syllogism (AT VII, 140; CSM II, 100). In the Third and Fifth Replies, Descartes accepts Ambulo, ergo sum 
only if referring to the awareness of walking (AT VII, 172–174, 352; CSM II, 122–123, 244). Cf. the Letter 
to Clerselier, 12 January 1646 and the Sixth Objections and Replies (AT VII, 413, 422 & IXA, 205; CSM 
II, 271, 278 & 285). The famous phrasing has been suggested in the Second Meditation text “[the deceiver] 
will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think (cogitabo) that I am something” (e.g., Frankfurt 
1991, 192–193; 2008, 135–136). The French could be seen to support this, adding “if I convinced […] or 
thought anything at all (ou seulement si j’ai pensé quelque chose)”. However, the text is complicated, and the 
addition seems premature. Cf. Broughton 2002, 116; Carriero 2009, 75.  
13 It is unknown how much of the similarity is intentional. Descartes seems not to have known the 
Augustinian passage in detail before writing the Discourse but read it while preparing the Meditations for 
publication (the Letter to Colvius, 14 November 1640: AT III, 247; CSMK, 159). However, the manuscript 
must have been quite finished, as Descartes had just sent it for Mersenne to be checked, printed, and 
delivered for the round of objections (the Letter to Mersenne, 11 November 1640: AT III, 239–240; 
CSMK, 158–159). See also the Letters to Mersenne, 1637, 1638 and 1640 (AT I, 376, II, 435 & III, 261; 
CSMK, 129, 161). Cf. Ariew 2019, 28–29. For Descartes and Augustine, see Menn 1998. Note though that 
Silhon makes a similar connection between being and acting. Immortalité II (1998, 199); cf. Clarke 2016, 54. 
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Now, of course, Descartes is unequivocal about whichever act being insufficient 
here. Just because the meditator would be the agent of a (physical) walking or seeing act 
does not prove that she exists, since both walking and seeing are spurious because she 
might have no body (e.g., Principia I, §IX: AT VIIIA, 7; CSM I, 195).14 The free act 
performed is essentially a mental one, be it the self-deceptive denial of matter, willing 
suspension of judgment or, as Descartes sometimes puts it, doubting itself (e.g., Search: 
AT X, 515; CSM II, 409–410). Since denying, judging, doubting, and suspending are 
instances of thought, one becomes self-aware through one’s mental activity (being the 
author of one’s own thoughts). This way, the more famous phrasing of the cogito is also 
accurate. Nevertheless, what I want to suggest is that in those passages where Descartes 
specifically discusses Cogito, ergo sum in the Objections and Replies, he is not referring to 
just the meditator’s realisation of her existence but to the whole First Chain of discovery 
– the argumentative chain from her existence to her nature – in which she concludes 
that she is a thinking thing. The emphasis in this Second Meditation passage is not yet 
on the thinking but instead on the existence, specifically as a willing agent.15 
This also explains Descartes’s insistence that the cogito is no inference or a syllogism. 
 [W]hen we become aware (advertimus) that we are thinking things, this is a primary notion 
(prima notio) which is not derived by means of any syllogism. When someone says ‘I am 
thinking, therefore I am, or I exist’, he does not deduce existence from thought by means 
of a syllogism, but recognizes (agnoscit) it as something self-evident (rem per se notam) by a 
simple intuition of the mind. This is clear from the fact that if he were deducing it by 
means of a syllogism, he would have to have had previous recognition (novisse) of the 
major premiss ‘Everything which thinks is, or exists’; yet in fact he learns it from 
experiencing in his own case that it is impossible that he should think without existing. 
(Second Replies: AT VII, 140; CSM II, 100. Translation modified.) 
Descartes denies the conclusion of those, like Gassendi, who view that the cogito requires 
a premise like ‘whatever thinks, exists’ and emphasises the cogito’s self-evident nature, 
viewing it as intuitive (AT VII, 422 & IXA, 205–206; CSM II, 271 & 285; cf. AT V, 138; 
CSMK, 331). By wondering how exactly ‘I exist’ is deduced, inferred or derived from ‘I 
think’, we dilute the discussion and misread Descartes’s point.16 Recall that while 
 
14 It is not clear if Augustine would have denied Video, ergo sum or Ambulo, ergo sum. Cf. Hintikka 1962, 23. 
15 Cf. also Alanen 2016; 2020. Chapter 3 mentioned that the rest of the Meditations consists partly of the 
meditator coming to terms with the limits of her agency. In the wax paragraph, she does not discover the 
nature of the wax by imagining (adding, removing, and molding) it. In the Third Meditation, she 
distinguishes fictitious ideas from adventitious and innate ones because the latter seem impervious to her 
will, and later recognises that she could be the cause of all her ideas, except the idea of God. Finally, in the 
Fourth Meditation, she discovers herself as spontaneously free, especially in C&D cases. 
16 Famous argument by the 18th century physicist Georg Lichtenberg, that the conclusion should be 
‘thinking occurs’, is derivative to this point. Cf. Gassendi (Disq. II, i, 6). See B. Williams 2015, 79; Hatfield 
2007, 103–116; Fisher 2014, 3.  
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mathematics and logic are not the main focus of the Second Meditation, reliability of 
logical inferences is still under doubt (cf. Stone 1993; Wagner 2014, 76). What provides 
us with self-awareness is direct intuition, a single attentive flash of a freely performed act 
on our part, not logical demonstration. Of course, there are instances when Descartes 
seems happy to treat the cogito as inferential, but these are related to the more general 
phrasing of Cogito, ergo sum (e.g., AT III, 247, V, 147, VI, 32, VII, 352, VIII, 7–8, IX, 27; 
CSM I, 127, 195–196, II, 244, CSMK, 159, 333).One has a clearer grasp of how things 
are after going through the Meditations and can, in turn, also present this intuitive 
certainty in the form of an inference or syllogism. By then we know that thinking is not 
just necessary and inseparable but essential for one’s existence, represented by the word 
ergo.17  (Cf. E. Curley 1978, chapter 4; B. Williams 2015, 74–75; Sarkar 2003.) 
Self-awareness being direct, the meditator becomes aware of herself not through the 
mediation of the senses, as in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition, but through the free 
mental act itself.18 Self-awareness being indubitable while it is attended to, it can trump 
the Renaissance skeptical questioning of the self. The cogito results directly from the 
meditative exercise of doubt, suspension and self-deception, allowing Descartes to go 
against Aristotelian and skeptical traditions, demonstrating the failures of both.19 (Cf. 
Frankfurt 1992; 2008, 151; E. Curley 1978, 86; Broughton 2002, 109–119.) 
The realisation of the existence of ‘I’ provides the meditator with an initial grip of 
certainty – a little opening to peek at the world. The discovery of ‘I’ concludes the 
modification of the Pyrrhonian epochē presented in the First Meditation and modifies it 
further. Suspension by a full equilibrium of opinions comes to temporary halt, because 
the meditator now possesses one notion that feels stronger and more convincing than 
anything else. The robust balance of all beliefs becomes a more developed Cartesian 
 
17 This reading can be seen as in line with Hintikka’s (1962; 1963) influential performative reading of the 
cogito. Cf. Frankfurt 1992; 2008; E. Curley 1978. It is possible to read the general phrasing in the Discourse, 
Principia, and Search as not an inference from thinking to existence, either. Cf. Broughton 2002, 112.  
18 Although, as chapter 3.1.2 discussed, Scholastic self-knowledge is not all this simple and was heavily 
debated in the 14th century. See Yrjönsuuri 1999; 2000; 2007; 2016; Leijenhorst 2012; Carriero 2009, 75.  
19 Other evidence for questioning the inferential reading of the cogito is Descartes’s criticism of deductive 
syllogism over intuition in the Regulae (AT X 363–370; CSM I, 14–15). I discussed intuition and deduction 
in chapter 3.4.1. However, it should be noted that inferential and intuitive readings do not necessarily 
exclude one another. See Newman 2016, 4.1.    
   There has been much discussion of Descartes’s originality with the cogito. Augustine aside, several authors 
in the Renaissance and early modern periods have been identified as preceding Descartes, including 
Charron, Campanella, and Silhon. Cf., e.g., Blanchet 1920; Gilson 1951; Popkin 2003; Maia Neto 2003; 
2014; Paganini 2008a; 2009b; Ariew 2011; Clarke 2016. One recent addition to this list has been the 
Spanish philosopher Gómez Pereira, whose Antoniana Margarita (1554) includes the following passage: 
“nosco me aliquid noscere, & quidquid noscit, est, ergo ego sum” (AM: 1749, 277; cf. Rodriguez Donis 2008). It 
seems that Descartes was made aware of this connection, as he comments to Mersenne in a 1641 letter 
that he has not seen the Antoniana and is not all that interested in seeing it, either (AT III, 386). 
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epochē in which all but the meditator’s own existence (and whatever belongs to her) is 
suspended.20 Attending to her agency, the meditator intuitively notices that she must 
exist. When attended to, her existence is indubitable because she sees no reason to doubt 
it: If she tries to doubt herself, she establishes her existence. The awareness of her 
existence is so strong and evident that she cannot but assent to its truth, breaking the 
indifference (cf. AT VII, 58–59; CSM II, 41; see chapter 3.4). Still, the stasis of 
indifference in broad terms continues, because everything else is suspended. This sort 
of self-awareness can then avoid the regressive horn of Agrippa’s trilemma: Being 
intuitive, the existence of ‘I’ vindicates itself.21 The existence of ‘I’ is not a belief or an 
opinion like any other. It serves as a certain starting point, a keyhole through which one 
can gain a glimpse of reality, a sneak peek into the room of existence, which she 
understands being a part of and which she is able to discover through her own power, 
indicating to her a potential path for unravelling what else there is.22  
However, unlike typically read, I propose that the meditator is not yet absolutely 
certain of her existence. She does not know (in the scientia sense) that she exists and will 
not until she recognizes God’s existence as non-deceiver. The heralded Archimedean 
point, as earlier stated, is often read to be the first absolutely indubitable certainty (e.g., 
Broughton 2002, 117, 183–185). Since the structure of the Second Meditation indicates 
that the call for the Archimedean point is filled by the soon to be discovered ‘I exist’, 
many have read the cogito as a foundationalist truth, setting up the first datum of certainty 
and allowing Descartes to create a method of acquiring permanent opinions for a 
rational foundation upon which science can be built (a reading I call cogito 
foundationalism, e.g., Gueroult 1953; Kenny 1968; M. Wilson 1978; Broughton 2002).23 
I suggest that the meditator’s existence is still merely a strongly compelling and evident 
conviction (persuasio), indicated by Descartes’s use of the term (“if I convinced [persuasi] 
myself”) just before establishing ‘I’s existence. Notice that the notion of the self, just 
 
20 Another way to put this is that not all existence is bracketed in the Cartesian epochē: As ‘I’ am the one 
forming the epochē, ‘I’ am also outside of it. Cf. Husserl on Descartes’s “Cartesianische epochē” in Crisis, §17 
(Hua. VI, 76–77). 
21 Cf. E. Curley 1978, 84–85. For intuition’s role in the skeptical history, see, e.g., Alanen 2000, 260–262. 
22 The keyhole could be read differently: The meditator is allowed just this opening to reality for 
understanding and analysis, widening as she learns more about herself and the world but everything is 
ultimately perceived solely through it, the only certainty being that the ‘I’ exists and cognises (a view close 
to cogito foundationalism). However, proving God’s existence would be rather difficult, easily leading to 
questions of the Cartesian Circle variety. As I argue below, the meditator does not know her existence for 
certain before cognising the existence of a non-deceiving God. 
23 Cf. chapter 3.4.1. See Kant’s criticism of Descartes (A342–347/B400–406; 2000, 412–415). Cf. 
Christofidou 2013, 38–53. Note that readings of the cogito are not homogenous. Still, I consider readings 
that see the cogito as establishing a foundational propositional content, as an (asyllogistic) inference, as a 
performatory thought act, or both inferential and performatory (see, e.g., Hintikka 1962; 1963; Stone 1993; 
Markie 2005) as also being guilty of cogito foundationalism.  
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like her autonomy, still appears limited at this point.24 The meditator concludes that her 
existence is necessarily true only as long as she conceives (concipire) that she exists.25  
Descartes’s seeming tendency to relate alethic modality to temporality might seem 
puzzling to a contemporary reader. However, as previously discussed (chapter 3.4.2), 
the condition here is not temporal but based on reasonable room for doubt. The 
difference between persuasive conviction and full knowledge, as discussed earlier, is 
whether there remain reasons for doubt. It is also crucial to recall that the Cartesian 
necessity of created nature is contingent due to God’s absolute potency. Just because 
something appears necessary to me does not guarantee that it indeed is the case (cf. 
Dicker 2013, 167–168). The meditator states in the Third Meditation that if she does 
not know (ignorare) whether God exists and deceives, it seems that she can never be 
“fully certain (plane certus) about anything else” without excluding even the cogito outside 
of this condition (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25; translation modified). We are convinced of 
our existence but are still ignorant of our cognitive nature and its origin, and thus, do 
not yet possess true knowledge. (See AT VII, 13, 53; CSM II, 9, 37.) 26  
Descartes, as earlier established, does not reduce truth to psychological states like 
indubitability. The cogito works as an Archimedean point (without being a foundational 
ground) by making the meditator aware of the persuasive cognitive certainty of her 
existence and guiding her to discover her true cognitive nature. Nevertheless, as we later 
find out in the Third Meditation, once the layers of doubt are re-introduced with full 
force, even this Archimedean point can still be questioned (cf. E. Curley 1978, 94–95; 
Cunning 2007; 2010, 68–70; Wagner 2014, 76). We could read the meditator as an 
atheist (somewhat merging with the skeptic meditator) to emphasise this: She admits 
her own existence and whatever it entails but insists on suspending judgment on all else, 
including God’s existence. Such a person, for Descartes, would not only fail to reach 
fully certain knowledge but would also fail to ground a stable body of science. The 
intuitive cogito might surpass one Agrippan problem but the other two horns remain 
troubling. Descartes must demonstrate why the meditator should trust her intuition and 
do so without arguing in a circle.27 (See chapter 3.4.1.) 
 
24 See chapter 4.4. Cf. Araujo (2003, chapter 4), who calls the indifferent freedom to suspend minimal 
autonomy and the spontaneous freedom of forming beliefs in accordance with the truth maximal autonomy.  
25 This point is often tied to the special indubitability of the cogito by which the meditator cannot construct 
a coherent skeptical scenario on how she would err about her existence (e.g., Frankfurt 1992, 196–197; 
2008, 140–141; E. Curley 1978, 86; Broughton 2002, 117–118). This is not true. “My nature is so imperfect 
that whenever I think I exist, I err” is a coherent skeptical scenario of the cause of error on my existence.  
26 Cf. AT VIIIA, 7; CSM I, 195. Note that in Scholastic discussions it was standard to describe “I exist” 
as a contingent truth that was known with certitude. Cf. Sanches (e.g., QNS, 58). See chapter 2.4. 
27 Descartes, though, describes the certainty of one’s thought acts as “metaphysical” in the Fifth Replies. 
Some then consider all C&D cognition metaphysically certain, i.e., scientia (e.g., Della Rocca 2005). Others 
have read C&D as ‘psychological’ certainty, in that it simply psychologically convinces us of some truth (e.g., 
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5.1.3. ‘I Think’: Cogito Being 
The meditator looks to venture forward by initially establishing the cogito. However, it is 
not all-together clear how the meditator’s awareness that she exists can help her in the 
project. The meditator’s existence is not an ordinary truth and does not directly lead to 
anything else. Carriero raises similar worries about whether the meditator’s mere 
existence works as a levering point in the inquiry: “If the meditator knew only that she 
existed and, in the process, learned nothing further about herself, it is hard to see how 
this might count as the Archimedean point” (2009, 71; cf. Hatfield 2007, 116–117). The 
meditator must first closely examine what she is before she can move any further.  
But I do not yet have sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is, that now necessarily 
exists. So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this ‘I’, 
and so making a mistake in the very item of cognition (cognitione) that I maintain is the 
most certain and evident of all. (AT VII, 25; CSM II, 17. Translation modified.) 
Here we see the meditator practicing great care with the recent discovery. Her 
understanding of herself might also include unwarranted misconceptions and prejudices 
and, thus, she could still have a very obscure and confused picture of the ‘I’. The 
meditator decides to retrieve the beliefs about herself before she began the cognitive 
exercise and meditate on them anew in order not to assent to a false belief right away. 
She will then subject those views to the denial-scenario of Demonic dreaming, to see 
which of them will be left (AT VII, 25; CSM II, 17).28 
We can also see the first sign of the cogito’s instability in this fourth paragraph. My 
existence (and nature) are certain and unshakable by being evidently perceived, because 
I can see no reasons to doubt them while attending to them. However, when the evident 
perception begins to wane, as the meditator’s wariness indicates is happening, hesitation 
can set in. Clear and distinct perceiving of my existence may concede a standing place, 
but without more investigation it won’t allow a safe route out of the whirlpool, nor will 
it stop me being washed away again by a new wave of doubt. However, with careful 
consideration, it may point out a passage to a fixed and completely immovable rock, 
capable of guarding against all subsequent waves no matter how high or fierce they are.29 
 
Gewirth 1941; Loeb 2005; Wagner 2014, 204). Some, however, including this author, read C&D as some 
sort of normative certainty but one not yet sufficient for full metaphysical certainty, because this certainty is 
still subject to being undermined by the Third Level of doubt (e.g., Carriero 2009; Christofidou 2013). I 
call this sort of normative certainty cognitive. Cf. Forsman 2019. 
28 Descartes suggests in the Search the Archimedean point to be the doubt itself (AT X, 515; CSM II, 409).  
29 Cf. Cunning 2007; 2010, 69–70. Wagner comes to a similar conclusion; however, he considers the 
meditator to not have a C&D perception of herself before the example of the wax, since Descartes’s “law 
of true logic” dictates that we have to understand a thing’s essence before its existence (1995; 2014, 76– 
77; cf. The First Replies: AT VII, 107–108; CSM II, 78). However, the importance of this “law” is unclear 
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The meditator then thinks back to her former opinions. She considered herself to 
be “a human (hominem)” and that, following the Aristotelian definition, to be “a rational 
animal”, but this sort of analysis only brings up questions on the nature of rationality 
and ‘being an animal’, so she abandons that train of thought.30 Instead, she decides to 
concentrate on what spontaneously (sponte & natura) occurred to her when considering 
herself. She lists several body parts (face, hands, arms), which she attributed to body, 
and functions (nourishing, locomotion, sensing, and thought) which she attributed to 
soul. The meditator admits she did not have a clear picture of the nature of soul: Either 
she did not think about it, or she thought it to be tenuous “like a wind or fire or ether”. 
However, she had no qualms of the nature of body and thought she knew it distinctly: 
as something possessing a determinable shape and definable location, occupying a space 
(spatius) by excluding any other body, perceivable by different senses, and movable in 
various ways by whatever comes in contact with it. Self-movement for her was as 
foreign to the nature of body as sensation and thought was, and certain bodies 
containing such “faculties” caused her wonder (mirare) (AT VII, 25–26; CSM II, 17–18).  
This fifth paragraph reveals some of the meditators Aristotelian colours, with the list 
of abilities following the distinction between the nourishing, sensory, and thinking parts 
of the soul. Nevertheless, nothing is too foreign for the naïve meditator’s common-
sense approach here, either, which might work better with the description of the soul. 
However, while self-movement is natural to exclude from the body and assign to the 
soul (both in the naïve and Aristotelian perspectives), the last part is somewhat puzzling: 
What does the meditator mean by certain bodies containing “faculties (facultates)” such 
as thought, sensation, and movement? This could be understood by relying on 
Descartes’s own view of animals as mechanistic automata, but the descriptions of body 
and soul in the paragraph are clearly not his own, and the meditator is not yet in any 
position to define animal nature. A better way is to take facultates only referring to self-
movement, and the meditator marveling that mechanistic statues and other inanimate 
objects can move on their own. This way, the passage likewise gratifies certain 
mechanistic-materialist sensibilities (along with describing the soul as a kind of ether).31 
(Cf. Carriero 1986, 209–211; 2009, 86–87; Cunning 2010, 74.)  
 
and controversial, and Descartes’s following of it seems inconsistent (cf. Carriero 2009, 209–210). As I go 
on to argue, we do not yet gain understanding of our essence in the Second Meditation. One way to 
understand the cogito passage in relation to the “law” is to view that we intuitively grasp both our nature 
and our existence at the same time but are initially only attentive to the latter and have to do extra inquiry 
for the first. The use of cogitabo in the passage on the meditator’s existence might support this. 
30 Descartes also criticises Scholastic conceptual analysis and genus-species definitions by the meditator 
abandoning this approach. See also the Search (AT X, 515–516; CSM II, 410–411). Cf. Carriero 2009, 85. 
31 Cf. AT VII, 350; CSM II, 243: “[I merely put] forward commonly held views…”. The meditator’s awe 
about the self-movement of inanimate objects seems inspired by Descartes’s own fascination. 
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The sixth paragraph subjects these former (partly Aristotelian, partly naïve, and 
partly mechanistic) views to the layer of denial. The meditator supposes that she is being 
deliberately tricked by a “supremely powerful and […] malicious deceiver (deceptorem 
aliquem potentissimum, & […] malignum)” and considers whether she could possess any of 
the attributes she assigned to body in such a situation. The Demon questions even the 
simples, such as shape and spatial placement, so the conclusion is negative. How about 
the attributes assigned to the soul? Nutrition and movement without a body are mere 
fabrications, sense perception does not occur without a body, either, and can be easily 
fabricated since “when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many 
things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the senses at all” (AT VII, 
26–27; CSM II, 18). Here we begin to see the first signs of the rearrangement of the 
Aristotelian view of body and soul, with the nutritional and the sensory parts being more 
closely connected to the body. Especially important to note is that sensation is described 
not to occur without a body, my appearance of it easily being just a bodiless dream. 
Without senses and bodies to be perceived, there is no sense perception. 
However, next comes another breakthrough.  
Thinking? At last I have discovered it – thought; this alone is inseparable from 
me. I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. 
For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to 
exist (desinerem). (AT VII, 27; CSM II, 18.) 
The meditator discovers that the only thing the layer of denial leaves unscathed is her 
thinking. She might have fabricated sensory evidence and could even be made to think 
false thoughts, but the fact she is thinking those thoughts is inseparable from her. It is 
important that this discovery is made by subjection to the layer of denial rather than to 
the layers of doubt. The meditator would not be able to reach the conclusion she makes 
here with the Third Level of doubt, because her whole cognitive process, her thinking 
itself, would be questionable. Here, with the focus on the pretense of the Demonic 
dream, the meditator follows the persuasive nature of her reasoning, assenting only to 
what she is convinced to be the case when keenly attending to it.32 “At present I am not 
admitting anything except what is necessarily true” (AT VII, 27; CSM II, 18). Descartes 
describes the benefit of this attentive exercise in the Synopsis, as earlier seen,  as 
“enabling the mind to distinguish without difficulty what belongs to itself, i.e., to an 
intellectual nature, from what belongs to body” (AT VII, 12; CSM II, 9; emphasis added.) 
Descartes means here by “necessarily true” what is inseparable (divelli nequit) from how 
 
32 Wagner (2014, 78) draws a similar point, but describes the meditator’s reasoning as only 
“psychologically” persuading. It seems, however, that something else is going on in here than a mere 
psychological quirk. Cf. Carriero 2009, 80. 
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the meditator conceives herself (cf. the cogito passage). The call for an attentive meditator 
reveals its importance again. Attention – reason and will working together – is the 
requirement for the project’s success, as well as of moral behavior in life, while 
inattention results in error and irresponsibility (Fourth Meditation: AT VII, 60; CSM II, 
41; cf. Christofidou 2013, 40). 
I am, then, in the strict sense only (praecise tantum) a thing that thinks; that is, I am a mind, 
or intelligence, or intellect, or reason – words whose meaning I have been ignorant of 
until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind 
of a thing? As I have just said – a thinking thing (res cogitans). (AT VII, 27; CSM II, 18.) 
The meditator finally comes to the conclusion that she exists as a thinking and 
cognising thing, a cogito being.33 Recognising that she exists and she thinks, the meditator 
appears to possess reality. However, if we read the earlier establishing of the meditator’s 
existence as an inference (or some other derivation) from her thinking, this part would 
include puzzling repetition. If the meditator derives her existence from thinking, would 
not she have an answer to her question of what her nature is? She is something that 
thinks. Likewise, the revelation that she thinks would come twice, once with cogito and 
once with the inquiry of her nature. The next four paragraphs seem to go nowhere by 
reading the cogito passage as deriving existence from thinking, merely clogging the 
narrative (cf. Broughton 2002, 109 & 121; see also M. Wilson 1978, 72). In contrast, the 
passages provide a smooth progression by viewing the inquiry of the meditator’s nature 
as affirming her thinking by attending to it for the first time, with her existence 
established by means of free agency. The actual dictum of Cogito, ergo sum becomes 
possible for the meditator only after establishing her existence and then discovering that 
she is a being that thinks. (Cf. the Search: AT X, 515–523; CSM II, 409–417). 
The discussion of the nature of the self is important for the cogito to function as the 
Archimedean point. The cogito’s role as a point of levering depends on establishing the 
persuasive strength of the meditator’s intuition and the clear and distinct perceptions it 
provides. The cogito comes in a single flash of intuition, without the meditator being able 
to understand or attend to the nature of the revelation. By further inquiry, discovering 
herself as a cognizing being, the meditator learns to rely on her evident perceptions, at 
least while the layer of denial is practiced. There is also the danger of the meditator, 
either as an Aristotelian, naïf, atheist, skeptic, or a mechanist, misunderstanding the 
existence of ‘I’, relying too much on the pre-meditative obscure and confused 
 
33 I am following Carriero (2009, 81) in describing the cognizing ‘I’ as a cogito being. I view this term 
unburdened by religious and psychological-cognitive connotations of ‘soul’ and ‘mind’. Similarly, the term 
leaves open the ontological category of the ‘I’, whether it is a substance, an attribute, or a mode, of which 
the meditator cannot make judgments yet. 
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conception of the self. The meditator’s understanding of the composition of body and 
soul in the beginning of the inquiry is extremely confused, mistaking the soul for 
something material or physical, and body for something that occupies a space.34 She 
must target the layer of denial on this pre-meditative self until she no longer understands 
her existence as sensory-material. For Descartes, the “mind, or intelligence, or intellect, 
or reason” is not like wind or fire, nor is it what animates a living thing (the first principle 
of life) as in the Aristotelian tradition (see chapter 3.1.1; cf. ST I, Q.75, a.1).35 
However, unlike how it is often viewed (e.g., M. Wilson 1978, 72; Carriero 2009, 82–
83; Wagner 2014, 80), I do not consider this discussion establishing the meditator’s 
essence yet.36 Throughout the passages, Descartes never mentions essence, with the 
discussion regarding the nature (natura) of herself.37 The difference between these terms 
might seem innocuous, yet there is evidence that Descartes does not consider them 
wholly synonymous (e.g., Comments: AT VIIIB, 347–348; CSM I, 297). Nature is 
something that I can clearly perceive belonging to something (what is necessary to or 
inseparable from it), whereas essence (essentia) is what makes something what it is. Essence 
individuates, whereas nature does not.38 The meditator is not yet in a position to make 
metaphysical conclusions or essential claims. She might not have a full account of her 
being, instead possessing only a partial picture, and wonders whether there is something 
more. (Cf. the Fourth Replies: AT VII, 219; CSM II, 154–155. See also the Synopsis: 
AT VII, 12–13; CSM II, 9; Christofidou 2013, 41).39 
 
34 Principia II, §13 &14 (AT VIIIA, 47–48; CSM I, 228–229): “The terms ‘place (loci)’ and ‘space (spatii)’ 
[…] do not signify anything different from the body which is said to be in a place”. Descartes does not 
think of space as a container, viewing space and body as identical. Cf. Christofidou 2013, 23, note 25. 
35 Cf. Cunning 2007, 125; 2010, 70–74. See also Frankfurt 2008, 163–164; Menn 1998, 247; Broughton 
2002, 124–125. According to Cunning, even after the cogito passage, the meditator often perceives the self 
only dimly and obscurely, being therefore in a position to doubt her existence. Though I agree with him, 
later on I advance a view that besides viewing herself obscurely, the meditator can also doubt her existence 
by losing attention from self-awareness. 
36 Carriero is correct in describing the meditator’s question of what she is as a request for an answer to the 
Aristotelian “What is it?” question (2009, 82). However, it is natural to read the Aristotelian question as 
part of her earlier understanding of soul and body, whereas when she reduces the questionable aspects of 
her existence, she is not trying to describe what makes her what she is but what she cannot separate from 
herself (AT VII, 27; CSM II, 18). 
37 The title is also “The nature (natura) of the human mind, and how it is better known than body”. 
38 Aristotelian comparison: man’s essence is “a rational animal”, yet laughter is necessary for being a man. 
39 According to Christofidou, nature is what can be clearly understood as belonging to the knowledge of 
a thing, while essence is what belongs to a thing. The corresponding passage in the Discourse goes “I knew 
I was a substance whose whole essence or nature is simply to think” (AT VI, 33; CSM I, 127). Principia I, 
§8 (AT VIIIA, 7; CSM I, 195) discusses the nature of the mind in relation to the mind-body distinction. 
See also the Fifth Meditation (AT VII, 64; CSM II, 45): “When […] I imagine a triangle, […] there is […] 
a determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle…” Descartes then does often talk of nature and 
essence as at least closely connected (and with a triangle, they appear to be the same). Nevertheless, I 
suggest that the use of ‘nature’ is less metaphysically committal and conclusive than ‘essence’ would be. 
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We also saw earlier that the meditator only concentrates on the aspects she perceives 
to be the case, suspending judgment on everything else. Descartes does not mean it as 
an essential claim when stating that the ‘I’ is “in the strict sense only a thing that thinks”. 
He connects the meaning of the word “only” as “in the strict sense only” instead of 
“only a thing that thinks” in the Letter to Clerselier: “[By ‘in the strict sense only’] I do 
not at all mean an entire exclusion or negation, but only an abstraction from material 
things; for I said that in spite of this we are not sure that there is nothing corporeal in 
the soul, even though we do not recognize anything corporeal in it” (AT IXA, 215; CSM 
II, 276). The meditator likewise surmises that she might even (forte etiam) cease to exist, 
were she to cease thinking.40 With the possibility of Demonic dreaming, the meditator 
separates from the concept of herself everything that fails the test, concentrating on this 
restricted way of seeing the self. She has not yet concluded that her mind’s essence is to 
think, that her thinking is not corporeal, or that her mind is really distinct from her 
body. There could be more to her nature (and there indeed is) than she is yet aware of, 
for all she knows.41 (Cf. Frankfurt 2008, 159–162; Broughton 2002, 124). 
Descartes makes a distinction between understanding (cogitatio) and imagination 
(imaginatio) in the seventh paragraph. The meditator decides to imagine if she is 
something more. She is not a structure of limbs or a thin vapor (pre-meditative picture 
of body and soul) that she earlier imagined.  
And yet may it not perhaps be the case that these very things which I am supposing to 
be nothing, because I am unaware (ignota) of them, are in reality identical with the ‘I’ of 
which I am aware (novi)? I do not know (nescio), and for the moment I shall not argue the 
point since I can make judgments only about things which I am aware of (mihi nota sunt). 
(AT VII, 27; CSM II, 18.) 
It is clear that if the ‘I’ is taken strictily (praecise) in this restricted sense, it is not 
dependent on things the meditator can “invent (effingo)”. For Descartes, imagination is 
not grasping the reality of things but merely “fictitious invention (fingerem)” 
contemplating a “shape or image of a corporeal thing”, either picturing it, piling up on 
it, or excluding from it. This continues the discussion of imaginative picturing from the 
First Meditation, questioning the Aristotelian picture of storing and contemplating 
 
40 There is also another reading of this part. Descartes does not have to mean that the meditator would 
vanish from existence if she ceased to think, but that if the meditator would cease to think, she would not 
be compelled of her existence anymore (Latin desinere means simply ceasing or ending). The reference 
would not be to “I am, I exist” but to “that is certain” when asking “how long?”. What might cease is not 
the meditator’s existence but her cognitive certainty of it.  
41 A person, for Descartes, is a union of mind and body. Hobbes proposes in the Third Replies the cogito 
being to be corporeal and thinking to be motion in the body. Descartes corrects that he did not assume 
the cogito being to not be corporeal, leaving the matter hanging until the Sixth Meditation. He also seems 
utterly repulsed by both suggestions. (AT VII, 172–179; CSM II, 122–126. Cf. Grene 1985, 139–140.) 
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phantasmas in the imagination. The concept of ‘I’ does not derive from this imaginative 
theory, which is closely connected with corporealism and “all such images and, in 
general, everything relating to the nature of body could be mere dreams”. Imagination, 
in fact, might be dangerous at this stage of the inquiry; therefore, the mind “must be 
carefully diverted from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as 
possible”. Yet, as the meditator has reminded herself, at this point it is still too early to 
make any conclusive statements. Imagination may still play a role in cognising myself. 
Indeed, the eighth paragraph lists the powers or abilities of the cogito being. “But what 
am I? A thinking thing (res cogitans). What is that? A thing that is doubting, 
understanding, affirming, denying, willing, unwilling, and also imagining and sensing.” 
Descartes separates imaginans and sentiens with quoque, indicating them to be special cases. 
It is not hard to see why. Imagination and sensation were found flawed and suspended 
in the First Meditation. Since the Second specialises in withdrawing the mind from 
material things – affiliated with the lower cognitive functions – it would be a safe 
assumption that imagining and sensing are inside the circle of suspension. The meditator 
herself is similarly hesitant to include them on the list: “This is a considerable list, if 
everything on it belongs to be. But does it?” She has become aware of having free will, 
capable of doubting, affirming, and denying, and a compelling, perceptive intellect, 
capable of understanding and seemingly getting to the truth, even though she has willed 
not to be deceived (notice that most powers are ones assigned to the will, emphasising 
the role of free agency for realising the cogito). She is just as cognitively certain of these 
as she is of her existence. (AT VII, 28–29; CSM II, 19; translation modified.) 
Nevertheless, it is also the same ‘I’ who “imagines many things even involuntarily” 
and “is aware of bodily things that come as it were (tanquam) through the senses” (AT 
VII, 28–29; CSM II, 19; emphasis added). Even if the materials present for her 
imagination are chimeras, the “power of imagination” is something real and belongs to 
her cognition. Imagination is something she is capable of, whatever it turns out to be. 
Similarly, even though actual sense perception would require a real object to be sensed, 
the meditator nevertheless is aware of something that is in the vicinity of sensing. 
I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. 
Yet I certainly seem (videre) to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what 
is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is restrictedly (proprie) just this. n this strict sense 
(praecise) of the term it is simply thinking. (AT VII, 29; CSM II, 19. Translation modifed.) 
Descartes is even more delicate with the description of sensation than he is with 
imagination. Imagination is one of the cogito being’s powers, but its role in cognising 
what must be the case remains rather non-existent. It is still more of a nuisance than an 
asset. Sensation resembles imagination in that it, too, has to do with material things, but 
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the question related to it is more challenging. Imagination allows the contemplation of 
a body that is not real (i.e., a horse’s head on a brontosaur’s body) and has enough 
leeway for the possibility of all the material available to it being fabricated. However, 
sense perception, as it is, requires first of all senses and second of all a direct contact 
with a real body to be sensed. The meditator cannot be certain of either at this moment 
in the inquiry. Perhaps she cannot see because she has no eyes or a body to perceive; 
perhaps there is nothing to be perceived either way. Thus, the meditator treats her 
appearing sensory cognition as seeming to see (videre video), restricting the talk on sense 
perception to the mental part of sense experience), likening it to dreamed sensation. Let 
us call this restricted concept of sensation “as it were sensing”.42 
Descartes differentiates between three grades of sensation in the Sixth Replies.  The first 
grade is limited to “the immediate stimulation of the bodily organs by external objects”. 
The second grade comprises “all the immediate effects produced in the mind” such as 
perceptions of pain, hunger, and colour, which arise from the “union and as it were 
intermingling of mind and body”. The third grade comprises the judgments “occasioned 
by the motion of these bodily organs”, which is not sensory but solely intellectual, in 
the strict sense. (AT VII, 436–438; CSM II, 294–295. Translation modified.) Comparing 
“as it were sensing” to these three grades, the aim is not only to question the first grade 
of bodily sensation but also to pull apart the second grade of embodied rudimentary 
sensations from the third grade of purely mental judgment. Of course, the issue is still 
left rather vague in the paragraph in question. I see this as intentional. The meditator is 
not aware of mental perception as judgment before analysing the piece of wax at the 
end of the Second Meditation, and mind-body union comes available only by the 
discussion in the Sixth. The meditator’s suspension would most likely break if Descartes 
delved too deeply into the nature of sense perception. By leaving things vague, he allows 
the meditator to follow her intuition without sacrificing the Cartesian epochē. Just as with 
imagination, whatever “as it were sensation” turns out to be, it is at least something that 
the meditator experiences. (Cf. Carriero 2009, 100–105; Yrjönsuuri 2019, 66–72.) 
5.2. Second Chain of Discovery: The Wax 
The meditator has made much progress in the right direction at the end of the First 
Chain. She has discovered the clarity and distinctness inherent in her certain perceptions 
 
42 Here I follow Carriero’s terminology (2009, 25, 102). Imagination similarly has a bodily and a mental 
part. When the mind imagines, it turns to corporeality, setting off changes in the physiological part of the 
brain (phantasia corporea) (e.g., the Third Replies: AT VII, 181; CSM II, 127).  We should then take 
discussion of imagination as likewise restricted to the mental part. 
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and learned to trust evident intuitions about herself and her powers. She is able to cut 
away from her nature everything on which she suspends her judgment by conceiving 
herself praecise what she is cognitively certain when attended to. This leads her to realise 
that, while the existence of material objects is suspended, her own being carries evident 
reality she cannot doubt when attending it. She can regard all her sensory perceptions 
of corporeality “as it were sensing”, accepting that she experiences something while 
continuing to suspend on really sensing anything.43 (Cf. Carriero 2009, 94–97.) 
Nevertheless, just as at the end of the First Meditation, the meditator’s mind begins to 
wander, and her attention lapses. The seductiveness of the sensory-corporeal world 
leaks back again, making the meditator wonder, why the material reality is more distinct 
than her newly discovered existence as a cogito being. 
But it still appears […] that the corporeal things of which images are formed in my 
thought […] are recognized (agnosci) with much more distinctness than this puzzling ‘I’ 
(nescio quid me) which cannot be pictured in the imagination. And yet it is surely surprising 
that I should have a more distinct grasp of things which I realize are doubtful, unknown 
and foreign to me, than I have of that which is true and known – my own self. (AT VII, 
29; CSM II, 20. Translation modified.) 
The meditator, whether as an Aristotelian, an atheistic skeptic, or a naïf, is still used to 
grasping mind and body with senses and imagination, considering those essential for 
her cognition (cf. Hatfield 2007, 125–126). It would surely be strange if the material 
subject matter of the imagination and sensation was more distinctly recognised than 
what she attends to as cognitively certain. The meditator still finds the cognitive exercise 
supremely taxing, so Descartes decides to change tactics and present the meditator with 
a particular body to experience and experiment with: a piece of wax. 
5.2.1. Wax by Common-Sense 
As I read it, Descartes has the meditator loosen her grip on the exercise, returning 
(momentarily) to the common-sensical context, which following passage addresses: 
[M]y mind enjoys wandering off (aberrare) and will not yet submit (patitur) to being 
restrained (cohiberi) within the bounds of truth. […] [J]ust this once let us give it 
(permittamus) a completely free rein (laxissimas habenas), so […], when it is time to tighten the 
 
43 This reading leaves the meditator in a surprisingly similar position as the Pyrrhonian skeptic. Just as the 
Pyrrhonist assents to the feelings forced upon him by impressions, so the meditator assents to her 
experience of “seeming to see”. 
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reins (reductis), it may more readily submit to being curbed (regi). (AT VII, 29–30, CSM II, 
20. Emphasis added.) 
The passage demonstrates a momentary relaxation of skepticism, releasing the reins on 
the mind to freely follow the senses and to form beliefs. This move is important because 
the meditator is required to contemplate on a particular wax that she can see, feel, and 
hear (not just “as it were see, feel, and hear”). Therefore, at the beginning of the wax 
passage, Descartes must temporarily relax the exercise to put an actual piece of wax on 
the meditator’s “radar”. (Cf. Carriero 2009, 106.) 
Let us consider the things which people commonly think they understand most distinctly 
of all; that is, the bodies which we touch and see. I do not mean bodies in general – for 
general perceptions are apt to be somewhat confused – but one particular body. Let us take, 
for example, this piece of wax (hanc ceram). (AT VII, 30; CSM II, 20. Emphasis added.) 
The wax, just refined from a honeycomb, retains some of the honey’s taste and the 
flower’s scent. It has a distinctive colour, shape, and size and is hard, cold, and easy to 
handle. Rapping it with a knuckle produces a sound. “[I]t has everything which appears 
necessary to enable a body to be known as distinctly as possible.” (AT VII, 30; CSM II, 
20.) Then the meditator takes the wax by the fireplace: 
The residual taste is eliminated, the smell goes away, the colour changes, the shape is lost, 
the size increases; it becomes liquid and hot; you can hardly touch it, and if you strike it, 
it no longer makes a sound. But does the same wax remain? It must be admitted that it 
does; no one denies it […]. So what was it in the wax that I understood with such 
distinctness? Evidently none of the features which I arrived at by means of the senses; 
for whatever came under taste, smell, sight, touch or hearing has now altered – yet the 
wax remains. (AT VII, 30; CSM II, 20.) 
By heating the wax, all the sensible qualities have either disappeared or been altered. 
Nevertheless, it is still the same wax and, more importantly, we can recognise that it is 
the same wax. Now, Descartes is not suggesting that the senses play no role at all in 
recognising the wax as the same wax. We can trace by the senses the changes the wax 
undergoes and should assume that they play at least some role in the story. After all, we 
needed to release the reins of the meditative exercise in order to cognitively locate this 
wax. What the passage demonstrates is that the senses play only a part of that role, and 
that part alone cannot grasp the wax distinctly, grasp what its nature is (harking back to 
the meditator’s view of grasping sensible and corporeal things more distinctly than 
herself as a cognitive agent, knowing better the nature of a body than the nature of a 
mind) (AT VII, 26; CSM II, 17). 
The meditator proceeds to consider the wax by the imagination after considering it 
by the senses. Do we grasp the nature of the wax better by imagining it? She tries to 
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imagine the wax not as a combination of sensible qualities (taste of honey, floral 
fragrance, whiteness, shape, sound) but as a body (corpus), presenting itself in different 
forms than it did a moment ago, concentrating (attendamus) to “take away everything 
which does not belong to the wax”. By focusing, the meditator is left with something 
extended, flexible, and changeable. However, grasping the wax as ‘flexible’ and 
‘changeable’ appears not to be a feature of the imagination; she can grasp the wax as 
capable of immeasurable changes of this kind, yet she is unable to run them all in her 
imagination. The same goes for the wax as ‘extended’, as she would not be making a 
correct judgment about what the wax is, unless she believed it capable of being extended 
in many more different ways than she is capable of imagining. “I must concede that I 
do not imagine what this wax is (quid sit haec cera), but perceive it with the mind alone. (I 
am speaking of this wax in particular; the point is even clearer with regard to wax in 
general).” (AT VII, 30–31; CSM II, 20–21. Emphasis added. Translation modified.) 
We should pause here, because these passages are quite complex. Taking away 
“everything which does not belong to the wax” should not be understood as sensory 
qualities not belonging to the wax at all, because the meditator is not yet in a position 
to conclude so (although, it is Descartes’s considered view that “materially false” 
sensations – such as colour, sound, and coldness – do not; cf. chapters 6.1.3, 6.2.2). 
Instead, just as earlier with herself, the meditator should consider the wax in a restricted 
sense (praecise), narrowing the focus on what is inseparable from it. Here, Descartes 
makes the meditator gradually “tighten the reins” on the suspension of judgment, 
starting with sensory apprehension of the wax, moving to the wax by imagination and 
concluding with perception of the wax by reason alone. The proceeding imitates the 
First Meditation exercise, beginning with skeptical consideration of the senses, followed 
by a similar consideration of imagination, and finally of reasoning itself. At face value 
the conclusion that grasping the nature of the wax must be by “mind alone” seems quite 
abrupt, but we must keep in mind that the meditator has earlier established the three 
ways of reaching real things (senses, imagination, and reason). By elimination, the nature 
of the wax cannot be reached by the first two; thus, only reasoning remains. It is also 
important to notice that while the suspension is being tightened, the meditator has not 
left the common-sense thinking (as a reference to the particular piece of wax 
demonstrates). However, the common-sense attitude she is in is somewhat restrained; 
she has begun to concentrate on different aspects of the wax, similarly to the First 
Meditation’s skeptical reduction. Descartes is, thus, gradually removing the importance 
of senses and imagination from the meditator’s understanding of the wax. 
[T]his wax which is perceived by the mind alone […] is of course the same wax which I 
see, which I touch, which I picture in my imagination […]. And yet […] the perception I 
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have of it44 is a case not of vision or touch or imagination – nor has it ever been, despite 
previous appearances – but of purely mental scrutiny […]. (AT VII, 31; CSM II, 21.) 
The mental exercise allows the mediator to separate those facets that are not 
important for perceiving the wax, like vision, touch, and imagination, and concentrate 
on those that are. Sensitive and imaginative features (colour, shape, size, taste, smell, 
sound…) do not constitute the nature of a body as a body but are something extra, so 
those aspects need not be focused on. Even if I considered that my senses are working 
properly and my sensory cognition was not erroneous (i.e., I was awake and not 
dreaming), those senses are limited in grasping how things actually are. They do not 
make the contribution in the distinct grasp of a body as we think they do. “[Mental 
scrutiny] can be imperfect and confused, as it was before, or clear and distinct (clara & 
distincta) as it is now, depending on how carefully I concentrate on what the wax consists 
in.” (AT VII, 31; CSM II, 21.) By gradually tightening the suspension and narrowing the 
focus, the meditator is able to mentally perceive the wax clearly and distinctly.45 (Cf. 
Carriero 2009, 106–107, 109–110 & 112–113.) 
5.2.2. Wax in the Cartesian Epochē     
In the next few paragraphs, Descartes begins to bring the meditator back to the full 
suspension of judgment by the Cartesian epochē. The transition begins by a quick return 
to the common-sense views and a deliberation on the mental difficulty of the suspension 
in the thirteenth paragraph. “I am amazed at how prone to errors (errores) my mind is.46 
For although I am thinking about these matters within myself […] nonetheless […] I 
am almost tricked by ordinary ways of talking.” (AT VII, 31–32; CSM II, 21. Translation 
modified.) The common way of describing her perceptions is confusing and misleading 
her, almost forcing the habitual opinions back into her considerations.  
We say that we see the wax itself, if it is there before us, not that we judge it to be there 
from its colour and shape; and this might lead me to conclude without more ado that 
knowledge of the wax comes from what the eye sees, and not from the scrutiny of the 
mind alone. But then if I look out of the window and see men crossing the square […] I 
normally say that I see the men themselves, just as I say that I see the wax. Yet do I see 
 
44 The French indicates activity: “ou bien l’action par laquelle on l’aperçoit… (or rather the act by which it is 
perceived)”. 
45 Of course, to be able to tighten the reins again, one must not have them relaxed too wide. Part of the 
discussion of the wax must fail to measure up to the highest standards the mind can set to itself without 
giving up on the meditative exercise completely. The contextual distinction between actions of life and 
investigation of the truth is again crucial. 
46 French adds “faiblesse, et de pente qui le porte insensiblement dans l’erreur (weak and prone to error)”. 
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any more than hats and coats which could conceal automatons? I judge that that they are 
men. (AT VII, 32; CSM II, 21. Emphasis added.) 
Looking outside the window in the common-sense attitude, the meditator can see 
shapes wearing hats and coats, taking from this that she sees humans. However, as all 
she sees are accessories (the hats and coats) and not the humans themselves underneath, 
her perception is based on a judgment that human beings are under the garments. 
Similarly, when she thinks she sees the wax, all she sees are colour, shape, and size, 
things which, like hats and coats, seem accessory to the wax itself. Just as in the case of 
the shapes outside, her initial view of grasping the wax by the visual capacity turns out 
to be mistaken. Instead, she judges the wax to “be there” based on certain evidential 
clues. Her grasp of the wax is the work of the capacity of judgment. 
[O]ne who wants to achieve knowledge (sapere) above the ordinary levels (supra vulgus) 
should feel ashamed at having taken ordinary ways of talking as a basis for doubt. So let 
us proceed, and consider on which occasion I perceived (percipiebam) what the wax was 
(quid esset cera) more perfect and evident. Was it when I […] believed I cognized (cognoscere) 
it by my external senses, or at least by what they call the ‘common’ sense47 – that is, the 
power of imagination? Or is my cognition more perfect now, after more careful 
investigation of what it is (quid ea sit) and of the means by which it is cognized?  (AT VII, 
32; CSM II, 21–22. Translation modified.) 
By establishing the power of judgment having a role in the sensory process, we can 
better assess how we perceived the wax clearly and distinctly just a moment ago. As 
discussed, bodily sensations fulfil clear perception, but not distinct, because they are 
associated with unnoticeable, spontaneous judgments of “coming from things outside 
ourselves” we habitually make on them. Imagination, by contrast, does not fulfil either 
one. (See chapter 3.4.1. Cf. Alanen 2003, 66; Clarke 2003, 66–67.) 
[W]hat distinctness was there in my earlier perception? Was there anything in it which an 
animal could not possess? But when I distinguish the wax from its outward forms – take 
the clothes off, as it were, and consider it naked – although my judgment may still contain 
errors, at least my perception now requires a human mind. (AT VII, 32; CSM II, 22.) 
However, we can concentrate on the clarity of sensory awareness by narrowing our 
attention to only what is strictly contained in the perception and separating what is not.48 
This way, we can remove the accessory qualities, ‘take off the clothes’ so to speak, and 
 
47 Linking imagination with the concept of sensu communi (integrating data from the five specialized senses), 
Descartes can connect the “ordinary” views with the Aristotelian framework (either in the naïve or the 
more sophisticated form).  
48 Cf. Principia I, §66 (AT VIIIA, 32; CSM I, 216): “[Sensations…] may be clearly perceived provided we 
take great care in our judgments concerning them to include no more than what is strictly contained in 
our perception – no more than that of which we have inner awareness”. See also Alanen 2003, 66, note 
54; Broughton 2008, 191. 
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perceive the things unadorned – as what necessarily belongs to them. The motivation 
for such a restriction is again the separation between the everyday viewpoint and the 
philosophical investigation and the desire to gain knowledge beyond the ordinary levels 
of perceiving the world.49 The example of clothed automatons outside the meditator’s 
window demonstrates that it is possible to raise doubt over what the senses reveal by 
those ordinary levels (just as it is possible to question their reliability by occasional 
sensory errors). Nevertheless, this is unadvisable for the meditative project. The 
common-sense view must be again fully suspended, and the meditator is required to 
operate in the restrained scope of the Cartesian epochē. 
What does Descartes mean by perceiving the wax with the human mind? We recall 
from earlier that Descartes had left the nature of “as it were sensing” intentionally vague. 
The meditator was not yet in a place to conclude judgment having to do with sensation 
in her previous analysis of her “seeming to see” things. Now, however, she can discern 
her sensation of a body to include not only a mental part of sensation but (mental) 
judgment as well. Her earlier understanding of grasping the wax by her senses and 
imagination (working as a unifying common sense) was not much different from an 
animal’s grasp of the same wax, operating mostly on the embodied first and second 
grade of sensation. This ‘ordinary level’ understanding is unsatisfying, insufficient to 
base science on or to refute the skeptical arguments raised thus far. The meditator 
discovers through Cartesian epochē a way to perceive a body distinctly by detaching from 
corporeality and focusing on the aspect of sense-experience belonging strictly to the 
mind alone; that is, the power of judgment as the third grade (which properly speaking 
is not sensory but intellectual). Even if this capacity would contain errors (the wax is 
not located ‘outside of her’ at all) making such a judgment is only possible by possessing 
a freely active human mind. (AT VII, 437–438; CSM II, 295. Cf. Carriero 2009, 117–119.)  
The train of thought is concluded in the fifteenth paragraph, where the wax exercise 
is contrasted with the restricted concept of the meditator’s self as a cognising mind.  
But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (So far, remember, I am not 
admitting that there is anything else in me except a mind.) What, I ask, is this ‘I’ which 
seems to perceive the wax so distinctly? Surely my cognition (cognosco) of my own self is 
not merely much truer and more certain than my cognition of the wax, but also much 
more distinct and evident. For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, 
clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. (AT VII, 33; 
CSM II, 22. Translation modified.) 
Even if the wax does not actually exist, even if what the meditator “sees” is not the wax 
at all, even if the meditator had no eyes to see in the first place, when she thinks she 
 
49 Interestingly, Descartes uses the term sapere here, instead of cognoscere or scire. 
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“seems to see” she must exist as a cognising being. She is not merely a passive recipient 
of “as it were sense-experience” but an active agent of her own cognitive acts, judging the 
wax to exist based on vision, touch, imagination, or any other reason. Just as in the 
earlier cogito passage, discovering herself freely authoring her own thoughts 
demonstrates her own existence with clarity and distinctness, whether those thoughts 
referred to anything located outside of her or not.50 (Cf. Christofidou 2013, 99.) 
[I]f my perception of the wax seemed more distinct after it was established (innotuit) not 
just by sight or touch but by many other considerations, it must be admitted that I now 
cognize (cognosci) myself even more distinctly.51 This is because every consideration 
whatsoever which contributes to my perception of the wax, or of any other body cannot 
but establish even more effectively the nature of my own mind. But […] there is so much 
else in the mind itself which can serve to make my notion (notitia) of it more distinct, that 
it scarcely seems worth going through the contributions made by considering bodily 
things. (AT VII, 33; CSM II, 22. Translation modified.) 
By considering things “located outside” ourselves, we can also become aware of 
ourselves in a clearer and more distinct fashion. However, since the target is discovering 
understanding above ordinary levels of senses and imagination, concentrating merely 
on bodily things is hardly worth it. By suspending all of one’s judgments on the existence 
of bodies, one is capable of unraveling the boundaries of understanding and discover 
the preconditions of cognition (cf. chapter 1.2.) 
Thus, the Second Chain reaches an answer to the earlier puzzle: The nature of one’s 
mind is actually grasped more clearly and distinctly than the nature of material bodies. 
The meditator even comments in the sixteenth paragraph that she has “finally got back 
where she wanted” (AT VII, 33–34; CSM II, 22). Perceiving corporeality is not strictly 
speaking (non proprie) the work of the senses and the imagination but of the intellect 
alone – of being understood (intelligantur). One should be careful though not to read too 
much into this statement. The predicament seems to make perception of bodies wholly 
the function of the intellect, going against the direct realist view with which I have been 
reading the Meditations (see chapter 1.1), but this would be a hasty conclusion. 
Descartes’s inclusion of non proprie clearly intends these lines to be read in the restricted 
praecise sense in which nothing is included in the meditator’s self that is non-evident 
(which the roles of sensation and imagination still are). This way, her perception of her 
own mind is more evident and easier to achieve than anything else. (AT VII, 34; CSM 
II, 22–23.) The meditator still learns more about her (thinking) nature than about the 
nature of corporeal entities in the discussion of the wax. 
 
50 “[W]hen I see, or I think I see (I am not here distinguishing the two).” AT VII, 33; CSM II, 22. 
51 French has “plus nette et plus distincte” and at the end of the sentence “plus d’évidence, de distinction et de netteté”.  
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Much has been accomplished by the end of the Second Meditation. The meditator 
has become more accustomed to the suspension of judgment and has begun to trust 
her own persuasive intuition, viewing its results as cognitively certain. She has 
discovered her own existence as an actively free agent to be indubitable when being 
attended to. She has been able to clarify, with the help of the wax experiment, this 
intuitive grasping to be the work of clear and distinct perception and to locate this as 
the work of her own active intellect and power of judgment instead of sensory or 
imaginative capacities. She has also made progress with understanding the nature of 
bodies, compared to the nature of her own active mind, by experimenting with the wax. 
She still has work to do to grasp the essences of body and mind, but she is already on the 
right path.52 (Cf. AT VII, 13; CSM II, 9.) 
Despite the meditator progressing with the meditative exercise, she still somewhat 
struggles with maintaining her suspension of judgment. Due to this difficulty, a 
hesitation on the suspension with an alteration in the proceeding, including partly letting 
go of the full suspension, follows both in the First and the Second Meditation. The 
conclusion to fully suspend judgment in the First due to reasons for doubt balancing 
reasons for belief is followed by the return of habitual opinions and the experiment of 
imagining the Demon to keep them in line. The successful analysis of the meditator’s 
‘I’ in the Second is followed by worries about the sensory-material bodies being 
perceived clearer and more distinct and the experiment of perceiving the wax to 
demonstrate that this is not the case. The difficulty carries over to the end of the Second 
Meditation: “But since the habit of holding on to old opinions cannot be set aside so 
quickly, I should like to stop here and meditate for some time on this new knowledge I 
have gained, so as to fix it more deeply in my memory.” (AT VII, 34; CSM II, 23.) The 
habitual opinions are still strongly impressed in the meditator’s mind, easily diverting 
her attention from the cognitive exercise, and because of this, suspension of judgment 
is still exceedingly tiresome.53 Like the First, the Second Meditation ends with a call for 
more meditation and a requirement for supplementary concentration on the reasons for 
 
52 Wagner (1995; 2014, 86–102, 107–116) reads the wax passage as the meditator discovering her mind’s 
essence, and by the same token its actual existence, with an experiential discovery of the cogito, constituting 
“psychological certainty” of the two. I agree that this sort of persuasive certainty is part of the 
metaphysico-epistemological task of getting the meditator from internally compelling C&D perception to 
the externally grounded metaphysical certainty. However, I view that the meditator must feel the cognitive 
certainty actually grasping some truth, and disagree that the meditator would already discover the mind’s 
essence with a C&D  perception, and that she would not have the initial certainty of her existence before 
the wax passage. Cf. Cunning 2010, 97–98, note 53. See also Forsman 2019.   
53 Cf. Principia I, §73 (AT VIIIA, 37; CSM I, 220): “Our mind is unable to keep its attention on things 
without some degree of difficulty and fatigue; and it is hardest of all for it to attend to what is not present 
to the senses or even to the imagination.” See also ibid, §66, §68, §70 (AT VIIIA, 32–34; CSM I, 216–
218); Cunning 2010, 101–102. 
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doubt and suspension (fixing them in memory). The additional meditation on the 
reasons for doubt becomes especially important for the beginning of the Third 
Meditation, which calls into question all the progress made in the Second by the return 
of the Third Level of doubt and the Deceiving God/Imperfect Nature scenario. With 
this, the progression of the first three Meditations follows Descartes’s procedure of 
nothing being known with absolute certainty before cognising God’s existence. 
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6. Third Meditation I: Existence, Mathematics, and God 
In the Second Meditation, the meditator operated inside the hypothesis of a bodiless 
dream, created with the layer of denial. This led to her directly discovering her existence 
and free activity as a thinking being. She learned to trust her intuition, especially the 
cognitive peak of her perception at its clearest and most distinct. The assent-compelling 
nature of this perception allows her to recognise cognitive certainties that are more 
evident than the claims she put forward in the First Meditation. She feels confident 
enough in these cognitive certainties at the beginning of the Third Meditation to lay 
down an epistemic truth rule: Whatever is perceived very clearly and distinctly is true. 
Now, she can begin to build the metaphysical foundation of her cognition. 
However, in order to build the foundation, the meditator is required to answer the 
two remaining Agrippan problems. That her intuitive certainties are indubitable, 
evident, clear, and distinct does not guarantee that they are true, and if they are to be 
true, their truth should emerge in a way that is not circular in nature. The Third 
Meditation, then, reinstates the layers of doubt that were temporarily substituted by the 
layer of denial in order to analyse the meditator’s epistemic nature. The results of the 
Second Meditation chains of discovery are specifically estimated against the Third Level 
of doubt: one’s potentially imperfect nature either as a theist or an atheist.  
Compared to the previous two, the Third Meditation narrative is again a bit different. 
Its most famous contents are the two causal arguments for God’s existence, but the text also 
includes a lengthy preliminary discussion on the truth and falsity of ideas as modes of 
thought. This discussion leads to addressing God’s existence for the first time, by the 
actual infinity included in the idea of God. The meditator next begins to wonder anyway 
whether her free agency could be greater than she acknowledges and whether she could 
possess or potentially possess all the perfections she ascribes to the idea of God, 
including the ability to keep herself persisting through time. This leads the way to 
address God’s existence for the second time by the causal relation of her existence to 
God’s existence. 
The Third Meditation structure is, then, as follows: 
Introduction: Recap of the results from the previous Meditation and the general truth rule 
Return of Level 3: Questioning the cogito and mathematics 
Preliminary Discussion: Classification of ideas 
Causal argument 1: Idea of God and God’s existence for the first time 
Conclusion 1: God exists and is the cause of my nature’s innate idea of him 
Alteration: My free agency could be greater than assumed 
Causal argument 2: Existence of ‘I’ and God’s existence for the second time 
Conclusion 2: God exists and is the cause of my existence and nature 
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The Third Meditation’s narrative, like the First’s and Second’s, is intricate and even 
confusing in places. The causal arguments for God’s existence are some of the most 
challenging content in the Meditations, largely due to their heavy reliance on Scholastic 
metaphysics. The dissection is even more important because of this difficulty for 
understanding how the cognitive exercise is meant to flow in the Third Meditation. 
I have decided to separate the Third Meditation’s analysis into two chapters because 
of its length. In this first chapter, I analyse the preliminary discussion of ideas as modes 
of thought and the First Causal argument for God’s existence (paragraphs 1–22). 
6.1. Preliminary Discussion: Ideas as Modes of Thought and Most 
Common Mistake 
The beginning of the Third Meditation might appear auxiliary to the rest at first glance. 
Even the Meditation’s title is simply De Deo, quod existat (Considering God, that He 
exists). The Synopsis similarly describes it as having “explained quite fully enough” 
Descartes’s principal argument for proving God’s existence (AT VII, 14; CSM II, 10). 
However, the chain of argumentation for God’s existence does not begin before the 
thirteenth paragraph, exactly one third of the way into the text. What is this preliminary 
discussion meant to accomplish, and why was it placed here? 
Descartes did not mean the titles of the particular Meditations to be wholly 
representative of the content but to mark certain key points he wants people to notice 
(AT III, 297; CSMK, 172–173).1 The Synopsis actually gives us a fairly good hint about 
the motives and placement of the preliminary discussion. “But in order to draw my 
readers’ minds away from the senses as far as possible, I was not willing to use any 
comparison taken from bodily things” (AT VII, 14; CSM II, 10). The preliminary 
discussion is still part of the exercise to draw the mind away from the senses; however, 
it is also more than this. With the return of the Third Level of doubt, even the 
meditator’s intuitive and deductive reasoning is once again in doubt, meaning she 
cannot trust either the previously discovered cognitive certainties or mathematics (cf. 
chapter 3.4). What she can do is consider the different modes of thinking she 
experiences, her ideas, inside the Cartesian epochē, suspending her judgment on them 
being either true or false. The meditator is to concentrate in the preliminary discussion 
on her internally experienced ideas, bracketed from their truth value, allowing her to 
 
1 The Sixth Meditation title is De rerum materialium existential, & reali mentis corpore distinction (Considering the 
existence of material things, and the real distinction of mind and body), both topics being argued early on 
in two of the twenty-four paragraphs (AT VII, 77–80; CSM II, 54–55). Cf. Carriero 2009, 359. 
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first, categorise them into different classes and second, recognise their differing amounts 
of objective reality related to their content. Analysis of these topics enables the causal 
arguments for God’s existence and would not be possible before the Second Meditation 
progress on her cognitive nature. 
The task of the Third Meditation is far from easy. Descartes aims to prove that 1) 
God exists, 2) is the cause of the meditator’s nature (as its creator), 3) is the cause of her 
existence (as the preserving power that created her and keeps her in existence), and 4) 
is not a deceiver. This proof should also provide an external metaphysical ground for the 
meditator’s internal certainties, and, by the cognitive exercise, is possible only by 
material covered in previous parts of the meditation.2 Descartes is all in and the stakes 
are high. Now it comes down to the cards he has dealt for the meditator. 
6.1.1. General Truth Rule 
The Third begins by resetting the meditation and recapping the previous exercise. 
I will now shut my eyes, stop my ears, and withdraw all my senses. I will eliminate (delebo) 
from my thoughts all images of bodily things, or rather, since this is hardly possible, I 
will regard all such images as vacuous, false and worthless. I will converse with myself 
and scrutinize myself more deeply; and in this way I will attempt to achieve, little by little, 
a more intimate knowledge of myself. I am a thing that thinks; that is, a thing that doubts, 
affirms, denies, understands a few things, is ignorant of many things, wills (volens), does 
not will (nolens), and also (etiam) which imagines (imaginans) and senses (sentiens)… (AT 
VII, 34; CSM II, 24. Translation modified.) 
The meditator lists all the agencies she recognises in herself, including the primary 
powers of will (doubt, affirmation, denial) and intellect (understanding), as well as the 
additional powers of imagination and sensation, separated by etiam. The role of these 
additional powers remains unclear, but they are part of her capabilities if considered 
praecise as aspects of understanding. 
[F]or as I have noted before, even though the objects of my sensory experience and 
imagination may have no existence outside of me, nonetheless the modes of thinking 
(cogitandi modos) which I refer to as case of sensory perception and imagination, in so far 
as they are simply modes of thinking, do exist within me – of that I am certain (certus). 
(AT VII, 34–35; CSM II, 24.) 
The meditator has made much progress during the meditative exercise and genuinely 
no longer finds it so obvious that the external world exists (at least in the philosophical 
 
2 Proof 4) is then expanded in the Fourth Meditation (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14). See chapter 7.3.2. 
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context). Nevertheless, despite the amount of progress, eliminating the images of bodily 
things from her mind altogether hardly seems possible. Thus, for the first two 
paragraphs, she withdraws the mind from the senses by the layer of denial, used in the 
Second Meditation discoveries. 
In the second paragraph, the meditator tries to draw some general conclusions from 
the results of her exercise thus far. Her previous meditation was successful in two ways: 
1) She gained something which, for all purposes, appears to reach the truth (a piece of 
reality) and is certain, and 2) she learned to use her native cognitive faculties well and 
trust her intuition. (Cf. Carriero 2009, 128.) She considers the list of abilities just 
mentioned as consisting of “everything I truly know (scio)” or at least “everything I have 
so far discovered that I know (scire)”. Just as she is certain that she is a thinking thing, 
would she also know what is required for her to be certain about anything? Such a 
criterion of truth could potentially then allow her a simple way to recognise the difference 
between real and false. The meditator recognises that “[i]n this first item of cognition 
(cognitione) there is simply a clear and distinct perception (clara & distincta perceptio) of 
what I am affirming (affirmo)”. Perceiving something clearly and distinctly appears, then, 
to provide her with such a criterion, seemingly allowing her to lay down the infallibility 
of clarity and distinctness as a general truth rule: “Whatever I perceive very clearly and 
distinctly is true” (AT VII, 35; CSM II, 24; translation modified). 
Many commentators have been eager to take Descartes at his word and consider 
C&D as the infallible and indubitable criterion of truth, capable of reaching certainty 
and knowledge in their fullest sense (e.g., Gueroult 1953; Kenny 1968; M. Wilson 1978; 
Broughton 2002; Della Rocca 2005). This reading appears to be supported later in the 
Third Meditation when Descartes seemingly stacks the deck in favour of cogito or clear 
and distinct foundationalism by stating that not only is the clear and distinct cogito certain 
but so are such intuitively perceived mathematical truths as 2+3=5 (AT VII, 36; CSM 
II, 25). With the list of things the meditator thus far “truly knows”, Descartes even uses 
the verb scire instead of cognoscere, taken to imply them counting as scientia. 
I consider such readings hasty, often interpreting Descartes by the internalist 
perspective (albeit not in every case). In fact, the meditator is not yet ready to admit the 
infallible nature of clarity and distinctness. “[T]his would not be enough to make me certain 
of the truth of the matter if it could ever turn out that something which I perceived with 
such clarity and distinctness was false” (AT VII, 35; CSM II, 24; emphasis added). Even 
when stating the general truth rule, the meditator is careful, admitting that she now 
“seems (videor)” capable of laying it down as an epistemic rule. The meditator will test 
this general rule in the next two paragraphs, seeing if it can survive the ultimate trial by 
setting it against the Third Level of doubt. Unawareness of her origin and nature calls 
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into question even her most persuasive and evident perceptions; thus, her intuitive cognitions 
are not absolutely certain and could be false. She has reached persuasio but not yet scientia.   
Descartes understands truth as a metaphysical conformity-relation, so it is not 
enough for the meditator to declare intuitive and evident perceptions to be generally 
true. She must demonstrate their reliability. Thus, the meditator’s expression of the truth 
rule appears more like pondering at this stage.3 The topic is especially relevant for how 
Descartes’s deals with atheism. If evidently clear intuition were the guarantee of truth – 
if truth were the result of an infallible cognitive capacity that everyone possesses – the 
atheist meditator would get off the hook way too easy. This relates not only to the 
atheist’s cognition of mathematics but likewise to the atheist’s cognition of her 
existence.4 Descartes demands a metaphysically firm ground for all true epistemic claims. 
Descartes’s project, as stated, is epistemically externalist, with God’s existence and nature 
verifying the external reliability of clarity and distinctness.5 (Cf. chapter 3.4.) 
6.1.2. Existence and Mathematics: Theological Doubt Reinstated 
After being tempted to conclude that anything she perceives very clearly and distinctly 
is true, the meditator contrasts this dictum with her earlier accepted pre-meditative 
certainties. She remembers there to have been numerous other things she previously 
thought to be fully certain and manifest (material bodies and everything else 
apprehended by the senses) only to realise they were doubtful. However, she now 
recognises that the mistake was to do with a habitual belief (consuetudinem credendi) of there 
being objects external to herself, resembling the modes of her thought.  
[What I perceived clearly was] that the ideas, or thoughts, of such things appeared before 
my mind. Yet even now I am not denying that these ideas occur within me. But there 
 
3 Despite using scire in the beginning of the Third Meditation, Descartes indicates the state to be 
cognitio/persuasio (AT VII, 35–36; CSM II, 24–25). Describing absolute knowledge by cognising the 
existence of God in the Fifth Meditation, Descartes adds perfecte in front of scire (AT VII, 71; CSM II, 49). 
Cf. the Second Replies (AT VII, 141; CSM II, 100). 
4 Carriero (2009, 341–343), while distinguishing cognitio and scientia and emphasising the requirement for 
the knowledge of God’s existence to reach the latter, insists that the meditator reaches proper certainty 
that she exists. While I do agree that with persuasio we can momentarily obtain a grasp of how things truly 
are, Carriero’s reading indicates that the atheist meditator could reach proper certainty of her existence. 
5 Della Rocca (2005, 18–19) likewise describes Descartes’s project as externalist but in a different way. For 
Della Rocca, Descartes is an externalist regarding the justification of current C&D perceptions, as this sort 
of perception gives us knowledge “even without ‘checking up’ on the perception and realizing that C&D 
ideas in general must be true”. However, this description overlooks Descartes’s attempt to demonstrate 
the reliability of C&D. If Descartes is this sort of externalist, the demonstration is superfluous because 
C&D would be reliable as a matter of fact. My reading explains Descartes’s demonstration while still 
describing him as an epistemic externalist. 
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was something else which I used to assert, and which through habitual belief I thought I 
perceived clearly, although I did not in fact do so. That there were things outside me 
which were the sources of my ideas and which resembled them in all respects. Here was 
my mistake; or at any rate, if my judgment was true, it was no thanks to my perception.6 
(AT VII, 35; CSM II, 24–25.) 
Even if her judgment was true and there are external sensory-material bodies, her belief 
was not the result of clear perception and correct use of her will but of a mere habit. 
It seems easy to read the above passage in support of the ‘veil of ideas’ interpretation 
of Descartes. (see chapter 1.1). I would suggest avoiding such an attempt. The meditator 
does not state that her thinking of things is not due to a direct external source nor that 
there are no such idea-resembling external things (which would still be difficult to 
swallow for an Aristotelian meditator). Even if there are, her belief, while correct, was 
not thanks to cognitive clarity but instead was blindly made. This continues the criticism 
of pre-meditation habitual naïve realism from the First Meditation and sets up the later 
critique of the Resemblance theory. The passage also follows Descartes’s Fourth 
Meditation comments on the correct use of one’s free judgment: It is better to suspend 
judgment than to choose blindly and be lucky, as relying on luck in epistemic matters is 
a grave misuse of the will and a moral fault (AT VII, 57–61; CSM II, 40–42; cf. chapters 
3.3.4 and 4.4). What the passage indicates is the meditator’s commitment to the 
Cartesian epochē. She is beginning to fully suspend her judgment on the external existence 
of the objects she perceives, considering them merely as modes of her thought.  
After the comparison to her previous sensory-corporeal views, the meditator 
contrasts the cogito-like cognitive states with her previous mathematical reasoning in the 
fourth paragraph. This follows the previously assumed certainties of the First 
Meditation, in which a foundational basis was first sought in empirical and, then, in 
mathematical/rational principles. Interestingly, the simple and universal things, taken to 
be certain after the painter analogy, are not mentioned here. I take the reason to be their 
assumed connection to external reality, whose existence has now been genuinely 
suspended, while arithmetic principles are not so clearly connected with externality.  
The meditator ponders whether she was in a similar cognitive peak when she 
concluded that 2+3=5. After all, it was so secure for her that the only reason it became 
open for doubt was that “it occurred to me that perhaps some God could have given 
me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident” (AT 
VII, 36; CSM II, 25). The meditator’s statement is less firm here than it was in the First 
Meditation, with the long-standing opinion of an omnipotent God replaced with a vague 
 
6 The French adds “ce n’était aucune connoissance que, j’eusse, qui fût cause de la vérité de mon jugement (it was not 
because of any awareness I possessed which caused the truth of my judgment)”. 
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reference to “some God (aliquem Deum)”. This replacement has been taken as evidence 
for placing mathematical reasoning on equal footing with the cogito (e.g., Grene 1999, 
567–568). Indeed, this appears to be the meditator’s initial conclusion as well: 
[W]hen I turn to the things themselves which I think (arbitror) I perceive very clearly (valde 
clare percipere), I am so convinced by them that I spontaneously declare: let whoever can 
do so deceive me, he will never bring it about that I am nothing, so long as I continue to think I am 
something; or make it true at some future time that I have never existed, since it is now true 
that I exist; or bring it about that two and three added together are more or less than five, or anything 
of this kind in which I see a manifest contradiction. (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25. Emphasis added.) 
Not only would the cogito be cognitively certain but so would be all clear and distinct 
mathematical truths. With later remarks on the “slight” and “metaphysical” reason for 
the doubt in question, this passage has likewise been read to confirm that the Deceiving 
God scenario was always meant as a hypothetical and less-than-serious supposition and 
that mathematical and rational truths were never really in doubt (Olson 1988; Grene 
1999, 567–569; Secada 2013, 205–207). 
I have two critical remarks on these readings. Firstly, there is clearly something off 
about mathematical reasoning sharing an equal cognitive status with the cogito. Why, if 
this was the case, did the meditator not already reach an evident cogito-like moment when 
considering mathematics in the First Meditation? Why did mathematical cognition not 
work as an Archimedean point?7 One possible answer is that the meditator’s grasp of 
mathematics was initially habitual rather than clear and evident, like it is now. 
Nevertheless, cognitive certainty of mathematics is still post-reflective, whereas with the 
cogito it is intuitive and self-evident. This does hint at a difference between cognising 
one’s existence and nature and cognising evident mathematics. Indeed, a close reading 
of the Latin raises further suspicion: “[V]el forte etiam [nunquam efficient] ut duo et tria 
simul juncta plura vel pauciora sint quam quinque... ([O]r perhaps even [can never make it so] 
that two and three added together are more or less than five...”) (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 
25; translation modified). 
Secondly, it is often missed that the meditator is clearly slipping in and out of her 
cognitive peak during this fourth paragraph. She enters the paragraph while in the 
cognitive peak, viewing her clear and distinct perceptions to be transparent and 
obviously coming to the truth, despite a previous thought of “some God” tricking her.8 
 
7 The topic has been discussed amongst others by Gueroult (1953, 51–52), Broughton (2002, 175–186), 
Lennon & Hickson (2013, 20–21), Brown (2013, 33–36), and Schüssler (2013, 162). However, while 
considering the cogito more certain and compelling than mathematics, they all consider the cogito to be “fully 
certain”. I suggest that the cogito is more certain and convincing than mathematics without being permanent 
scientia. I argue for this view in chapter 7.3.1. 
8 The reference to “some God” is likely an amalgamation of all the deception scenarios (the imperfect 
nature due to divine or mundane origin and the Demon). Cf. the cogito passage in the Second Meditation 
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However, when she considers her preconceived notion of “the supreme power of 
God”, her attention is redirected from the matter, she loses the cognitive peak, and her 
confidence vanishes by the realisation of the still remaining room for doubt. “I cannot 
but admit that it would be easy for [God], if he so desired, to bring it about that I go 
wrong even in those matters which I think I see clearly with my mind’s eye” (AT VII, 
36; CSM II, 25). Attending to the clearly perceived matters again produces another 
cognitive peak and makes the meditator so convinced (persuadeor) as to spontaneously 
declare that no matter who deceives her, her existence, and perhaps even her ability to 
conduct correct mathematics, will remain true. However, at the end of the paragraph, 
the meditator must admit that as long as she is ignorant of her origin, there remains 
reason for doubt and, therefore, she seemingly cannot be absolutely certain of anything. 
Since […] I do not yet even know for sure whether there is a God at all, any reason for 
doubt (dubitandi ratio) which depends simply on this supposition is a very slight (tenuis), 
and so to speak, metaphysical one. But in order to remove even this slight reason for 
doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and if 
there is, whether he can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this (hac enim re ignorata),9 it 
seems (videor) that I can never be fully certain (plane certus) about anything else. (AT VII, 
36; CSM II, 25. Translation modified.) 
The meditator cannot possess full certainty on what she perceives as long as reason to 
doubt remains. Thus, the meditator is required to examine the origin of her cognitive 
nature to reach knowledge in its fullest sense (scientia); that is, whether or not God exists 
as the creator of her native cognitive abilities and whether or not God could have 
created those abilities to fall short from grasping how the world truly is. This marks the 
return of the Third Level of doubt, putting in question again all of the progress made 
in the Second Meditation. The meditator’s cognitive peak may come apart from reality; 
thus, none of her compelling clear and distinct perceptions might be true.10 
Truth, as stated, is not an intrinsic or formal property of our thought for Descartes 
but a metaphysical conformity relation between our thoughts and reality. The meditator 
does assume that her cognition at its peak reaches how things are, because she takes the 
occurring clear and distinct perception to be true. However, at this point, she cannot be 
 
(AT VII, 24; CSM II, 16): “some God, or whatever I may call him… (aliquis Deus, vel quocunque nomine illum 
vocem)”. Translation modified. 
9 The French emphasises knowing God’s existence and nature: “car sans la connaissance  de ces deux vérités”. 
10 Clear and distinct perception being put into doubt is indirectly brought up in the Second Replies (AT 
VII, 144; CSM II, 103): “[O]nce we have become aware (cognitum) that God exists it is necessary for us to 
imagine that he is a deceiver if we wish to cast doubt on what we clearly and distinctly perceive.” I take 
the issue to be that, even before knowing that God exists, we can doubt clear and distinct perceptions. Cf. 
the Seventh Replies (AT VII, 460; CSM II, 309): “[T]here will be nothing which we may not justly doubt 
so long as we do not know that whatever we clearly perceive is true”. See also the Discourse (AT VI, 39; 
CSM I, 130). Contra, e.g., Owens 2008; Secada 2013, 205–207. Cf. Cunning 2010, 64. 
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metaphysically certain that it really does. It does seem that she arrives at the truth each 
time she perceives clearly and distinctly, but she does not grasp why this would be so. 
Truth for Descartes is not reduced to indubitability, so even if momentarily there are no 
good reasons to doubt the veracity of one’s clear and distinct perception, it might still 
turn out to be unreliable and failing to grasp the truth (i.e., clear and distinct perception 
is not true just because it is clear and distinct; cf. Della Rocca 2005, 3.) The imperfect 
nature scenario of the Third Level ensures that even if I did clearly and distinctly grasp 
the truth, I can doubt not only the memory of being certain but also the truth itself 
when the moment passes. One may be able to glimpse the truth with persuasio, but this 
does not get us far in Descartes’s eyes. As stated, we must confirm the second-order 
reliability of our cognition to be completely certain that we have reached the truth.11  
One could argue against this reading, because the meditator still seemingly puts the 
doubt in less firm terms than she does in the First Meditation, but here we must 
remember the cognitive state that the meditator is in. She has not yet reached a strongly 
compelling clear and distinct cognition in the First and, thus, is more convinced by 
God’s possible passive deception. Now, in the midst of still occurring cognitive peak, 
this reason feels more tenuous and “metaphysical”. Descartes is quite happy to describe 
the doubt as metaphysical in other places, meant to be separated from practical life and 
moral certainty and aimed for metaphysical knowledge (Metaphysico sciendi) (e.g., AT VI, 
38 & VII, 460, 475; CSM I, 130 & II, 308, 320). However, while being so strongly 
compelled, such doubt can seem an unnecessary trifle.12  The importance of the 
metaphysical doubt is recalled again when the cognitive peak fades, and the meditator 
cannot but admit that she might not reach the truth.13  
Another reason for this less-than-firm-phrasing is that the doubt is also theological: 
Even God’s existence is still in question, giving reason to doubt the meditator’s divine 
origin. Yet, as we recall from the First Meditation, the atheist meditator is likewise 
incapable of escaping the core scenario: The atheist’s nature could just as well be so 
imperfect that she could be mistaken when she thinks she has correctly counted that 
2+3=5 or cognised her existence as inseparable from her thinking. Following the strong 
maxim from the First Meditation (as long as reasons for doubt remain, assent should 
be withheld), the meditator cannot claim to know any of the results of the Second. The 
doubt is raised about the origin of one’s nature instead of one’s reasoning, so the reasons 
 
11 Cf. chapters 3.4 and 4.3; Carriero 2009, 129–13, 341–342. See, though, note 4. 
12 Not that the peak is morally certain; cognitive certainty is stronger than what suffices for everyday life.  
13 Descartes claims in certain paragraphs that some perceptions, such as one’s existence, cannot be open 
to doubt (e.g., AT VII, 38–39, 145–146; CSM II, 27, 104) but these can be seen as referring to a strongly 
persuasive perception at the moment it is perceived. See AT V, 178 & VII, 460, 546; CSM II, 309, 373 & 
CSMK, 353. Cf. Cunning 2007, 120–122. 
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for doubt are not erased by reason itself being questionable. Thus, this strongest form 
of doubt is not self-defeating.14 
The way Descartes slips the meditator (and us readers) in and out of this cognitive 
peak is masterful (see also Carriero 2009, 346). The meditator is to view the cogito-like 
cognitive states to be more certain, evident, and obvious than any of her previous 
“certainties” she considered in the First Meditation (access to reality runs through the 
senses, there are external objects which resemble her sensory perceptions, mathematical 
truths hold up). Yet, she cannot be certain that even this cognitive peak reaches reality. 
Cognising well by our native faculties might not be the same as cognizing truly.15 
6.1.3. Ideas as Modes of Thought 
The beginning of the Third Meditation is rather devastating. None of the cognitive 
certainties grasped in the Second Meditation might add up to true cognition, and now 
even clearly and distinctly cognised mathematics is questionable. Worse, it seems that 
other evidently perceived rational principles, such as non-contradiction, may also be 
false, as implied by the meditator’s statement that “anything else of this [cogito-like] kind 
in which I see a manifest contradiction” is cognitively certain when perceived clearly 
and distinctly, but not known fully certain.16 The most radical skepticism, endorsed by 
the axiomatic horn of Agrippa’s trilemma, is still too strong to overcome.17  
What can the meditator do if she can neither trust her cognitive abilities to reach the 
truth, even at their peak, nor rely on even the simplest demonstrations? Even if the first 
of the Second Meditation’s double successes is questioned, the second success remains. 
The meditator is still more learned about her native cognitive powers and their use, 
 
14 Contra, e.g., Frankfurt 2008, 40; M. Wilson 1978, 35–37; Olson 1988; Christofidou 2013, 33–36. 
15 Compare with the imagined reality of Descartes’s “objection of objections”. Letter to Clerselier, 12 
January 1646 (AT IXA, 211–213; CSM II, 274–275). Popkin has famously read this passage as 
demonstrating the deep hidden skepticism lurking in Descartes’s system, one he feared but was never able 
to overcome (2003, 167–168). My reading reveals that the meditative exercise not only realises but 
emphasises this possibility, being able to defeat it with scientia of God’s existence and non-deception. See 
also the so-called Angel scenario (AT VII, 145; CSM II, 103; chapter 7.3.3).  
16 The principle of non-contradiction can also be included in the ultimate doubt through the doctrine of 
created eternal truths: God can make contradictories true, therefore, they might be true. However, even 
here the scenario should be read as “we don’t know if God has made contradictories true and we are just 
not aware”. God’s creation is not bound by our rational limitations and, thus, there can be a gap between 
our clear and distinct perceptions and the reality created by God. Contra Olson 1988, 407. Cf. Wagner 
2014, 3 & 63. See also chapters 3.4.1 and 4.3. 
17 The special nature of the cogito then overcomes the Demon but does not clear the Imperfect Nature 
scenario. Thus, it can be recalled into doubt in the beginning of the Third Meditation. The same applies 
to all clear and distinct cognition. 
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granting her trust in what she intuitively perceives. What she can do is consider her 
thoughts while suspending judgment of their truth value. Such consideration is meant 
to take care of certain preliminary matters before her examination on God’s existence 
and nature occurs. “First, however, considerations of order appear to dictate (videtur 
exigere) that I now classify my thoughts into definite kinds, and ask which of them can 
properly be said to be the bearers of truth and falsity” (AT VII, 36–37; CSM II, 25).18 
In the French version, the sentence above is greatly expanded: 
“So I may have opportunity of examining this without interrupting the order of 
meditation which I have decided upon, which is to start only from those notions which 
I find first of all in my mind and pass gradually to those which I may find later on, I must 
here divide…” (AT IXA, 29.19)  
The expansion may indicate that some of Descartes’s readers felt the Latin text to be 
bumpy and difficult to follow in these parts (see Carriero 2009, 132). It is not hard to 
see why. One would expect Descartes to have immediately proceeded to the arguments 
for God’s existence after the meditator’s proclamation of examining the topic. Indeed, 
Clerselier specifically asked for Descartes’s intentions with this preliminary discussion 
in a 1649 letter. Descartes had this to say on the matter: 
My purpose was to base the proof of the existence of God on the idea or thought which 
we have of him, and so I thought that I was obliged first of all to distinguish all our 
thoughts into certain classes, so as to observe which are those that can deceive. By 
showing that not even chimeras contain falsehood in themselves, I hoped to forestall 
those who might reject my reasoning on the grounds that our idea of God belongs to the 
class of chimeras. (AT V, 354; CSMK, 376.) 
The causal arguments work out God’s existence from our understanding of God; thus, 
Descartes is first required to discuss how our thinking about objects – our ideas and 
their contents – functions. The first order of business is to consider the ideas, or more 
precisely their contents, as merely modes of our thought, separate from whether they 
correspond with any reality. This way, we can potentially discover which parts of the 
cognitive process can be in error or bear falsity. 
Some of my thoughts are as it were (tanquam) the images of things, and it is only in these 
cases that the term ‘idea’ is strictly appropriate – for example, when I think of a man, or 
a chimera, or the sky, or an angel, or God. Other thoughts have various additional forms: 
thus when I will, or am afraid, or affirm or deny, there is always a particular thing which 
 
18 Just like with the cogito, the deceiver could not deceive the meditator about her thinking a certain thing, 
regardless of the thing’s truth value, if she perceives the thing in question clearly and distinctly. 
19 Et afin que je puisse avoir occasion d’examiner cela sans interrompre l’ordre de méditer que je me suis propose, qui est de 
passer par degres des notions que je trouverai les premières en mon esprit à celles que j’y pourrai trouver après, il faut ici que 
je divise toutes… See chapter 1.2.2 for the order of meditation. 
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I take as the object of my thought, but my thought includes something more than the 
likeness (similitudinem) of that thing. Some thoughts in this category are called volitions or 
affects (voluntates, sive affectus), while others are called judgments. (AT VII, 37; CSM II, 25–
26. Translation modified.) 
One should be careful not to take the meditator’s description of ideas as “images of 
things (rerum imagines)” too literally. Descartes is very critical of an overly imagistic theory 
of ideas, as his critique of cognition based on similitude in the Resemblance theory 
shows (e.g., AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27). What the meditator describes here as “idea as an 
image of a thing” is the idea’s content: What it is an idea of (sun, horse, brontosaurus, 
etc). Whether read as an Aristotelian, a naïf, or an atheistic skeptic, she is used to 
thinking of her cognition as imagistic, confusing the nature of content as likenesses. 
Descartes makes a distinction in the Fourth Replies between the word ‘idea’ taken 
materially, as mental operation (thought, volition), and idea taken formally (formaliter), as 
“representing (repraesentant)” something, that is, the content of said mental operation 
(thought sun, wished pot of gold) (AT VII, 232; CSM II, 163). Comparably, a bust of 
Pallas materially is just marble, whereas formally it represents Pallas specifically. It is by 
this formal understanding that ideas act “as if images of things”. (Cf. Nadler 2006, 87; 
Sinokki 2015, 122–125.) I discuss this distinction more later. It suffices for now that the 
meditator draws a distinction between the mental operation and the content the 
operation is directed at – considering the latter as ideas in a strict (proprie) sense.20 
The meditator attempts in the sixth paragraph to locate the source of falsity and 
error in these modes of her thinking. Taking ideas strictly as mental content “considered 
solely in themselves” so they “do not refer (referam) to anything else” they cannot strictly 
speaking be false. “[F]or whether it is a goat or a chimera that I am imagining, it is just 
as true that I imagine the former as the latter.” Moving to the broader understanding of 
ideas, the same goes for volitions and affects; whether or not the things I desire are 
immoral or even non-existent, it is true that I desire them.  By the process of elimination, 
the only remaining source of error, for which the meditator must keep her guard up, is 
in judgments. “And the chief and most common mistake which is to be found here 
consists in my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things 
located outside me.” (AT VII, 37; CSM II, 26.) 
However, how can the above be true? Does not Descartes uphold truth as a strong 
metaphysical conformity relation between thought and object? Should not there then be 
falsity in the content of my ideas? Indeed, in a later passage of the Third Meditation, 
 
20 In the Preface, Descartes points out a further ambiguity in ‘idea’, separate from the other two: The word 
can also be taken objectively (objective) as “the thing represented (re repraesentata)” by the operation (AT VII, 
8; CSM II, 7). These senses are often confused with each other. I am following Sinokki (2015) in 
distinguishing them as three separate senses. 
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Descartes discusses material falsity (falsitas materialis) occurring in ideas, when their 
content expresses something that has no being of its own as real and positive (such as 
coldness). (AT VII, 43–44; CSM II, 30; cf. Fourth Replies: AT VII, 233; CSM II, 163.) 
Likewise, one way to read the meditator’s imagistic comment on ideas is that ideas are 
“as it were images” because of the relationship they have to their object – they connect 
thinking with reality (Brown 2008, 198). How can ideas in the strict sense then not be 
“bearers of truth and falsity”? The content of our thoughts should be true or false 
independently from our affirmations or denials. 
This issue has puzzled many commentators. The passage has been read so that 
Descartes runs together and conflates the notions of falsity and error. Judgment, as we 
have seen earlier, is a collaboration between the mind’s perceptive and willing powers 
(see chapter 3.3). What Descartes should say is that the ideas perceived may be false, 
but error arises not in perception but in affirmation (M. Wilson 1978, 141). Another 
way to read the statement is to view it as applying only to non-relational ideas (Newman 
2008, 139–140). A third way is to consider “ideas” in the passage taken broadly as mere 
affective mental items, their truth or falsity not being an issue. Issues of falsity arise only 
when “idea” is taken in the strict sense, as relating to something real (Brown 2008, 198). 
I see this puzzlement coming from misunderstanding Descartes’s description of 
different meanings of ‘idea’ and from failing to take the meditative exercise seriously. 
Descartes’s description of ideas materially is an umbrella class – any mental item is an 
idea in this broad understanding. A loose slab of marble and a bust of Pallas share the 
same material composition by the previous analogy. In a similar vein, ideas, so to speak, 
are composed of my thinking, whether they were thought acts, volitions, affections or 
representational content. (Cf. Sinokki 2015, 122, 125.) It is also clear that the meditator’s 
discussion of “ideas considered solely in themselves” refers to the formally taken 
content ideas, as the following example of thinking of goats and chimeras demonstrates 
My suggested reading of the passage is that we are to treat the content of the ideas 
inside the Cartesian epochē; that is, consider them merely as modes of our thought – as 
mere experience – and suspend judgment on whether they “stand for” or “represent” 
anything outside of our thinking, bracketing their truth value. “If I considered just the 
ideas themselves as modes of my thought, without referring them to anything else, they 
could scarcely give me any material for error” (AT VII, 37; CSM II, 26). We tend to 
spontaneously judge the contents of our thoughts, volitions, and affects as referring to 
“things outside us” – consider them not as modes of thought but as modes of extension 
(see chapters 3.4.1, 5.2.2). Judging ideas to have external equivalents, when they might 
not, runs the risk of assenting to falsehood. Suspending judgment on the real existence 
of the content objects of my thought and leaving open the question whether they 
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correlate with external reality or not, protects me from falsity and from erring in my 
thinking. Whether or not there are goats with the head of a lion, or brontosauruses with 
the head of a horse, it is nevertheless the creature that I am thinking of or imagining at 
the moment, that is, it is the content of the current idea I am having.21 
What Descartes calls falsity in the strict or formal (formalem) sense occurs, by the above 
reading, only in judgments – it is the case of coming to a false conclusion, like 
performing an invalid inference (AT VII, 43; CSM II, 30). This formal falsity differs 
from the earlier mentioned material falsity, when there is a possible error in the content 
itself, a sort of a false premise (“I seem to feel cold on its own, but what the content 
‘cold’ might be is just the absence of the feeling of warmth”). One can make a valid 
conclusion from a false premise, but it does not take us any closer to the truth of the 
matter.  One should remember that falsity for Descartes is the negation or privation of 
truth – it is the lack of some crucial piece, making us participate (participare) in non-being 
(e.g., AT VII, 54–55, 60–62; CSM II, 38, 42–43).22 Thus, both formal and material falsity 
is the absence of something that should be there – the possible lack of equivalent reality 
in the formal sense or the missing of proper content in the material sense. (See also AT 
VII, 231–235; CSM II, 162–164.23 Cf. Sinokki 2015, 119.) 
Reading the above passage on the lack of falsity in the ideas from the viewpoint of 
the genuine cognitive exercise of Cartesian epochē clarifies why “ideas in themselves” are 
not bearers of truth and falsity. Taking them as merely modes of one’s mind severs the 
possible connection to “things outside us” and makes sense of the claim that formal 
falsity takes place only in judgments.24  
6.1.4. Chief and Most Common Mistake: Natural Impulses vs. Clear 
and Distinct Perception 
The meditator concludes that from the restricted view of the cognitive exercise, her chief 
and most common mistake (praecipuus & frequentissimus error) has been to judge that her ideas 
 
21 Introspective transparency is possible but only by worked out C&D perception of thoughts. Cf. Paul 2018. 
22 It should be noted that negation and privation are not synonymous terms. A negation is me lacking 
something which I could have but which does not belong to me by my very nature (e.g., a tail with 
humans). A privation is possessing an impaired nature, deprived of something which one ought to have 
(e.g., sight with humans). This distinction becomes very relevant in relation to God’s potential deception. 
See the Fourth Meditation: AT VII, 56 & IX, 43; CSM II, 38–39. 
23 Intriguingly, Descartes refers to Suárez here (DM 9, s.2, §4). I return to material and formal falsity below. 
For the discussion on material falsity, see, e.g., M. Wilson 1978, 110–117; Ariew 2005, 79; 2011, 49; Scholl 
2006, 55–63; Wee 2006.  
24 The reading also questions the formal sense of ideas connecting thinking with reality (e.g., Brown 2008). 
This connection, I argue, comes from them possessing objective reality in relation to their content. See below. 
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resemble (similes) or conform to (conformes) things located outside of herself. Descartes 
explains to Clerselier that by restricting the discussion to the formal experience inside 
the Cartesian epochē, he is capable of forestalling the atheistic objection that the 
meditator’s concept of God would be a chimera. Even chimerical ideas – ideas that 
contain no reality and have no existing equivalents – do not contain falsehood in 
themselves in this restricted experience sense (AT V, 354; CSMK, 376). 
   In the seventh paragraph, the meditator classifies ideas based on apparent origins.  
Among my ideas, some appear to be innate, some to be adventitious25, and others to have 
been invented by me. My understanding of what a thing is, what truth is, and what 
thought is, seems to derive simply from my own nature. But my hearing a noise, as I do 
now, or seeing the sun, or feeling the fire, comes from things which are located outside 
me, or so I have hitherto judged. Lastly, sirens, hippogriffs and the like are my own 
invention. (AT VII, 37–38; CSM II, 26.) 
Ideas can be considered to belong to three different classes: innate (innatae), so born with 
me; adventitious (adventitiae), so seemingly coming from foreign objects separate from 
myself (what I “as it were sense”), and invented (factae), so created by myself.  Ideas would 
then originate from the three sources the mediator previously recognised: the reason, 
the senses, and the imagination. However, this is only what appears (videntur) to her; 
they could just as well be acquired from only one source. She is, after all, still largely 
unaware of her ideas’ true origins. “But perhaps all my ideas may be thought of as 
adventitious, or they may all be innate, or all made up; for as yet I have not clearly 
perceived their true origin” (AT VII, 38; CSM II, 26; cf. AT III, 383; CSMK, 183–184). 
   The change of discussion from the truth and falsity of the meditator’s modes of 
thought to the origins of her ideas may seem somewhat abrupt. However, the distinction 
between innate, adventitious, and invented ideas is crucial for the overall argument 
concerning God’s existence. Descartes expands on the nature of innate ideas and the 
distinction in the Comments: 
I have never written or taken the view that the mind requires innate ideas which are 
something distinct from its own faculty of thinking. I did, however, observe that there 
were certain thoughts within me which neither came to me from external objects nor 
were determined by my will, but which solely came from the power of thinking within 
me; so I applied the term ‘innate’ to the ideas or notions which are the forms of these 
thoughts in order to distinguish them from others, which I called ‘adventitious’ or ‘made 
up’. (AT VIIIB, 357–358; CSM I, 303.) 
Descartes does not consider innate ideas to include only general natures (such as the 
concept of truth) separated from the mind’s ability to think but also the forms of thought 
 
25 The French reads: “étrangères et venir de dehors (foreign and coming from outside)”. 
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content that one is aware of. Even if we consider the content of our experience as 
merely a feature of our thinking, separated from whether it conforms with anything 
existing, we cannot but notice clear differences between that content. An apple that I 
“as it were sense” is clearly different from the concept of an apple that I think about, as 
well as from an imagined apple that I picture to be pink. Descartes’s point is that at least 
some of this experience appears non-malleable by my will and not coming from 
elsewhere but originating as part of my nature as a thinking being. Similar to the painter 
analogy passage in the First Meditation, the meditator recognises certain general and 
universal natures or concepts that shape and form her cognition (the main difference to 
the painter analogy is that the meditator does not consider these natures to be 
necessarily related to anything real anymore; cf. chapter 4.2.3). 
Of course, the features in question have a major part to play in the causal proofs for 
God’s existence, as Descartes points out to Clerselier: “[I had to distinguish] the ideas 
which are born with us from those which come from elsewhere, or are made by us, in 
order to forestall those who might say that the idea of God is made by us or acquired 
by hearing others speak of him” (AT V, 354; CSMK, 376). Whereas the earlier 
forestalling was for a seemingly atheistic objection, this one is specifically directed to 
empiricist and materialist rebuttals. Both Hobbes and Gassendi raise a counter 
argument related to this, and a version of it can likewise be found in Regius’s Broadsheet. 
Descartes stoutly, though not always patiently, denies these objections. (AT VII, 186–
188, 286, 364, VIIIB, 345, 360–361; CSM I, 296, 305, II, 131–132, 199–200, 251–252) 
Awareness of God’s existence is, for him, as native to cognitive beings as thinking itself 
is – an important feature of our innate nature.  
However, the class of ideas the meditator is to concentrate for now on is the 
adventitious one: “[T]he chief (praecipue) question at this point concerns the ideas which 
I take to be derived from things existing outside me: what is my reason for thinking that 
they resemble these things?” (AT VII, 38; CSM II, 26). Her chief and most common 
mistake has been to judge these ideas as resembling things located ‘outside of her’; thus, 
the meditator ponders what made her make such a judgment. Her first conclusion is 
that it seems to be “teaching of nature (doctus a naturâ)”. Additionally, her acquaintance 
with them has shown that, like the seemingly innate ones and unlike the one’s she 
invented, these ideas are not simply dependent on her will but rise in her experience 
involuntarily. “[N]ow, for example, I feel the heat whether I want to or not, and this is 
why I think that this sensation or idea of heat comes to me from something other than 
myself, namely the heat of the fire by which I am sitting” (AT VII, 38; CSM II, 26). The 
most obvious judgment from this, to her, is that the thing in question transmits 
(immittere) to her its own likeness (similitudinem) rather than anything else.  
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Descartes draws a distinction in the ninth paragraph between these teachings of 
nature and what has been revealed to the meditator “by some natural light (lumine aliquo 
naturali)”. The meditator begins to analyse, whether her reasons for believing the 
adventitious ideas being transmitted and resembling external objects have been firm 
enough. She instantly concludes than instead of being meditated and well-thought out, 
like her reasons for doubt, or based on a strongly persuasive conviction, like her 
cognitive certainty of her own existence and nature as a thinking being, these teachings 
of nature seem to be based on a spontaneous impulse (spontaneo impetus). Taking them 
to be true is simply a habit acquired early on by her natural impulses (impetus naturales) 
of sensory reliance, without ever being reflected and meditated on. (AT VII, 38–39; 
CSM II, 26–27.)  
The meditator also recognises that she has “often judged in the past that [the natural 
impulses] were pushing [her] in the wrong direction when it was a question of choosing 
the good” (AT VII, 39; CSM II, 27). She famously gives an example of such pushing in 
the Sixth Meditation: 
“[R]egarding those very things which nature presents to me as objects which I should 
seek out or avoid, and also regarding the internal sensations where I seem to have 
detected errors – e.g., when someone is tricked by the pleasant taste of some food into 
eating the poison concealed inside it.26 […] [W]hat the man’s nature urges him to go for 
is simply what is responsible for the pleasant taste, and not the poison [it knows nothing 
of].” (AT VII, 83–84; CSM II, 58.) 
We have grown accustomed to follow certain native inclinations and habitually trust 
them to be beneficial. However, there can be cases where what nature has taught us 
might be harmful, even morally questionable.27 These impulses are clearly not free of 
error; thus, the meditator cannot trust them in cases of truth and falsehood (i.e., what 
is real and not), either. She then compares them to “what is revealed [to her] by the 
natural light – for example that from the fact that I am doubting it follows that I exist”, 
which “cannot in anyway be open to doubt” (AT VII, 39; CSM II, 27).  
The reference to “natural light (lumine naturali)” is an infamously difficult notion, one 
that gains more prominence in the First Causal argument for God’s existence. As such, 
I will return to this obscure Cartesian doctrine in the analysis of the First Causal 
argument. However, here in the preliminary discussion, the notion of lumine naturali 
 
26 French adds “et ainsi que je suis directement tromé par ma nature (as if I have been directly deceived by my 
nature)”. 
27 See AT XI, 430; CSM I, 376. Cf. Alanen 2003, 198–202; Yrjönsuuri 2019, 70, note 6. In Sixth Meditation, 
the meditator considers a body suffering from dropsy as an example of a distorted nature. Comparing 
dropsy case with madness in the First Meditation clarifies how the distorted nature of insanity fits with 
the non-deceptive nature of God. Cf. chapter 7.3.3. 
Existence, Mathematics, and God 
197 
appears to be nothing more complicated than the intuitive clear and distinct perception, 
as the reference to the Second Meditation cogito passage reveals.28 The comparison, then, 
is between our ordinary common-sense teachings of nature, which, while habitual and 
reasonable, do not appear rationally compelling, and our meditated cognitive peak, 
which is so rationally compelling that it seems to include no room for doubt while being 
apprehended. Both are clearly part of our nature, but only one appears to get things 
right convincingly and reliably (at least, while the metaphysical exercise is still going on). 
(Cf. chapter 2.5.2.) 
Of course, the meditator is quite unequivocal that what is revealed by the natural 
light has no room for doubt at all, which can question my reading of it as the same as 
clear and distinct perception. According to my interpretation, after all, clarity and 
distinctness can be open for doubt, at least reflectively. However, the meditator’s 
confidence can be seen to be referring to a strongly persuasive clear and distinct 
perception at the moment it is perceived. She states herself that “[t]here cannot be another 
faculty both as trustworthy as the natural light and also capable of showing me that such 
things are not true” (AT VII, 38–39; CSM II, 27). We have nothing better at our disposal 
for distinguishing truth from falsehood than our cognitive peak. We are so convinced 
when experiencing such a peak not only that something psychologically “feels” true but 
also that we actually grasp something in reality that we cannot but assent that it is, indeed, 
the case. No room for doubt exists at that moment, which opens up only afterwards, 
when the cognitive peak fades and we reflect on whether what we experienced was 
indeed the truth. We realise by concentrating merely on our own native abilities that we 
do not seem to have anything better and are left to trust this illusive peak experience, 
no matter how faulty it might be.29 Compared to our natural inclinations, we have only 
suspected that it might be in error and have not actually caught it to be in error.30 
The meditator continues the critique of her previous habitual judgments in the 
following three chapters. She realises it does not necessarily follow that the ideas 
originate from things that are separate from her just because they are indeterminable 
to/independent from her will. Her natural impulses seem similarly to oppose her will, 
as the First Meditation made clear when “despite her wishes” the habitual inclinations 
pulled her assent so strongly that she had to invent an imaginary scenario of a Deceiving 
Demon to counter the pull and equalise her will (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). Nevertheless, 
 
28 The reference is to ‘I exist’, not to ‘I think’, as revealed by the emphasis on the free agency of doubting. 
29 The French emphasizes the peak as an active ability by adding “faculté, ou puissance (faculty or power)”. 
30 In the Sixth Meditation, as we gain a better understanding of our nature and God as its author, these 
natural impulses turn out to likewise include at least some truth. However, the genuine teachings of nature 
need to be separated from so-called habitual false beliefs. (AT VII, 77–78 & 82; CSM II, 54 & 56.) I return 
to this topic in chapter 8.1. 
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these impulses are part of her nature, so she might have another power that she is 
unaware of that produces the ideas without having to rely on things “located outside”, 
as she has thought to be the case with dreaming. These ideas, then, could simply be a 
feature of her cognition, just as dreaming is. Likewise, even if the ideas did come from 
foreign sources, it does not follow, either, that they must resemble those things. Indeed, 
she notes having discovered disparity between an object and its idea in many cases, for 
example, in the two ideas of the sun she seems to possess. The senses testify the sun to 
be small, but her innate astronomical reasoning reveals it to be several times larger than 
the earth, and her reason persuades her that the idea that appears to directly emanate 
from the sun itself bears no actual resemblance to it.31 (AT VII, 39; CSM II, 27.) 
This discussion forms the climax of the criticism of Aristotelian epistemic optimism 
and Resemblance Picture of Sensation (RPS) that began in the First Meditation and was 
developed further in the Second (cf. chapters 4.1.2 and 5.1.1). The meditator concludes 
that the reason for her “chief and most common mistake” was threefold: 1) It was a 
spontaneous impulse based on custom and habit of nature, 2) the ideas in question 
appeared impervious to her will, and 3) she assumed the objects she experienced to 
transmit their likeness and not something else. Now, the meditator finds each of these 
reasons to be unfounded and concludes there is no meditated and convincing reason 
for making such judgement. This again lays the groundwork for God’s existence as 
Descartes emphasises to Clerselier: “[T]he reason why I insisted on our lack of certainty 
concerning the convictions that arise from all the ideas which we think come from 
outside was in order to show that there is no single idea which gives such certain 
knowledge as the one we have of God” (AT V, 354; CSMK, 376–377).  
These passages also indicate the meditator’s progress with the exercise. She still 
found herself confidently assenting to “habitual opinions” in the First Meditation, 
considering them “in a sense doubtful” but “highly probable” (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 15). 
Now she realises their hold on her was not based on well-founded confidence or 
compelling reasons but on a “blind impulse” that “there exist things distinct from 
myself which transmit to me ideas or images of themselves through the sense organs or 
some other way” (AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27). She assents to them out of habit rather than 
reliable judgment and does not find them as plausible or reasonable anymore.32  
 
31 This does come across as a rather weak argument and both Hobbes and Gassendi were quick to point 
out that there appears to be only one idea of the sun perceived from different perspectives, just as there 
is only one idea of the tower perceived from different distances (AT VII, 184, 283–284, 363–364; CSM 
II, 129–130, 197–198, 251). Descartes’s point, though, seems to be that since we cannot see or “seem to 
see” the sun at a close distance, the concept of the sun we have through the senses differs significantly 
from the one we can reason to; thus, the case is not the same as with the tower.    
32 This progress later culminates in the Fourth Meditation in which the meditator regards these teachings 
of nature as merely “probable conjectures” (AT VII, 589; CSM II, 41). Cf. chapters 3.3.4 and 4.5. 
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6.2. God’s Existence: First Causal Argument  
The meditator’s analysis of her previous reasons for considering things as ‘located 
outside of herself’ has revealed them to have been rather weak. “In so far as the ideas 
are simply modes of thought, there is no recognizable inequality among them; they 
appear to come from within me in the same fashion” (AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27–28). 
Considering ideas simply as a cognitive feature reveals no recognisable (agnoscere) 
inequality to their origin. Instead of being caused by something foreign and external to 
me, I myself could be their cause, just as I am the cause of my own thinking. Maybe my 
free agency is greater than originally thought, and the ideas are created by my will and 
imaginative power. Or, even if I do not actively invent the said ideas, they might 
originate simply from my own natural disposition and be innate (just as the concept of 
thinking seems to be). As far as I know, I could be causally responsible even for my 
own innate nature by possessing a power I am not yet aware of.33 
The purpose of the causal arguments is to have the meditator recognise that 1) there 
is at least one concept she does not cause (the concept of God) and 2) she is not causally 
responsible for either her nature or her existence. Thus far, the meditator has cognitive 
certainty of her existence, her nature as something that thinks, and that her thinking has 
certain content, regardless of whether the content carries existence outside of her 
thought. The meditator can only use resources that are indubitable at the moment they 
are perceived; thus, the first argument begins from her thinking (she possesses a concept 
of God) and the second from her existence. The First Causal argument aims to prove 
that the idea of God is not invented but innate in a unique way that only God can cause 
that idea. The meditator could cause every other idea including angels, other people, 
even extension and thinking, but not the idea of God. The causal arguments reveal a 
divide between Descartes and his Scholastic predecessors on how we cognise God. For 
the late Scholastics such as Aquinas, our cognition of God (in this life) is limited and 
mediated, not reaching God’s full nature or essence (see chapter 3.1.1). For Descartes, 
we have direct cognitive access not only to God’s existence but also to his nature. (Cf. 
Nolan & Nelson 2006, 105–106; Nolan 2014, 128–130; Carriero 2009, 175–176.) 
The causal arguments for God’s existence, as mentioned in the beginning, are some 
of the most challenging content in all of the Meditations. They were mostly considered 
unconvincing and doomed to failure among contemporaries34 and cause even greater 
 
33 The matter relates to what I call the Principle of Causal Dependence: Whatever exists must have a cause 
for its existence. It also relates to what I call the Principle of Causal Adequacy: The said cause must have 
at least as much “reality” as its effect. See below. Cf. Cottingham 1986, 49; Dicker 2013, 34, 117, 276. 
34 See, e.g., the First Objections (AT VII, 92–95; CSM ÌI, 66–69) and the aftermath of Gassendi’s Counter-
Objections in the Disquisito (Letter to Clerselier, 12 January 1646: AT XI, 209; CSM II, 273). 
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aversion today. Even readers sympathetic to Descartes’s quest typically cannot help but 
feel that things begin unravelling when the proof for God’s existence becomes topical 
(Cunning 2010, 112; Nolan 2014, 127). It is no wonder, then, that several commentators 
have preferred to build the case for Cartesian metaphysical knowledge without having 
to appeal to God’s existence (e.g., Kenny 1968; Cottingham 1986; Della Rocca 2005). 
These attempts, however, come across as questionable more often than not. 
Descartes was clearly very proud of his causal proofs for God’s existence and 
considered them to have conclusively settled the question (cf. the First Replies: AT VII, 
120; CSM II, 85). Therefore, we should not too easily give up on trying to understand 
their content. The importance of God’s necessary existence for knowledge in the scientia 
sense can likewise be seen when considering the driving motivation behind the 
Meditations. The atheistic skeptic would be more than content with the conclusions 
drawn at the end of the Second and the preliminary discussion of the Third. She can 
have cognitive certainty that she exists, thinks, and “as it were” senses many things 
considered as mere features of her cognitive nature. However, Descartes’s intended 
Cartesian scientist, whom he expects the meditator to morph into during the meditative 
exercise, cannot be content with this mere persuasive conviction. It might still just be 
wrongly placed confidence in an erroneous belief, not imperviously certain knowledge. 
Before God’s existence and nature are concluded, we do not know anything in the full 
sense of the word.35 
6.2.1. Principle of Causal Dependence and Principle of Causal 
Adequacy 
Descartes has paved the ground for the path to God’s existence with the preliminary 
discussion and has counted for certain atheistic, empirical-materialist, and Aristotelian 
objections. Now, the tracing of God’s native signature in the meditator’s mental 
landscape can begin. She starts this tracing by discovering an alternative way to study 
the ideas she possesses. “[I]t now occurs to me that there is another way of investigating 
whether some of the things which I possess ideas of exist outside me (extra me existent)” 
(AT VII, 40; CSM II, 27). Descartes clarifies what he means by this other way (alia via) 
in the Letter to Clerselier: “I could not have said ‘there is another way’ (autre voye) if I 
had not first turned down (reietté) all the others and thus prepared my readers to 
understand what I was about to write” (AT V, 355; CSMK, 377; translation modified). 
The meditator has turned down the Aristotelian-empirical way as faulty and based on 
 
35 See chapter 1.2.3. I return to the atheist and the scientist in chapter 7.3.1 Cf. Forsman 2019. 
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custom rather than deep insight, but while ideas as modifications of one’s thinking 
appear to be equal, they differ in regard to the content they represent.36 
“[I]n so far as different ideas represent (repraesentat) different things, it is clear that they 
differ widely. Undoubtedly, the ideas which represent substances to me amount to 
something more and, so to speak, contain within themselves more objective reality (realitatis 
objectivae) than the ideas which merely represent modes or (sive) accidents”. (AT VII, 40; 
CSM II, 28. Emphasis added.)  
The “other way” shifts the discussion of ideas from material and formal to taking them 
objectively as the represented content itself. Ideas considered as modes of the mind are 
caused simply by the meditator’s thought, but considering merely their contents reveals 
them as sort of “reality” inside the mind, possibly requiring external causes. (AT VII, 8 
& 233; CSM II, 7 & 163. Cf. Nolan 2014, 137; Sinokki 2015, 125.) This is a crucial step 
in discovering God’s authorship, since the idea of “a supreme God, eternal, infinite, 
[…] the creator of all things that exist apart from him, certainly has in it more objective 
reality than the ideas that represent finite substances” (AT VII, 40; CSM II, 28). 
The causal arguments depend upon two general principles: Principle of Causal 
Dependence (PCD) and Principle of Causal Adequacy (PCA). The Causal Dependence 
Principle is neither unintuitive nor a big divergence from the historical canon. It merely 
states that everything existing has some cause for its existence. Thus, it is simply a 
rephrasing of the Scholastic ex nihilo, nihil fit and a version of what was known as the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) in later 17th century metaphysics.37 The Causal 
Adequacy Principle, that the cause must have at least as much (reality) as the effect, in 
contrast, appears archaic, obscure, and even bizarre at first hand. However, I argue that 
even this is not the case, and we can see the force behind these assumptions by 
simplifying Descartes’s argument.  
One could question, how the meditator can make assumptions like these. Is she not 
to suspend from everything due to the Third Level of doubt? Yet, her cognitive success 
has revealed that some perceptions include such peak clarity and distinctness that she 
must give her assent. The inherent nature of these perceptions, as previously discussed 
is so strongly persuasive that the meditator cannot doubt them while presently attending 
to them, being intuitive and epistemically self-evident. In the fourteenth paragraph, the 
meditator realizes that both PCD and PCA are among these cognitive peaks. 
 
36 Note that the representation of an apple is simply having a way to think about an apple. Cf. Carriero 2009, 
169, note 2. 
37 PSR was relied on by Spinoza and, especially Leibniz in their respective philosophies: Everything that 
exists, must have a reason for existence.  See, e.g., Melamed & Lin 2020. While Descartes’s PCD is a close 
cousin of PSR, his view of God’s non-motivationally indifferent creation of eternal truths does not fit with the 
general PSR. See chapter 3.4.1. 
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[I]t is manifest by the natural light that there must be at least as much (fr. add. realité) in 
the efficient and total cause as in the effect of that cause. For where, I ask, could the 
effect get its reality from, if not from the cause. And how could the cause give it to the 
effect unless it possessed it? It follows from this both that something cannot arise from 
nothing,38 and also that what is more perfect – that is, contains in itself more reality – cannot 
arise from what is less perfect. (AT VII, 40–41; CSM II, 28. Emphasis added.)  
Natural light, as previously mentioned, is infamously obscure and has garnered 
complicated explanations over the years in relation to the causal arguments. However, 
Descartes explains this notion in relatively simple terms in the Principia: “[T]he natural 
light or faculty of cognition (cognoscendi facultatem) […] can never encompass any object 
which is not true in so far as it is indeed encompassed by this faculty […] in so far as it 
is clearly and distinctly perceived” (I, §30: AT VIIIA, 16; CSM I, 203; translation 
modified). According to this passage, the light of nature or natural light is the very power 
of my thinking by which the C&D cognitive peaks are obtained (see Dicker 2013, 146; 
cf. Hatfield 2007, 156–157). The capacity can also be attained by the cognitive success 
of the Second Meditation even before concluding God’s existence and non-deceiving 
nature: Regardless of what my clear and distinct perceptions turn out to be, I experience 
their peak persuasion whenever I properly use my cognitive powers. This capacity could 
be called ‘natural light’. Descartes once again guides the meditator to follow what she 
intuitively perceives by the seemingly successful use of her cognitive prowess by which 
she already discovered that the principle of non-contradiction is included in her peak 
cognitions (AT VII, 36; CSM II, 25). Now, she discovers causal principles, concluding 
a few paragraphs later: “[t]he longer and more careful[ly] I examine all these points, the 
more clearly and distinctly I recognize their truth” (AT VII, 42; CSM II, 29). 
PCD, as argued, does not require a large cognitive leap. If something exists, it ought 
to have some cause, otherwise it popped out of nothing. However, “nothing” has no 
causal powers and, therefore, cannot be a cause. PCA, despite its apparent abstruseness, 
can be similarly derived. If some existence had something more (power, reality, 
perfection, etc) than its cause, that extra factor would have had to emerge from nothing. 
“Nothing” has no causal powers; therefore, it cannot cause what is incremental in the 
effect (Second Replies: AT VII, 135; CSM II, 97; cf. Nolan & Nelson 2006, 108). 
We should pause here briefly to discuss the relation of causality and skepticism. It is 
good to remember that the skeptical scenarios that feed the meditator’s suspension of 
 
38 Strictly speaking, both a positive (something cannot exist without a cause) and a negative (nothing cannot 
be a cause) principles are at work here. Descartes invokes them both at different places. Later on, Hume 
famously argued that we cannot conclude one of these principles from the other (T I, iii, 3). Some have 
questioned whether Descartes conflates the two (e.g., Dicker 2013, 139–144). However, the meditator 
clearly and distinctly cognises both the positive and the negative principle (AT VII, 164–165; CSM II, 
116). Cf. Christofidou 2013, 97–98; Nolan 2014, 132, note 16. 
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judgment are causal by nature. They all tell a causal story on how my judgment is 
potentially erroneous either due to illusions, dreaming or the origin of my nature by 
divine or mundane means. This relation between causality and my reasons for doubt 
plays a role in the cognitive exercise, especially with the resolution of the Third Level 
doubt. However, this does not mean that the reasons rely on causality in such a way that 
causality cannot be doubted. The causal story in these reasons, specifically in the origin 
of my nature, is vague enough to allow room for doubting even my perception of 
causality. For example, take the Deceiving God/Imperfect Nature doubt. The scenario 
does explain the source of my erroneous nature, but I cannot make stable conclusions 
on how the said causality works or whether there even is such causality due to that 
inherently erroneous nature (cf. Hatfield 2007, 92–93). Nevertheless, if I follow what I 
keenly attend to be the case, I compellingly assent to both PCD and PCA. 
If the thought behind PCD and PCA can be understood, where does the controversy 
on the causal arguments arrive from? The most controversial aspect of the 
argumentation is undoubtedly the further conclusion derived from the PCA: Descartes 
thinks that causal adequacy applies not only to the case of formal effects, with 
everything existing requiring a cause with at least as much formal reality, but also to 
cases of objective reality, with the objective reality of an idea requiring a cause with as much 
formal (actual) or eminent (higher form) reality as is in the idea objectively. The 
discussion here relates to the meditator’s previous notion that reality is scaled. Modes are 
causally dependent on substances, thus, modes have less reality, both formally in 
existence and objectively in the mental content, than substances. This conclusion 
requires no actual substances or modes to exist but can be derived simply from the 
meditator’s concepts. To be a mode is, in part, to be dependent, and to be a substance 
is, in part, to be depended upon. Similarly, an infinite God and the concept of such 
include more reality, both formally and objectively, than a finite substance or its concept, 
this conclusion simply depending upon the meditator’s concepts of infinity and 
finitude.39  (AT VII, 40–42; CSM II, 28–29; Christofidou 2013, 93–97. Cf. chapter 1.1.) 
Why would we think that reality is scaled like this? More importantly, why would the 
causal scaling extend from the world into our mental concepts? The thought of degrees 
of reality has obvious predecessors in both ancient and Medieval thought, from Plato 
and Aristotle to the Scholastic doctrine of a continuous scale of beings running all the 
way to God (cf. C. Wilson 2003, 89–90; Nolan 2014, 134). Yet, even for these traditions, 
Descartes’s formal reality–objective reality causal model seems odd (see Caterus: AT 
VII, 92–94; CSM II, 66–68; cf. Carriero 2009, 185). Comparingly, today we tend to think 
 
39 Of course, modes are ontologically dependent on substances, like finite substances are on God (but not 
on each other). 
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of reality more simply: Something either exists or it does not. For Descartes, however, 
the same existence and reality can come in two distinct ways, as actual beings in the 
world and as concepts in one’s thought, and allow degrees of more or less perfection or 
completeness. The first part is not too foreign even today (think of metaphysics of 
fictional characters) but why would anyone be convinced of the latter (cf., e.g., Hobbes: 
AT VII, 185; CSM II, 130)?  
Firstly, compared to previous traditions, Descartes’s scaled reality is less complex 
and closer to our way of thinking. Reality admits only a three-part scale: modal reality, 
finite substance reality, and infinite substance reality. Secondly, and this is the main 
point, Descartes does not really have to rely on the formal–objective model with the 
causal arguments. In fact, they can be phrased without most of the Scholastic 
argumentative baggage. I will do just this in what follows, diverting the overly Scholastic 
discussion and clarifying Descartes’s argument for God’s existence in simpler terms.40 
6.2.2. Causal Origins of Ideas 
If the argument can be put more simply, why does not Descartes do so? What reason 
there could be to intentionally obfuscate one of the most, if not the most, important 
points of the cognitive exercise? Certain previous parts have demonstrated that while 
the meditator has progressed with the exercise, she still tends to think in empirical and 
imagistic fashion regardless of whether we consider her as an Aristotelian, a naïf, an 
atheistic skeptic, or a mechanist (e.g., AT VII, 37; CSM II, 25–26). Given her empirical 
tendencies, she is likely to assume herself to be the cause of her non-sensory ideas, such 
as that of God, and the critique of the RPS model has made her realise that even her 
sensory ideas might not be externally caused. Thus, she could very well have caused and 
compounded all of her ideas. 
The more obtuse argument is to help the meditator, already skeptical of the 
Resemblance Picture but still mostly engaged in imagistic thinking, dislodge the last 
remnants of her previous views and appreciate the absolute perfection and infinity in 
the idea of God. In the rest of the fourteenth and then in the fifteenth paragraph, the 
meditator exhibits this imagistic thinking by giving sensory based examples of her 
persuasion to the formal–objective model. 
A stone […] which previously did not exist, cannot begin to exist unless it is produced 
by something which contains, either formally or eminently everything to be found in the 
 
40 This is not to say the model is not important for Cartesian metaphysics, just that the causal arguments 
do not rely on it. 
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stone; similarly, heat cannot be produced in an object which was not previously hot, 
except by something of at least the same order of perfection as heat […]. But it is also 
true that the idea of heat, or of a stone, cannot exist in me unless it is put there by some 
cause which contains at least as much reality as I conceive to be in the heat or in the 
stone. […] [T]he ideas in me are like images which can easily fall short of the perfection 
of the things from which they are taken, but which cannot contain anything greater or 
more perfect. (AT VII, 41–42; CSM II, 28–29.) 
The sensory imagistic examples unfortunately tend to confuse the matter more than 
clarify it. Descartes’s contemporaries clearly struggled with the imagistic examples, 
mixing ideas to be literally corporeal images (see Hobbes: AT VII, 179–181; CSM II, 
126–127), and the French edition is riddled with additions and explanations to these 
parts (though, in many cases, without really clarifying anything).41 However, the 
underlying thought is not overly complicated. An idea of a primary quality (e.g., the 
form of the sun) is not the cause of that quality in formal reality. Similarly, a horse-
headed brontosaurus cannot create me or the idea of itself in me, but I can create (an 
idea of) a horse-headed brontosaurus. Still, Descartes cannot just abandon the imagistic 
discussion because of the serious meditative nature of the exercise. The sensory image 
account is risky and allows for misunderstandings, but some misunderstandings are 
unavoidable. Descartes cares more to give enough material for the attentive meditator 
to move away from an imagistic understanding in order to discover the idea of God 
non-imagistically than to avoid misunderstanding and make malignant reading difficult 
(AT VII, 181; CSM II, 128). (Cf. AT VII, 9–10; CSM II, 8; Nolan 2014, 130, 139.) 
Based on the previous train of thought, the meditator concludes that if at least one 
of her ideas includes objective reality in such form that it could not have gained it from 
her formal existence, she could not be the cause of that idea due to PCA. Thus, 
something other than herself would have to exist to cause it. However, if no such idea 
is to be found, she appears to have no convincing argument for the existence of anything 
apart from herself. “For despite a most careful and comprehensive survey, this is the 
only argument I have so far been able to find” (AT VII, 42; CSM II, 19). This exercise, 
then, is the last-ditch effort to secure something more stable than fleeting conviction. 
It is good to notice that the meditator has not progressed any further from her 
cognitive success in the Second Meditation. She is merely applying terms and concepts 
to what she clearly and distinctly perceives in herself. That the ideas and concepts she 
possesses appear hierarchical tells nothing certain of the metaphysical hierarchies 
outside her thought (cf. C. Wilson 2003, 90; Nolan & Nelson 2006, 106). Indeed, as the 
 
41 For example, in the description of objective reality, the French adds “c’est-à-dire participant par representation 
à plus de degrés d’être ou de perfection (that is participate by representation in a higher degree of being or 
perfection)”. Cf. C. Wilson 2003, 89. 
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following five paragraphs argue, the meditator could cause most of her ideas, including 
corporeal nature, angels, animals, and other humans. Descartes relies here on an 
intuitive thought process similar to what was prominent in the First Meditation’s painter 
analogy (AT VII, 19–20; CSM II, 13–14): Invented ideas are formed by taking other 
ideas, or their elements, and compounding them in novel ways. I can create an idea 
representing a horse-headed brontosaurus due to possessing the ideas of a horse and a 
brontosaurus and a capacity to match these together (cf. Fifth Replies: AT VII, 362; 
CSM II, 250). What has changed from the painter analogy, though, is that the meditator 
no longer considers that even the basic and simple elements of these ideas have to be 
externally caused. Her ideas of other humans, animals, and so on represent finite things, 
and she herself appears to be a finite being, so she could cause them by combining 
aspects of the ideas representing herself and extended corporeality. Even ideas of angels 
could be invented by borrowing elements of the ideas representing herself and God, 
because angels represent creatures more perfect than herself but less perfect than God 
(the idea of God here is not perceived clearly and distinctly but more in terms of 
‘limitless’ or indefinite, see chapter 7.1). (Cf. Nelson 1997; Nolan 2014, 133.) 
The same applies even to her clear and distinct ideas of spatial-corporeal nature as 
extension, as she discovered in the wax exercise of the Second Meditation (AT VII, 30–
32; CSM II, 20–21). Despite the idea of her own nature as a thinking being not including 
corporeal notions such as shape, size, position, and motion, these notions are simply 
modes of a finite substance and, thus, can be derived from her or contained in her 
eminently. However, she also notices other aspects of corporeal nature that she only 
has confused and obscure ideas about, such as light, colour, rest, sound, smell, taste, 
heat, and cold. Of these, she is not even certain whether the content they represent is 
accurate or materially false. For example, heat and cold express themselves as separate 
things, whereas one could be merely the absence of the other. The same applies to light 
and darkness or motion and rest. Such ideas do not require a distinct cause from the 
meditator, because, if materially false, they are simply negations and arise from her 
imperfection, and even if they are accurate, they clearly contain so little reality that they 
are difficult to even distinguish from the absence of a thing.42 
The meditator also includes substance, duration, and number as parts of the 
extended nature she has a clear and distinct idea of. As with other aspects of extended 
 
42 A further clarification: Since heat for Descartes is the motion of particles and cold is simply their lack 
of motion, the content of the idea representing cold is materially false as it represents absence inaccurately 
as a distinct “thing”. We can suspect this even before we know whether neither heat nor cold has external 
reality outside of our thinking. In contrast, my idea of a horse-headed brontosaurus, though invented by 
me and most probably without thought-external reality, is not materially false as it accurately represents 
its contents (a horse-headed brontosaurus). Cf. C. Wilson 2003, 92–93. 
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nature, she could have merely borrowed these from her own nature: She perceives that 
she exists at the moment and has done so for a while (at least as long as her clear 
perception endures), that her thoughts are dependent on her as a thinking being, and 
that she can count her various thoughts. Here, for the first time, the meditator describes 
herself to be a (finite) “substance”. Is the meditator making an unjustified metaphysical 
assumption here? By a standard reading of the metaphysical hierarchy, she would be. 
The meditator is not in a position to make metaphysical claims on whether she can 
independently sustain her existence (and indeed, as the Second Causal argument 
clarifies, she actually cannot). Moreover, many have pointed out (e.g., Kenny 1968, 134; 
Dicker 2013, 138–139; cf. Nolan 2014, 137) that modes depend on finite substances in 
a very different way than finite substances depend on the infinite substance: A finite 
substance is not a substance without properties; thus, no finite substance can exist 
independently from modes, whereas an infinite substance can exist independently from 
finite substances (see Principia I, §§60–61: AT VIIIA, 28–30; CSM I, 213–214).43 
However, the meditator may describe herself as a substance in a less metaphysically 
robust way. Instead of assuming herself completely independent, she can take herself 
to be a substance in the sense that her thoughts are dependent on her; they would not 
exist if she, the thinking agent, did not exist. Recalling the wax exercise, the meditator 
recognised that the piece of wax had a degree of independence from its properties 
(shape, size, consistency). Those properties changed, yet it continued to be the same 
wax. Applying this to herself, she notes that she can have various thoughts and ideas, 
yet, endure as the same thinking being. Though she clearly differs from a stone or the 
wax, concepts of substance and mode (such as shape, size, extension, etc) are contained 
in her due to her being a finite substance with a degree of independence.44 (AT VII, 42–
45; CSM II, 29–31.) 
The only idea left is the one representing God. In this idea, the meditator discovers 
objective infinity, independence, and power of such magnitude that the more she 
attends to these aspects, the more she recognises that she alone cannot be the cause of 
the idea. By the PCA, for her to possess this idea, an external source (God), with the 
same magnitude of formal reality, must exist. “[F]rom what has been said, it must be 
concluded that God necessarily exists” (AT VII, 45; CSM II, 31). 
 
43 In metaphysical lingo, there is only a modal distinction between modes and finite substances, while there 
is a real distinction between finite and infinite substances.  
44 The French translation specifically calls back to the wax: “et comme les vêtements sous lesquels la substance 
corporelle nous paraît (and as it were the garments under which corporeal substances appear to us)”. Note 
that the meditator counts extension as one of the modes of corporeal substance, indicating that she is still 
largely confused about substances in the sense of Cartesian metaphysics. Cf. Nolan & Nelson 2006, 110; 
Cunning 2010, 109; Dicker 2013, 138–139, note 25. 
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6.2.3. Idea of God 
It is important to notice that to form the core of the First Causal argument, the 
meditator needs not to rely on the formal-objective model. All it takes from her is to 
recognise that her idea of God represents an actually infinite substance, and that this 
actual infinity in her could be caused only by a substance that is actually infinite (AT VII, 
45; CSM II, 31).45 Distilled from the formal-objective discussion the core argument 
comprises of three clear and distinct steps, with a concluding fourth step:  
1. In me exists an idea that represents an actually infinite being (God) with all perfections 
2. PCD: Something that exists must have a cause for its existence 
3. PCA: The only possible cause for this idea is an actually infinite being 
4. Therefore, an actually infinite God exists 
Step 2, as previously argued, is quite intuitive for the meditator and does not require 
much persuasion to be clearly and distinctly seen. It is steps 1 and 3 that pack the main 
force of the argument and require more work for her to grasp them clearly and distinctly 
(cf. Nolan 2014, 128, 134–135). 
 Step 1 is based on the idea of God being innate in the meditator’s mind. A materialist 
or an atheist could object that we do not possess an idea of God, at least not a purported 
one, and at the very least Descartes would have to argue that we indeed do possess it (cf. 
Hobbes: AT VII, 179–180, 183; CSM II, 126–127, 129). Descartes would hark back that 
anyone who uses the word “God” in a sentence while understanding what they are 
saying, possesses the idea. “[I]f he had any conception corresponding to these 
expressions, […] he knew at the same time what was to be understood…” (Letter to 
Mersenne, July 1641: AT III, 392; CSMK, 185). This ingrained concept of God that has 
nothing to do with sensory material and includes all the perfections Christian 
theologians ascribe to God is a clear deviation from Scholastic thought, in which God’s 
nature can only be cognised in mediate terms (e.g., as a negation or an analogy). Indeed, 
Descartes considers it an improvement that his argument for God’s existence delivers 
us likewise a clear and distinct grasp of God’s nature. The meditator, as discussed, 
requires awareness of not just God’s existence but also of God’s non-deceiving nature 
as the author of her disposition to overcome the Third Level of doubt.46 
However, just because the idea is innate does not mean that it is always consciously 
present. Rather “we have within ourselves the faculty of summoning up the idea” (AT 
VII, 189; CSM II, 132). Descartes clarifies in the Comments that a certain idea, along with 
 
45 It was brought to my attention that God’s actual infinity is, of course, objective reality. What I mean, is 
that we would recognise God’s actual infinity even if it was not part of the formal-objective reality model. 
46 See chapter 3.1.1. Carriero (2009, 168–182) has extensively analysed Descartes’s approach to God’s 
nature compared to the Scholastic tradition of Aquinas. Cf. Nolan & Nelson 2006, 105; Nolan 2014, 130. 
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a capacity for summoning it up, being innate in us means that it exists in us potentially 
(AT VIIIB, 361; CSM I, 305). The idea of God is the clearest and most distinct idea that 
innately exists in us. However, we do not generally notice it because of our tendency to 
rely on sensory material objects. Nevertheless, just as the mind has a capacity to form 
ideas of external material things, it has a capacity (a potential power) to summon up the 
idea of God by concentrated and attentive meditative exercise (see the Second Replies: 
AT VII, 135–136; CSM II, 97; cf. Nolan 2014, 130–131). Because the idea is innate, 
Descartes does not have to argue for the meditator possessing it (presumably no 
argument would manage such a feat). He merely has to help her become aware of it to 
make her discover its contents. 
Of course, as Descartes admits, it is possible that the exercise fails and the meditator 
does not become aware of the clear and distinct idea of God in herself, especially if she 
is lazy or inattentive. Even those who meditate faithfully might experience problems 
here due to the persistence of our sensory imagistic habits. “Some people will perhaps 
not notice [the implicit idea of God in them] even after reading the Meditations a 
thousand times” (Letter to Hyperaspistes, August 1641: AT III, 430; CSMK, 194). 
Innate ideas must be in a sense awakened, turning “the mental gaze” on them by 
repeated and attentive meditation (Fifth Meditation: AT VII, 63–64; CSM II, 44).47 This 
also explains the meditator discovering her own existence and nature before God’s; 
while the latter is metaphysically primary, we cognise the former with less meditative 
effort (see chapter 1.2.2). 
Step 3 is based partly on the PCA but also relies on the way the innate idea of God 
represents infinity. The meditator, as discovered, is capable of inventing all of her finite 
ideas – excluding only the concepts of herself and of thinking, which are transparent to 
her (if perceived clearly and distinctly) and arise from her natural disposition, not 
requiring an external source. An empiricist or an atheist could object that the idea of 
God is formed the same way, from observation of things, hearing others talk of God or 
by simply amplifying various attributes and compiling them (e.g., Gassendi and Regius: 
AT VII, 286–287, 294–295, VIIIB, 346; CSM I, 296, II, 199–200, 205). Descartes’s 
answer is that the infinity of the idea of God is unique in that the meditator cannot attain 
actual infinity by simply augmenting or negating the boundaries of finitude. Instead, her 
understanding of finitude is, in a way, a ‘bounded’ version of her cognition of God’s 
actual infinity. That she is in the first place aware of her own limitations requires her to 
already have some concept of the unlimited. “[M]y perception of the infinite […] is in 
 
47 The Platonic metaphor here should not go unnoticed. The meditator even refers to the process of innate 
ideas becoming transparent as remembering something already known instead of learning something new 
(AT VII, 64; CSM II, 44). Cf. Nolan 2014, 131. For more on innate ideas, see Van De Pitte (1991) and 
Nelson (2008). 
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some way prior to my perception of the finite…” (AT VII, 45–46; CSM II, 31). The 
meditator, then, could not have compounded or borrowed the content of the idea from 
anything in her.48  (Cf. Carriero 2009, 190–191; Nolan 2014, 133–134.)  
The meditator’s idea of God cannot be materially false either, as her ideas of heat or 
cold might be. Infinity being conceptually prior to finitude, the actual infinity conceived 
in God cannot represent something unreal. Even if I were to suppose that the content 
of the idea carries no external existence, there would be no way to confuse it with the 
absence of a thing. “[The idea of God] is utterly clear and distinct and contains in itself 
more objective reality than any other idea” (AT VII, 46; CSM II, 31–32). Because the 
actual infinity contained in the idea of God cannot represent an absence and the 
meditator cannot cause it by herself (as a finite being, it could not even arise from her 
native capacities), the only possible cause of the idea, according to the PCA, is an actually 
infinite being. 
The meditator has concluded for the first time in the exercise the real existence of 
something external to herself and her thought with the First Causal argument. However, 
the causal argument is still more deductive than it is intuitive, resulting in the potential 
to lose the discovered conclusion. For the meditator to get from mere cognitive certainty 
to scientia of God’s existence, she is is required to grasp it with a single and evident 
intuition.  She is still required to do more meditative work, beginning with the rest of the 
Third Meditation and concluding in the Fourth and the Fifth. Something external has 
(potentially) been discerned, but the meditator’s cognitive journey is far from over. 
 
48 See chapters 7.1. and 7.3.2 for more on the meditator’s grasp of the infinite. See Agostini 2018 for the 
Scholastic background of Descartes’s concept of the infinity and perfection of God, Suárez in particular. 
Does this mean that no being could understand finitude without the infinite? Maybe not. Descartes could 
simply mean that for us, as beings hardwired with the idea of infinite God, finitude is understood only by 
infinity. See Carriero 2009, 191. 
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7. Third Meditation II: Demons, Angels, and Atheists 
In the Second Meditation, the meditator discovered her own existence to be necessarily 
(necessario) true as long as she conceives it. I suggested the presented condition not to be 
temporal but to be based on whether we have sufficient reasons for doubt (chapters 
3.4.1, 5.1.2). The same thing applies in the Third Meditation with the meditator having 
evidence that, along with herself, an actually infinite God with all the perfections must 
necessarily exist. Each step of the First Causal argument is clear and distinct after some 
attentive meditative “massaging” of the meditator’s intellect. Thus, the conclusion is 
clear and distinct, demanding the meditator’s assent with no room to contest its validity. 
However, just as withe the cogito, the Third Meditation implies that the issue is not 
yet fully settled. Despite momentary evidentness, even the clear and distinct cognition 
of God can fade and become open to doubt, with the meditator acknowledging that her 
concentration loosens and sensory-material beliefs leak back, making it harder to 
recognise why the idea of an infinite being must be caused by an infinite being itself. 
The Third Meditation, like the First and the Second, includes a moment where the 
meditator’s attention on the meditation relaxes, making her to alter her approach. 
In this second chapter on the Third Meditation, I analyse the alterative interlude on 
the meditator’s potentially unlimited agency and the Second Causal argument for God’s 
existence (paragraphs 23–39). I also dissect the cognitive exercise through the last three 
Meditations and discuss my reading of the meditative project as metaphysically 
grounding knowledge on the so-called God foundationalism. 
7.1. Change of Perspective: Existence of ‘I’ and Existence of God 
That even cognition of God can be called into doubt becomes apparent in the twenty-
sixth paragraph, when the meditator, already past the clarity and distinctness of God’s 
infinity, raises a counter: Could her free agency be greater than she has assumed and 
potentially include the infinity of God, along with other perfections? She discovered the 
potential for infinity within her in the Second Meditation, by noticing she has the power 
to make the wax undergo “immeasurable” changes in her imagination (AT VII, 31; CSM 
II, 21; cf. Secada 2013, 208). In the Third, she experiences a gradual increase of her 
cognition (cognitionem) and sees no reason why she could not increase it to infinity just 
like the countless ways she can influence the wax. The same thing could apply to all the 
perfections of God she perceives. The meditator, while not possessing actualised 
infinity, could still possess it potentially. “[I]f the potentiality for these perfections is 
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already within me, why should not this be enough to produce (producendam) the idea of 
such perfections?” (AT VII, 46–47; CSM II, 32.) 
What is the meditator doing, though, if she increases her potential to infinity? She is 
taking a finite element of herself (cognising) and augmenting or amplifying it. Producing 
an idea of God through these means would be to systematically repeat the same process 
with all her finite attributes and compiling them. However, this would not suffice for 
actual infinity. “[E]ven if my cognition always increases […], I recognize that it will never 
actually be infinite, since it will never reach the point where it is not capable of a further 
increase; God […] I take to be actually infinite […].” (AT VII, 46–47; CSM II, 32; 
translation modified). As Descartes explicates in a Letter to Clerselier: 
[T]he notion I have of the infinite is in me before that of the finite because, by the mere 
fact that I conceive being […] without thinking whether it is finite or infinite, what I 
conceive is infinite being; but in order to conceive a finite being, I have to take something 
away from this general notion of being, which must accordingly be there first. (23 April 
1649: AT V, 356; CSM II, 377.) 
Infinity for Descartes is not merely limitless; he reserves the term “indefinite” for things 
such as the division of matter, the extension of space, or a continuous set of numbers. 
I could not reach actual infinity by adding finite numbers into a limitless chain, because 
there is always potential for one more finite number. The complete infinity of God allows 
no potential for addition (First Replies: AT VII, 113; CSM II, 81). All limitation implies 
“a negation of the infinite”, and all amplification requires “an idea of something greater” 
(Fifth Replies: 365; CSM II, 252). I cannot reach the infinite simply by stretching the 
finite; I must already have the unbounded available to be able to remove the boundaries. 
That we are able to amplify and negate in the first place guarantees the idea of God.1 
However, Descartes needs not to be read as implying that having perceived myself 
(a finite being), I must have previously (or contemporaneously) perceived an infinite 
God of which I am a limited version, or that I perceive the finite through the infinite.2 
Rather, by cognising myself, I gather the means to be cognitively led from myself to the 
idea of God by the order of discovery. The idea of myself as something finite and 
imperfect triggers in me a concept of something infinite and perfect. Concurrently, I 
will be led from my own existence to God’s existence by these same means. 
 
1 Cf. Schechtman 2018. Locke and Hume think we acquire the infinite by addition (Essay II, xvii, §3; EHU 
2.6). Compare with Hilbert’s fully booked infinite hotel that always has room for one more guest. 
Descartes holds that this sort of conceptual infinity is far removed from God’s formal infinity. See the 
Letters to Regius, 24 May 1640 and Clerselier, 23 April 1649 and Principia I, §§26–27 (AT III, 64, V, 356 
& VIIIA, 14–15; CSM I, 201–202 & CSMK, 147, 377).  
2 Cf. Spinoza (E I, P15). This would imply only one substance, which Descartes disdains. Descartes also 
considers it easier to discover the existence of oneself than the existence of God, being mostly concerned 
with creating a metaphysical foundation for errorless cognition. Chapters 1.2.2, 6.2.3. Cf. Nolan 2014, 132. 
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[W]e are able to recognize (cognoscere) our own imperfections before we recognize the 
perfection of God […] because we are able to direct our attention to ourselves before we 
direct our attention to God. Thus, we can infer our own finiteness before we arrive at his 
infiniteness. Despite this […] the cognition (cognitio) of God and his perfection must 
implicitly always come before the knowledge of ourselves and our imperfections […] 
since our imperfection is a defect and negation of the perfection of God. And every 
defect and negation presupposes that of which it falls short and which it negates. 
(Conversation: AT V, 153; CSMK, 338. Translation modified.)  
We recognise our own existence before God’s in the order of discovery due to the 
former being easier to attend to. Nevertheless, the recognition of our imperfection 
presupposes a being that is perfect. This procedure likewise explains Descartes’s 
comments in the Third Replies, in which he seems to give in to the empiricist objection 
that we can reach God’s understanding by indefinitely extending our own (AT VII, 188; 
CSM II, 132). This extension should be taken as an heuristic tool, allowing us to discover 
potential infinity which reveals a prior concept of actual infinity (God). Cognising the 
existence of ‘I’ and cognizing the existence of God are then intrinsically tied together.3  
The meditator has evident cognition that God necessarily exists by concentrating 
carefully. However, the task of attentive exercise is once again beginning to take its toll, 
and if she releases her attention, she recognises that all of the conviction of God’s 
existence and nature starts to fade.  
[W]hen I relax my concentration, and my mental vision is blinded [by the sensory images], 
it is not easy for me to remember why the idea of a being more perfect than myself must 
necessarily proceed from some being which is in reality more perfect. (AT VII, 47; CSM 
II, 32–33.)  
We are typically unaware of the clearness and distinctness of the idea of God due to our 
reliance on sensory material. Even after discovering the evident uniqueness of the idea, 
we struggle to keep it in mind when it is out of focus and not in the immediate attention. 
Reference to remembering likewise suggests that something similar is happening as 
when the meditator’s habitual opinions flooded back in the First Meditation, and she 
had to make an effort to impress the resolution to her memory (AT VII, 22; CSM II, 
15; cf. AT VII, 34, IXA, 204; CSM II, 23, 270). That she has momentary clear and 
distinct access to God’s existence is not yet sufficient to completely overturn her doubts. 
When that perception fades and she loses the persuasion, doubt can creep right back in.  
It is easy to see the meditator’s concern here. Each step in her argumentation is clear 
and distinct, but what guarantees their cognitive certainty when she moves from one 
 
3 Cf. AT X, 421–422; CSM I, 46. We still could fail to reach a C&D concept of God by confusedly 
constructing an imagistic idea, e.g., an old man with a beard. AT VII, 133–138, 364–365, VIIIB, 360–366; 
CSM I, 305–309, II, 96–99, 251–252. Cf. Carriero 2009, 190–206, Cunning 2010; Nolan 2014, 132–134. 
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step to another? They are clearly different clear and distinct perceptions; while attending 
to step 2, then, the persuasion in step 1 has already disappeared. Some sort of reasoning 
or deduction is required; thus, a gap can appear in my clear and distinct perception of 
the causal necessity of God’s existence and nature based on God’s idea. Her certainty 
of God is still merely persuasive at this point: It is cognitio, not yet scientia. The meditator 
would need to acquire God’s existence as immediate and intuitive, similarly to the cogito, 
for her to achieve stronger certainty of God. (Cf. AT V, 136–138; CSMK, 330–331.) 
The meditator then, once again, resorts to an alternate approach to achieve what is 
required. In the First Meditation, she used self-deception by imagining the Demon; in 
the Second, she granted limited return to common-sense thinking to obtain a particular 
body to experiment with. Following the inquiry of her potential possession of infinity, 
she decides in the Third to change the perspective from her ideas to something more 
immediate and intimate – her existence – and inquire whether her free agency could be 
so great that she can cause herself and preserve her endurance. “I should therefore like to 
go further and inquire whether I myself, who have this idea, could exist if no such being 
existed” (AT VII, 47–48; CSM II, 33). This way, she hopes to make God’s existence 
more immediate and intuitive as well. (Cf. Carriero 2009, 197; Wagner 2014, 158–160.) 
7.2. God’s Existence: Second Causal Argument 
One controversy concerning the causal arguments is whether they are two distinct 
arguments or if the second is just an extension or a variant of the first (see e.g., Carriero 
2009, 198; Chistofidou 2013, 100). The Third Meditation seems to make a case for two 
separate accounts, the first from the idea of God and the second from the meditator’s 
existence, but Descartes challenged this to Mesland in 1644: 
It does not make much difference whether my second proof […] is regarded as different 
from the first proof […] Just as it is an effect of God to have created me, so it is an effect 
of him to have put the idea of himself in me, and there is no effect coming from him 
from which one cannot prove his existence. Nevertheless, it seems to me that all these 
proofs based on his effects are reducible to a single one… (AT IV, 112; CSMK, 231.) 
The causal arguments can be considered distinct, because they rely on different effects 
of God: that he has created me (existence) and has imprinted an idea of himself in me 
(nature). However, they are reducible to one because they contain the same basic 
elements: They rely on the two causal principles and the idea of God. The proposed 
effect could not be caused by the meditator in either case.4 
 
4 Third Meditation, First and Second Replies (AT VII, 51–52, 105–106, 167–168; CSM II, 35, 76–77, 118).  
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Descartes explicates in the First Replies that the purpose with the second argument 
“was not to produce a different proof from the preceding one”, but “to take the same 
proof and provide a more thorough explanation of it”. Why is the further explanation 
required? Firstly, for the intuitive understanding of God, it is not enough to realise that 
part of the meditator’s nature (actual infinity in the idea of God) is caused by God. Her 
whole nature (native powers and innate ideas) and existence must be God’s work. As a 
finite entity, the idea of God could not belong to her intellect, if her finite existence was 
not caused by God. (AT VII, 105–106; CSM II, 76–77.) The Second Causal argument 
supports and elucidates the first by adding the meditator’s existence into God’s effects. 
Secondly, the causal arguments do not accomplish much if the effect is not evident, 
as made explicit by the reply to Caterus’s objection that because objective reality of ideas 
is not “anything actual”, it requires no efficient cause, let alone an infinite one. 
Descartes’s answer compares the idea of God to an idea of a highly intricate machine: 
Such an idea is so “rich” with objective intricacy that it is fair to ask, what caused the idea.5 
The richer the idea is, the less likely it is to be just conceived and not relating to anything 
outside the intellect. What awakens or triggers in us the need for an external cause for 
the idea of God is, then, the richness we experience in God’s actual infinity. However, 
the perceived intricacy in the machine idea is dependent on how well the conceiver is 
acquainted with mechanics, making it easier to see that the idea requires an external 
cause, because only a few can appreciate it to a certain ‘fidelity’ (thus, objective intricacy 
and objective reality are not synonymous; the machine is the same for both the 
mechanic and the layman regarding the latter). With the idea of God, everyone’s ability 
to appreciate the adequacy of precision is the same. The idea is similarly rich and innate 
in everyone; thus, its requirement for an external cause is not as evident, being easier to 
assume one’s intellect as the source. (AT VII, 92–93, 103–105; CSM II, 66–67, 75–76.) 
The meditator is to consider her own existence, the most cognitively compelling item 
she possesses, rather than “heaven and earth” (AT IV, 112; CSMK, 232). The Second 
Causal argument helps the meditator to perceive God’s existence more evidently and 
intuitively.6 (Cf. Carriero 2009, 186–189, Cunning 2010, 118–119; Sinokki 2015, 60–64.) 
7.2.1. Causal Origins of the Meditator’s Existence 
The First Causal argument is crucial for demonstrating the first two of the Third 
Meditation’s aims: that God 1) exists and 2) is the cause of (at least part of) the 
 
5 Cf. Synopsis, Second Replies, Principia I (AT VII, 14–15, 134–135, VIIIA, 11; CSM I, 198, II, 10–11, 97).  
6 Cf. the Second Replies (AT VII; 136; CSM II, 97–98).  
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meditator’s nature (if God did not exist, she would not possess the idea of actual 
infinity). The task of the second argument is to strengthen the first two while 
demonstrating the last remaining aims, that God 3) is the cause of her existence and 
temporal endurance, and 4) is not a deceiver (cf. chapter 6.1). The Second Causal 
argument aims to prove that the meditator cannot be causally responsible for her 
existence or nature; she cannot have created herself nor can she preserve herself in 
existence. Like the first, the second argument can then be reduced to four clear and 
distinct steps, distilled from most Scholastic formal-objective parlance: 
1. I exist as a thinking being that has an idea of an actually infinite being (God) with all perfections 
2. PCD 
3. PCA: The only possible cause for my existence is an actually infinite being 
4. Therefore, an actually infinite God exists 
With the meditator’s progress, steps 1 and 2 appear clear and distinct and do not require 
persuasive argumentation. Once again, it is step 3 that demands cognitive polishing to 
evidently perceive it.   
   However, if the meditator must gain an intuitive cognition of God’s existence, as 
I suggested, why would another chain of clear and distinct steps help? Would not those 
steps be just as vulnerable as the ones in the First Causal argument? Just as in the case 
of the first argument, where tracking the steps made the meditator appreciate the actual 
infinity present in the idea of God, the argumentative strategy in the second is to help 
the meditator discover why her perpetual existence could only be due to God’s activity. 
By running the steps, she can gain immediate access to God as the author of her nature 
and the generator of her temporally enduring existence who cannot be deceitful.          
   The meditator begins the enquiry by listing potential causes for her existence in 
paragraph twenty-nine. These include herself, her parents, and “any means (quibuslibet) 
less perfect than God” (AT VII, 48; CSM II, 33; translation modified), comparable to 
the atheistic origin from the First Meditation by “faith or chance or a continuous chain 
of events” (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14). The meditator runs down these possibilities with 
an argument by elimination during the next seven paragraphs. She begins the discussion 
with self-causation, which helps to establish three aspects Descartes wants to 
concentrate on: 1. If something is truly self-causing, it cannot be dependent on anything 
else (being absolutely independent). 2. Causation does not end with original creation but 
includes durationally extended preservation. 3. If the meditator is not self-causing/self-
preserving (thus, absolutely independent, i.e., God), nothing less than an actually infinite 
God can cause her existence (as her nature includes an idea of actual infinity). The third 
aspect is particularly reminiscent of the First Causal argument with the meditator 
realising that nothing less than an actually infinite God can cause the concept of actual 
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infinity in her. Considering these aspects advances the position that, unlike herself, God 
is self-causing. (Cf. Nolan & Nelson 2006, 111; Nolan 2014, 129, 140–142.) 
   The discussion begins with the first aspect. If the meditator caused her own 
existence, why would she not have caused herself all the perfections she has an idea of 
but seemingly lacks? The meditator recognises a causal power over her thoughts, maybe 
even over most of her ideas, granting her some level of independence. However, if she 
could cause herself, she would not be dependent on anything and would be able to cause 
even the idea of actual infinity in her, making herself, qua PCA, an actually infinite being. 
Perhaps she would then just confuse the ideas of herself and God as distinct. However, 
if she can cause the idea of actual infinity, she should be able to cause her attributes to 
be actually infinite. This clearly is not the case, as the previously recognised lack of 
something (her doubt and desire) requires a prior notion of infinity. If, however, she 
was able to create the idea of actual infinity but not actual infinity itself, there would a 
limitation on her power and she would not be an actually infinite being, thus, again qua 
PCA, incapable of creating the idea of an actually infinite being.7 
   Based on the previous discussion, it is easy to see why, if the meditator is not self-
causing and, thus, not actually an infinite being herself, her existence cannot be caused 
by finite causes, such as her parents or the atheistic “continuous chain of events” 
proposed in the First Meditation (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14). Her nature as a thinking 
thing includes the concept of actual infinity, so whatever caused her, qua PCA, is 
required to have actual infinity either by itself or through its cause. If the means that 
caused her are finite, they could not cause the concept of actual infinity either in the 
means themselves nor in the meditator’s thinking. Thus, one is required, qua PCD, to 
ask, what caused the finite means, et cetera? Just as in the case of ideas taken objectively, 
there cannot be an infinite regress here (cf. AT VII, 42; CSM II, 29). One must arrive 
at the total and efficient cause at some point, which in the case of actual infinity can only 
be an actually infinite being ((AT VII, 45–51; CSM II, 31–34). 
7.2.2. Infinite and Indefinite Causal Regresses 
The Second Causal argument is closer to the cosmological argument, wherein one starts 
from the existence of something perceived by the senses and deduces back to the 
uncaused First Cause (cf. chapter 3.1.1). Nevertheless, just as with the First, Descartes 
considers the Second to improve on the Scholastic arguments. The causal chain is not 
 
7 Cf. B. Williams 2015, 130–131; Nolan 2014, 142. The French connects self-causation and independence 
in a more apparent way: “Or, si j’etais independent de tout autre, et que he fusse moi-méme l’auter mon être…”. 
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infinite because the meditator’s thinking includes the concept of actual infinity in God’s 
nature. If this concept were not innate in her nature, a potentially infinite regress of causes 
could be possible (without reaching actual infinity), as the “indefinite” set of numbers 
demonstrates.8 The traditional cosmological argument could not sufficiently refute the 
meditator’s possibly atheistic origin by an infinite chain of finite causes.9 
Moreover, the chain cannot be infinite because the meditator is not considering just 
what originally caused her but also what is sustaining her at the present moment. She 
discovered earlier that causation does not terminate with creation but extends to 
preservation, preventing her from bypassing the causal argument by assuming that she 
has always existed and, thus, was uncaused. “For a lifespan can be divided into countless 
parts, each completely independent of the others, so that it does not follow from the 
fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless there is some cause 
which as it were creates me afresh at this moment…” (AT VII, 49; CSM II, 33). Every 
countless temporal moment is causally independent of every other; existing at one point 
does not guarantee existence at another (division of time is, then, another indefinite 
regress).10 There then must also be a cause for her sustained existence. This cause 
appears not to be her, just as in the case of her genesis, because she recognises no power 
in her that could endure her existence (after all, considered praecise in the restricted scope 
of the cogito being, she should be aware of such power if she had it).11 Her existence, 
then, depends on something other than herself at every moment, making the infinite 
regress impossible, because “I am dealing not just with the cause that produced me in 
 
8 Similarly, the objective reality of ideas forms no regress only because something formal has to put the 
reality in the idea.  
9 Cf. AT VII, 112; CSMK, 232. The main difference between Descartes and Aquinas is, again, the nature 
of our cognition of God. Cf. Nolan & Newman 2006, 105; Carriero 2009, 198–199. See the First Replies 
(AT VII, 94; CSM II, 68): “[My approach] is plainly a quite different […] from observing that my father 
begot me […] and in view of the impossibility of going ad infinitum […] bringing the inquiry to a close by 
deciding that there is a first cause” (AT VII, 107; CSM II, 77–78). However, if Descartes attributes the 
former to Aquinas, he seems to be rather unfair towards the angelic doctor (see ST I, Q.46, a.2, ad.7). Cf. 
Carriero 2009, 199–208. See also the Fifth Replies (AT VII, 370–371; CSM II, 255). 
10 Descartes, though, insists on the indefinity of time to be different from the indefinity of space, for 
otherwise the world would have no beginning. For more, see Gorham 2018. Cf. AT XI, 656, V, 52–53, 
VIIIA, 27; CSM I, 212; CSMK, 320. 
11 This may come across as a rather weak argument. Arnauld picks up on it, noting that the mind could 
have powers it is unaware of (AT VII, 214; CSM II, 150). Descartes replies that the mind, regarded as a 
thinking being, is always actually aware of its acts and potentially aware of its powers: If one concentrates on 
employing a given power, supposing that the power resides in us, one immediately becomes actively aware 
of it (AT VII, 232, 246–247; CSM II, 162, 171–172). However, this seems insufficient because one might 
be aware of a power while being unaware of all of its effects (as a thinking being, my power to think might 
sustain my existence). The conclusion, though, is possible to draw similarly to the case of the meditator’s 
genesis: Only an actually infinite (i.e., absolutely independent) being could sustain itself in existence. Thus, 
as the meditator notices limitations in herself, she is not an actually infinite being. For continuous creation, 
see Principia I, §62 & II, §§36, 42: AT VIIIA, 30, 61–62, 66; CSM I, 214, 240, 243. Cf. chapters 3.4.1, 4.3.1. 
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the past, but also and most importantly with the cause that preserves me at the present 
moment”. (AT VII, 48–50; CSM II, 33–34.) Even if an indefinite chain of finite causes 
could cause her existence initially, it cannot cause her existence right now. (Cf. Nolan & 
Nelson 2006, 111–112; Carriero 2009, 197; Nolan 2014, 143.) 
The meditator, by the way of the causal arguments, has now reached an evident 
cognition of God. “It must be concluded that the mere fact that I exist and have within 
me an idea of a most perfect being, that is God, provides an evident demonstration 
(evidentissime demonstari) that God indeed exists” (AT VII, 51; CSM II, 35). This idea of 
the most perfect being, which includes the indispensable attribute of actual infinity, 
cannot have arrived or been abstracted from the senses, nor can it be invented, either; 
it has never appeared or seemed to appear independently of the will and it cannot be 
compiled from other material through aggregation or negation. Thus, by elimination of 
the other established sources, it can only be innate – a feature of the meditator’s native 
cognitive structure. (Cf. AT VII, 133 & VIIIB, 366; CSM I, 309 & II, 96.) Both the 
evidentness of God’s causal nature and the possession of this cognitive structure are 
essential for the strategy. The causal arguments, in Descartes’s words, would be 
“incomplete” lacking the evidentness of the effect and the idea of God (AT IV, 112; 
CSMK, 232). We are required to have within us an innate and intuitive concept of actual 
infinity in relation to the idea of God for the causal arguments to work. 
It is a fair to ask if we really have a concept of the completed infinity required here? 
Pricking through my thinking, I find it hard to pinpoint any such concept. An empiricist 
or an atheist would then claim that we do not. Descartes would reply that we do but are 
not typically aware of it and have to partake in an arduous cognitive exercise to draw 
the concept out. One would eventually recognise God’s existence as easily and 
intuitively as one’s own by doing the exercise. 
[The idea of God] is innate in me, just as the idea of myself is innate in me. […] [T]he 
mere fact that God created me is a very strong basis for believing that I am somehow 
made in his image and likeness, and that I perceive that likeness, which includes the idea 
of God, by the same faculty which enables me to perceive myself. That is, when I turn my 
mind’s eye upon myself, I understand that I am a thing which is incomplete and 
dependent on another and which aspires without limit to ever greater and better things; 
but I also understand at the same time that he on whom I depend has within him all 
those greater things, not just indefinitely and potentially but actually and infinitely, and 
hence that he is God. (AT VII, 51; CSM II, 35. Emphasis added.) 
Following the order of reasoning, becoming aware of my intuitive existence and 
inquiring further into my nature, I ultimately cognise in myself the concept of God as 
actually infinite, making me recognise God’s existence as an intuitive and necessary 
truth. The metaphor Descartes likes to use here is that God has stamped the mark of 
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his craftmanship in his work.12 The notion that, by attending carefully, I recognise God’s 
trademark in me by the same capacity that I recognise that I exist strongly implies that 
God’s existence is an intuitive feat similar to the cogito.13 The argumentative strategy is 
employed for the meditator to appreciate the actual infinity present in God and to 
recognise that God is a causa sui, both self-causing and self-preserving.14 The Aristotelian 
or the atheist are just not meditating carefully enough or paying sufficient attention if 
they stubbornly persists in saying they do not perceive this clearly and distinctly, as 
Descartes insinuates in the Second Replies: 
I do not see what I can add to make it any clearer that the idea in question could not be 
present to my mind unless a supreme being existed. I can only say that it depends on the 
reader: if he attends carefully to what I have written he should be able to free himself 
from the preconceived opinions which may be eclipsing his natural light… […] Those 
who give the matter their careful attention and spend time meditating with me will clearly 
see that there is within us an idea of a supremely powerful and perfect being […]. I cannot 
force this truth on my readers if they are lazy, since it depends solely on their exercising 
their powers of thought. (AT VII, 135–136; CSM II, 97.) 
Reading the Meditations as a cognitive exercise is, then, indispensable not only for 
realisation of the cogito but also for understanding God’s existence. 
7.3. Demons and Angels: God Foundationalism 
The meditator has established the four required aims at the end of the Third Meditation. 
[I]t would be impossible for me to exist with the kind of nature I have – that is, having 
within me the idea of God – were it not the case that God really existed. By ‘God’ I mean 
 
12 The causal arguments are then also referred to as the Trademark argument. Gassendi pressed Descartes 
on how this stamping is carried out: Is the meditator the stamp, the subject of the stamp or both? Descartes 
replied by likening the issue to a painting created with such high technique and mastery that it could have 
only been done by the ancient painter Apelles (Fifth Objections and Replies: AT VII, 306, 372; CSM II, 
213, 256). Note that none of Apelles’s known works have survived, and even in Descartes’s time no one 
had seen a painting by the Greek master. Cf. chapter 2.1.2. and 2.5.2.  
13 In the last paragraph, the meditator pauses to contemplate on God, which is “the greatest joy of which 
we are capable in this life” (AT VII, 52; CSM II, 36). Cf. Carriero 2009, 189; Cunning 2010, 119; Secada 
2013, 215; Wagner 2014. Like the previous, the Third ends with contemplation of the meditation’s results.  
14 Even God is not exempt from the PCD, but, unlike the created nature, he is positively a se (from itself) 
– a self-caused sustainer. Caterus and Arnauld suggest that God’s self-causing is to be taken negatively, as 
an uncaused sustainer, because the cause would have to exist prior to the effect to be the efficient cause of 
oneself (AT VII, 94–95, 207–214; CSM II, 68–69, 146–150; cf. Aquinas’s second way: ST I, Q.2, a.3). 
Descartes rejects the negative meaning, stating that God needs no efficient cause since God’s actually 
infinite and inexhaustable essence (his formal cause) is a positive reason or cause (ratio sive causa) for him 
needing no cause (AT VII, 108–111, 235–241; CSM II,78–80, 164–168). See Comments (AT VIIIB, 368; 
CSM II, 310). Cf. Carriero 2009, 217–222; Nolan 2014, 141–144, note 47; Agostini 2018, 20–24. 
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the very being the idea of whom is within me, [has] no defects [and] cannot be a deceiver, 
since it is manifest by the natural light that all fraud and deception depend of some defect. 
(AT VII, 51–52; CSM II, 35.) 
The meditator acknowledges that God 1) exists, 2) is the author of her nature (her 
capacities or powers and her innate ideas), 3) is the creator and sustainer of her 
existence, and, due to God’s nature being bereft of all imperfection, 4) cannot deceive 
us. Nevertheles, as previously mentioned, the proof of God’s existence needs to also 
deliver an external metaphysical grounding for the meditator’s internal certainties in 
order to overturn the Third Level of doubt. I discuss in this last chapter how the 
meditator achieves this external ground by a reading I have termed God foundationalism 
(see chapter 3.4.2). Specifically, I concentrate on two intrinsically tied issues: 1. Why is 
the metaphysical basis mandatory (what would be lost if it was not discovered)? 2. How 
does the meditator move from strong internal evidence to metaphysical knowledge 
(how her cognitio can become scientia). This analysis also requires me to trace the 
meditative exercise through the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Meditation. 
7.3.1. Atheistic Mathematics and Atheistic Existence 
I start with the first issue. Recall that the meditator discovers that after “a most careful 
and comprehensive survey”, the only argument for something outside of her internal 
conviction is that one of her ideas carries reality she could not have caused herself. (AT 
VII, 42; CSM II, 19.) Failure to find such reality would be devastating, requiring us to 
abandon science (cf. Nolan 2014, 130.) 
However, would a negative result truly be this devastating? Consider the meditator 
as an atheist: She would be content with the conclusions of the Second Meditation and 
the beginning of the Third, accepting the cognition of her own existence and nature but 
nothing relating to God. Descartes’s intended Cartesian scientist, however, would not 
be. The reason, as discussed, is that neither a pre-scientist nor an atheist can be fully 
certain of their cognitive states, not even those affirming their existence. Recall that the 
meditator’s self-vindicating intuition can avoid the regressive Agrippan problem, but it 
cannot clear the axiomatic or the circular horn. It is not enough to just claim that clear 
and distinct intuition is trustworthy; one must also verify why this cognitive peak can be 
trusted, without relying on its trustworthiness and arguing in a circle (see chapter 5.1.2). 
Just because certain peak cognitions are compelling, does not mean that they are true. It 
might seem that I grasp something real with my thinking, but do I (see chapter 6.2)? 
Consider the atheist’s and the pre-scientist meditator’s cognition of mathematics. 
Descartes explains in the Second Replies that he grants the atheist mathematician clear 
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and distinct cognition of the triangle’s features but maintains that “this cognition of his 
is not true knowledge (vera scientia)” because no cognition that can be rendered doubtful 
can be called “knowledge”. The atheist then “cannot be certain that he is not being 
deceived on matters which seem to him very evident […] [s]o he will never be free of 
this doubt until he acknowledges that God exists.” (AT VII, 141, CSM II, 101; cf. AT 
VII, 428; CSM II, 289.) The same applies, as previously argued, to the pre-scientist 
meditator’s seemingly true cognition that 2+3=5 in the beginning of the Third 
Meditation. Both forms of mathematical cognising require some form of reasoning or 
deduction that can be lost once it is not directly attended to. Of course, the prospects 
of destabilisation seem larger regarding angles of the triangle than the addition of 2 to 
3, because the latter appears more direct and intuitive. However, even the latter requires 
more than one component and is not a single intuition, like the cogito.  
 These considerations, though, can cause hesitation regarding the status of the cogito. 
I mentioned earlier that there are grounds for taking my existence as more evident and 
compelling than the truth of mathematics, indicating that the text of the Third 
Meditation adds “perhaps even” in front of the deceiver’s assumed inability to make the 
meditator be mistaken of the addition of 2 to 3 (chapter 6.1.2). Even if we regard 
Descartes’s choice of words here as a regular conjunction, it still seemingly holds that 
cogito, relying on nothing but pure intuition, carries more credibility than mathematics 
(cf. chapter 5.1.3; Forsman 2019). Descartes holds that we are always thinking and as 
we think, we are aware that we think, so it seems difficult to see how one would lose 
attention of her existence, in which case there seems to be no room for doubt (cf. the 
Fifth Replies: AT VII, 356–357; CSM II, 246–247). Neither the pre-scientist’s nor the 
atheist’s existence seems unrestricted and doubtful in the same way as the cognition of 
mathematics from which one’s attention can easily slip. 
However, for Descartes, being aware is not a singular activity but can occur in 
different ways. He distinguishes between two kinds of conscious thought, what he calls 
direct thought and reflective thought. Only the latter involves awareness that one is thinking 
(AT V, 220–221; CSMK, 356–357). Furthermore, he differentiates reflective thought from 
attentive reflective thought (the conscious thought of a person deliberately attending to her 
conscious reflection; cf. Lähteenmäki 2007). With the meditator’s existence, Descartes 
seems to make a further separation between minimal self-awareness (being aware of 
one’s thoughts as had by one) and full self-reflection (attending to the fact that since 
one possesses these thoughts, one must exist). Not all reflective awareness includes the 
sharp attention to one’s existence; one’s existence is a philosophical discovery, not a 
mundane experience. The existence of oneself is not attended to at every moment; thus, 
it can count as one of the shifting and changeable opinions (AT VII, 69; CSM II, 48). 
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We now have a better understanding of the dissimilarity of the cogito and 
mathematics. Despite the difference in stability, self-awareness and awareness of 
mathematical truths are not radically different when compared to the metaphysical 
knowledge through God. Prior to knowing God’s existence, neither the pre-scientist 
nor the atheist has more than a persuasive conviction that they exist and that 
mathematical truths hold. One’s attention might lapse in both cases and this cognition 
becomes minimal enough for doubt to creep in, because one’s nature could be so 
imperfect that one goes wrong even when attentive evidentness leads to seeming 
indubitability. The meditator can doubt her existence if she becomes distracted by her 
former material understanding of the self, losing attention from the C&D one (cf. 
Cunning 2007; 2010), or considers that, though self-awareness seemed fully certain a 
moment ago, she might not have reached the truth due to potentially imperfect nature. 
Nevertheless, unlike mathematics, one’s existence has a special nature. Recognising 
their existence, both the pre-scientist and the atheist grasp a piece of reality, even if 
momentarily and without further understanding why. I discussed earlier that the cogito’s 
Archimedean role springs from the meditator becoming aware of the compelling quality 
of her certain peak cognitions, enabling the correct use of her cognitive powers and 
leading her to discover more about her true cognitive nature and its metaphysical 
grounding. Merely observing evident mathematics does not accomplish this.15 The 
intimacy and intuitiveness of the cogito make it stronger than mathematics and more 
capable (at least momentarily) to resist the Deceiving God/Imperfect Nature doubt.16 
What is required, however, is not something that resists the doubt but that ultimately 
defeats it; this is possible only by knowing the author of my nature (a non-deceiving God). 
The meditator can have clear perception and even be cognitively certain of each clear 
perception before knowing God’s existence, yet she cannot be metaphysically certain 
that her clarity and distinctness do not come apart from grasping the truth. 
Of course, as God does exist and is not a deceiver, the meditator’s mathematical 
demonstrations and awareness of her existence are metaphysically guaranteed to be true. 
It may, hence, be asked whether God guarantees the atheist’s beliefs in the same way, 
 
15 The cogito could also be seen as ‘special’ in that, to the extent that someone initially recognizes their 
existence by free agency, questioning the cogito can reaffirm it (cf. Hatfield 2007, 148). However, as this is 
reaffirming, it is still not stable but remains in flux. Also note that, unlike mathematics, the cogito asserts the 
existence of something non-abstract. 
16 Gueroult likewise argues that the meditator’s existence is more certain than mathematics but calls the 
cogito “une certitude entière” (1953, 51–52). Cf. Lennon & Hickson (2013, 20–21), who do discuss the 
meditator’s existence in relation to God but consider the cogito permanent, dependent on God only by 
being created by God (i.e., there was a time she did not exist). Broughton (2002, 175–186) views some 
clear and distinct ideas to be absolutely certain, whereas some are not, the favored set including “I exist,” 
but excluding mathematics. Brown (2013, 33–36) ponders why mathematics is less compelling than the 
meditator’s existence but without emphasizing the question or giving adequate answers. 
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despite the atheist’s ignorance of God. The atheist has some grasp of how things are 
but is not fully aware of why he is in touch with reality as it is. He has internal evidence 
(clarity and distinction) but lacks this external ground. Having scientia of something is not 
just to be certain that things are a certain way but is to understand why one’s certainty 
guarantees that they really are so. (AT VII, 141, 196, 428; CSM II, 101, 137, 289.)17 
I previously argued, unlike it is sometimes read (see chapter 3.4.1), that clear and 
distinct perception does not guarantee full certainty or knowledge and can be doubted 
in the enquiry before God’s existence has been discovered. Indeed, in the Synopsis, 
Descartes locates proving the general veracity of clear and distinct perception in the 
Fourth Meditation, even stating that “we should know (sciamus) that everything that we 
clearly and distinctly understand is true in a way which corresponds exactly to our 
understanding of it; but it was not possible to prove this before the Fourth Meditation” 
(AT VII, 13–15; CSM II, 9–11). The meditator concludes in the beginning of the Fourth 
that her contemplation of God “in whom all the treasures of the sciences and wisdom 
(scientiarum & sapientae) lie hidden” grants her a way forward to the “cognition 
(cognitionem) of other things” (AT VII, 53; CSM II, 37: translation modified). Discovering 
the nature of God as non-deceiving erases the reasons to doubt her evident perceptions. 
She knows that neither is she being deceived nor is she unable to grasp the truth with 
her cognitive prowess when correctly applied. Meanwhile, an atheistic meditator, unable 
to erase this ultimate level of doubt, cannot develop her cognition into scientia.  
7.3.2. Fourth Meditation: Erroneous Cognition and Cartesian Theodicy 
Why can the veracity of clarity and distinctness not be confirmed before the discussion 
of the Fourth Meditation if the meditator has discovered both God’s existence and 
nature at the end of the Third? The reason is that, while she has become aware of God’s 
nature, there are still certain aspects remaining in question. The meditator made an 
important observation in the First Meditation regarding God’s supposed goodness and 
her own error-laden nature: “But if it were inconsistent with [God’s] goodness to have 
created me such that I am deceived all the time, it would seem equally foreign to his 
goodness to allow me to be deceived even occasionally; yet this last assertion cannot be 
made” (AT VII, 21; CSM II, 14). This atheistic issue is still unresolved by the time of 
the Fourth Meditation. 
 
17 Scientia can then somewhat be seen as a version of the KK-thesis, but it is not fully internalist. Cf. 
Carriero 2009, 348. I therefore disagree with building scientia on coherent justification (Frankfurt 2008; 
Sosa 1997), unshakable psychological conviction, or consistency of reason (Gewirth 1941; Loeb 2005). Cf. 
chapters 3.4. and 5.1. 
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The form of deception is imperfection (i.e., non-being) and God’s nature is devoid 
of any imperfection; thus, God could not deceive. We discover in ourselves a capacity 
for judgment (the collaboration of the intellect and the will) through experience, which, 
as part of our nature, certainly comes from God, and because God is non-deceitful by 
nature, he would not have enabled us to err while using our judgment correctly. 
However, we still seem to err regarding obscure and confused perceptions, for example, 
by thinking that the presence and nature of the corporeal world is evident by the senses. 
If God allows us to err in these matters, would he also allow us to be in error with clear 
and distinct matters? Is our error compatible with God’s nature as a non-deceiver? The 
meditator maintains that God could have created her nature so that she has only clear 
and distinct perceptions or could even live in a perpetual state of cognitive peak and avoid 
error altogether; she, then, must next enquire into the nature of her erroneous cognition. 
(AT VII, 52–55, 61; CSM II, 35–38, 42.) 
The meditator’s conclusion about the epistemic reliability of her judgmental prowess 
is based on three assumptions: God 1) exists, 2) is omniperfect and veracious (non-
deceitful), and 3) is the creator of her capacity for judgment. However, she calls the 
conclusion in question in the fourth paragraph. 
There would be no further doubt on this issue were it not that what I have just said 
appears to imply that I am incapable of ever going wrong. […] And certainly so long as 
I think only of God, and turn my whole attention to him, I can find no cause of error or 
falsity. But when I turn back to myself, I know by experience that I am prone to countless 
errors. (AT VII, 38; CSM II, 54.) 
We conclude when we look at the concept of God that we ought to assent to what we 
perceive clearly and distinctly with such creator. However, we notice when we look at 
ourselves that we do go wrong and fall in error in numerous places. We must know 
where our errors result from, and whether they are to be blamed on God or on us, to 
resolve this. If we can be in error even when using our cognitive powers at their fullest, 
our errors would be God’s fault, resulting from granting us a nature that goes wrong 
even with full and correct use. We would not be responsible (blameworthy) for our 
errors. If, however, the errors result from the misuse of our cognitive abilities (i.e., 
depend on us), we are to be blamed for them ourselves. We could arrive at the truth by 
sticking to the abilities full and proper use. 
The beginning of the Fourth Meditation, like the Third’s, raises a skeptical counter 
for the previous meditative progress, turning attention from the clear and distinct idea 
of God to our erroneous nature.  More specifically, there are two intertwined doubts at 
play here: 1. How can I make mistakes if God is non-deceitful? 2. Can omniperfect, 
veracious God exist if my nature is capable of mistakes? The first doubt questions 
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whether God could allow us to be deceived, potentially even by clarity and distinctness, 
targeting the previous assumption 2) about God’s nature. The question there is about 
our actual errors: Perhaps allowing deceit is not foreign to God’s nature. This could be 
called the problem of erroneous cognition. The second doubt questions whether God can 
be acquitted from the existence of error in his creations, targeting the previous 
assumption 1) about God’s existence. The question there is about our ability to err: The 
meditator conceives God as an “omniperfect creator” (AT VII, 52; CSM II, 35), but if 
there is capacity for error in her, does anything fulfil that concept? This could be called 
the problem of Cartesian theodicy. (Cf. Ragland 2007; 2016; Dicker 2013, chapter 4.) 
Descartes’s solution to both the theodicy problem and the error problem is partly 
based on the meditator locating the source of her error in the misapplication of her 
powers of understanding and will, by willing to assent to more things than what her 
understanding can attentively grasp clearly and distinctly and by discovering her 
freedom to be at its fullest when spontaneously assenting to a clearly and distinctly 
known truth or good (AT VII, 56–59; CSM II, 39–41). I covered these topics in a 
previous chapter (3.3), so I will not spend much space on them here. Instead, I 
concentrate on what could be called the metaphysics of error. Recall that falsity for 
Descartes is not really a “thing” but a lack of being. Thus, error is a negation, and 
committing errors is participating (participare) in non-being. The meditator realises that 
error, or the capacity for error, is not something that can truly be in her but is caused by 
her being something between God (perfect being) and nothingness (non-being). 
“[E]rror as such is not something real which depends on God, but merely a defect. […] 
[G]oing wrong does not require me to have a faculty specially bestowed on me by God; 
it simply happens as [the God-given] faculty of judgment […] is in my case not infinite” 
(AT VII, 54; CSM II, 38).  
However, the meditator is not fully satisfied with this neo-Platonic style answer. 
Erring is not a true negation, something that does not belong to her nature, but rather 
a privation of some knowledge she should possess but is deprived of somehow. If she 
is capable of erring, her nature must be impaired in some way (cf. chapter 6.1.4). The 
meditator concludes that there is “no doubt” that God could have given her such a 
nature that she is never mistaken, and that God always wills what is “best (optimum)” 
(AT VII, 55; CSM II, 38). However, as Gassendi notes, if God could have created her 
nature to never err but has not, God seems to lack either the knowledge, the power or 
the will to do so and is not omniperfect (e.g., omniscient, omnipotent, and 
omnibenevolent) (AT VII, 308; CSM II, 214–215). 
The meditator recognises by attentive meditation that “there is no call to doubt 
[God’s] existence” by not grasping why or how certain things were created, as her own 
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nature is “weak and limited” while God’s is “immense and infinite”, confirming the 
previous assumption 1) about God’s existence (AT VII, 55; CSM II, 38–39). She 
recognises some paragraphs later that neither of her God-given powers of willing and 
understanding is culpable for her errors. Her will is perfect in its own right, and her 
understanding, granted by a veracious God, correctly grasps what it grasps, confirming 
the previous assumption 2) about God’s nature (AT VII, 58; CSM II, 40–41). 
However, this is insufficient for error or theodicy skepticism. The meditator must 
justify why an omniperfect, veracious God allows even an occasional error or erring-
ability to occur. Not knowing God’s motives is an inadequate answer, for God might 
think that us being deceived is the “best”.  
The meditator’s answer here is double faceted. First, we have free will, which can be 
indifferent in a case of complete equilibrium of reasons. Error occurs due to us “betting 
on the wrong horse” when we assent to things we do not comprehend (and where our 
will is therefore indifferent, cf. chapter 3.3.4), so the privation results from the incorrect 
operation of our native power of free will, not from the power itself or its provider. God 
simply tolerates our errors due to the value of free will (it is better that we are free to 
make mistakes than if we were to see everything clearly and forced to suspend when we 
do not, i.e., were divinely determined to assent only to the truth). This value of the will’s 
freedom explains our actual occasional errors.18 (AT VII, 59–61; CSM II, 40–42.)    
Second, by looking at God’s whole creation, what seems imperfect on its own might 
appear quite perfect as part of a whole. The meditator “must not complain that the 
forming of those acts of will or judgements in which [she goes] wrong happens with 
God’s concurrence”, for as part of the innate nature coming from God they are “wholly 
true and good” and the ability to perform them is more perfect than lacking that ability 
is. Error is not caused by God (and, thus, should indeed be considered a negation rather 
than a privation), so our ability to err does not require his concurrence; there may be 
“more perfection in the universe as a whole because some of its parts are not immune 
from error”. This perfection of unity could potentially explain our ability to err (I say 
“could” because, as the meditator points out, thus far in the cognitive exercise she 
recognises only herself and God with any certainty, but due to the immense power of 
God, she must at least acknowledge the possible existence of other things). (AT VII, 
55–56, 60–61; CSM II, 39, 42–43. Cf. Ragland 2007; 2016, chapter 2.19) 
 
18 This also supports Descartes considering the will’s freedom incompatible with divine determinism in 
certain (equal balance) cases, while compatible in other (C&D) cases. Chapter 3.3.4. Cf. Ragland 2007; 2016. 
19 See Fifth Objections and Replies (AT VII, 313–314, 376; CSM II, 217–218, 258–259). Compare with 
Leibniz’s theodicy, which explains the occurrence of evil by an appeal to unity of perfection. Some have 
questioned if the unity proves too much: If God’s perfection is compatible with possible error in non-
C&D, could it not also be so with possible error in C&D (e.g., Della Rocca 2006, 145–147)? However, 
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The significance of the Fourth Meditation discussion is often not recognised in 
commentaries, partly due to the tendency of reading God’s existence and nature, as well 
as the veracity of clarity and distinctness, to have been fully settled in the Third 
Meditation. Thus, the Fourth is typically passed over rather quickly, considered more of 
a “quasi-theological interlude” than an intrinsic part of the core metaphysical-
epistemological argument. (Cress 1994, 149; Della Rocca 2006, 142. Cf. Newman 1999; 
Ragland 2007; 2016; Christofidou 2013.) Read through the cognitive exercise, however, 
it becomes rather clear why Descartes thinks it was not possible to verify clarity and 
distinctness as reliable until the Fourth Meditation. Before the problems of erroneous 
cognition and Cartesian theodicy are solved, God’s existence and nature are still in 
doubt and the meditator is incapable of escaping skepticism. In the twelfth paragraph 
of the Fourth Meditation, she is finally able to disclose unequivocally: “If […] I simply 
refrain from making a judgment in cases where I do not perceive the truth with 
sufficient clarity and distinctness, then it is clear that I am behaving correctly and 
avoiding error” (AT VII, 59; CSM II, 41; cf. Carriero 2009, 129, note 1). She likewise 
concludes in the last paragraph that “if […] I restrain my will so that it extends to what 
the intellect clearly and distinctly reveals and no further, then it is fully (plane) impossible 
for me to go wrong.” Her clear and distinct perceptions are indubitably “something (fr. 
add. réel et de positif)”; therefore, they cannot come from nothing but must be authored 
by God and, since God does not deceive, those perceptions are “undoubtedly true”. 
(AT VII, 62; CSM II, 43. Translation modified.20) The meditator then learns not only 
about the metaphysical nature of her errors and their source in the Fourth Meditation, 
but also how to unqualifiedly reach the truth by taking care to attentively focus on those 
things she understands clearly and distinctly and separate them from the ones she 
perceives only obscurely and confusedly. This is an important preliminary step in 
moving from clear and distinct persuasio to metaphysically secure and lasting scientia, 
resolving the Third Level of doubt.21 (Cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 11.) 
 
according to Descartes, the ability to err in C&D would be malicious, thus, barred by God’s omniperfection. 
Cf. Ragland 2007, 137–139; 2016, 68–73. See also Cunning 2010, 127. 
20 Della Rocca (2006; 2011) locates a new version of the Circle in the Fourth, that Descartes presupposes 
the veracity of clarity and distinctness as part of the proof for their veracity (defending a coherentist reading). 
My reading dissolves such a Circle by having the issue be not about how to distinguish between C&D and 
non-C&D but whether even C&D could be erroneous. C&D can be verified with error and theodicy 
problems sufficiently settled. Cf. Carriero 2009, 278, note 40; Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 98–100; 
Christofidou 2013, 81, note 10; Ragland 2016, 73–81; Fulmer & Ragland 2017. 
21 There might, though, be a further problem for the error and theodicy solutions. According to Descartes, 
all of God’s creation is a) non-motivationally indifferent and b) providentially pre-ordained (Principia I, §40 
and the Letter to Elizabeth, 6 October 1645: AT IV, 314, VIIIA, 20; CSM I, 206, CSMK, 272). It then 
seems that a) God could have created a world where we are indifferently free, yet do not commit errors, 
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7.3.3. Fifth and Sixth Meditation: From Cognitio to Scientia 
The final step in resolving the Third Level is taken in the Fifth Meditation. The Synopsis 
of the Fifth is very concise: “[B]esides an account of corporeal nature taken in general, 
there is a new reasoning to demonstrate the existence of God […] [and] I explain the 
sense in which it is true that the certainty even of geometrical demonstrations depends 
(pendere) on the cognition (cognitione) of God” (AT VII, 15; CSM II, 11; translation 
modified). The task is to 1) establish the reality present in her mathematical concepts 
and simple universal notions, 2) present a further reason for God’s existence, and 3) 
elevate all of her momentary cognitions to lasting scientia by evident cognition of God, 
bringing the discussion back to the Second Level of doubt for the Sixth Meditation.22 
The Meditation structure also evenly reflects this, with task 1) taking the first seven 
paragraphs, task 2) consisting of the next six, and task 3) covering the last four. 
The meditator begins the Meditation by acknowledging that despite the meditative 
progress, there are “many matters which remain to be investigated”. She is aware of the 
nature (what is inseparable from the being) of both herself and God but is not yet certain 
whether those natures constitute the full essence of either (cf. chapter 5.1). However, as 
she was finally able to unquestionably lay down her proposed truth rule in the previous 
Meditation, discovering a reliable criterion of truth, she first decides to focus her attention 
on escaping from the doubts she “fell a few days ago”, and meditate on whether she is 
able to disclose any certainty on corporeal-material nature. (AT VII, 63; CSM II, 44.)  
The first task of establishing the present reality of her mathematical notions and 
spatial simples turns out to be not that difficult by the previous meditative progress. 
Encouraged by the successful enquiry of the idea of God in her and further reassured 
by the cognitive truth rule of assenting only to what is clear and distinct, she decides to 
use a similar method to consider which of the general ideas that objectively exist in her 
thought are distinct or confused, instead of yet inquiring whether any particular material 
objects exist outside of her. The discussion continues the argument line from the First 
Meditation painter analogy, where the meditator noticed, and then suspended, certain 
repeating general features of corporeal nature such as extension, quantity, size, shape, 
location, and duration. These, along with mathematical-geometrical apprehension, 
appear to be something, whether they exist in actual nature or not, and even if she were 
dreaming, and the only thing that made her doubt them was the uncertainty of the 
source and reliability of her nature. (AT VII, 20; CSM II, 14; chapter 4.2.4. Cf. the wax; 
 
and b) our errors are indeed pre-determined by God. Cf. chapter 3.3.3. However, see Ragland 2007, 128–
132, 139–141; 2016, 51–56, 129–165, 191–235; Newman 2008, 350–351. Cf. Cunning 2010, 127; 2014, 83. 
22 Descartes states in the Synopsis that the certainty of “even geometrical demonstrations” depends on 
cognizing God, but in the text, the certainty of “all other things” depends on it (AT VII, 69; CSM II, 48). 
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chapter 5.2.) Now, with the meditative enquiry’s recent successes, however, she has 
cognitive certainty of her nature’s author, convincing her of its capacity to grasp features 
of reality precisely and accurately. The mathematical and simple notions that now appear 
“fully evident and transparent (plane nota & perspecta)” are not simply nothing, even if 
they may not exist externally, because she can grasp them clearly and evidently as 
‘something true’, such a grasp being “in harmony” with her nature. Continuing the 
discussion from the Third Meditation on certain features of thinking being innately part 
of our nature as cognising beings, she can think of these notions by will, but they appear 
impervious to her agency (AT VII, 38; CSM II, 26; cf. chapters 6.1.4 and 6.2). Thus, they 
are not simply her own invention (extension of her active willing and imagining) but 
have “true and immutable natures (veras & immutabiles naturas)” of their own.  
 
When […] I imagine a triangle, even if perhaps no such figure exists […] anywhere 
outside my thought, there is still a determinate nature, or essence, or form of the triangle 
which is immutable and eternal, and not invented by me or dependent on my mind. (AT 
VII, 64; CSM II, 44–45.) 
The Fifth Meditation is the first place where Descartes explicitly refers to the essence 
(essentia) of something, indicating a shift from the previous discussion of what is 
inseparable from a thing to what makes it the thing that it is. Now that the meditator has 
uncovered the transparency and veracity of clarity and distinctness, she no longer 
considers grasping only a partial picture of things, but their full being. She can now 
confirm her suggestion in the painter analogy that whatever these forms and simples 
are, they are at least capable of actual existence with some mind-independent reality of their 
own. What has changed from the First Meditation, though, as was the case in the Third, 
is that she does not consider them to originate from sensation anymore. “I can think up 
countless other shapes which there can be no suspicion of my ever having encountered 
through the senses, and yet I can demonstrate various properties of these shapes, just 
as I can with the triangle” (AT VII, 65; CSM II, 45). Instead of being exported from 
reality by means of the senses, the understanding and grasp of such figures and 
calculations appears to be innately part of the meditator as a cognising being. 
Nevertheless, they demonstrate the existence of some reality independent of her thoughts. 
This also applies to the spatial-temporal simples, briefly mentioned in the beginning of 
the Fifth Meditation, but as their previous connection with external sensory reality is 
still suspended, they are fused together with the subject-matter of pure arithmetic, 
mathematising the general nature of spatial-temporality.23 (AT VII, 63–65; CSM II, 44–
45. Cf. the Sixth Meditation: AT VII, 80; CSM II, 55.) 
 
23 “Temporality” is not to be taken too literally here. For Descartes, time is a modification of the mind to 
measure duration, which is not fully distinct from existence. Cf. AT VIIIA, 27; CSM I, 212; Gorham 2018. 
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The discussion then develops to the second task of elaborating God’s existence 
further, producing what is typically called the ontological argument for God’s existence. “[The 
idea of God is] within me just as surely as the idea of any shape or number. And […] 
that it belongs to his nature that he always exists is no less clear and distinct than […] 
that some property belongs to [their] nature.” (AT VII, 65; CSM II, 45.) A natural 
question is, why does the meditator require this further elaboration of God’s existence? 
God was already demonstrated to exist in the Third Meditation and reconciled with our 
actual and potential errors in the Fourth, so the second task might appear as a gratuitous 
repetition. However, as even the Second Causal argument includes some derivation, 
God’s existence might still appear less intuitive and immediate than her own existence 
or even the geometric and arithmetic concepts. The intention of the further ontological 
realisation is to help the meditator cognise God’s existence as transparently clear, self-
evident, and immediately intuitive as her self-awareness was in the Second Meditation. 
As such, calling it an ‘argument’, or even a ‘proof’, is misleading, as it would have been 
in the case of the meditator’s existence in the Second (in the Synopsis, Descartes in fact 
refers to it as a ratio instead of an argumentum: AT VII, 15; CSM II, 11).24 
Descartes admits in the First Replies being worried about the inclusion of the 
ontological realisation. He is trying to appeal to “a variety of different minds” (among 
them theists and atheists, practiced thinkers and novices, skeptics and non-skeptics, 
Aristotelians and mechanists), many of whom might struggle with discovering the innate 
idea of God and be unable to intuitively grasp his existence through his essence (AT 
VII, 120; CSM II, 85; cf. chapter 1.2.3). However, an intuitive grasp of God is also 
essential for stabilising the meditator’s persuasion into firm and lasting scientia. 
[My readers] should reflect on the fact that the ideas of all other natures contain possible 
existence, whereas the idea of God contains not only possible but wholly necessary 
existence. This alone, without a formal argument, will make them realize that God exists; and 
this will eventually be just as self-evident to them as the fact that the number two is even 
[…]. For there are certain truths which some people find self-evident, while others come 
to understand them only by means of a formal argument. (Second Replies: AT VII, 163–
164; CSM II, 115. Emphasis added.) 
Different readers find different truths self-evident with less exercise than others, so 
some may intuitively and immediately grasp God’s existence already by the Third 
Meditation’s formal arguments. However, Descartes recognises that perceiving God 
intuitively might still be difficult for certain (maybe most) meditators at the end of the 
Third and the Fourth. The Fifth’s ontological realisation enables those who struggle 
with the clarity and distinctness of God’s existence by the formal arguments to grasp it 
 
24 Like with the cogito, we can produce a logical proof for God after the Meditations. Cf. chapter 5.1.2. 
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with a single, immediate intuition. Still, such readers initially benefit from the Third, 
because, if exercised correctly, it should allow anyone but the most cantankerous reader 
to embrace God’s actual infinity, without which the Fifth’s intuitive grasping would not 
be possible. The order of the ‘proofs’ in the meditative exercise is not arbitrary – we 
would be incapable of the Fifth’s recognition without the cognitive effort of the Third. 
The ontological realisation also allows for a more simple and self-evident intuition of 
the same truth even for those who did intuitively grasp God’s existence in the Third. 
One then relies on the meditative exercise, “deliberately altered” from Descartes’s 
earlier methods of explanation, to make the matter manifest by careful attention and 
repeated cognitive effort, directing the mental gaze correctly as if remembering 
something that was present all along. (AT VII, 120; CSM II, 85. Cf. Nolan & Nelson 
2006, 112–113; Cunning 2010, 103–105, chapter 6; Secada 2013. See chapter 6.2.3.) 
There has been much commentary on the ontological ‘argument’ over the years (e.g., 
Gueroult 1953; B. Williams 2015; Nolan & Nelson 2006; Carriero 2009; Cunning 2010; 
Nolan 2020).25 I will concentrate on how its discovery allows progress from cognitive 
to metaphysical certainty. The meditator initially experiences the single and immediate 
intuition of God’s existence on the same cognitive level as mathematics and her own 
existence: “Even if it turned out that not everything on which I have meditated in these 
past days is true, I ought still to regard the existence of God as having at least the same 
level of certainty as I have hitherto attributed to the truth of mathematics”.26 Recall that 
the realm of cognitively certain conviction was discovered independently from the 
verification of the truth rule (see chapter 6.1). Similarly, this intuitive cognitive certainty 
of God’s existence does not presuppose that clear and distinct perceptions are true, 
because whether or not they are verified, the intuitive grasp of God is at least as certain 
and obvious (more obvious than the First Meditation ones) as her grasp of her existence 
and nature is, as “the nature of my mind is such that I cannot but assent to these things, 
at least so long as I clearly perceive them” (AT VII, 65–66; CSM II, 45).27 
 
25 Like the causal proofs, ontological recognition is to improve from the Scholastic arguments. Anselm 
famously argued the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived demonstrating both God’s 
existence and nature by a single self-evident argument (Pros., preface, 2–5). Contemporary Gaunilo (fl. 11th 
century) expressed the famous “Lost Island” version of the argument that, by the same logic, would also 
have to exist. Anselm, though, considered Gaunilo to have missed the point. (Pro Ins. and Resp.) Anselm’s 
argument was again criticized by Aquinas, in part because of his view that we do not know the nature or 
essence of God, after which it was regarded as lifeless for several centuries (ST I, Q.2, a.1). It is no wonder 
Descartes was more drawn towards Anselm’s meditative way than Aquinas’s synthetic, as the former 
provides us with God’s nature as well as his existence. Cf. T. Williams 2016; Oppy 2020. See Nolan 2020. 
26 Cf. Second Replies where Descartes compares the grasp of God to the cogito (AT VII, 151; CSM II, 107). 
27 Recall also that cognitive certainty is not merely having a psychological urge to assent. When I think that 
something is the case, my thought seems to grasp what is real. See chapter 5.1. Compare with Stoic 
cognitive impressions (chapter 2.1.1). 
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However, as argued, that an intuition is immediate does not mean that it would be 
readily or instantly available. Indeed, at first sight, that existence belongs to God’s 
essence is not transparently evident (perspicuum), but by careful concentration it can 
become so, after which God’s existence can no more be separated from his essence than 
that “three angles equal two right angles” can be separated from the essence of a triangle. 
The meditator concludes by attentively meditating on her concept of God that it is not 
the proofs that provide us conviction but perceiving intuitively and self-evidently – 
particularly that God’s omniperfect, actually infinite essence contains necessary 
existence – that ultimately “completely convinces her”. However, while God’s existence 
is self-evident, in fact the most self-evident of all, perceiving it clearly and distinctly 
takes considerable mental effort from most meditators due to our tendency to be 
preoccupied and “overwhelmed” by preconceived opinions. If this was not the case, 
God’s existence could be acknowledged before and with much less meditative labour. 
As things stand though, the meditator is required to start with what is easy to grasp self-
evidently (her own existence and nature) and progress from there to what takes more 
time and attentive effort. (AT VII, 66–69; CSM II, 46–47. Cf. chapters 1.2.2 and 6.2.3.) 
Now we are also closing in on the looming Cartesian Circle. The Circle has generated 
mountains of literature and solution attempts, most of which I will be unable to address.  
However, as I take my reading to relocate the problematic part of the Circle – the question 
is not how God’s existence is proven by clarity and distinctness and vice versa but how 
cognition of God can become scientia of God – I highlight a few recent solutions I find 
promising for the redefined problem. A prominent line, traced to Gewirth’s influential 
account (1941), is to have the initial cognitio (persuasio) ground the emergence of the 
metaphysical certainty of scientia. Carriero (2009, 347–358) reads that recognising the 
metaphysical underpinnings of cognition (God exists and is a non-deceiver, clear and 
distinct perceptions are verifiably true, etc) elevates one’s condition from momentary 
true cognition to systematic, enduring, and stable understanding of one’s place as a 
knower in the world (like mooring a castle in air). Andrea Christofidou (2013, 183–186) 
suggests that the meditator can grasp God’s existence with a single intuition, running 
like an uninterrupted thread from the cognition of one’s mind to the cognition of God, 
elevating the epistemic state from (in her terms, time-bound) cognitio to (tenseless) 
scientia. Georges Dicker (2013, 170–176) considers that since the radical doubt rests on 
the use of reason, it can be overcome by subtracting the grounds for doubt until those 
hypotheses no longer make sense (cognising that a non-deceiving God exists removes 
the reason to doubt that our C&D perceptions are true). (Cf. Forsman 2019, 111–112.28) 
 
28 Allison Simmons and Calvin Normore defended a similar solution in private conversations. Cunning 
(2010; 2014) hints along these lines as well: The pre-scientia meditator is simply confused when conceiving 
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I am sympathetic to this line of reading, particularly the one resting on removing the 
reasons for doubt, as it goes well with my description of the difference between mere 
persuasion and absolutely certain knowledge to be in whether there remains ground for 
doubt (cf. chapter 3.4.2). However, a problem still remains: Since even my most self-
evident grasping might be deceptive, how do I know my cognition of God’s existence 
and non-deception is not just one more unreliable intuition? Could I not, once the clear 
conviction fades, once again call into question God’s existence due to my possession of 
a potentially deceptive nature? Even if my cognitive thread would be uninterrupted and 
my grasp as immediate and intuitive as possible, as long as my understanding of God is 
merely cognitively certain and strongly persuasive, metaphysical scientia remains remote.  
How does the meditator then elevate her cognitive state from persuasio to scientia? I 
suggest that the key lies in God’s actual infinitude, retained to a degree in the concept 
of God we possess. Unlike all of the meditator’s other ideas, which contain only 
potential existence, the idea of God, clearest and most evident of all of the meditator’s 
ideas, marred only by her clinging to preconceived opinions, contains necessary existence 
as part of its nature due to omniperfection and included actual infinity. This actual 
infinitude provides the recognition of God’s necessary existence, forcing on her that 
she is not its cause and that the formal equivalent of the objective concept must exist 
outside of her mind. Since (at least part of) the perfect infinity is contained in the concept 
(per the formal-objective model and PCA), recognition of it provides the means to 
confirm the metaphysical existence of something external by means more stable and 
solid than just conviction, like actually getting a hold of, not merely glimpsing, the thing 
in question. This raises the meditator’s cognitive state from cognising to actually knowing 
God’s existence and essence, which similarly elevates all her clear and distinct cognitions 
to the same level because God’s essence includes that he does not deceive. (AT VII, 46, 
53, V, 356–357; CSM II, 31–32, CSMK, 377–378. Cf. Christofidou 2013, 183.) 
An obvious objection is how can a finite being come to understand actual infinity 
(e.g., Caterus and Gassendi: AT VII, 96–97, 286; CSM II, 69–70, 200)? During the 
causal arguments, Descartes draws a distinction between understanding (intelligere) and 
comprehending (comprehendere): One can understand infinity as a perfection without 
 
God as a deceiver (a faulty being) – ‘powerful deceiver’ is a contradiction and could not severe our 
cognitive access to reality. Cf. Gómez-Alonso (2011). Along with Gewirth, these solutions can be read as 
a continuation of the “reason validating itself” tradition, influenced by Frankfurt (but note that Frankfurt’s 
own solution to the Circle rested more on his reading of Descartes as a coherentist, viewing him as wishing 
to solve the science vs. revelation problem due to Galileo’s conviction; 2008, 235–256). Cf. Loeb (1986) 
who suggests Descartes to have been insincere about God’s role in the veracity of clear and distinct. 
However, the Letter to Mersenne, 15 April 1630 clearly indicates the metaphysical and epistemological 
questions to precede the physical ones and even Galileo’s condemnation. (AT I, 144, CSMK, 22). Cf. 
Alanen 2000, 260, note 15. 
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having a complete comprehension of the infinite (AT VII, 46; CSM II, 32). Even by the 
meditator’s direct intuition with which God’s infinity confronts our thought, we can 
never truly reach (attingere) God’s full essence but must consider it in “small quarters”. 
Descartes uses the following analogy to describe the issue in a 1630 Letter to Mersenne:  
We can touch a mountain with our hands, but we cannot put our arms around it as we 
could put them around a tree […]. To comprehend (comprendre) something is to embrace 
(embrasser) it in one’s thought; to understand (sçavoir) something, it is sufficient to touch 
(toucher) it with one’s thought. (AT I, 152; CSMK, 25. Translation modified.29) 
Descartes’s language here suggests a certain following of the Stoic tradition of katalēpsis: 
I can grasp something by getting in contact with it but can fully comprehend it only by 
immersing it in my thought. However, since I am finite, I can never embrace full infinity 
in my thought, being only able to superficially graze it. Nevertheless, though my thought 
cannot embrace, it can still be in touch with God’s actual infinity, and this is enough for 
moving from cognitio to scientia. (Cf. AT V, 356, VII, 113–114; CSM II, 81–82; CSMK, 
378; Nolan 2014, 130. See chapter 2.1.1.30) 
By the end of the Fifth Meditation, the meditator no longer possesses merely 
persuading cognition but absolutely firm scientia of God’s existence. Concentrating on 
God’s necessary existence, the meditator can move from the unstable grasp of persuasion 
to discovering the metaphysical basis of veracious perceiving and, finally, unravel the 
Third Level of doubt about the potential deviousness of her nature. God’s simultaneous 
existence and essence as the creator of the meditator’s cognitive nature verifies both 
earlier convictions and occurring C&D perceptions, removing all counter objections, 
and elevates all of the meditator’s persuasio (including of her existence and nature) to 
scientia, morphing her into the Cartesian scientist. (AT VII, 69–71; CSM II, 48–49.) 
I established earlier (chapter 3.4.1) that God’s created eternal truths not being in 
contradiction with our clear and distinct perceptions is essential for Descartes’s 
cognitive project. However, some have called this conformity suspect based on 
Descartes’s certain turns of phrase in the Second Replies. 
 
29 CSMK translates sçavoir as “to know”, but whether Descartes uses it in the same sense as science is unclear. 
30 Cf. Fifth Objections and Replies and Letter to Hyperaspistes, August 1641: AT III, 430, VII, 287, 364–
365; CSM II, 200, 252, CSMK, 195. See also SPQ: 1998, 82–83. Note that only God has existence as one 
of his “features”. See Gassendi’s criticism (AT VII, 323; CSM II, 224) and Kant (A598/B626; 2000, 567). 
Cf. Carriero 2009, 195. There might be a further problem for coming to know God through his infinite 
essence: How can a finite mind contain actual infinity, even objectively? Descartes never settles this question. 
Wagner (2014) has recently suggested a solution to the Circle where the meditator has numerically the 
same thoughts as God due to veridical perception elevating the human nature “into the sharing of divine 
nature”. Cf. Secada 2013. While sort of similar to my own, I find such solution ‘mysticistic’ and 
inconsistent with Descartes’s metaphysics. See Comments: AT VIIIB, 362–363; CSM I, 306. 
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[A]s soon as we think that we correctly perceive something, we are spontaneously 
convinced (sponte persuademus) that it is true. Now if this conviction is so firm that it is 
impossible for us to ever have any reason for doubting what we are convinced of, then 
there are no further questions for us to ask […] What is it to us that someone may make 
out (fingat) that the perception whose truth we are so firmly convinced of may appear 
false to God or an angel, so that it is, absolutely speaking, false? […] For the supposition 
which we are making here is of a conviction so firm that it is quite incapable of being 
destroyed; and such a conviction is clearly the same as the most perfect certainty. […] 
For the evident clarity of our perceptions does not allow us to listen to anyone who 
makes up this kind of story. (AT VII, 145–146; CSM II, 103–104. Emphasis added.) 
Descartes seems to shun the possible skeptical scenario of reality appearing different to 
God or an angle compared to us, so certain commentators, Frankfurt most famously, 
suggest that what he is truly after in the Meditations is not metaphysical conformity of 
our thinking with the created world but instead the inherent consistency of our 
thoughts. If ‘perfect certainty’ is simply synonymous with spontaneous conviction, 
which could be “absolutely speaking false”, we could not in the absolute sense know 
whether God deceives us or not. (Frankfurt 2008, 248–249; 1977. Cf. Bennett 1994.) 
However, as argued, such a result would be devastating for the Meditations project. 
For the metaphysical basis of cognition to actually work as a metaphysical basis, the 
sum of the three angles of a triangle must be 180 degrees because a) God has created 
my cognitive nature so, and b) it is part of the reality as God has ordained. So, what is 
behind the “God or an angel” passage, or as I like to call it, the Angel scenario?31 Notice 
that Descartes does not dismiss the scenario as a legitimate option inside the meditative 
exercise but instead as a fable (fingerem) someone else has created. Use of the same Latin 
root fingere as with the Demon supposition (see chapter 4.5) indicates that the Angel, 
like the Demon and madness, is an unconvincing scenario. However, unlike madness, 
which has a transitional function, and the Demon, which acts as a psychological 
instrument, the Angel scenario serves no purpose, especially after the meditative project 
has already reached its end, and can just be dismissed out of hand as ridiculous. We do 
not possess convincing reasons for doubt after discovering scientia, and even if someone 
tried to offer such, it would be like an alien speaking in a language we do not understand, 
as our reasons for the opposite are so strong that our will simply does not go for the 
doubt or suspension. (See AT VII, 164; CSM II, 116. Cf. Cunning 2010; 2014.32) 
 
31 Also known as the “limited aims passage” and, due to Frankfurt’s heavy reliance on it, “Harry’s Angels” 
passage. Note that the Angel scenario differs from both the God and the Demon: It posits the possibility 
of a purer enquirer, from whose viewpoint what we consider as the evident truth by our conviction is no 
truth at all. Cf. Gomez-Alonso 2011, 23. 
32 Cf. also Kenny 1968, 195; Frankfurt 2008, 35–36; E. Curley 1978, 108–111; B. Williams 2015, 185; M. 
Wilson 1978, 135, note 42; Hatfield 2006, 134–135; Carriero 1997, 5; 2009, 352–353; Wagner 2014, 33–
34. As noted, God’s non-motivational indifference may, though, indicate that God could deceive. If God 
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This reading is not meant as a fully fleshed solution to the Circle – such is beyond 
this work’s reach. It is, instead, to help clarify the inherent problem of the Circle and 
point towards a coherent solution to it. One of the advantages of the skeptical meditative 
reading, then, is that it also allows for a better understanding of, and a potential solution 
to, the Circle as well. (Cf. Forsman 2019, 111–112.) 
By the end of the Fifth Meditation, the discussion has cleared all three Agrippan 
horns: We have learned to trust our self-evident, clear and distinct intuitions that justify 
themselves in the Second Meditation (the regressive horn), established not only the clarity 
and distinctness but why clarity and distinctness is reliable in the Third and the Fourth 
(the axiomatic horn) and, finally, avoided the circular horn by elevating a strongly persuasive 
conviction to actual knowledge through God’s infinite nature in the Fifth. We know 
that our cognitive nature is created by a non-deceiving God and know how to avoid 
error, so we can trust clear and distinct perceptions. (Cf. Principia I, §30: AT VIIIA, 16–
17; CSM I, 203.) Clearing Agrippa’s trilemma resolves the Third Level of doubt, 
returning the discussion to the Second Level of moderate external world skepticism and 
(clear and distinct) content dogmatism. Such a return is indicated by the meditator 
asking herself at the end of the Fifth Meditation, “[c]an one raise the objection I put to 
myself a while ago, that I may be dreaming, or that everything which I am now thinking 
has as little truth as what comes to the mind of one who is asleep?”, retorting “[e]ven 
though I might be dreaming, if there is anything which is evident to my intellect, then 
it is wholly true”. (AT VII, 70–71; CSM, 48–49.) Likewise, the beginning of the Sixth 
posits that material things “are capable of existing” in so far as they belong to created 
eternal truths of corporeal nature (geometrical-mathematics and spatial-durational 
simples) and do not consider whether the things actually exist or not.  
For there is no doubt that God is capable of creating everything [I clearly perceive]; and 
I have never judged that something could not be not be made by him except on the 
grounds that there would be a contradiction in my perceiving it distinctly. (AT VII, 71; 
CSM II, 50).  
The  main part of the meditative goal – gaining a metaphysical foundation for 
veridical knowledge claims – has, thus, been acquried through God foundationalism and 
 
is capable of making our experience of freedom and his divine providence to be true at the same time, 
without us understanding how (Principia I, §40–41: AT VIIIA, 20; CSM I, 206; cf. AT IV, 314; CSMK, 
272), how do we know he has not made it true that his concept excludes deception while being capable of 
deception. See note 21. However, note that Descartes’s point seems to be that God would not grant us 
something detrimental, i.e., would not do us harm. Our nature and essence is to think – and not just to think 
but to grasp reality with our thinking. If God would make us clearly and distinctly cognise things that are 
not true, he would create in us a false nature. The same applies if God would decree us being deceived 
“good”. See Ragland 2016, 9, 51–56; 2014, 83–84. Cf. Schmaltz 2014; Koistinen 2014. See also Forsman 
2016. 
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its externalist ground over merely internalist conviction, providing scientia about 
everything cognitively certain.33 
 
33 However, the meditative journey is not over yet, continuing in the Sixth Meditation by clarifying the last 
remaining questionable cognitive abilities – sensation and imagination – especially in perceiving material 
bodies (including a long discussion on habitual false beliefs) and providing a more detailed account of the 
way the meditator constitutes two distinct ways of being (including a long discussion on possession of a 
potentially defective causal mechanism, roughly equivalent to madness in the First Meditation). By 
discovering the natures and essences of herself and her creator in the Fifth Meditation, the meditator has 
been able to uncover the ‘principles’ on which to base true and certain beliefs – ‘I’ (herself as a praecise 
cognizing being) and God (the author of her being, AT VII, 77–78; CSM II, 54). However, due to still 
generally distrusting her sensations, even the required third ‘principle’ for dissolving the Second Level of 
doubt – body – cannot be grasped by imagination or sensation, either (i.e., by Scholastic means). Unlike 
the ‘I’ and God, both of which were intuitive realisations instead of demonstrative inferences, the proof 
for corporeal body is demonstrative, based on the natures of the previous two. Our God-given “bodily” 
inclinations cannot be corrected (being incorrigible by any other capacity of our nature as a cognitive being), 
and God’s non-deceiving nature guarantees our inclinations to be true (whereas cases like dropsy or 
madness are both defects, which can be corrected by being in a defectless state – healthy or sane). If our 
natural inclinations would lead to error, God would be a deceiver. Considering these issues makes the 
meditator recognise her full cognitive nature. In cases of both dreaming and occasional sensory errors, I can 
also use my other senses, memory, and intellect to correct what my senses tell me or what I think I sense 
but only dream, clearing the Second Level of doubt. However, as mentioned, the First Level of OSE cases 
can never be fully settled due to the weakness of human nature and the urge to get actions done. Just as 
with causal defects, we cannot always expect to be in an optimal position to make the right judgment or 
have the opportunity to perform meticulous checks and, thus, must acknowledge our proneness, despite 
our best efforts, to making mistakes. (AT VII, 83–90; CSM II, 57–62.) See chapters 1.2.2, 4.1.3, and 6.1.4. 
Cf. Carriero 2009, 359–361. 
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8. Conclusion: After the Meditations 
What is the position where the meditator, and the reader, is supposed to be left after 
going through the meditative exercise? The experience is to be transformative, so even the 
common-sense world should appear to the meditator as if through a “new set of eyes”. 
However, is she to see the common-sense world completely differently or was her initial 
common-sense perspective right about certain things but needed to be improved? 
What if the skeptical doubts would ever return in our everyday life? Would we have 
to try and reach the cognitive peaks all over again? This would seem extremely difficult 
because, according to Descartes, we hardly ever experience C&D cognitive peaks in 
everyday (embodied) life and cannot afford to wait for such in order to get things done 
(e.g., AT VIIIA, 5; CSM I, 193). Would we then have to go through the exercise again? 
I discuss these issues in this conclusive chapter while also drawing some closing 
remarks on my reading of the meditative skeptical exercise and its intended effect on 
us. I start with the first issue – how deeply is our common-sense perspective of the 
world we inhabit changed – and then move on to discuss the second issue of how we 
are to replicate the results in everyday embodied life if needed. 
8.1. Cartesian Epochē vs. Common-Sense ‘Teachings of Nature’ 
There are at least two ways to see the cognitive exercise’s impact on our everyday, 
common-sense perspective of the world. In the first, common-sense is just a mass of 
confused colours, sounds, temperatures, and what not, misconceiving the true physical 
reality of fluid corpuscularian-extended matter and its motions. In the second, the 
common-sense perspective gets something right about the physical reality but it must be 
improved upon. In the first way, the cognitive meditative exercise has a clearly larger 
impact on our everyday life, altering it completely, than in the second one, where it 
simply enhances our understanding and knowledge of the world around us, leaving it 
somewhat as it was before the exercise began while refining certain aspects of our 
relation with it. I argue in this chapter for the second to be the best way to understand 
the transformative feature of the exercise.1 
 
1 This interpretative question is related to the understanding of reductivism in Cartesian physics. All 
complexity is ‘reducible’ to matter and motion in Descartes’s picture. Hard reductionism, for which most of 
the scholarship has opted, reads this ‘reducibility’ making the world less intricate: The world is just matter 
and motion. Softer reductionism (e.g., Brown & Normore 2019) sees this ‘reducibility’ not taking away from 
the richness of the world we encounter in our everyday life but to make it more intricate by explaining the 
complex patterns that comprise encountered physical reality. 
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Part of the exercise with the Cartesian epochē is to recognise and separate cognitive 
clarity from natural inclinations, or teachings of nature. When we initially come across 
these inclinations in the Third Meditation, we habitually consider them to also include 
the sensory resemblance model of RPS. However, these teachings of nature prove 
indispensable to our full essence as human beings in the Sixth, unrestrained from the 
Second Meditation praecise sense – a closely joined, “intermingled (permixtum)” unit of 
(cognising) mind and (extended) body. The inclinations are hardwired in us by a non-
deceiving God; thus, they depict and guide our everyday life accurately, at least for the 
most part. (AT VII, 81–82; CSM II, 56–57. See chapters 4.1.2, 6.1.4, and 7.3.3.)   
Revisiting a theme that was touched quickly on in the Second Meditation (5.1.3), the 
meditator should raise the question of what it is to be human, so (by the redefined full 
essence of the Sixth Meditation) a closely conjoined unit of two distinct ways of being (cf. 
Carriero 2009, 360). As a compound, her rashly made habitual judgments may mislead 
her to make false conclusions on the mental side, or her body may have a causal defect, 
a faulty corporeal clockwork, that obstructs the composite nature from working as it 
should on the corporeal side (e.g., madness or dropsy, chapters 4.2.1 and 7.3.3). 
However, while the corporeal causal defects are somewhat unavoidable (our bodies are 
not always in optimal condition), we can train out of the habit of misusing our 
inclinations and judgment-making capacity by an attentive reorientation of our cognitive 
framework. We know the RPS model does not depict reality accurately, so we can learn 
to separate habitual false beliefs from real teachings of nature. (Principia I, §70–75: AT 
VIIIA, 34–39; CSM I, 218–221.) This does not mean that after exiting the meditation 
for the final time, we would stop taking trees and lakes to actually exist in our vicinity, 
but would be more aware of the intricate levels of complexity in them, and how that 
visible world differs from the metaphysical and physical reality that makes it. Instead of 
robbing us of the everyday world’s majesty, the exercise makes us appreciate it more. 
In fact, we cannot understand this composite nature fully in the Cartesian epochē. 
Descartes explains to Elizabeth in 1643 that we have three “primitive” ideas or notions: 
of the soul, of the body, and of the union between these two. Of the first two notions, 
the mental soul “is conceived only by the pure intellect”, while the corporeal body “can 
likewise be known by the intellect alone, but much better by the intellect aided by the 
imagination”. However, “what belongs to the union of the soul and the body is known 
only obscurely by the intellect alone or even by the intellect aided by the imagination, 
but it is known very clearly by the senses”. (AT III, 691–692; CSMK, 226–227.) 
[P]eople who never philosophize and use only their senses have no doubt that the soul 
moves the body and that the body acts on the soul. They regard both of them as a single 
thing, that is to say, they conceive (fr. conçoivent) their union; because to conceive the union 
between two things is to conceive them as one single thing. (AT III, 692; CSMK, 227.) 
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Mathematical thinking and imaginative capacity aids in conceiving the corporeal side 
and the Cartesian epochē helps to conceive the mental side and the real distinction. 
However, their union cannot be perceived with either intellectual meditation or 
imaginative mathematical grasping. We cannot cognitively perceive we are so 
compounded; we can only experience it in our everyday actions.  
Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure intellect, help to familiarize us with the 
notion of the soul; and the study of mathematics, which exercises mainly the imagination 
in the consideration of shapes and motions, accustoms us to form very distinct notions 
of body. But it is the ordinary course of life and conversation, and abstention from 
meditation and from the study of the things which exercise the imagination, that teaches 
us how to conceive the union of the soul and the body. (AT VII, 692; CSMK, 227.) 
The essentiality of the ordinary course of life also explains why the meditative effort 
is to be attempted only once. Descartes advises us to spend only “a few hours a day on 
in the thoughts which occupy the imagination” and “a few hours a year on those which 
occupy the intellect alone” (AT VII, 692–693; CSMK, 227), clarifying in the Conversation: 
A point to note is that one should not devote so much effort to the Meditations and to 
metaphysical questions […]. It is sufficient to have grasped them once in a general way, 
and then to remember the conclusion. Otherwise, they draw the mind too far away from 
physical and observable things, and make it unfit to study them. Yet it is just these 
physical studies that it is most desirable for people to pursue, since they would yield 
abundant benefits for life. (AT V, 165; CSMK, 346.) 
Note that Descartes does not mean here that philosophy in general should be done 
only rarely – for him, physics and other natural sciences are equally philosophy. His 
point is that once the stable metaphysical basis has been discovered and the principles 
of veridical cognition are set in place, one does not have to search for them all over 
again; thus, the exercise is a once-in-a-lifetime occurrence. Nevertheless, as the 
meditative contemplation is separated from the conduct of life during the exercise, with 
everyday common sense staying the same in our ordinary way of being, the world that 
we return to after the exercise is very much the same as it was when we entered it for 
the first time, only with a layer of metaphysical intricacy added/corrected. What the 
transformative character of the exercise does is to lead us away from the wrong way of 
seeing the world, clearing away the misguided principles of Aristotelianism and the 
resemblance assumption of folk naïve realism. In this sense, “nothing is restored back 
the way it was”: We better understand the world around us at a more fundamental level 
(i.e., we stop being naïve realists). (Cf. Christofidou 2013, 10.) 
However, common-sense is not overturned. A completely new alien realm of 
colourless corpuscules and mechanical motions has not replaced and overtaken the 
earlier reality of tables, chairs, and coffee mugs. We have shed most of the false beliefs 
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from our cognitive habits and have learned new appreciation for the complexity that 
produces the world around us. We still see the same tables, chairs, and mugs, but know 
there to be more to reality than just that (e.g., we know that an apple’s red colour is 
simply light reflecting from it in a certain way and not a real attribute of it). (See Principia 
I, §66–68: AT VIIIA, 32–33; CSM I, 216–217. Cf. Broughton 2002, 196–202; Carriero 
2009; Brown & Normore 2019. Contra, e.g., Bermúdez 1997; Grene 1999 562–563.) 
8.2. Beyond the Meditations: Knowledge, Tranquility, and 
Happiness in Everyday Life 
There is a further aspect to the exercise’s transformative character: It is to benefit even 
practical life by making us vigilant about our native urges when considering the world 
around us, helping us avoid judgmental errors and the associated regret and irresolution, 
teaching us to live a morally good, tranquil, and happy life (cf. Fine 2000; Brown 2013). 
   This raises the question of how are the meditative results to be repeated in everyday 
life, when one rarely, if ever, has C&D perception and must make decisions in which 
the balance of reasons is not forcibly weighted on either side, not even by plausibility.  
As far as the conduct of life is concerned, I am very far from thinking that we should 
assent only to what is clearly perceived. On the contrary, I do not think that we should 
always wait even for probable truths; from time to time we will have to choose one of 
many alternatives about which we have no knowledge, and once we have made our 
choice, so long as no reasons against it can be produced, we must stick to it as firmly as 
if it had been chosen for transparently clear reasons. (Second Replies: AT VII, 149; CSM 
II, 106. Cf. AT VI, 25, VIIIA, 5; CSM I, 123, 193.) 
Suspension during the exercise is a moral responsibility but irresolution is to be avoided 
in everyday life as blameworthy and even a vice (AT XI, 459–460; CSM I, 390–391; cf. 
AT V, 159; CSMK, 342; chapter 3.3.4). However, what if the skeptical doubts take hold 
of us again; could even the most hardened man in the street be susceptible to a sudden 
skeptical seizure? It does not seem we should rehearse the meditation all over, as the 
exercise is a “one and done” deal. How, then, are the results supposed to guide our life? 
   First, let me reiterate what possessing scientia is for Descartes. It is not actively 
rehearsing the steps leading to God’s existence but requires a single intuitive cognitive peak, 
enabling transparency not only on that we are certain but also on why we are certain, 
which allows for an external ground for all our veracious cognition. The task, after such 
cognitive peak is reached, is not to train the mind to summon the peak again easily and 
effortlessly whenever skeptical doubts take hold but to rehearse it to distinguish clear 
thinking and a true cognitive grasp from mere cognitive non-sense and protect itself from 
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the latter. Possessing scientia outside of the cognitive exercise is, then, due not to 
reaching the peak every time I wonder about the reliability of my cognitive basis but to 
having trained my mind to guard against pure, cognitive poppycock. (Cf. chapter 7.3.2) 
   The same thing extends to making morally right decisions in everyday life. 
Descartes says in a 1645 Letter to Elizabeth that virtue consists of the right collaboration 
between the understanding and the will according to three conditions (loosely related 
to the “provisional moral code” in the Discourse, see chapter 2.5.2): first, “always try to 
employ [your] mind as well as [you] can to discover what [you] should or should not do 
in all the circumstances of life”; second, “have a firm and constant resolution to carry 
out whatever reason recommends without being diverted by […] passions or appetites; 
and third, “[thus guiding yourself], by reason, all the good things which [you do not] 
possess are one and all entirely outside [your] power”. The third is important since 
“nothing can impede our contentment except desire and regret or repentance”, but “if 
we always do whatever reason tells us, even if events show us afterwards that we have 
gone wrong, we will never have any grounds for repentance, because it was not our own 
fault”. Thus, by training the mind to use the power of understanding the best it can, and 
the power of the will to firmly follow what the reason recommends, we become 
accustomed to not desiring things that are outside of our agency. Such mental practice 
prepares the mind against irresolution, which easily leads to doubt and regret. 
“[E]xcess of irresolution results from too great a desire to do well and from a weakness 
of the intellect, which contains only a lot of confused notions and none that are clear and 
distinct. That is why remedy against such excess is to become accustomed to form certain 
and determinate judgements regarding everything that becomes before us, and to believe 
that we always do our duty when we do what we judge to be best, even though our 
judgement may perhaps be a very bad one. (Passions III, §170: AT XI, 460; CSM I, 391.) 
Note that firmness and resolution by themselves are insufficient for virtue. Acting 
morally right in everyday life requires the best possible use of our intellectual capacity, 
which we have trained to distinguish between clear and confused cognition. If we just 
randomly pick a direction and firmly follow it, we would be morally blameworthy, 
regardless of the direction turning out right; we would not be using our capacity of 
judgment correctly. Of course, even using our understanding to the best of our ability, 
we might still end up making the wrong choice – we cannot anticipate metaphysical 
security or evident cognitive conviction in everyday life actions but have to rely on moral 
certainty, which, while typically sufficient, might get things wrong from time to time. 
Nevertheless, we can escape being blamed for vice and error and avoid regret and 
 
2 Consider the Angel scenario (chapter 7.3.3). Remembering the results of the exercise and training the 
mind to vigilance, such cognitive non-sense simply carries no convincing evidence for the will to follow. 
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repentance by striving to reach the best judgment possible and acting resolutely based 
on that judgment. (AT IV, 264–266; CSMK, 257–258. Cf. AT VI, 23–28; CSM I, 122–
125. See chapters 1.3, 2.5.2 and 3.3.4; cf. Naaman-Zauderer 2010, 183.) 
Happiness (la béatitude) for Descartes is the result of such virtuous, resolute, and non-
regretful living, consisting of “a perfectly content and satisfied mind” (AT IV, 264; 
CSMK, 257; cf. AT V, 83; CSMK, 325–326). Like the Stoics and the ancient skeptics, 
Descartes thinks that happiness consists of a certain kind of tranquility, a contented 
state free from disturbances that work as obstacles for our felicity.3 A happy and 
contented life is the intended result of the skeptical inquiry just as much for Descartes 
as it is for the ancients (see chapter 2.1). However, Descartes is not an eudaemonist; the 
highest good in this life for him is not the attainment of happiness but the right and 
virtuous use of our judgmental capacity, resolute practice of our free agency, and the 
contemplation of the truth (AT IV, 275–285, 304, V, 82–83; CSMK, 261–264, 268, 324–
325; cf. Regulae and Third Meditation: AT VII, 52, X, 361; CSM I, 10, II, 36). Using such 
a practice, we can eventually reach such a stable and lasting containment and tranquility, 
even in this life, that our state of mind cannot be simply altered by sad events and 
misfortunes (AT IV, 236–237, 309; CSMK, 253, 270). Virtue is essential for lasting 
happiness, not the other way around. (Cf. Davis 2001; Araujo 2003, 199–203; Naaman-
Zauderer 2010, 183–204; Svensson 2011; 2015; 2019; Brown 2013, 42; Vitz 2015.) 
In summary, the meditative task is to train both cognition and will into distinguishing 
errorless from erroneous cognition and to rehearse their power to protect from 
cognitive gibberish. The cognitive, meditative exercise is to have a lasting, 
transformative effect both cognitively and morally, benefitting us not just with the 
proper cognitive basis and establishment of science but also with ethical results – virtue, 
tranquility, and happiness. The search for the truth is also a search for the highest good. 
I argue that skepticism in the Meditations is attentive, meditational cognitive exercise, 
that is not merely methodological but is intended to have a genuine effect on our 
thinking. The skeptical meditation is not simply a thought-experiment or a theoretical 
mind-game but a seriously practiced, transformative process of rediscovering and 
reorienting our cognitive framework to discover truth, certainty, and a way to a happy, 
tranquil, and morally good life. This offers a novel way to approach the skeptical inquiry 
as undermining both Scholasticism and skepticism, advancing a reading that allows a 
better and more complex understanding of the relationship between our ordinary life 
context compared with the meditational enquiry, the will’s role in Descartes’s theory of 
judgment, and the way metaphysical scientia is founded in a potentially non-circular way. 
 
3 The conversation on happy life begins with Descartes suggesting the depressed Elizabeth to read De Vita 
Beata by Seneca the Younger (c. 4 BC–65 AD), a Roman Stoic (AT IV, 251–253; CSMK, 256). 
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